very good solutions that might help us, we have got many, many ideas in the minds of our constituency out there about what we should do and how much we should pay for it and where we should go. And it is now a more complicated matter in some ways than it was before, because there are people with agendas to do things differently.

My view has been that it is important to inform the American people because we have got a huge number of debates that certainly Congressman Hamilton will relate to of the frictions that are between us the question of the intelligence culture of keeping the information flowing versus the law enforcement of prosecutions successfully to put people in jail, the question of need to know and compartmentation versus coordination and cooperation-these are in direct conflict, it seems-of foreign intelligence and no Americans will ever spy on Americans domestically, the question of risktakers in the field, the friction between the field and headquarters, the don't rock the boat people at headquarters, and the tension of headquarters and field that we always have anyway, the question of Americans have a right to know anything that ought to be guarded. I'm not sure where that's stated exactly, but it's believed that Americans should know everything.

We have the question of the analysts can't do their job unless they have all of the raw data or just some of the raw data that has been by other analysts going on. We have the culture of the users that says the military gets too much of the product. No, the national customer gets too much of the product. We've got to realign the allocations.

There's not a new debate in here that you haven't heard. Nothing I've just said is new. It's just unresolved, and we need to start making some conclusions in some of these things because I think Judge Webster said the main debate we have before us is striking the balance true between being a free society and a protected society.

I don't think we can get there unless we have this debate, and that means we have to enlist the support of the media. So that is the posit I have before you-is how do we have an informed electorate, an informed constituency on this subject, given all those problems, and how do we get that audience that hears us clearly and comes away unconfused and says, of course, go do that? If you can help us with that, I am eternally grateful.

Mr. Hitz.

Mr. HITZ. Chairman Goss, I don't mean to be pulling out an example that is inapposite, but I think you have a model in the deliberations of the Church Committee, much of which are being criticized nowadays, certain aspects. They held long hearings on the matter and began to move a bill in the succeeding Congress. And as they moved the bill they discovered that writing charters for the FBI, ČIA, NSA, and elsewhere in the context of the world situation the Congress and the President were facing at the time just didn't make a lot of sense, with thou shalts and thou shalt nots.

And at the end of the day, as you recall, in 1980, a simple two or three-paragraph bit of legislative language was passed causing the Intelligence Community and the Director of Central Intelligence to keep the Congress fully and currently informed about a range of issues. You've taken it from that. And all I'm saying is,

aren't you really saying with the work that you've done you've got some ideas. We've talked about a number of them today-the DNI concept, et cetera. As you move a bill, you're going to find that either support develops for that idea or people come up with some kind of reason why it shouldn't go. It seems to me you are to some degree addressing that audience just by virtue of the legislative undertaking that this is a predicate for.

I mean, I think that's how it's going to come out. And if it doesn't stop with you at the end of this series of hearings and your final report and appears to be going on to a commission which may have a broader ambit, they will, I suppose, have something to say about it too. But you do have, at least where I sit, you do have an audience in the sense of an American public that wants to see what can be done to improve our intelligence and law enforcement performance in this area.

Chairman Goss. Thank you. Congressman Hamilton.

Mr. HAMILTON. Before I try to respond to the unanswerable question you have raised here, let me say that I think your explanation a few moments ago of the tensions, if you would, between a democratic society on the one hand and intelligence on the other was a very, very good statement.

Chairman Goss. Thank you.

Mr. HAMILTON. And it reflects how, as I said in my statement, how awkward it is for the intelligence function to fit in a democratic society. Two or three comments.

You asked how do you reach an audience. The answer to that in part is that the audience you want to reach is a very elite audience. Most people aren't interested in intelligence. I think they are more interested in it after September 11 than they were before, and they are beginning to see the importance of it. But what we've been talking about today is an insider's game and so the audience is not vast out there, I believe, and therefore should be somewhat easier to reach.

Having said that, I hope I don't contradict myself by saying that I do think it's very important to reach out to the public. You're doing that in these hearings, which are public, but I must say, Mr. Goss, I'm not sure but if you look over the last decade or so and saw the number, the percentage of open hearings the Intelligence Committees had in the House and the Senate, it would be fairly small.

Chairman Goss. Very small.

Mr. HAMILTON. Because most of your business has to be done in secret. I'm not critical of that; it's just a fact. We've had CIA directors in the past who were really interested in the problem you raise. Bob Gates comes to mind. And Bob, Mr. Gates, made an extended effort. I went with him, as a matter of fact, around the country giving speeches together-one legislative viewpoint, his the Executive branch-on the Intelligence Community. And we went to a number of college campuses and there was enormous interest in that.

In other words, here was a CIA director who was concerned about the kind of things you're talking about who really made it a point, with all of the CIA director has to do, to reach out to the American people. In this case he went to a lot of campuses to tell

people about the intelligence function. Well, I think that's a very important part of it.

The third point I'd make is that there is value in the debate itself even if you don't reach a conclusion. I really think that's the case. We've all seen that in the democratic process. The mere fact that General Odom and I may have a difference of opinion about what you do with the DCI, we're not probably going to resolve that to either one of us's satisfaction. But the fact that you discuss it is important and makes each one of us more sensitive to the other's point of view, which I think has been terribly important here.

The final word would be George Shultz's statement, who said nothing is ever finally decided in this town. And there's a lot of truth in that.

Chairman Goss. Thank you. General.

General ODOM. I would just make two points. I think Senator Rockefeller has already preemptively answered a lot of your questions. You don't need a big public audience to get these things done. You need the people in charge who use the intelligence to do it. So I even have wonderment about this endeavor in this way.

Second, that takes me to my second point. May be we didn't have the information because the trend over the past ten or twelve years and even more recently has been to make our intelligence activities a lot more transparent. I could tell you as an intelligence operator if I were running al-Qa'ida, with what I could read in the American press, I could see how to evade you. So I think the publicity approach to intelligence ought to be seriously scrutinized in light of the intelligence failure vice 11 September.

Chairman Goss. My time has long expired. That's a subject of great debate. Can a democratic, free, open society that plays by the Marquis of Queensberry rules exist in a globe where not everybody else is playing by the Marquis of Queensberry rules. But my time has expired and I'd love to take that up in chapter two.

Chairman GRAHAM [presiding]. We have now completed round two and we're now at round three, which I think will be the conclusion of our imposition on your time.

The question I wanted to ask, which has haunted me from September 11 and before September 11 but particularly since then, it seems as if the Intelligence Community had a difficult time recognizing that the cold war had ended and that some of its practices which were the product of the cold war were not relevant or not the most relevant to the new world in which the Intelligence Community would be called upon to provide information to decisionmakers.

I would put just as a few characteristics of that failure to evolve the fact that we had big struggles over whether to use a satellite architecture that seemed to be more aligned to continuing to look at the Soviet Union rather than the flexibility to look at multiple issues, the continued decline in human intelligence which had started at the end of the cold war and continued after the cold war, when it would appear that the nature of our adversary would be such that we need more emphasis on human intelligence, some of the problems that NSA had in the 1990s, including one period where it went black for a while, with it said that our technology was falling behind the technologies with which we had to compete.

A-do you believe that in fact we have what I call the Darwinian problem of failure to recognize that the environment in which we're living is changing and by that failure almost consign ourselves to a death spiral and, B-if that is an accurate, maybe a little overdramatized, statement, what can we inject into these big intelligence agencies to give them a great capacity to recognize changes and to respond to them? Because it's my thesis that if there's been significant change in the world in which the Intelligence Community operates since the end of the cold war, if you project an equivalent period of time into the future there will be even more change during the next eleven or twelve years.

So what can we do to try to not require a 9/11 incident to shake us that the world is changing and we need to change and adapt to it or we will die of irrelevance?

Mr. HITZ. Well, if I may be so bold as to start, I lived through part of it, Mr. Chairman, as did all of you on the dais. And the shift over after '91 I think you are accurate in saying took a long time.

Part of it—and there's no blame to be levied here-part of it was the notion that the Intelligence Community thought it, like the military services, was going to pay a peace dividend. We cut back substantially on the recruitment of new personnel. We wanted to get smaller. When we did that, with the whole changeover in targets that Presidential Decision Directive 35 led us to, a good many seasoned operatives decided they had won the cold war, they had enjoyed working against the Soviet target, and they didn't necessarily want to shift over to the next sets of targets.

At the same time, we were going through-again it just happened that way-a revolving door at the top of ČIA. I served, in the period of eight years, under five different Directors of Central Intelligence. That's an awful lot of change at the top of a major corporation. And each Director, in good faith, had his own ideas of how he wanted to do the job and sent out a lot of directives and stirred up a lot of commotion, as happens in a bureaucracy. So we were slow on that, but 9/11 was the wakeup call and, as I'm sure it's been chronicled before this Committee to an extraordinary degree the response has been heartening in the sense that new people have applied. The new targets have been measured.

But there was a lot of time lost.

Mr. HAMILTON. I would agree that the community, Intelligence Community, has had a lot of rigidity in it and has been slow to change. It focused early on, for example, a few years back principally on an attack by ballistic missile and there were a lot of other things out there other than ballistic missiles and we learned about them, to our regret. It focused very heavily on military threats and overlooked the terrorist threat for a long time.

It was focused on advanced technologies and overlooked the importance of the human spy. It focused on collection and not enough on analysis. It had a lot of bureaucratic rigidities.

Now all of that is in the past, all of that I think is conventional wisdom that we need corrections there. How do you bring about those corrections? Well, you bring them about exactly the way you've been doing. You've been calling people in here from the Intelligence Community and pointing out a lot of these things to

them and changes are beginning to occur. When a Director of the FBI comes in and says we're going to start emphasizing prevention instead of law enforcement, that's a revolution. Now it's going to take a while to carry it out, but it's quite a change.

So things are happening and I think they're happening positively. The process works too slowly, I am sure, for all of us, but your job, which I think you are fulfilling is to call these people up here and put them on the spot and let them know what you think the changes are that are occurring in the world and in the country, put a little sunlight on it, make them respond. And the system will move, maybe a little too gradually, a little too slowly, but it will

move.

General ODOM. The comment I would add to this is to make a distinction between policy issues and structural issues. The hearing started out focusing on structural issues, and most of Mr. Goss's comments, those were policy issues more than structural issues.

We're going to make mistakes, and that's corrective feedback. Sometimes you pay a higher price, sometimes you pay a smaller price. In the military we have a tradition. When you screw things up, we relieve the commander, which leaves me puzzled about the behavior of the Administration in the intelligence area. I consider intelligence, as I said earlier, a military engagement, and I would hold the commanders as responsible as I would ship commanders who run their ships aground. They don't stay around after they've run them aground, even if they are not very guilty.

And I've seen people relieved in Vietnam who you wouldn't believe how little they were relieved for. But the example turned out to quicken the responsiveness of people below. So I think that's the policy issue you're facing on the redress here.

The business of shifting adequately, I didn't live through it, but let me explain some of the things I know about it just from old friends and hearsay. You had these big organizations. They had to make programmatic decisions to downsize. They didn't do that very well, in part because of internal management incompetence and also because the community at large does not have a PPBS system. It has a kind of everybody's playing, pulling his chips in and trying to beggar the other fellow.

And the DCI, unless he builds some kind of system to do that, you're not going to improve that very much. This is a structural issue, and it was the second point of my comments in my statement this morning, how you relate input dollars to intelligence output. And the absence of that system I think explains some of the slowness and viscous reactions within my old Agency, NSA, and other parts of the community in the 1990s.

Chairman GRAHAM. Congressman Goss.

Chairman Goss. No.

Chairman GRAHAM. Senator Rockefeller. Mr. Condit.

Mr. CONDIT. Mr. Chairman, I can't resist this. I know it will get a rise out of the panel, but I want to go back to the comment the General made about transparency. I don't have the benefit of serving in the Intelligence Community like some of you have and Chairman Goss has, but it just seems to me what's the problem with opening this up? I mean, everybody knows that everybody's watching everybody and that we're going to monitor people, we're