Chairman Goss. Members may submit questions for the record to follow up on matters appropriately addressed to Dr. Hoffman and Mr. Fallis. I also ask unanimous consent that the declassified findings and recommendations from the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence inquiry into intelligence collection, reporting, analysis and warning relevant to the bombing of the USS Cole be placed in the record. Without objection, so ordered. [The information referred to follows:] UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE INQUIRY INTO INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION, REPORTING, ANALYSIS AND WARNING RELEVANT TO THE BOMBING OF THE USS COLE FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Finding #1: The Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency aggressively collected and promptly disseminated raw intelligence pertaining to potential terrorist threats. Finding #2: Although Intelligence Community analysts in Washington, D.C. often had access to intelligence available on global terrorist activities, they did not always enhance their products with historical information. As a result, field operators and analysts, with limited resources to apply to historic research, were often left with that task. The process was further hampered by limitations on intelligence-sharing. While the Intelligence Community has changed significantly its terrorism procedures, it has yet to adequately address the principal shortcomings identified in this report - lack of historical context for terrorist threat products and failure to abide by warning guidelines. Finding #3: Intelligence available prior to the attack on the USS Cole was not provided to consumers in a formal warning product prepared and issued by the Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism. Intelligence Community analysts and managers attributed the decision not to issue a warning product to both the lack of specificity in timing and target and concerns about warning fatigue. The degree of specificity required by the analysts and managers in this case was overly stringent and exceeded the existing published guidelines for an Intelligence Community Terrorist Threat Recommendation #1: To the Director of Central Intelligence — Not later than 90 days after the receipt of this report, provide to the Committee a detailed description of the steps the Intelligence Community is taking to increase analytic depth on the terrorist target. This description should include an assessment of the relative value of all current terrorist threat products; a determination, if any is required, as to whether new products would better serve the customers and which current products are insufficiently valuable and should be discontinued; and assignment of clear analytic responsibility to those who are tasked to produce terrorist threat products. Recommendation #2: To the Director of Central Intelligence — Revise the existing procedures and standards for issuing formal Intelligence Community warning products. The revised system should include: a streamlined interagency coordination process; clear and concise standards for issuing warnings; and a system of threat ratings for the consumer, incorporating Create a training program for both the analysts involved in the terrorist threat warning process and the consumers of the warning products to ensure that they understand the standards for issuing a warning product and the significance of those products. Not later than 90 days after the receipt of this report, provide the Committee with a report on your progress in implementing this recommendation. Chairman Goss. I would now like to introduce the distinguished members of our panel today. First, Senator Warren Rudman served in the Senate for two terms, from 1981 through 1992. Among other committee assignments, he chaired the Senate Select Committee on Ethics, was the Vice Chairman of the Senate Iran-Contra Committee and was a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee. Since leaving the Senate, Senator Rudman has led commissions that have examined the U.S. Intelligence Community and emerging threats to the United States. Until December of 2001, he served as the Chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. Senator, welcome. Judge Louis Freeh served as Director of the FBI from September 1993 to June 2001. Prior to his service as FBI Director, he had a distinguished career as an FBI agent, Federal prosecutor, U.S. district court judge for the Southern District of New York. Judge Freeh, welcome, sir. Mary Jo White is the former U.S. attorney for the Southern District of New York. Her office prosecuted those responsible for the first attack on the World Trade Center, the plot against New York landmarks in 1993, the 1998 East Africa embassy bombings, as well as numerous other important cases of concern to this committee. We welcome you, Ms. White. Thank you for joining us. Dr. Paul Pillar is the National Intelligence Officer for the Near East and South Asia. Dr. Pillar has served in senior positions at the Central Intelligence Agency, including as the Deputy Chief of the DCI's Counterterrorist Center. He is the author of "Terrorism and U.S. foreign Policy." I would recommend that to anybody; as far as I am concerned, it is pretty close to the Bible and has served us well. Unfortunately, not enough people have read it apparently. Dr. Pillar, welcome. Each of our committees has adopted a supplemental rule for this Joint Inquiry that all witnesses shall be sworn. I will ask the witnesses to rise at this time. I think, Mr. Fallis and Dr. Hoffman, I may as well ask you if you don't mind to rise and be sworn as well, just in case there are questions. Thank you. We are missing Dr. Hoffman, I guess. [Witnesses sworn.] Chairman Goss. The full statements of the witnesses will be placed in the record of these proceedings, as usual. I will now call on Senator Rudman, then Judge Freeh, then Ms. White, and then Dr. Pillar, in that order, to give their opening spoken remarks. Thank you. We welcome you all. We are truly delighted you are here. TESTIMONY OF THE HON. WARREN RUDMAN, FORMER UNITED STATES SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE Mr. RUDMAN. Mr. Chairman, I am delighted to be here. This is the committee I served on, one of my favorite committees in my time in the Senate, and I am honored to appear before you. I expect that two of the things that I did in the last few years are of interest to you and I have tried to draw from them in my testimony: first, of course, chairing PFIAB; secondly, chairing HartRudman; and third, something I want to talk about a bit this morning that Chairman Goss is very familiar with, and that is the Roles and Other Responsibilities of the Intelligence Community for the 21st Century, which we prepared at the request of this Con gress. I think it is Public Law 971. I wish more people had read it. I want to talk a little bit about it this morning. I would highly recommend that every staff member read this before you write your final report, if you haven't already; and I would think that Members might want to read some portions of it, because it was a very distinguished group of Americans who spent a lot of time looking in advance of 9/11 at precisely the things that you are looking at post-9/11. I want to just give you a couple of excerpts from that, and I will take 5 or 6 minutes. I do not have a prepared statement, but rather I thought I would respond to the specific questions addressed to me by the leadership of the committee. The first question that you asked was that our national security study group, Hart-Rudman, warned in 2001 that the United States was not prepared to deal with terrorist attacks in the U.S. homeland. "Please summarize why you felt that to be true at the time, what steps were taken, if any, in response to our report and why we believe important steps were not taken and what measures remain to be taken." Briefly, this Commission was commissioned by the Congress and the previous administration. Its task was to prepare a report on U.S. national security for the 21st century to be given to the incoming President in 2001, so no one knew who that would be at that time or what party that person would be in. It was a totally bipartisan group. We spent a huge amount of time. We traveled all over the world. We met with friend and foe. We met with intelligence agencies, those with whom we have good relations and those with whom we have poor relations. And we came to the overwhelming conclusion at the end of our study that we were facing an asymmetric threat to our entire national security structure. And, to everyone's surprise, our lead recommendation dealt with homeland security and international ter rorism. No one on that committee would have thought at the time that we started that that would have been our conclusion. We would have thought it might have been more in the area of DOD reorganization or intelligence reorganization or changing the State Department, changing public diplomacy. It was not. And you are all familiar with the report; I have discussed it with many of you personally. We said in that report, "More or less, large |