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made over the last decade under the understanding that the world had changed, threats were gone essentially because the Cold War was over and that we didn't need to worry about the spread of technology that could help terrorists.
I would look at things we decontrolled. I would also look at what terrorist nations, terrorist supporting nations and terrorist groups need most to make the kind of weaponry that we think is most likely to be made, and then I would try to identify the technologies necessary for that and draft a new set of export controls that are designed for the post September 11 world. I think we need to put our best experts to work on that and we need to do it.
In the case of the pending bill, it was conceived and debated before September 11. So I think the first thing we need to do is treat that bisl as a piece of ancient history and agree among ourselves that we need to start over and we need to think through a new set of export controls specifically aimed at things that threaten us the most, which is international-one of which is international terrorism. So that is what I would do.
Mr. TAYLOR. Dr. Hamza.
Dr. HAMZA. I am not very familiar with the exact rules so I will restrict myself to the following; that is
Mr. TAYLOR. What troubles me, Dr. Hamza, is we make good rules and then we give either the Secretary of Defense or the sitting President the availability to waive them. Let's face it. How do you get to be President? You accept campaign_contributions. Do those campaign contributors sometimes call the President, and say “Gee, I would like this rule waived." It is not going to hurt American security. It's my opinion they probably do. So, in addition to just taking that loophole out, what else would you do?
Dr. HAMZA. Let me give another, the other side of the view here. Dr. Milhollin is very well versed in what is going on here. Let me just present the problems we have there and what would exports do for us. We had the electromagnetic enrichment of uranium. The electromagnetic is all unclassified. That is why it was chosen initially. This is the largest program we had. The centrifuge was a minor program. Now, it is our main program because of technology exports. The program was hampered for simple things like vacuum parts, things that pump the air out of the equipment, high voltage sources, sparking, things like machining to a certain tolerance.
So now, if you want to put exports, such that we will not do what we can do, then all these equipment has to be under some kind of restriction to a country like Iraq. This is very broad. This covers huge sectors, high voltage; I mean, how can you stop a country from importing high voltage equipment. Vacuum pumps. They are used everywhere in making liquid nitrogen and making oxygen and making all kinds of—so—but these things stopped us. For ten years we could not get over them to a degree that we will have a production system. We stayed in the pilot plant stage with the few units trying to get resolve the problems of these units because we couldn't resolve the basic simple technologies involved.
So if you are looking at a country like Iraq and want to stop it through technology controls, through export controls, I think it will be a very hard and very broad. I mean, after all, I mean 90 percent what have goes into a nuclear weapon is regular technologies, ma
chining, casting, furnaces, equipment like this, fuses, some simple electronics and some complicated also, electronics. But, so, I don't know. I cannot help in this because what I look at is what we built is 90 percent of regular import. Some ten percent are the sensitive ones and these are probably the ones one should keep an eye on.
Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. Chairman, I see the red light, but apparently we are all willing to miss this very important procedural vote.
Mr. SAXTON. Actually Mr. Taylor, Ms. Davis is sitting anxiously waiting for her chance.
Mr. TAYLOR. Okay. If I could, for the record, I would like both of you to tell me how many years do you think it will be, if it has not already occurred, before either a terrorist state or a terrorist organization purchases a working weapon of mass destruction from the former Soviet Union. Because, I am still dumbfounded why anyone tries to go to all the trouble of building a bomb when apparently there is so much material and so many weapons available in the former Soviet Union in apparently a nation that is in chaos.
Mr. SAXTON. If you could
Mr. TAYLOR. For the record. I understand Ms. Davis wants to get to her questions.
Mr. SAXTON. Yeah, we are going to let you answer that perhaps in writing.
Mr. TAYLOR. Unless you can say it in a word or two, I am sure she could forgive me that.
Mr. SAXTON. Do you want to take 30 seconds? But, we really need to move on to Ms. Davis because of the situation we find ourself in with votes.
Dr. MILHOLLIN. Do you want us to answer in 30 seconds or do you want us to just
Mr. SAXTON. I guess we prefer that you submit your answer to us in writing at this point. Is that all right, Mr. Taylor?
Mr. TAYLOR. Sure.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 283.]
Mr. SAXTON. Ms. Davis. Here's what—we are in a series of three votes. Mr. Hunter left to catch the first vote. He is going to come back so I can catch the second two votes and so we will try to accommodate your time by continuing to move forward. Ms. Davis.
Mrs. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. I'd prefer not to miss the first vote, Mr. Chairman, but
Mr. SAXTON. You and I are going to run over there together. Mrs. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. I will do this as quickly as I can. Dr. Hamza, you made a statement earlier. You said in quotes that even if the, you know, the inspectors go over and they were to remove, you know, whatever Saddam has over there, that it wouldn't make any difference because in your words, the will is there and a strong determination. Where is that will coming from? Is it just Saddam Hussein? If Saddam Hussein were to be removed, are you saying that that wouldn't matter either, that there is still the will and the strong determination by whom?
Dr. HAMZA. It is not just Saddam. It is also the Bath Party, which came on the basic idea of revival of Iraq's power or our power and also as implemented by Saddam, this meant to him that is more weaponry and more militarization of the whole country.
They understood, they call it a struggle for survival. To be a struggle through military and armament
and as such, their basic aim is to have a fighting force, which is basically impregnable and basically the strongest in the region and do their own through their own will build that fighting force using Iraq's huge oil resources as a basis.
Mrs. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. So the entire party would have to be removed from the government?
Dr. HAMZA. The whole party system has to be removed which is ingrained. It has its own literature, its own law, its own history. It is huge. It is like the Communist Party.
Mrs. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. If Saddam Hussein or the party had a nuclear weapon completed, ready to be used, and this is an opinion from you, what do you think he would do with it?
Dr. HAMZA. It depends. If he is in a corner, he will use it. That was made clear during the Gulf War when he ordered us to make one crash nuclear weapon and it is called the crash nuclear weapon, which is declared by Iraq in 1996 and is officially admitted by the Iraqi government to turn the French fuel we had into one nuclear weapon.
Now that makes no sense unless you intend to use it as a last resort. What would you do with one nuclear weapon? If you test, you lose it. So that terrified us at the time and our chemists saved us by dragging their feet and claiming they cannot get 18 kilograms we need to make one nuclear weapon out of the French fuel, which is 31 kilogram. So there is the intent. Then, they made two other crash programs, which are chemical and biological weapons, which were put on the way of the U.S. forces in case they came to Baghdad. We don't know what they intended to do with them. Our guess, and the word was they would be blown up on the face of whatever incoming force there is and claiming that the Air Force destroyed them.
So this is one angle also to watch out for, is that the depots he can use. So, it is just the total belief that weaponry, especially weapons of mass destruction, because Iraq cannot make any other kind of weaponry, it cannot make conventional weapon. The weapons of mass destruction is all it can make is the base for the survival of the regime and its power base.
Mrs. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Well, it interests me that you said, I believe the program in 1987, if I am correct what you said, was to develop six a year. I find that a little more than just, if I am backed into a corner.
Dr. HAMZA. That is the orders we got. We had to reduce that order actually gradually and make it into something like we could live with, like two a year, but we always got back orders that once we are through this stage one, we have to think ahead of time and to jump in to a larger production facility.
Mrs. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. HUNTER. I thank the gentlelady, and you have got about a minute left on this vote, but I think that they will hold it open for a while as they usually do on the first one, so I thank her for her line of questions.
Gentlemen, let me take you back to Mr. Spratt's questions, and this is kind of a complex thing and let's kind of walk through what
we have in terms of controls, what we had before 1991 and what we put in place afterwards. The essence, I think of Mr. Spratt's questions, Mr. Milhollin, was the effect that we still—there are still ostensibly controls in place, for example, for the aluminum tubes, even if the tubes fit under this so-called classification of something that is mass marketed. And, your response was that you are still going to have a problem as a result of us essentially legalizing those sales. Could you explain that in a little more detail?
Dr. MILHOLLIN. Right now, aluminum tubes are controlled for export by all the countries in the nuclear suppliers group, which contain, which includes most of the countries in the world that can make aluminum tubes of this kind. That is also true for maraging steel and carbon fibers. So if we look around the world, we see our principal trading partners and allies controlling things in the same way we do. They control all of these technologies for export, which means that it doesn't mean that there is a prohibition against the export. It means that if you want to sell it to somebody, you have to get a license and the reason for that is that these things are specially—can be used to make nuclear weapons.
Well, if we detect a shipment on the way somewhere of a controlled technology, the fact that it is controlled gives us a diplomatic place to stand when we talk to the country that is supplying it. We can say to them, “Look, this is controlled. You have obligations here. We don't think you are meeting your obligations, therefore we are asking you to stop this shipment.” If the-if we change our law now and de-control these things, we will no longer have that platform. There will no longer be any basis for saying to another country, “Look, you are undermining world security by selling this, because there won't be any decision by the world or by multi—through a multilateral export control regime that these things are dangerous and should be restricted.” That is my point. Mr. HUNTER.
You know, I thought that the one statement by Dr. Hamza was—reflected a tragedy in the way our system works in that you mentioned Hewlett-Packard having told you that theyyou couldn't buy a certain system from
them directly, but you could buy it from their Singapore outlet. What was that system again, Dr. Hamza.
Dr. HAMZA. Just at the time the 368 process for the desktop computer, which just came out, was restricted for a country like Iraq. Just a simple desktop computer.
Mr. HUNTER. But nonetheless, simple things like that are important for your weapons programs, are they not?
Dr. HAMZA. Yes. We bought a fax machine also this way from London, which was fast at the time for our weapon design program.
Mr. HUNTER. But, Hewlett-Packard told you that they couldn't sell that to you directly from a U.S. outlet of Hewlett-Packard, but that you could go to their Singapore store and buy it. And, the reason I think that is such a tragedy is because David Packard was such a great American defense leader.
At one time, I believe was head of Defense Research and Engineering for a U.S. administration. Was certainly a chairman of the Packard Commission on—and lent a great deal of expertise to our country in terms of trying to keep us strong and invulnerable. And yet, his company, ultimately playing by the rules, but nonetheless,
I think, disserving our country, was essentially allowing an endrun around American laws. And, I think that is one of the I think is one of the real problems and real tragedies with our export laws that they allow us, if you manipulate them correctly, or you circumvent them, you can—you can, while complying with the letter of the law, certainly not comply with the spirit of the law and certainly not with the requirements of being a good citizen and trying to protect national security.
But, I want to go back to 1991 because I can recall that after the war, we had a number of statements to the effect, the same effect as Dr. Milhollin has given us now, that we helped to built that military apparatus, and you heard in Congress a lot of resounding “Never again shall that happen.” And yet, Dr. Hamza, in the 1990s, the mid 1990s after the war was over, you were involved in the continuing weapons program for Saddam Hussein, is that correct? And, that weapons program continued even though we had inspectors in the country. Is that right?
Dr. HAMZA. Yes, 1993, as I mentioned, for example, the diffusion process, the bottleneck which, in the diffusion process for uranium enrichment, was a barrier. It was completed in 1993 when the inspectors were there.
Mr. HUNTER. So again, now, it has been—the point has been made by several members. They have pulled out these charts that showed how much we seized, almost like the Mexican government showing how much cocaine has been stopped from delivery across the border, and what they don't show us is how much activity continued to go on. And so, what you are saying is the nuclear weapons program was continuing even while we were trotting out these seizures and announcing with great flourishes that certain facilities had been shut down.
Obviously, other facilities that we didn't know about were being opened up and were operating; is that right?
Dr. HAMZA. That is correct.
Mr. HUNTER. Well, then would you basically agree with—when we had two inspectors in here last week who told about their frustrations and their feeling that they made almost no progress. And, one of our members said, “Well, what depth of inspection do you need to be sure that you are really sanitizing that entire weapons complex.” And, the answer was, “You need virtually an occupation of the country to be able to know that.” Is that your
Dr. HAMZA. Yeah, that's correct, because in no other way can you really get around to know where things are and get your hand on them because somebody is carrying before you go there and picking things ahead of you. And, unless you have a force to really control this, what is going on, there is no way you can get your hand on serious.
Mr. HUNTER. Yeah. I think the person who was told two weeks ahead of time that an inspection team was going to be at a certain facility, and when they arrived, there were lots of nuclear weapons materials lying around and then he had to go explain that to Saddam Hussein. I would hate to be in his shoes at that point. It would be an act of gross negligence on the part of one of their governmental officials not-after they got the tip-off that the inspection team was coming, not to have moved the materials. So, it looks