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hinders the ability of a group to gather resources and plan sophisticated attacks in advance because they cannot rely on a steady stream of money or other essential resources. “ For example, Colombian efforts to disrupt arms trafficking activities have been more successful than coca eradication. The Colombian military has managed to do this by focusing intelligence and investigative resources on financiers and arms trafficking middlemen (external to the FARC itself). FARC communiqués and reported discussions have indicated that the organizational leadership has become increasingly concerned about the loss of necessary weapons into the country. It may be that the Colombian Armed Forces will be able to deprive FARC of crucial supplies to the extent that such activities will impinge on the group's ability to expand or even maintain control over territory in Colombia and therefore conduct operations in the medium to long term.

4. Establish a dedicated counter-intelligence center specifically to engage terrorist reconnaissance. More sophisticated terrorist groups do not attack people or places without a basic level of planning and reconnaissance. Therefore arguably the greatest return on investment is in the identification and disruption of pre-attack planning as well as logistical operations. A key means of achieving this is through the discernment of the terrorists' own intelligence-gathering processes. Yet we determined that none of the countries surveyed had a dedicated, stand alone, terrorist counter-intelligence unit.48 This misses an important opportunity for pre-empting a terrorist attack. Given the highly fluid and transnational nature of the threat that the United States is facing, we recommended that the U.S. establish a separate counter-terrorism unit dedicated specifically to identifying and targeting the intelligence gathering and reconnaissance activities of terrorist organizations.

How might the threat from al-Qa’ida and associated groups change in the future? The more sophisticated terrorist entity is perhaps best viewed as the archetypal shark in the water. It must constantly move forward to survive and indeed to succeed. While survival entails obviating the governmental countermeasures designed to unearth and destroy the terrorists and their organizations; success is dependent on overcoming the defenses and physical security barriers designed to thwart attack. In these respects, the necessity for change in order to stay one step ahead of the counterterrorism curve compels

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This policy will not, however, have as dramatic an impact on groups that rely on less-sophisticated tactics in regions where it is easy to find explosives for rough devices.

48 In contrast to the specially dedicated counter-intelligence or counter-espionage units generally found in the intelligence and security services and many law enforcement agencies throughout the world.

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terrorists to change: adjusting and adapting their tactics, modus operandi, and sometimes even their weapons systems as needed. 49 The better, more determined and more sophisticated terrorists will therefore always find a way to carry on their struggle.

The loss of physical sanctuaries—the most long-standing effect that the U.S.-led war on terrorism is likely to achieve-will signal only the death knell of terrorism as we have known it. In a new era of terrorism, “virtual" attacks from "virtual sanctuaries," involving anonymous cyber assaults may become more appealing for a new generation of terrorists unable to absorb the means and methods of conventional assault techniques as they once did in capacious training camps. Indeed, the attraction for such attacks will likely grow as American society itself becomes ever more dependent on electronic means of commerce and communication. One lesson from last October's anthrax cases and the immense disruption it caused the U.S. Postal Service may be to impel more rapidly than might otherwise have been the case the use of electronic banking and other on-line commercial activities. The attraction therefore for a terrorist group to bring down a system that is likely to become increasingly dependent on electronic means of communication and commerce cannot be dismissed. Indeed, Zawahiri once scolded his followers for not paying greater attention to the fears and phobias of their enemy, in that instance, Americans' intense preoccupation with the threat of bioterrorism. The next great challenge from terrorism may therefore be in cyber space.

Similarly, the attraction to employ more exotic, however, crude weapons like lowlevel biological and chemical agents may also increase. Although these materials might be far removed from the heinous capabilities of true WMD (weapons of mass destruction), another lesson from last October's anthrax exposure incidents was that terrorists don't have to kill 3,000 people to create panic and foment fear and insecurity: five persons dying in mysterious circumstances is quite effective at unnerving an entire nation. Accordingly, the issue may not be as much ruthless terrorist use of some mass destruction weapon to attempt to destroy an entire city and affect its entire population as the discrete, calculated terrorist use of some chemical, biological or radiological device to achieve far-reaching psychological effects or a specific reaction from the U.S.

Concluding Observations

In thinking about future threats, we need to keep at least five imperatives in mind.

49 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (NY: Columbia Univ. Press, 1998), pp. 180-183.

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First, we should recognize that terrorism is, always has been, and always will be instrumental: planned, purposeful and premeditated. The challenge that analysts face is in identifying and understanding the rationale and "inner logic" so that motivates terrorists

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and animates terrorism. It is easier to dismiss terrorists as irrational homicidal maniacs than to comprehend the depth of their frustration, the core of their aims and motivations, and to appreciate how these considerations affect their choice of tactics and targets. To effectively fight terrorism, we must gain a better understanding of terrorists and terrorism than has been the case in the past.

Second, we need to recognize that terrorism is fundamentally a form of psychological warfare. Terrorism is designed, as it has always been, to have profound psychological repercussions on a target audience. Fear and intimidation are precisely the terrorists' timeless stock-in-trade. Significantly, terrorism is also designed to undermine confidence in government and leadership and to rent the fabric of trust that bonds society. It is used to create unbridled fear, dark insecurity, and reverberating panic. Terrorists seek to elicit an irrational, emotional response. Our countermeasures therefore must be at once designed to blunt that threat but also to utilize the full range of means we can bring to bear in countering terrorism: psychological as well as physical; diplomatic as well as military; economic as well as moral.

Third, the U.S. and all democratic countries that value personal freedom and fundamental civil liberties will remain vulnerable to terrorism. The fundamental asymmetry of our inability to protect all targets all the time against all possible attacks ensures that terrorism will continue to remain attractive to our enemies. In this respect, both political leaders and the public must have realistic expectations of what can and cannot be achieved in the war on terrorism and, indeed, the vulnerabilities that exist inherently in any open and democratic society.

Fourth, the enmity felt in many places throughout the world towards the U.S. will likely not diminish. America is invariably targeted as a hegemonic, status quo power and more so as the world's lone superpower. Diplomatic efforts, particularly involving renewed public diplomacy activities are therefore needed at least to effect and influence successor generations of would-be terrorists, even if we have already missed the current generation.

Finally, terrorism is a perennial, ceaseless struggle. While a war against terrorism may be needed to sustain the political and popular will that has often been missing in the

30 My colleague at St Andrews University, Dr Magnus Ranstorp's, formulation.

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past, war by definition implies finality. The struggle against terrorism, however, is neverending. Terrorism has existed for 2,000 years and owes its survival to an ability to adapt and adjust to challenges and countermeasures and to continue to identify and exploit its opponent's vulnerabilities. For us to succeed against terrorism, our efforts must be as tireless, innovative and dynamic as our opponents.

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