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going to monitor weapon systems, we're going to monitor actions and so on and so forth.
If there was more transparency it just seems to me it would be more openness, more sunshine on the issue, everybody would be aware of what's going on. And the fact is, as we're doing the terrorist thing right now there's not much that is not in the newspaper already about what goes on with that. So why wouldn't we just 'fess up and just say this is what we're doing, this is what we're going to do, and if we catch you doing this we're going to do this? Why wouldn't we do that? It seems to me it's an honest approach to protecting ourselves but doing it in a transparent way so that people know we are.
General ODOM. Let me answer that very briefly. If we did that, we don't need the Intelligence Community. That's called a news service. We have a lot now. I'd say 90 percent of the intelligence that affects policymaking in the government comes out of the media. The media is our best new collection agency. Even some military collection comes out of it.
General Vessey, when he was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, would look over at the television and see CNN on someplace and say, Bill, why can't you do that for me. Well, I said, I don't need to because CNN is doing it free. And the Intelligence Community really needs to take advantage of that. We should.
The second point is, people have short memories and even though something's published and made information today, they don't keep it in mind. And what they are exposing, what they close up from having been alerted, sometime later they may open up again. And if you go around reemphasizing openness you keep educating them how to defeat your intelligence collection.
Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Condit, I think there has been over a period of years a kind of set of mind in the Intelligence Community to keep more secret than is necessary, feeling that we know best how to handle this and it's not a matter that really should be discussed in public.
I think the Congress and the oversight committees have done a lot to try to change that perception on their part, and my view would be you want to maximize openness and transparency to the extent that you can. But you do have to recognize you are dealing with a very special business and you do have to be careful about methods and sources and all of the rest of it.
So it's not an easy kind of a balance to strike. In general, I think the Intelligence Community has erred on the side of too much secrecy and not enough openness. I do think that's changing now, in part because of the Congress and the oversight. There needs to be a greater appreciation by the national security community that the more information that is out there about their job and how tough it is to do, the obstacles they confront, I think the American public understands that pretty well, especially in light of September 11.
But I agree with your premise that more transparency is needed, with a very major caveat that you are dealing with a special business here.
Mr. HITZ. I tend to echo that. For the one or two percent of information that is acquired from a source or by a technique that we would not want to have revealed in order to be able to use it again,
I'm sure that we go to a great extreme to protect things that don't need to be protected. But you do have to protect that essential core.
Mr. CONDIT. I agree with that point. I just also would underscore that it seems to me all the work that the three of you and Judge Webster have done on making suggestions, that transparency may be the thing that forces us to make the necessary changes to reform the Intelligence Community, and it's the very thing that we seem to frightened of. I just think we maybe should take a look at embracing it a little more than we have in the past.
I thank you.
Chairman GRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Congressman.
Again, thank you to each for your very significant contribution today. We have learned a lot from the wise men, and I anticipate that you will represent a well of wisdom and insight that we will want to come back to again. Thank you very much.
[Whereupon, at 4:05 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
October 11, 2002
MEMORANDUM FOR SENATOR FEINSTEIN
FROM WILLIAM E. ODOM
SUBJECT: "The Intelligence Enhancement Act of 2002”
I fully support the concept of separating the position of the Director of Central Intelligence from the Director of the CIA. I have elaborated my reasons in detail in the reform study, "Modernizing Intelligence: Structure and Change for the 21 Century." This can be done with or without legislation, but it makes no sense unless several other things are done at the same time, things your legislation does not include.
Most important for making the separation work is the creation of three "national program managers" for the three collection disciplines, SIGINT, IMINT, and HUMINT. If it is not, then the CIA remains a mixed and confused organization, and its behavior will not improve.
The National Reconnaissance Office must also be reformed, taking away its independent budget and placing its funding in the hands of the three national managers for SIGINT, IMINT, and HUMINT. The NRO should not be allowed to come to Congress for a budget, but rather depend upon NSA, NIMA, and the CIA requesting and justifying in a “planning, program, budgeting system" monies which the NRO spends to acquire technical collection systems.
No less important is that the DIC- or DNI – has an organization directly under him consisting of 1) a management staff, and 2) a collection, analysis, and production staff. The National Intelligence Council and the DI of the CIA should become the second of these.
Finally, a new National Counterintelligence Service (NCIS) needs to be created with overall responsibility for counterintelligence. The FBI should be taken out of counterintelligence work entirely and left to law enforcement and criminal investigation. The NCIS should be under the new DNI or DCI and authorized to review and coordinate the CI operations of the CIA and the three military departments in the Department of Defense.
Your legislation, if it does not include these additional structural changes, could produce more problems than it solves. If it goes ahead to include them, it would be a major achievement, on the level of the National Security Act of 1947.
Two other lesser points are worth making.
First, on a ten-year term for the DNI (or DCI). I have a mixed reaction to this aspect of your legislation. If an effective choice of a DNI is made, it would be good, but if a weak or incompetent choice is made- more likely - then the country would be stuck with a mess for a long time. Also, the record of the FBI with its autonomous director does not encourage me to have confidence in such a solution Political accountability for the chief of the US Intelligence Community is important. It already has a large corps of professionals who give considerable independence of mind. The largest part of it is in uniform. And several flag officers serve in its top ranks. Finally, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff does not have a ten-year term, and that seems to work well. I could support a similar solution for the DNI/DCL. It might even make sense to require that a military officer hold this post if one wants to depoliticize it, but a very long term could lead to great politicization, as we saw with J. Edgar Hoover.
Second, on budget authority, your bill needs to consider the deeper implications of DNI budget controls. This is a complex issue which I spell out in my reform study. As your bill now reads, I do not believe it would make the DNI follow a “planning, program, budgeting system" (PPBS), but would rather discourage that outcome. I say this because I know you strongly support PPBS being applied to the National Foreign Intelligence Budget. It can be only if structural changes of the kind I outlined above for "national managers" and effective staffs under the DNI/DCI are made.
The budgeting area is a labyrinth of problems. I will be glad to discuss them with you, but they cannot be dealt with briefly in a letter.
Overall, I congratulate you on the main thrust of your bill because it certainly addresses the most visible structural issue: the double-hatting of the DCI and the Director of the CIA. Fixing the problem, however, requires deeper changes than merely separating the two.
William E, Odom
Thank you for your letter of October 7 regarding Senator Feinstein's introduced legislation. I concur with the legislation, and believe that the "Intelligence Enhancement Act of 2002” would address key organizational problems within the intelligence community, particularly with regard to the creation of a Director of National Intelligence. Please convey to Senator Feinstein my support and admiration for her efforts - I know what a wough road this can be.
I commend the work that the Joint Committee has done in conducting this inquiry, and thank you agair for the opportunity to testify.
With best w shes, I am
Lee H. Hamilton
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