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lacking was the inability of the staff under the DCI to structure the input-output relationship so we could get an effective budget together.

And he was the prisoner of the CIA on this, and the NRO and other parochial players, and it's freeing him up to where he will impose a programming, planning, budget structure system that I think will empower him as much as budget execution authority.

Let me say that we draw an analogy between space and intelligence. Everybody thinks that NASA is in charge of space in this country. Space is a place, not a mission. There are many missions in space. The Commerce Department has a mission in space; it's weather. There's a private sector, telecommunications. The universities, science, the Intelligence Community, there are a dozen other missions in space.

Now can you centralize all those under one czar of space in a single department in the U.S. government? No, and it's kind of a mess. If you use the DCI program management model, you'd have a director of space, and he would have to look over every budget where there's space involved and put it together and say am I funding adequately each. Which one should I give a plus-up? And you get an overall comprehensive look, and the Senate then could find out, and the House, what the input-output relations are. He doesn't have to be able to execute those budgets to cause that to happen.

So I think the DCI model, separating the CIA, there is a separation of sorts, even though one person is wearing the hat now, is an accumulation of learning about how to manage this federal system. So I don't think it's in as desperate a shape internally on the foreign intelligence side. I think it is an abject mess on the counterintelligence side.

Senator FEINSTEIN. Just so you know, in my bill there is no inside authority, and I would like to give a copy to each one of you. Perhaps you would take a look at it and make any comments you would care to make.

General ODOM. Be glad to.

Senator FEINSTEIN. Mr. Hamilton.

Mr. HITZ. He's going to kick it to me because he thinks he's been heard on it.

Senator Feinstein, I may be bound a little bit by my long history at CIA and tendency to find some of the arguments in the letter that you read from DCI Tenet to be arguments I've heard and tend to agree with over time. But, as Congressman Roemer has said, and Senator Rockefeller, we have had 9/11. If this isn't a better time to look at this from ground zero, when will there be?

It strikes me, you know, in 1947 you had the creation of the National Security Council, which was intended to do for the President of the United States some of the things that you're talking about putting in the responsibility of a director of national intelligence. It was the National Security Council, on behalf of the Secretaries of State and Defense, the President and Vice President, who were going to tell the DCI how to organize the collection and, more to the point, the analysis and dissemination of intelligence. President

And it probably isn't possible or desirable to have the national security advisor in effect put in the role of the DNI, but it strikes me that since September 11, with all of the complaints about the inability of the FBI and the CIA to talk to one another, the President of the United States has fashioned a pretty darn good remedy for that. He sits them down in front of him several times a week and says what the heck is going on here and are you guys cooperating.

Now the President can't do that every day. He's got a lot of other things to do. And if your DNI is a person who is going to do that in his behalf, with his authority and with something more than that-and he isn't going to hide behind the White House and fail to come to the Congress to answer your questions on the appropriate occasion, maybe that's something that should be looked at. But it strikes me that budget authority is one thing, but what General Odom keeps pointing back to, operational, management operational authority, that's the thing that the Secretary of Defense in the current structure is never going to give up when it relates to agencies that are supplying him with information that protects the fighting men. And I can understand his point of view. I just think all of these the DCI, the SecDef and the Director of the FBI-have got to work together and have got to do a better job and have got to do it in a way that minimizes overlap and confusion, and maybe a DNI can do that on behalf of the President of the United States and still be responsible to Congress in such a fashion that you can get him up here and ask him what he's done.

General ODOM. Can I add one short sentence on that?
Senator FEINSTEIN. It's up to the Chairman.

Chairman GRAHAM. I'm very generous and compassionate, plus I value the information we're getting.

General ODOM. If you had a national counterintelligence service outside of the FBI and the FBI were in law enforcement, what I proposed in my testimony this morning, under the DCI, the DCI would already have these people in the room together. They wouldn't be in another department. And that's how you get the counterintelligence side and the domestic side talking to the foreign intelligence side.

Mr. HAMILTON. Senator Feinstein, I've commented on this quite a bit. I'll just conclude. The thing that puzzles me-I support your idea-the thing that puzzles me here is why we reject for the Intelligence Community the model of organization that we follow in every other enterprise in this country. We have someone at the head who has responsibility and accountability. We accept that. But for some reason we reject it when it comes to the Intelligence Community.

Chairman GRAHAM. Thank you, Senator. It has now rotated back to my time as we finish the first round of questioning. I had asked a question in my first round about ideas to enhance the personnel standards and quality, retention, creativity of the Intelligence Community, and I would be interested in the General and Congressman Hamilton's comments.

Mr. HAMILTON. Senator Graham, we talked a lot in the HartRudman Commission about this problem of personnel. And one of the conclusions we reached was that the personnel or the civil serv

ice system in the United States has now become a national security issue. We think it is that serious or we thought it was that serious a problem.

I know you are wrestling with this in the Senate right now on the Department of Homeland Security and I don't mean my comments to be directed too much to that. There is too much rigidity in the system. There is not enough allowance for incentive. And it is an exceedingly serious problem in our government. And it has national security consequences. We've got to work through this matter so that managers can manage more effectively.

I've had the experience of running a Congressional office and I've also had the experience, as I am now having at the Wilson Center, of running at least part of my employees there under the federal system. I would absolutely assure you, ladies and gentlemen, that you would not tolerate in your office the kind of management restrictions that operate today in the federal government. You could not run a Senatorial office.

Now I know the importance of this to employees, so it's a tough problem, but the only thing I want to say here, Senator, when you talk about personnel we are now approaching this national security review and we have to look at the civil service system and we have to find ways and means of getting more flexibility into it. If we don't, we're going to choke ourselves to death.

Chairman GRAHAM. Before turning to the General, you mentioned that you became aware of the severity of this problem while serving on the Hart-Rudman Commission. Did that commission make some recommendations?

Mr. HAMILTON. Yes, it did.

Chairman GRAHAM. And did those recommendations basically represent your thoughts as to what should be done?

Mr. HAMILTON. They do. And if you want it in one word, it's more flexibility.

Chairman GRAHAM. General.

General ODOM. I don't have a lot to add. I endorse Mr. Hamilton's points with all the force I can. Dealing with-even with people in the Intelligence Community not necessarily under as free a rein as the rest of the federal service, it's still difficult. I'd much rather have people in uniform. I know how to hire and fire people in uniform. If they're not in uniform, it's hard. You can't hire and fire them. And the intelligence business is warfare. And if you don't look at it that way you're going to be beaten.

I mean, it's not a friendly affair. It's not a negotiating affair. It's you're going to take the other guy or he's going to have you. Would you run the NFL football club that way? Would you choose your quarterbacks on this kind of basis? Well, I don't want to choose my agents, I don't want to choose my analysts on that basis.

Chairman GRAHAM. My time is going to be out soon and I have another major question I'd like to ask which I'm going to hold to the next round. But for this, General, you've talked with wisdom and insight on the specific issue of counterintelligence. Recently there was organized what's called CI-2000, I believe, which is a multi-agency effort at counterintelligence. It is supposed to have a couple of particular qualities-one, to approach counterintelligence in a proactive basis, such as identifying what are the crown jewels

that our adversaries might want to learn and then begin to ask how do we defend those against attack. It also has a heavy emphasis on what I would call benchmarking, trying to ask what are the best practices in the Intelligence Community in things like use of polygraphs to try to enhance our defenses against espionage.

Do you have any comment about that initiative?

General ODOM. I do. The intelligence study that was cited, which you have, that I did in 1997, is being published as a book at Yale Press. It will come out in January. It's been de-acronymized so it's a little more accessible to the public.

I bring up this point and try to clarify what I think is a serious muddle in that kind of proposal. I said earlier counterintelligence is information about the other person's intelligence capabilities and what they are seeing of you. Security is not an intelligence responsibility. Let me put this in a practical case that I lived through.

Most of you remember the Soviet bugging of the Moscow Embassy. My agency had a lot to do with discovering that. I had subordinates who thought they got their instructions from God, protecting the crown jewels, and they were going to go down and make George Shultz shape up, clean up the embassy in Moscow. I had to explain to them that we could make the information available that the KGB was reading his mail. It was his authority to decide whether or not he cared. NSA couldn't do anything about that. But I had really-people were deeply convinced that we needed to do something.

Some were down here lobbying staffs and Members of the Congress on trying to force the Secretary of State to do what he might or might not want to do. My point was, the President hired him and the President's finally responsible for the security. If he wants the Secretary of State to fix the Moscow embassy properly, he should order him to do it. The intelligence people can't do that. A counterintelligence service cannot protect the secrets. Security is a manager's responsibility. He buys the locks and puts them on the doors. He hires the guards.

The intelligence guys, the fellow goes out and finds information. And I've run into these well-meaning people who confuse the security role with the counterintelligence role. And unless you sort that out you will find yourself with organizational muddles you wish you had never gotten in.

Chairman GRAHAM. Thank you, General.

Senator Shelby.

Vice Chairman SHELBY. General, we're not picking on you. We appreciate all three of you and we appreciate Judge Webster too. As a matter of fact, I read again today your article-I had read it back in June that was published in the Wall Street Journal. I thought it was very interesting and maybe perhaps instructive.

The British have what we call or what they call MI-5, right? How does MI-5 work in the U.K.?

General ODOM. I don't claim to be a great expert on MI-5, but I can tell you what my impressions are. It does counterintelligence, only counterintelligence.

Vice Chairman SHELBY. Nothing else, does it?

General ODOM. Nothing else. It's not a law enforcement agency. It turns to Scotland Yard to arrest people. But it's different from my proposal.

Vice Chairman SHELBY. That's what I wanted you to get into.

General ODOM. It stands out there alone and is a competitor. In my proposal the national counterintelligence service would be under the DCI, just like CIA would be. Number two, MI-5 I do not believe can look into the counterintelligence picture held by MI-6. In other words, MI-6 in its offensive operations will inevitably get into counterintelligence. They'll learn about the other guy's spies. So everybody's going to be doing some counterintelligence.

But this agency which does only counterintelligence needs to look in there so he can see whether there's a gap, whether his agency is being played off against the other one. And I would have I don't think MI-5 looks into any counterintelligence activities in the Ministry of Defense in Britain. I could be wrong about that.

But what I propose is there would not be counterintelligence operations run in the military services that were not coordinated with the national counterintelligence service. So the national counterintelligence service could look down every one of these closed holes and see what the overall picture looks like. If you can't do that, you're not going to have a comprehensive picture.

It's not to exaggerate. If I were a foreign intelligence service I would love to run against the FBI and the counterintelligence capabilities here. You've just got big gaps welcoming you to come through.

Vice Chairman SHELBY. They've done quite well, haven't they, against the FBI? Why would you want to-and I'm not saying it's good or bad; it's just your proposal-to put this under the DCI or central intelligence as opposed to a freestanding entity?

General ODOM. I want it to be freestanding, away from the CIA. I want it under a Director of Central Intelligence who is not the director of CIA.

Vice Chairman SHELBY. So what we've been talking about is like creating, as Lee Hamilton mentioned, a CEO, a chairman of the board of the Intelligence Community.

General ODOM. It's closer. I think Congressman Hamilton wants more executive budget execution authority than I do. But otherwise I think we overlap enormously. Also, this was my point to Senator Feinstein, that if you're trying to force these people in the room together and you've got the DCI in control of both of them, he can cause them to do that. Counterintelligence is intelligence. They are more closer kin in their skills, their cultures, et cetera to the rest of the Intelligence Community than they are to law enforcement. Vice Chairman SHELBY. General, how would the other agencies, assuming this counterintelligence agency or entity was created as you would envision, how would the other community, how would they share their information? You know, they would have some information dealing with some counterintelligence, would they not? It's just cross-fertilization.

General ODOM. Absolutely. It's call multidisciplinary as opposed to counterintelligence. They will be a user of the national imagery agency collection. They will be in a position to task the national im

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