Изображения страниц
PDF
EPUB

ternally, and there are some people who really support the September 12th strategy and others who really don't, and I think Congress needs to find some way to push the administration to continue to try the firm multilateral ultimatum approach, and also the first time that someone gets a flat tire in Baghdad at an inspection, not to assume that that was done by Saddam; therefore, it becomes cause for war.

We need to have some sense of judgment about what is a sufficient breach or impediment. I don't want to give Saddam any kind of green light to start playing games, but I also don't-I am a little bit nervous that Mr. Cheney and Mr. Rumsfeld will use any pretext that they can to say the inspections have failed, because we know from their public statements in the summer they don't like the President's current strategy. Therefore, I think Congress needs to make it clear that what it supports is the President's current strategy, the September 12th U.N. speech concept, but without binding him to come back.

So it is—in the event that the U.N. fails to act. So I don't know how you put that into language, a strong encouragement of a multilateral approach, without insisting on a U.N. Security Council resolution.

Mr. SKELTON. Thank you.

Mr. WELDON. I thank the distinguished member. I thank both of you for outstanding testimony and for your candid response to our questions. You have given us some intellectual disagreement to chew on, but I think in the end your positions are much, much in sync, and we appreciate that. You have played a very important role for us as we have to advise our colleagues on what our position should be relative to the vote, I assume, next week. And, I think in that regard, you have been very helpful, and we appreciate your time. Thank you very much.

This hearing stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:35 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

OCTOBER 2, 2002

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

OCTOBER 2, 2002

« ПредыдущаяПродолжить »