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grams and the danger they may pose to our country and our allies. I hope that our witnesses today can add to the information we already have by helping us understand just how Iraq built its chemical, biological, nuclear and long-range missile programs, and how he got what he needed. We need to know what is there so we can know how to respond.

Dr. Milhollin has tracked technology transfers to Iraq for quite some time, and Dr. Hamza brings the unique perspective of one who has been inside Saddam's weapons complex.

Gentlemen, we thank you for being here today and we hope you can share some additional light on the threat we face. In considering how Iraq got the weapons of mass destruction, we believe he has today, we must be willing to look at how United States actions may have, however unintentionally, contributed to his effort. Some American products and those of our friends may have gotten through our export control system into Saddam's hands, highlighting how easily technology can move in our global economy. But for me, it highlights too, the need to work hard to fashion an export control system that balances the competitiveness of U.S. industry with our security responsibility to prevent more critical technologies and materials from reaching those who would develop weapons of mass destruction.

This committee took a step in that regard when we approved a strengthened version of the Export Administration Act, one that seems more important now as we face the possibility of war to dismantle the proliferation we worked so hard to prevent. But in the near term, Mr. Chairman, the immediate challenge facing us is deciding how to proceed against Iraq. Doing that requires the best information possible. That is what I hope our witnesses will focus on today, the detail of Saddam's weapons programs and their insight as to how they can be eliminated. We thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Skelton can be found in the Appendix on page 221.]

Mr. HUNTER. I want to thank the ranking member and remind our colleagues and those listening that I am just filling in for Bob Stump, who is the chairman of this committee, and who is a little under the weather right now, but nonetheless, told me the other day, make sure we had an aggressive schedule of briefings to educate both our members and the American public on this very important issue that is facing us. So, we all wish our chairman well and look forward to him being back with us here in just a couple of days.

Mr. Milhollin, you have been a very valuable resource for this committee, one of the guys that I think kind of people that make this country great and that is that you are an honest broker who is very candid and who tells it like it is in some fairly difficult debates we have historically had on technology control, and this tug of war between what the ranking member described as industrial competitiveness and security interests.

But, we really appreciate the energy you expend and the intellect and evenhandedness that you bring to this issue. Thanks for appearing before us for about the 50th time and, sir, the floor is yours.

STATEMENT OF GARY MILHOLLIN, DIRECTOR, WISCONSIN

PROJECT ON NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL Dr. MILHOLLIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I hope I can live up to that introduction. I am very pleased to appear today to discuss the challenge of Iraq and the relation between that challenge and the export of sensitive technology. I would like to begin by offering for the record some publications that my organization has produced on Iraq, and also, I would request permission to update my written remarks after the hearing if that is appropriate.

Mr. HUNTER. Without objection.

Dr. MILHOLLIN. First, I would like to offer an op-ed from The New York Times written this past Monday on inspections. I have a copy I will provide to the staff; second, an article from commentary magazine, the October issue which also discusses inspections; third, a graphic from The New York Times Week In Review this past Sunday, which describes several dangerous nuclear imports and what we can learn from those imports, including the aluminum tube episode that I think the committee has probably been briefed on.

Then, I would like to also include in the record the article that you just referred to from 1992, which lists U.S. contributions to Saddam Hussein's missile and nuclear sites and, then a graphic, which I have put here on a board, which shows world wide contributions to Iraq's program, and then, finally, a report that my organization prepared on Commerce Department licenses that, in my judgment, contributed very much to Iraq's mass destruction weapon capabilities.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 241.]

Mr. HUNTER. Without objection, those will be included in the record.

Dr. MILHOLLIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to begin by just saying that there is no question that Iraq has an active weapon of mass destruction program. I know the committee has been briefed on this in detail, but I think perhaps I should just mention briefly that in the nuclear area, we know Saddam Hussein has a workable weapon design, lacks only the fissile material to fuel it, that the risk there is that this material is available many places in the world.

We know that smugglers are after it, and we know we are not likely to get a phone call if on some unlucky day enough to make a few bombs winds up in Iraq. Second, we know that the Iraqis are working on short-range missiles which are permitted under U.N. resolutions, but at the same time, they are using this program to develop the technology for long-range missiles. We also know that Iraq has illicitly held back a few Scuds. We are not sure how many. But, in the event of hostilities, we have to expect that these may be used.

In the chemical weapon area, we know that Iraq has made nerve gas and mustard gas, has weaponized these agents, and I can tell you that in a round table we had recently with U.S. generals, there is a tremendous amount of concern about Iraq's chemical artillery.

Finally, in the biological area, we know that Iraq has made anthrax, and there are also rumors about Iraq's interest in smallpox.

So what we are looking at is a rather complete weapon of mass destruction program that we know is possessed of a great capability that is not being carefully inspected or inspected at all, and that we have to assume is still operating. I must say that I might say that our organization maintains a web site in which we try to provide a continuous update of Iraq's weapon of mass destruction status. It is www.Iraqwatch.org. It is an easy place to go to find upto-date information on all of the programs. And, I have here a printout from today's version which I recommend to the committee.

I would like to say a few words about how Iraq managed to build these programs. The short answer is with imports. Almost all from the West, and almost all legal. The article that Mr. Hunter held up a moment ago from the New York Times in 1992 was prepared by my organization from U.S. export control records. If you look at this document, you will see that it is entitled “Iraq's Bomb: Chip By Chip.” you can see that America's leading electronic companies sold sensitive equipment directly to the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission where atomic bomb fuel was made, to sites where A-bomb detonators were made, and to the Ministry of Defence which oversaw Iraq's missile and A-bomb development. U.S. exports also went directly to a site called SOD-16, which was Iraq's main missile building site. There is no question that virtually every nuclear and missile site in Iraq received high-speed American computers. And, these were all licensed by the Ŭ.S. Department of Commerce.

You have to ask yourself, “Why?” There were investigations at the time, which this committee perhaps remembers, that revealed that the Commerce Department knew what the risks were, but approved the exports anyway. Why did it do that? Because it was following a policy of preferring trade to national security. I am going to suggest later that we are at risk of doing the same thing now.

The United States was not alone in supplying Iraq. I have produced a graphic here from The New York

Times which my organization produced that shows the worldwide contribution to Iraq's programs. You will notice by looking at this graphic that German firms sold as much to Iraq to its mass destruction weapon programs as the rest of the world combined. We produced this pie chart, which is divided down the middle with Germany on one side and the rest of the world on the other. German firms help increase the range of Iraq's Scud missiles. Those increased-range Scuds killed our troops in Saudi Arabia and they also killed Israeli civilians in Tel Aviv.

I must say, from my own part, I find it shocking that Germany did so much to create Iraq's weapon of mass destruction threat and seems to be the main country in the West today that is least willing to confront it.

As far as I can tell, these exports, the ones that we have tracked, are still a problem today. They have never been fully accounted for. So, if we actually sent troops into Iraq, to counter the mass destruction threat that Iraq poses, I think we have to accept the fact that these troops will be trying to undo what our own Western companies have created.

I would like, also in my testimony, you will notice that I also cite the example of Huawei Technologies. That is a Chinese company that helped Iraq build its air defenses. Today we are sending pilots

in to try to destroy those air defenses. Those pilots are taking risks to knock out technology that U.S. exports have helped create. The fiberoptic technology, the switching equipment and other things, high-speed computers that went from Huawei Technologies, from the United States went from some of our leading companies. They made Huawei a big exporter out of a very small, rather insignificant company.

The effect is that by not being prudent in export control with respect to Huawei, we have enabled Iraq to build an air defense network that threatens our pilots. The lesson here is that when you decide on a policy of allowing sensitive exports to go out in order to increase export revenue, those exports don't just go away. They can come back to bite you. So, this is not just a question of trade, it is a question of body bags.

I would like to end my statement here by suggesting that we may be making the same mistake now that we made in the late 1980s, when we created the Iraqi threat that we are still trying to deal with. I am sure the committee has been briefed on the question of aluminum tubes, a shipment that was intercepted on its way to Iraq. Our government sources have been cited as saying they think the tubes were intended for centrifuge needs to process uranium to a nuclear weapons grade. As it turns out, these tubes and their equivalent that is maraging steel and carbon fibers, which can also be used to make the critical part of centrifuges, these are items for Iraq's weapons effort. All of these technologies fit the mass market criteria that are contained in the new Export Administration Act. And, that is why I have opposed this act before this committee. My staff

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Milhollin, I hate to hold you up during the statement, but you are saying that the tubes that we are talking about, which some experts believe were to be used for the nuclear weapons program, would, in your opinion, be legalized for sale if we passed the proposed Export Administration Act?

Dr. MILHOLLIN. That is right. I had my staff do a study this week. We called a number of aluminum suppliers in the United States to inquire whether aluminum tubes that meet the export control criteria in the present EAA would be available widely and the answer is “Yes.” My staff was able to order—well, they were invited to order thousands of these tubes from numerous suppliers in the United States.

Now, if you look at the criteria in the new Export Administration Act for mass market items, those criteria would be met by this availability. So what we would be looking at here if we pass the current EAA is that we would be, with one hand, helping Iraq make nuclear weapons, and with the other hand, smashing Iraq for doing so with imports.

I can't believe that this is a wise policy. I don't think our country can have it both ways. We can't be telling the world that we are the leaders in export control, we can't be asking all the other countries in the world to help us keep this material out of the hands of terrorist-supporting nations, and at the same time to facilitate our own industry decontrol it for export.

I know that the members of the committee must be saying to themselves, “Well, we would never sell this to Iraq, but the fact is,

if we can decontrol our own exports, we have no hope of getting other countries to keep the control over theirs." This is a game where everybody watches everybody else. And so, if we put trade above national security, everybody else will do so, too. And, the next time our intelligence agencies detect such a shipment, they are not going to be able to stop it because everybody will say this is decontrolled. It is not important. What are you talking about? I think is a risk that we can't take and shouldn't take.

So that is why I urge the committee to remember when it considers the EAA, that this is a signal to the whole world on nuclear proliferation.

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you very much, Dr. Milhollin.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Milhollin can be found in the Appendix on page 224.]

Mr. HUNTER. And Dr. Hamza, we appreciate you being with us this morning. And, you bring a unique perspective as a former leader of the Iraqi nuclear weapons program. We look forward to your testimony, sir. STATEMENT OF DR. KHIDHIR HAMZA, FORMER IRAQI NU

CLEAR ENGINEER, DIRECTOR, COUNCIL ON MIDDLE EASTERN AFFAIRS

Dr. HAMZA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, distinguished members. Actually, the remarks from Dr. Milhollin will cover some of my introductory remarks, so I will skip them and go to the next step. Whenever we found the U.S. reluctant to supply us with some of the equipment and materials, for example, we wanted to upgrade our computers in atomic energy from IBM 360 that came a new series at the time to a new series, I believe it was 370, and IBM wanted export license for atomic energy.

Mr. HUNTER. What year was this?

Dr. HAMZA. That was around 1985, 1984. The Japanese NEC Corporation provide us without export license and asked for only a letter that we use this computer for student purposes for teaching. And, they give us the same level of computer that the U.S. required a license for without any licensing.

So, I mean, when we do export controls here, it should be also put as with the view that the other side might sell what we would hold here. For example, at the time a new desktop computer, I believe 368, came out, which is a little bit fast that could be used for various weapon purposes, control and other purposes, and there were restrictions on selling it to countries like Iraq. So, when I went to Hewlett-Packard branch in Baghdad to buy three of these computers for my use, they said we cannot sell it to you from the U.S., but we can sell it to you from Singapore.

So, the same American company which cannot sell us through the U.S. can sell us through its subsidiary in Singapore. So, that should be also kept in mind. But, all the same, what Mr. Milhollin said is true, atomic energy, if you look around about 80 to 90 percent of the equipment we have are from the U.S.

Mr. HUNTER. Are from? Dr. HAMZA. U.S. Almost all radiation detector equipment, many of the radiation sources, most of the computers, a lot of the materials we use are sourced from the U.S. so, the problem with this,

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