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side, just as teachers tend to leave the classroom and go into administration for the same reason.

Is there some way that we ought to be re-looking at the compensation strategy for intelligence agencies to keep our best people doing what they're best at and being rewarded for that superior service?

Mr. HITZ. There are a lot of good points that you've made, Mr. Chairman, and also ways in which I think aspects of them have been tried in the past but not pushed enough. I think the intelligence reserve corps has been attempted after a fashion, and I think you would agree with me, sir, that presently, with deficiencies in a number of language skills and experience levels, a lot of old boys have been brought back. They are in effect an intelligence reserve corps right now. They've gotten recent retirees to agree to come back and put their shoulder to the wheel after 9/11. That's an informal way of getting at that, but it certainly makes

some sense.

On the question of trying to recruit operatives from America's Arab-American community to go back to the Middle East, I thought there was a very thoughtful unsigned editorial in the Washington Times a day or so ago making the point that that's not necessarily the answer to a problem, because natives of that region want to be dealt with by a real American, so to speak. I'm putting that in quotation marks. They want somebody that may not speak the language with absolute proficiency but is good enough.

And a perfect example of that is the Popov case in the cold war era, when the Agency sent a recent emigre from the Soviet Union to first deal with Popov when he was coming over to us from Vienna, and Popov didn't trust him. He knew what Stalin was able to do with emigres and wouldn't fiddle with it. So I think there has to be a sort of a balance on that part.

On the management side, as opposed to why promote a person who is a first-rate case officer into management and lose those talents, again that's a debate that's gone on long in the Intelligence Community and lots of people frankly, as case officers, don't want to be and aren't very good as managers. I think George Kiesevalter-I don't think I'm taking his name in vain-always considered himself to be a case officer till the day he died, even though he was a very senior intelligence officer.

But I want to be clear on the point. I don't think all of the talent for doing this work is going to come out necessarily of our finest universities. There are all kinds of skills that work in this area and, if I can be permitted just a personal anecdote to finish up with, my first boss in the Agency was a Nisei. He was a person who lived long enough ago in Los Angeles to be able to dive for abalone in Los Angeles Harbor. It's been a long time since that happened.

Well, he was sent to camp. His family were interned, and in 1942 the U.S. Army came along and recruited him to the counterintelligence corps. He served in Japan until the end of the war, joined CIA, for 30 years practicing his trade all over the world—an extraordinary person. Why there was no lingering bitterness, I have no idea. But he was absolutely first-rate. So this country has got an awfully broad range of talents out there to draw from.

Chairman GRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Hitz. I'm sorry my time has expired, but when I rotate back I'd like to ask Mr. Hamilton and General Odom for their comments on the issue of personnel.

Senator Shelby.

Vice Chairman SHELBY. Thank you. There's been a lot of debate recently in the Senate about the creation of the Department of Homeland Security that you are all familiar with. Perhaps the most important part, at least I think so, of the Homeland Security legislation that's being debated is its provisions dealing with information analysis. Senator Graham and I have been involved, with Senator Lieberman and others, dealing with that particular piece. If homeland security analysts are to occupy, if they are to occupy a unique position and have a unique perspective in that they would have access both, General, to domestic and foreign intelligence, and to information on homeland vulnerabilities, it seems that it would be important to give them the capability for this sort of deep information access to intelligence agencies, in other words, if they needed it or thought they needed it.

What are your thoughts here regarding the role of homeland security in the Intelligence Community and should it have an analytical component? And, without an analytical component, what would it be?

General.

General ODOM. It needs an analytic component. It doesn't just need one; it needs many. It needs a central one and then it will need distributed ones. Let me offer the model of mainframe central processing versus distributed processing in computers. When you had one big mainframe computer, with slow computers, dumb terminals, people got backed up in a queue. When we came to microprocessors, we could have a lot of people processing simultaneously. Intelligence analysis is done the same way, and many users need analysis and you'd like to have the analysis with them. The collection can be more centralized. When you have the organization, homeland security, deciding where it wants those, I think it should have them near decisionmaking points, then each of those analytic capabilities need to be able to tap into NSA, the national imagery agency, to CIA's clandestine service, and to what I would see as the national counterintelligence service. The FBI will never give information out. A national counterintelligence organization would be an intelligence organization, not an arrest organization. Therefore they would have an incentive. They want their stuff used. They're not doing it for themsevles.

There's no reason that that analytic center can't draw on the whole community. The model that I think it's easy to look at right now in that regard is how the State Department works. You have INR at State, which is the general central point, but within negotiation you can have an analytic center supporting anything that's going on.

That seems to me to be sort of a straightforward, easy organizational issue to deal with.

Vice Chairman SHELBY. I agree with you, General. Congressman Hamilton?

Mr. HAMILTON. Senator Shelby, I don't know that I understand all that well the President's proposal on the Department of Home

land Security with regard to intelligence. As I understand it, the Department of Homeland Security would not be a collecting agency at all. They would not get the raw data. They would get the conclusions from the CIA and the FBI.

Vice Chairman SHELBY. The whole community.

Mr. HAMILTON. The whole community, and then they would use that to assess threats and for the primary purpose of protecting the infrastructure. And the President's talked about it being a clearinghouse, and I think George Tenet has said the Department would be a consumer of intelligence.

I'm a little skeptical of all of that. I don't think the conclusions of the Intelligence Community, if handed to the Department of Homeland Security, will satisfy the Department of Homeland Security folks. They're going to want to know, well, where did this come from and how sure are you of this information.

Vice Chairman SHELBY. They're going to vet it, in other words. Mr. HAMILTON. I think that's correct.

Vice Chairman SHELBY. And I think they should.

Mr. HAMILTON. You were mentioning they have to have some capability to examine information analysis. I think I agree with that. Now, if you do that, then what is the relationship between these three organizations-DHS and CIA and FBI? I'm not sure I know the answer to all of that, but I am a little skeptical of this idea that the raw data would not be available.

I also understand that the President would have the authority to provide the raw data, under certain circumstances, and that might work satisfactorily, but I'm reasonably sure if I were running the Department of Homeland Security and I got the conclusions from the intelligence agencies-those conclusions tend to be fairly broad and sweeping and vague at times-that I wouldn't be satisfied with it.

So I sense the Senate is quite correct in looking at this pretty carefully.

Vice Chairman SHELBY. I agree with you, Senator Graham and I. That was not the President's first proposal but we've worked out a proposal now.

My time is up. Can Mr. Hitz say anything, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. HITZ. Well, I find myself in agreement with Congressman Hamilton on that, and the only question I was going to put to you, Senator Shelby, was what is the recourse of the homeland security analyst if he finds that the intelligence he's provided is not up to snuff? This is the point. Does he have to go back to the President and knock on his door to get it right.

Vice Chairman SHELBY. He should be able to go right back and task someone what is this, what does this mean and so forth. That's what Senator Graham and I have been proposing for six months, I guess it is.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GRAHAM. Thank you, Senator. The next questioners, in order, will be Congressman Roemer, Senator Roberts, Senator Feinstein. That will complete the first round. Congressman Roe

mer.

Mr. ROEMER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to welcome all three of you here today. You have really been extremely helpful to

us in helping us look forward and help us try to come up with some answers to some of these very vexing and complicated problems. Congressman Hamilton, I want to especially welcome you before the Committee as both a colleague from Indiana and a good personal friend. We welcome your very extensive testimony.

I want to quote back from a line in your testimony which I think is extremely important to us today with the current threat that we have in the world and as we may be going into Iraq to do something about weapons of mass destruction. The quote is: If we were starting all over again I cannot imagine we would create such a vast enterprise and have no one clearly in charge.

We still have that system out there today. What do you think specifically we can do about this problem? And how big a problem is it?

Mr. HAMILTON. I think it's a very large problem. I think you have two basic options. The one option is to try to strengthen the DCI. I certainly don't oppose that effort because I think that needs to be done. I also think it's a very incrementalist approach that we have been trying for many years and we've never been really satisfied with the results we've gotten.

The other option is to go to a director of national intelligence that I have been arguing for. Obviously there are some problems with that as well. But those are the two options and I think you have to make a choice between them.

I favor the director of national intelligence. The criticism that Judge Webster and others have made is that it may not-and I think Fred as well-is that it may not be realistic. There's something to that criticism. I mean, I understand it's a very tough thing to achieve.

Mr. ROEMER. Congressman, you were just

Mr. HAMILTON. But, Mr. Roemer, may I just say that we're in a new period and we've simply got to think anew here.

Mr. ROEMER. I couldn't agree with you more.

Mr. HAMILTON. And we've got to put aside the way we've always done business, and the way we've always done business is, if we give a little extra power to the DCI things are going to be okay. It's not going to be okay.

Mr. ROEMER. You were just talking about the creation of a homeland security department, where we all would probably have our complaints or criticisms about this part of that part, but it's an attempt by the Administration to centralize power and agencies, disparate agencies, under one roof. That's what you're suggesting here as well.

Mr. HAMILTON. That's correct. I'm looking for a way to improve, I guess, visibility and accountability in the Intelligence Community. I've gotten to the place where the very phrase "Intelligence Community" I dislike, because it's too vague. And one of the great problems in government always is accountability and getting someone to take responsibility, and I'm looking for that.

But I really think the quality of your intelligence will improve if you have a single person over all aspects of the Intelligence Community with responsibility for budgeting and personnel. I'm going to comment on Senator Graham's business on personnel in a mo

ment.

Mr. ROEMER. Again for Congressman Hamilton, with respect to the need for creation of an independent commission, how do you feel about that?

Mr. HAMILTON. I favor it. I think that I come from the point of view that we need more, not less, oversight of the Intelligence Community that is independent of the Executive branch. And I think this Committee has performed a very important service in the last few months and weeks, but I don't think you've finished the job. I think there's a lot more to be done.

It's terribly important how we go about this. We ought not to be saying I'm looking for somebody to blame. We ought to be looking ahead and saying what were the problems in the system that brought about the shortcomings and how can we correct them.

Now you and I know that there are a lot of commissions in this town, some good, some bad, some indifferent. So it makes all the difference who you put on the commission. And I think there are a lot of good Republicans and I think there are a lot of good Democrats who can serve effectively on this commission and do the country well, a great service.

I don't worry about a little redundancy here or a little overlap. Indeed, I think it's probably good because it's hard to get this town to move on anything and you need a lot of people looking at any given problem. I know you've been a primary supporter of this in the House. I applaud that effort. I also understand the hesitation of the Bush Administration and maybe some of you here about this. You'll say well, this is going to be used to hang us or point out people who made big mistakes. I don't see it that way at all.

But we do have to be sensitive to that concern, I believe. But I think a real service can be rendered by further oversight by you, by the Committees, but also an independent commission as well. Mr. ROEMER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Chair

man.

Chairman GRAHAM. Thank you very much, Mr. Roemer.
Senator Roberts.

Senator ROBERTS. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also wish to echo the comments of positive advice and counsel from the four wise men. And, Lee, I would refer your speech to my colleagues. I got to Tab 9. While listening intently to every word that you said, I discovered Tab 9, which includes your speech of July 18, 2001, so you were just as prescient as usual in regards to when you addressed a hearing before the Subcommittee on Government Efficiency, Financial Management and Intergovernmental Relationsthat's a mouthful-of the House Committee on Government Reform. So we thank you for your insight.

I just have a couple of observations, and if any of you three want to make any comments, I'd appreciate it. Number one, Senator Shelby asked my question in regards to homeland security and some kind of an analytical center. I just had the dubious privilege of being the President of the United States on Monday in an exercise called Crimson Skies-very similar to the Dark Winter exercise on an attack from Iraq-which makes you scratch your head a little bit today-on a smallpox inclusion and what happened as a result of that. It was a very helpful exercise. It has helped us

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