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Semetex Corporation: computers_$5,155,781
Spectral Data Corporation: satellite data processing equipment-$26,880
Tektronix: high-speed electronics useful in developing atomic bombs and missiles;
radio spectrum analyzers for developing microwave equipment_$102,000
Thermo Jarrell Ash Corporation: computers for testing materials—$350,898
Unisys Corporation: computers for production control—$7,796
Veeco Instruments Inc.: computers for factory design-$4,640
Wiltron Company: equipment for making radar antennas-$49,510

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(Insert from the New York Times, The Week in Review, Sunday, July 18, 1993– E5.)

IRAQ'S PURCHASES IN THE A-BOMB SUPERMARKET The Number of Deals The Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control has compiled a list of all the publicly known deals in which Iraq bought technology and equipment for its nuclear and missile programs before the Persian Gulf war in 1991. Some purchases were made from brokers rather than directly from the manufacturer. A deal can mean construction of an entire factory, or supplying the machine tools or training to operate it. The vast majority of these deals were approved by or made through the governments.

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SHARE OF RESPONSIBILITY Breakdown of Iraq's purchases, weighted for importance to its nuclear and missile programs, as estimated by the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control. One example: although France had only six transactions with the Iraqis, one was to build the Osirak nuclear reactor, which Israel destroyed by bombing in 1981.

Switzerland 8 percent Italy 5 percent France 5 percent Brazil 4 percent Britain 3.5 percent

United States
3.5 percent
3 percent
2.5 percent
2.5 percent
2 percent

Soviet Union
2 percent
1.5 percent
1.5 percent
1.5 percent
1.5 percent

Saudi Arabia
1.5 percent
1.5 percent
West Germany
50 percent

(Source on all charts: Gary Milhollin and Diana L. Edensword, Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control.)

Types of technologies and equipment bought by Irag from the five countries with the greatest
share of responsibility


Missile develop Missile develop Scud improve Equipment to in- Missile develop


ment crease Scud range ment

Nuclear weapons Nuclear weapons Missile developScud launchers Nuclear weapons development, no development, no ment Nuclear weapons development tably plutonium tably Osirak re

Nuclear weapons actor

extraction labdevelopment Supergun

development oratories Missile develop

Supergun ment Warhead development Supergun

BEEFING UP THE SCUD MISSILE: WHO HELPED The Soviet Union supplied Iraq with Scud missiles that had a range of 180 miles. They were used to bombard Israeli cities and a military base in Saudi Arabia where 28 American soldiers were killed after Saddam Hussein expanded the range to 380 miles. These companies and government agencies had roles: AUSTRIA

WEST GERMANY AVL Designed rocket test tunnel for missile Anlagen Bau Contor Supplied laboratory complex

equipment Consultco Designed missile complex

Aviatest Built wind tunnels, supplied engiAlfred Fenneberg Managed construction of neers for missile complex missile fuel complex

Beaujean Developed and supplied test BRAZIL

stands for missile propulsion H.O. Piva; Embraer; Orbita Trained Iraqis BP; Carl Zeiss; Degussa; Tesa Supplied in rocket technology, supplied assistance

training in missile electronics, wind tunnels, BRITAIN

test facilities International Computer Systems Supplied Fritz Werner Subcontractor and supplier for computers at missile site

missile complex International Military Services Designed Gildemeister Contractor for missile comand supervised construction of a missile test- plex, blueprints, machine tools, furnaces, test ing complex

stands, control facilities Matrix Churchill Supplied scores of sen- H & H Metalform Supplied rocketry equipsitive machine tools MEED International Front company for ment, cylindrical presses, testing plant for

missile complex missile procurement Technology Development Group Front Havert Industrie Supplied material, equipcompany for missile procurement

ment, fast-refueling pressure units TMG Engineering Front company for mis- Heinrich Mueller Supplied precision lathes sile procurement

Inwako Intermediary for delivery of compoSAUDI ARABIA

nents to install gyroscopes Saudi Pump Factory Helped supply test Leifeld Supplied cylindrical presses, rocket stand for turbo pumps

motor nozzles SOVIET UNION

Messerschmitt-Bolkow-Blohm (MBB) Soviet Government Supplied at least 819 Subcontractor for missile complex Scuds

MBB and Gildemeister Transferred AmerSWITZERLAND

ican-made computers, electronic test equip

ment Condor Projekt Supervised construction of missile fuel production site

MBB and Transtechnica Helped build UNITED STATES

radar tracking station, rocket test stand for

missile complex Electronics Associates Supplied computer Nickel Supplied climate control technology system for missile wind tunnel

for fuel stores at missile fuel production site imaging enhancing equipment capable of mis- Sauer Informatic Supplied computer plant

for missile complex sile targeting Litton Industries Financed West German Schaeftelmaier Supplied electronic measfirm Gildemeister, which built Iraq's missile urement and testing instruments for missile

fuel production complex Scientific Atlanta Supplied antenna testers formers, electrical systems to control missile

Siemens Supplied switching devices, trans(through West German firms) for missile com- fuel production, equipped radio room at misplex

sile complex Tektronix Supplied measuring equipment (through West German firm MBB) to missile Thyssen Contract for 305 turbopumps (sup

plied 35) site

Carl Zeiss Supplied computerized mapping Witron Supplied network analyzers used to develop missile guidance





WASHINGTON—The terms of the punishment forced on Iraq since the Persian Gulf War may be most valuable for what they have taught. Rarely has a country defeated in battle been so laid bare to outside scrutiny. To the victors, the answer to how Iraq gained its power is now dispiritingly clear: it was us—the West, and German companies in particular.

That conclusion is documented in stark detail in a new study by the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control. Based in part on the work of United Nations inspectors, it identifies the Western companies who supplied the crucial parts in what was emerging as an extraordinary Iraqi arsenal. German firms were by far the worst offenders, but others in Switzerland, Britain, France, Italy and the United States were also instrumental. Without Western help, the report's author, Gary Milhollin, shows, Iraq could never have come so close to producing nuclear weapons and long-range missiles.

The pattern is in some ways familiar. Countries aspiring to power have long turned to foreign merchants for muskets and machine guns. What has changed has to do with what has changed about war. Rather than in vast shipments, even the smallest of acquisitions may prove decisive in an era in which nuclear, biological and chemical weapons can hold populations hostage. And the goods sought for military value may just as well be produced by a supercomputer manufacturer or biotechnology company as by a munitions maker.

A Western bolt found in an Iraqi missile is not necessarily a sign of complicity. A bolt has many peaceful uses, too. But the picture provided by the Wisconsin Project suggests just how instrumental such dual-use trade can be. Italian technology allowed Iraq to extract plutonium, and high-performance Swiss presses gave it the ability to make nuclear weapons parts. Most of what Iraq needed to extend the range of its Scud missiles came from Germany. American computers were used in virtually all Iraqi missile and nuclear sites. Of course, Iraq's

most crucial acquisitions had even clearer military purposes. The Soviet Union openly sold Baghdad hundreds of Scud missiles; Brazil helped secretly in an effort to build an atomic bomb. But it was the wider Western flood, aided by lax laws and porous borders, that helped Iraq to refine those tools, outfit secret factories, and thereby to reach the verge of even more destructive force.

'Dairy Plant Parts Just one example of that flow was first found in crates marked as dairy plant parts bound from Frankfurt for Baghdad. In fact the intercepted metal parts were a supplement to the 27,436 Scud missile parts worth $28.2 million that the German company, H & H Metalform, had already delivered to Iraq. A separate compression device was to have helped Iraq test a new intermediate-range missile. There was little mystery to its purpose, German intelligence found: the company had sold the same kind of rocket-testing device to Brazil.

With the most dangerous of the projects dismantled, the tension between Iraq and the West is mostly about the future. In refusing again last week to permit U.N. inspectors to install cameras at a missile-test site, Iraq made clear its aversion to the next step of U.N. oversight, which under Security Council Resolution 715 calls upon the West to keep long-term watch as Iraq begins to build new weapons.

An apparent agreement on a separate U.N. plan calling for Iraq to sell oil to meet humanitarian needs suggested that Baghdad might still be open to a last-minute compromise. But even a fence-mending visit by Rolf Ekeus, the chief U.N. weapons inspector, left unclear by Friday whether Iraq would back down or brave a Western threat of a retaliatory strike.

The new U.N. focus on monitoring—with its fixation on products-nevertheless carries a danger of being too narrow. There are signs that Western equipment remains a key ingredient in secret weapons programs, not only in Iraq but elsewhere.

A report to Congress last month concluded that illegal shipments by Western companies had helped Iraq repair or rebuild nearly all of the military production capacity it lost during the war. American intelligence reports have similarly warned of newly aggressive efforts by Iran to acquire the technology needed to produce chemical and biological weapons.

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