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Recommendation #1: To the Director of Central Intelligence — Not later than 90 days after the receipt of this report, provide to the Committee a detailed description of the steps the Intelligence Community is taking to increase analytic depth on the terrorist target. This description should include an assessment of the relative value of all current terrorist threat products; a determination, if any is required, as to whether new products would better serve the customers and which current products are insufficiently valuable and should be discontinued; and assignment of clear analytic responsibility to those who are tasked to produce terrorist threat products.
Recommendation #2: To the Director of Central Intelligence
existing procedures and standards for issuing formal Intelligence Community warning products. The revised system should include:
a streamlined interagency coordination process;
clear and concise standards for issuing warnings; and
a system of threat ratings for the consumer, incorporating
Create a training program for both the analysts involved in the terrorist threat warning process and the consumers of the warning products to ensure that they understand the standards for issuing a warning product and the significance of those products. Not later than 90 days after the receipt of this report, provide the Committee with a report on your progress in implementing this recommendation.
Chairman Goss. I would now like to introduce the distinguished members of our panel today.
First, Senator Warren Rudman served in the Senate for two terms, from 1981 through 1992. Among other committee assignments, he chaired the Senate Select Committee on Ethics, was the Vice Chairman of the Senate Iran-Contra Committee and was a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee.
Since leaving the Senate, Senator Rudman has led commissions that have examined the U.S. Intelligence Community and emerging threats to the United States. Until December of 2001, he served as the Chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.
Judge Louis Freeh served as Director of the FBI from September 1993 to June 2001. Prior to his service as FBI Director, he had a distinguished career as an FBI agent, Federal prosecutor, U.S. district court judge for the Southern District of New York.
Judge Freeh, welcome, sir.
Mary Jo White is the former U.S. attorney for the Southern District of New York. Her office prosecuted those responsible for the first attack on the World Trade Center, the plot against New York landmarks in 1993, the 1998 East Africa embassy bombings, as well as numerous other important cases of concern to this committee.
We welcome you, Ms. White. Thank you for joining us.
Dr. Paul Pillar is the National Intelligence Officer for the Near East and South Asia. Dr. Pillar has served in senior positions at the Central Intelligence Agency, including as the Deputy Chief of the DCI's Counterterrorist Center. He is the author of "Terrorism and U.S. foreign Policy." I would recommend that to anybody; as far as I am concerned, it is pretty close to the Bible and has served us well. Unfortunately, not enough people have read it apparently. Dr. Pillar, welcome.
Each of our committees has adopted a supplemental rule for this Joint Inquiry that all witnesses shall be sworn. I will ask the witnesses to rise at this time.
I think, Mr. Fallis and Dr. Hoffman, I may as well ask you if you don't mind to rise and be sworn as well, just in case there are questions.
Thank you. We are missing Dr. Hoffman, I guess.
Chairman Goss. The full statements of the witnesses will be placed in the record of these proceedings, as usual.
I will now call on Senator Rudman, then Judge Freeh, then Ms. White, and then Dr. Pillar, in that order, to give their opening spoken remarks.
Thank you. We welcome you all. We are truly delighted you are here.
TESTIMONY OF THE HON. WARREN RUDMAN, FORMER UNITED STATES SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Mr. RUDMAN. Mr. Chairman, I am delighted to be here. This is the committee I served on, one of my favorite committees in my time in the Senate, and I am honored to appear before you.
I expect that two of the things that I did in the last few years are of interest to you and I have tried to draw from them in my testimony: first, of course, chairing PFIAB; secondly, chairing HartRudman; and third, something I want to talk about a bit this morning that Chairman Goss is very familiar with, and that is the Roles and Other Responsibilities of the Intelligence Community for the 21st Century, which we prepared at the request of this Congress.
I think it is Public Law 971. I wish more people had read it. I want to talk a little bit about it this morning. I would highly recommend that every staff member read this before you write your final report, if you haven't already; and I would think that Members might want to read some portions of it, because it was a very distinguished group of Americans who spent a lot of time looking in advance of 9/11 at precisely the things that you are looking at post-9/11.
I want to just give you a couple of excerpts from that, and I will take 5 or 6 minutes. I do not have a prepared statement, but rather I thought I would respond to the specific questions addressed to me by the leadership of the committee.
The first question that you asked was that our national security study group, Hart-Rudman, warned in 2001 that the United States was not prepared to deal with terrorist attacks in the U.S. homeland. "Please summarize why you felt that to be true at the time, what steps were taken, if any, in response to our report and why we believe important steps were not taken and what measures remain to be taken."
Briefly, this Commission was commissioned by the Congress and the previous administration. Its task was to prepare a report on U.S. national security for the 21st century to be given to the incoming President in 2001, so no one knew who that would be at that time or what party that person would be in. It was a totally bipartisan group. We spent a huge amount of time. We traveled all over the world. We met with friend and foe. We met with intelligence agencies, those with whom we have good relations and those with whom we have poor relations.
And we came to the overwhelming conclusion at the end of our study that we were facing an asymmetric threat to our entire national security structure. And, to everyone's surprise, our lead recommendation dealt with homeland security and international ter
No one on that committee would have thought at the time that we started that that would have been our conclusion. We would have thought it might have been more in the area of DOD reorganization or intelligence reorganization or changing the State Department, changing public diplomacy. It was not.
And you are all familiar with the report; I have discussed it with many of you personally. We said in that report, "More or less, large
numbers of Americans will die on American soil, victims of terrorism, in the coming century."
It happened a bit sooner, rather than later.
Why did we come to that conclusion? It was obvious. From the excellent history that Eleanor Hill gave you a few minutes ago, it was an escalation of attacks against American interests. It was quite apparent that the homeland was not secure and that, at a point in time, those terrorists, be it al-Qa'ida or many other groups-some of which you are, I am sure, studying; others which you may not be that someone would launch an attack on this country.
We talked about weapons of mass destruction, we talked about weapons of mass disruption; and we laid it out in laborious detail, because it was overwhelmingly apparent to all of us that that was going to happen.
We made a number of recommendations. In late January 2001, we presented it to the new administration, to the National Security Advisor, the Vice President through the National Security Adviser and the President, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense. It was very well received. People were very interested in it. We brought it up here. We met with a number of you on this committee. To the credit of the Congress, a number of you immediately started moving towards a Homeland Security Departmentwhich is now, I understand, wound up in some controversy, but I expect eventually it will happen-and we made a number of recommendations that Congress reacted very quickly to and started to act on them, particularly, in the House, Congressman Mac Thornberry; here in the Senate, Senator Fred Thompson and Senator Joe Lieberman.
The administration's attitude was, this is an excellent report, we are getting it to an internal task force of the NSC, and we will start to go through it. I find no fault in that. This is a brand new administration; it had much on its plate. It was the FebruaryMarch time frame of 2001.
My understanding is that they were in the process of working on the recommendations. DOD, in fact, had done some of the things that we had recommended. So I would say that although people might criticize and say that the administration should have acted more forthrightly, my sense is, for a new administration receiving a voluminous report, including an implementation plan, they probably did about all that any administration would have done under the circumstances.
Let me also say that had every recommendation that we had put into that plan been adopted the day after we gave it to the White House, I seriously doubt that that would have been sufficient to prevent 9/11, for many reasons, including some of the reasons that your Staff Director has talked about here today.
Your second question: We said that military consumers often drove intelligence collection and that, given limited resources, the Community was neglecting important regions and trends. "How did this affect the ability of the United States to understand the growth of capabilities and locations such as Afghanistan and Yemen? Would placing more of the Intelligence Community under
the authority of the Director of Central Intelligence prevent similar problems in the future?"
The answer to your question is, generally yes. Up until September 11, the bulk of U.S. intelligence efforts had been focused on states. That has been the historic role of the United States Intelligence Community.
And I might add that our Intelligence Community, as well as most foreign ones that I have studied, are extraordinarily good at looking at structure, at capability, and intent. They don't have a very good track record even working against states for determining what and when; and I am not sure that that will ever be totally solved, no matter how hard we try.
To try to come up with a definition of people's intentions, whether they be states or they be shadowy terrorist organizations, is the toughest assignment given to any Intelligence Community; and frankly, if you look at the record over the last 50 years, the record is not particularly good, not here or anywhere else.
Do I believe, or did our Commission believe, in making the Director of the CIA, giving him a stronger role? We do, but we are not the first ones to say that. This has been recommended for many years.
You have a Director of Central Intelligence who is also the Director of CIA; 85 percent of that budget is controlled by DOD. From what I read in the papers lately, they would like to get even more control of it. And I leave that to you; you are elected to solve problems like that. I don't know what the answer is.
We have tried to recommend a number of reasonable solutions in this report, which a number of Members of Congress served on. Nothing has happened, except I do believe there is a stronger Community coordination effort since this report than there was before. But you have got a long way to go, and frankly, I think it is in the court of the Congress as much as it is the administration's.
We called for the President, through the NSC, to set strategic intelligence priorities and update them regularly. Was this done? Is it being done today?
I can tell you that I am no longer chairman of PFIAB, so I am no longer privy to those things, but my understanding is that, yes, there has been broad strategic intelligence directives, PDDs, which have been adopted by this administration. I am sure they would be available to this committee. I would advocate that you check with them to get a more precise answer.
Three more questions you asked:
"How can the United States improve cooperation between intelligence agencies focused overseas, CIA, NSA, et cetera, and those with domestic focus, such as the FBI; and how could they take full advantage of each other's capabilities? What gaps existed in their cooperation prior to September 11?"
I believe that the Joint Terrorism Centers, which these committees are very familiar with, have come a long way in cooperation; but we have got some very interesting issues here that have to do with law, civil rights, the rights of Americans.
I was saying to Louis Freeh before we testified this morning, that you go back and read the history of the 1946-1947 National Intelligence Act, and it was very clear that the FBI was responsible