« ПредыдущаяПродолжить »
information available to terrorism analysts. We've made steady progress. While we have not achieved all of our goals, we continue to work with counterparts in both communities.
b. There appear to be different understandings of inter-agency responsibilities at different levels. This meeting shows that senior officials talk to each other. Analysts tell our Joint Staff that they communicate constantly by secure phone, video and other means. Is the inference that middle managers aren't getting information from either below or above? How accurate is that inference? If even somewhat accurate, what is to be done about it?
In DIA, interagency responsibilities are generally understood at all levels. Concerted effort is made to ensure information flows vertically and horizontally throughout the workforce. Since DIA is an organization that is dependent on information from others - it is the raw material of our trade - understanding of inter-agency responsibilities, capabilities, and policies is an imperative at every level of our organization.
5. In January 1999, a SMIOC attendee asked about the terrorist threat and who was in charge. The issue had to do with ORCON (originator controlled) information and how distribution was controlled. The answer was that "this [Issue] was not about technology but about policy which had to go all the way to an Intelligence Community Principals' Committee for approval."
a. Does it take a Principals' Committee to resolve the ORCON issue, or can the DCI, on his own recognizance take action?
The Director of Central Intelligence can make unilateral decisions on the use and
b, Either way, what has the Community done to reduce or eliminate the ORCON caveat since 1999? Since 9/11?
The caveat remains in use. In the area of terrorism information, DIA does not contend that the ORCON caveat is an impediment to the flow of information. Those in the originating organizations charged with making release decisions are uniformly responsive and reasonable.
6. In April 1999 a SMIOC meeting was convened to receive a briefing on computer network defense. Challenges to both network defense and information sharing were listed as: law enforcement versus national security; domestic versus foreign intelligence; private versus public interests; the interagency process; and policy and legal issues.
a. That is a very clear itemization, over three years ago, of exactly the same challenges that the IC is struggling with today. Did that articulation of the issues by one agency (Defense) result in interagency examination of these issues?
While our focus over the past year has been on sharing terrorist related information, the core information sharing issues related to computer network defense are similar. I am unaware of any formal interagency examination of the issues resulting from that SMIOC
b. Either way, who is working those information-sharing issues? Who brokers competing interests? Who is in charge? Who represents the interests of concerned state and local organizations?
The DCI, by virtue of his position, is the ultimate arbiter of competing interests in the intelligence sharing area, but “disputes” are generally resolved at much lower levels between organizations. DIA represents its own and DOD's interests on information sharing issues. The Homeland Defense/Security apparatus is currently the avenue for state and local organizations.
7. In January and July 2000 a decision brief on asymmetric warfare was discussed by the SMIOC. Both the NSA and the Coast Guard representatives spoke to the legal ramifications of the portion pertaining to Homeland Defense. NSA reiterated its concern about policy and legal issues, especially regarding collection in support of Homeland Defense and terrorism. The Coast Guard cautioned that new environments and new threats might mean old rules no longer applied. A legislative review of what could be done by different organizations might be needed.
a. That was nearly three years ago. Has anyone in the Intelligence Community. followed up on the Coast Guard suggestion and done a legislative review?
DIA participates as part of the larger DOD representation on Homeland Defense issues.
b. What is your understanding of what are the old rules that should no longer apply and how changing these rules would impact individual rights?
DIA is subject to a range of intelligence oversight policies and procedures that impose some restrictions, most notably those pertaining to United States citizens, but we are not unduly constrained from performing our foreign intelligence or force protection missions. Laws and governing directives provide sufficient flexibility and, properly interpreted and complied with, do not inhibit our ability to share or receive information relevant to the terrorist threat.
8, In February 2001 the discussion on asymmetric warfare continued at the SMIOC. NSA stated that the FISA requirements remained a major issue. NSA continued to work the issues, but legal constraints remained an impediment. The Coast Guard observed that "[the IC] had more latitude than the lawyers were allowing," and that "if [NSA was] really going to address this issue strongly, they would have to re-evaluate several Cold War parameters and policies."
a. What has been accomplished in working these issues over the past three years? Where were we just prior to 9/11 and where are we now?
See consolidated response below.
b. Has the IC ever taken the Coast Guard's advice to seek out what the law allows and not focus on what the law does not allow?
As part of its overall effort to broaden the depth and breadth of information available to analysts, DIA has been working with the DoD General Counsel and Department of Justice and law enforcement agencies to overcome impediments to sharing FISA information as it relates to terrorism threat reporting. DIA adheres to all requisite FISA handling restrictions in accordance with U.S.C. S 1806(B).
9. Do you believe that there is a lack of Information sharing because the information is classified at too high a level? If the Intelligence Community classified information at a lower level, would that help information sharing? (Rep. Castle)
The level of classification is not an insurmountable obstacle to information sharing; lowering the level would not, in itself, ensure wider sharing. Analysts who require access to terrorism information generally hold the highest levels of security clearances and are adept at "sanitizing" their analysis to ensure those who need to use it can receive it. Failure to share information is a very complex phenomenon which occurs even in areas where the information is unclassified.
United States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
February 5, 2003
Dear Mr. Chairman:
Following the October 1, 2002 hearing at which Ambassador Francis X. Taylor testified, additional questions were submitted for the record. Please find enclosed the responses to those questions.
If we can be of further assistance to you, please do not hesitate to contact us.
Questions for the Record
Joint Congressional 9/11 Inquiry
October 31 Committee letter, Question 1:
What operating system(s) and software packages does your agency use for internal classified e-mail correspondence? What is the average age and process speed of your workstations?
Microsoft NT 4.0 and Windows 2000 are the operating systems used in the Department of State.
The Department uses Microsoft Outlook for all internal classified e-mail correspondence.
The average age of our classified computers is
approximately two years and the average processing speed is 650 Mhz.
Under the Department's ongoing modernization program, desktop equipment will be upgraded every four years.
The operating system on Bureau of Intelligence and Research computers is Windows/NT 4.0. INR uses the MSOFFICE suite with Outlook as the e-mail carrier. The average processing speed of INR computers is a gigabyte.