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Semetex Corporation: computers—$5,155,781
Spectral Data Corporation: satellite data processing equipment—$26,880

Tektronix: high-speed electronics useful in developing atomic bombs and missiles; radio spectrum analyzers for developing microwave equipment—$102,000

Thermo Jarrell Ash Corporation: computers for testing materials—$350,898
Unisys Corporation: computers for production control—$7,796
Veeco Instruments Inc.: computers for factory design—$4,640
Wiltron Company: equipment for making radar antennas—$49,510

[Insert from the New York Times, The Week in Review, Sunday, July 18, 1993– E5.]


The Number of Deals

The Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control has compiled a list of all the publicly known deals in which Iraq bought technology and equipment for its nuclear and missile programs before the Persian Gulf war in 1991. Some purchases were made from brokers rather than directly from the manufacturer. A deal can mean construction of an entire factory, or supplying the machine tools or training to operate it. The vast majority of these deals were approved by or made through the governments.

West Germany Austria Egypt Niger
102 deals 9 deals 2 deals 1 deal
United States France Yugoslavia Poland
25 deals 6 deals 2 deals 1 deal
Switzerland Belgium Argentina Portugal
22 deals 5 deals 1 deal 1 deal
Britain Japan China Soviet Union
20 deals 5 deals 1 deal 1 deal
Brazil Saudi Arabia Greece Spain
14 deals 3 deals 1 deal 1 deal
Italy Chile Liechtenstein Sweden
13 deals 2 deals 1 deal 1 deal


Breakdown of Iraq's purchases, weighted for importance to its nuclear and missile programs, as estimated by the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control. One example: although France had only six transactions with the Iraqis, one was to build the Osirak nuclear reactor, which Israel destroyed by bombing in 1981.

Switzerland United States Soviet Union Saudi Arabia 8 percent 3.5 percent 2 percent 1.5 percent Italy Austria Japan Other 5 percent 3 percent 1.5 percent 1.5 percent France Argentina Niger West Germany 5 percent 2.5 percent 1.5 percent 50 percent Brazil Egypt Portugal

4 percent 2.5 percent 1.5 percent

Britain Belgium Yugoslavia

3.5 percent 2 percent 1.5 percent

[Source on all charts: Gary Milhollin and Diana L. Edensword, Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control.]


Types of technologies and equipment bought by Iraq from the five countries with the greatest share of responsibility

GERMANY LAND Missile develop- Missile develop- Scud improve-
Equipment to in- Missile develop- ment ment ment
crease Scud range ment Nuclear weapons Nuclear weapons Missile develop-
Scud launchers Nuclear weapons development, no- development, no- ment
Nuclear weapons development ..* . Osirak re- Nuclear weapons
development Supergun oratories development
Missile develop-

ment Supergun

Warhead development



The Soviet Union supplied Iraq with Scud missiles that had a range of 180 miles. They were used to bombard Israeli cities and a military base in Saudi Arabia where 28 American soldiers were killed after Saddam Hussein expanded the range to 380 miles. These companies

and government agencies had roles: AUSTRIA

AVL Designed rocket test tunnel for missile

Consultco Designed missile complex
Alfred Fenneberg Managed construction of
missile fuel complex

H.O. Piva; Embraer; Orbita Trained Iraqis
in rocket technology, supplied assistance
International Computer Systems Supplied
computers at missile site
International Military Services Designed
and supervised construction of a missile test-
ing complex
Matrix Churchill Supplied scores of sen-
sitive machine tools
MEED international Front company for
missile procurement
Technology Development Group Front
company for missile procurement
TMG Engineering Front company for mis-
sile procurement

Saudi Pump Factory Helped supply test
stand for turbo pumps

Soviet Government Supplied at least 819

Condor Projekt Supervised construction of
missile fuel production site
Electronics Associates Supplied computer
system for missile wind tunnel
International Imaging Systems Supplied
imaging enhancing equipment capable of mis-
sile targeting
Litton Industries Financed West German
firm Gildemeister, which built Iraq's missile
Scientific Atlanta Supplied antenna testers
(through West German firms) for missile com-
Tektronix Supplied measuring equipment
(through West German firm MBB) to missile
Wiltron Supplied network analyzers used to
develop missile guidance


Anlagen Bau Contor Supplied laboratory equipment Aviatest Built wind tunnels, supplied engineers for missile complex Beaujean Developed and supplied test stands for missile propulsion BP; Carl Zeiss; Degussa; Tesa Supplied training in missile electronics, wind tunnels, test facilities Fritz Werner Subcontractor and supplier for missile complex Gildemeister Contractor for missile complex, blueprints, machine tools, furnaces, test stands, control facilities H & H Metalform Supplied rocketry equipment, cylindrical presses, testing plant for missile complex Havert Industrie Supplied material, equipment, fast-refueling pressure units Heinrich Mueller Supplied precision lathes Inwako Intermediary for delivery of components to install gyroscopes Leifeld Supplied cylindrical presses, rocket motor nozzles Messerschmitt-Bolkow-Blohm (MBB) Subcontractor for missile complex MBB and Gildemeister Transferred American-made computers, electronic test equipment MBB and Transtechnica Helped build radar tracking station, rocket test stand for missile complex Nickel Supplied climate control technology for fuel stores at missile fuel production site Sauer Informatic Supplied computer plant for missile complex Schaeftelmaier Supplied electronic measurement and testing instruments for missile fuel production Siemens Supplied switching devices, transformers, electrical systems to control missile fuel production, equipped radio room at missile complex Thyssen Contract for 305 turbopumps (supplied 35) Carl Zeiss Supplied computerized mapping equipment



WASHINGTON.—The terms of the F. : forced on Iraq since the Persian Gulf War may be most valuable for what they have taught. Rarely has a country defeated in battle been so laid bare to outside scrutiny. To the victors, the answer to how Iraq gained its power is now dispiritingly clear: it was us—the West, and German companies in particular.

That conclusion is documented in stark detail in a new study by the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control. Based in part on the work of United Nations inspectors, it identifies the Western companies who supplied the crucial parts in what was emerging as an extraordinary Iraqi arsenal. §. firms were by far the worst offenders, but others in Switzerland, Britain, France, Italy and the United States were also instrumental. Without Western help, the report's author, Gary Milhollin, shows, Iraq could never have come so close to producing nuclear weapons and long-range missiles.

The pattern is in some ways familiar. Countries *.*. power have long turned to foreign merchants for muskets and machine guns. at has changed has to do with what has changed about war. Rather than in vast shipments, even the smallest of acquisitions may prove decisive in an era in which nuclear, biological and chemical weapons can hold populations hostage. And the goods sought for military value may just as well be produced by a supercomputer manufacturer or bio

ology company as by a munitions maker.

A Western bolt found in an Iraqi missile is not necessarily a sign of complicity. A bolt has many peaceful uses, too. But the picture provided by the Wisconsin Project suggests just how instrumental such dual-use trade can be. Italian technology allowed Iraq to extract plutonium, and high-performance Swiss presses gave it the ability to make nuclear weapons parts. Most of what Iraq needed to extend the range of its Scud missiles came from Germany. American computers were used in virtually all Iraqi missile and nuclear sites.

Of course, Iraq's most crucial ol. had even clearer military purposes. The Soviet Union openly sold Baghdad hundreds of Scud missiles; Brazil helped secretly in an effort to build an atomic bomb. But it was the wider Western flood, aided by lax laws and porous borders, that helped Iraq to refine those tools, outfit secret factories, and thereby to reach the verge of even more destructive force.

‘Dairy Plant’ Parts

Just one example of that flow was first found in crates marked as dairy plant parts bound from Frankfurt for Baghdad. In fact the intercepted metal parts were a supplement to the 27,436 Scud missile parts worth $28.2 million that #. German company, H & H Metalform, had already delivered to Iraq. A separate compression device was to have helped Iraq test a new intermediate-range missile. There was little mystery to its purpose, German intelligence found: the company had sold the same kind of rocket-testing device to Brazil.

With the most dangerous of the projects dismantled, the tension between Iraq and the West is mostly about the future. In refusing again last week to permit U.N. inspectors to install cameras at a missile-test site, Iraq made clear its aversion to the next step of U.N. oversight, which under Security Council Resolution 715 calls upon the West to keep long-term watch as .# ins to build new weapons.

An apparent agreement on a separate § plan calling for Iraq to sell oil to meet humanitarian needs *. that Baghdad might still be open to a last-minute compromise. But even a fence-mending visit by Rolf Ekeus, the chief U.N. weapons inspector, left unclear by Friday whether Iraq would back down or brave a Western threat of a retaliatory strike.

The new U.N. focus on monitoring—with its fixation on products—nevertheless carries a danger of being too narrow. There are signs that Western equipment remains a key ingredient in secret weapons o not only in Iraq but elsewhere.

A report to Congress last month concluded that Fo shipments by Western com

anies had helped Iraq repair or rebuild nearly all of the military production capac

ity it lost during the war. American . reports have similarly warned of newly #. efforts by Iran to acquire the technology needed to produce chemical and biological weapons.

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