Licensing Mass Destruction The Commerce Department's process is secret. Neither Congress nor the public is permitted to examine Commerce licensing in the open. This is true despite the fact that dual-use licenses are supposed to be for civilian items restricted to peaceful use. Commerce refuses even to confirm the existence of an individual license application, and refuses to disclose which applications have been approved after the exports have gone out. Cases come into public view only when someone inside the government becomes angry enough to leak them to the press. This means that only the exporters know which cases are pending, and only the exporters' voices are heard by the licensing officers when decisions are made. The effects are to freeze the public and Congress out of the process and to open the door to the worst forms of private lobbying. The Commerce Department argues that secrecy is necessary to protect proprietary interests. But the U.S. nuclear industry competes well on the international market despite the openness of NRC regulation. Congress should now require the Commerce Department to publish quarterly summaries of all dual-use licensing actions. This information already exists in a database. It could be released by pushing a button. The resulting list would be the same as the one that Commerce released in March on Iraq, but would include countries such as Iran, Libya and Syria. The list would only cover licensing actions that have been completed. Pending sales would not be revealed. Congress could accomplish this by amending Section 12(c) of the Export Administration Act, which the Commerce Department now interprets as requiring complete secrecy for dual-use licenses. The list would also include the name of the exporter. If a company is ashamed of having sold one of its products to a developing country, the company should not have made the sale in the first place. Reputable companies do not object to telling the truth about their business. If the sales are legitimate, and satisfy the export criteria, there is no reason to keep them hidden. The decision to license them is an official government act paid for with tax dollars. Pushing export licensing into the light of day would encourage the exporters to be honest, encourage the government to be careful, and allow the public to find out whether U.S. exports are undermining national security. ANNEX: IRAQI END USERS Following is a list of the known Iraqi military and nuclear end users that imported sensitive American equipment from 1985 to August 2, 1990, when Iraq invaded Kuwait: Iraqi Airways: One of the "agents and front companies" that Iraq used for its "arms procurement network," according to the U.S. Treasury Department. In a press release on April 1, 1991, Treasury http://www.wisconsinproject.org/pubs/reports/1991/licensemd.html Page 14 of 25 11/19/2002 Licensing Mass Destruction termed these companies "Specially Designated Nationals," and said that "when you deal with them, you're dealing with Saddam." • Total approvals to Iraqi Airways: over $50 million, including: 1. Compasses, gyroscopes, and accelerometers (ECCN 1485) - The Commerce Department approved these sales without 2. Navigation, radar and airborne communication equipment - Approved without external review in four of the five cases. 3. Computers (ECCN 1565) valued at $5 million. 4. Aircraft, helicopters, engines and equipment valued at 5. Aircraft parts, boats, diesel engines, underwater cameras, and • Many of the items approved for Iraqi Airways fell into categories that are listed, by their commodity control numbers, as useful in the development, testing, production and deployment of missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons. Items such as compasses, gyroscopes, accelerometers, computers, radars and navigational equipment all fall into this category. It is possible that some of these items aided the Iraqi SCUD program. • The procedures by which missile technology exports are approved are not available to the public. It is widely assumed that at least the Department of State reviews and approves these sensitive exports. However, the Department of Commerce approved at least six exports that appear to be on the missile technology list with no external review. In one case (B373514), the Commerce Department approved over a million dollars' worth of compasses, gyroscopes, and accelerometers without consulting either the State or Defense Departments. All items in category 1485 are missile items and should have been referred to the State Department. Iraqi Air Force: http://www.wisconsinproject.org/pubs/reports/1991/licensemd.html Page 15 of 25 11/19/2002 |