224. UNITED STATES PARTICIPATION IN SOUTH PACIFIC COMMISSION

JOINT RESOLUTION Providing for Membership and Participation by the United States in the South Pacific Commission and Authorizing an Appropriation Therefor, January 28, 1948 1

Whereas delegates representing the Governments of Australia, the French Republic, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, New Zealand, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America attended the South Seas Conference held at Canberra, Australia, and signed an "Agreement Establishing the South Pacific Commission" on February 6, 1947; and Whereas the purpose of the South Pacific Commission is to encourage and strengthen international cooperation in promoting the economic and social welfare and advancement of the non-selfgoverning territories in the South Pacific in accordance with the principles set forth in chapter XI of the Charter of the United Nations, thereby contributing to the maintenanc of international peace and security: Therefore be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the President is hereby authorized to accept membership for the United States in the South Pacific Commission, created by the Agreement Establishing the South Pacific Commission, signed on February 6, 1947, at Canberra, Australia, by delegates representing the Governments of Australia, the French Republic, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, New Zealand, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America, and to appoint the United States Commissioners, and their alternates, thereto.

SEC. 2. When used in this joint resolution

(1) the term "Secretary" means the Secretary of State;

(2) the term "Government agency" means any department, independent establishment, or other agency of the Government of the United States, or any corporation wholly owned by the Government of the United States; and

(3) the term "Commission" means the South Pacific Commission.

SEC. 3. There is hereby authorized to be appropriated to the Department of State, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated

(a) Not more than $20,000 annually for the payment by the United States of its proportionate share of the expenses of the Commission and its auxiliary and subsidiary bodies, as set forth in article XIV of the Agreement Establishing the South Pacific Commission;

(b) Such additional sums as may be needed for the payment of all necessary expenses incident to participation by the United States in the activities of the Commission, including salaries of the United States Commissioners, their alternates, and appropriate staff, without regard to the civil-service laws and the Classification Act of 1923, as amended; personal services in the District of Columbia; services as

Public Law 403, 80th Congress, 2d session, H. J. Res. 232.

authorized by section 15 of Public Law 600, Seventy-ninth Congress; under such rules and regulations as the Secretary of State may prescribe, allowances for living quarters, including heat, fuel, and light and cost-of-living allowances to persons temporarily stationed abroad; hire of passenger motor vehicles and other local transportation; printing and binding without regard to section 11 of the Act of March 1, 1919 (44 U. S. C. 111), and section 3709 of the Revised Statutes, as amended; and such other expenses as the Secretary of State finds necessary to participation by the United States in the activities of the Commission: Provided, That the provisions of section 6 of the Act of July 30, 1946 (Public Law 565, Seventy-ninth Congress), and regulations thereunder, applicable to expenses incurred pursuant to that Act shall be applicable to any expenses incurred pursuant to this paragraph (b).

SEC. 4. The Secretary is authorized, when the Commission is desirous of obtaining the services of a person having special scientific or other technical or professional qualifications, from time to time to detail, or authorize the detail of, for temporary service to or in cooperation with the Commission, any person in the employ or service of the Government of the United States who has such qualifications, with the approval of the Government agency in which such person is employed or serving, under the same conditions as those governing the detail of officers and employees of the United States Government to the government of another country in accordance with the provisions of the Act of May 25, 1938 (52 Stat. 442), as amended, except that the authority vested in the President under that Act shall be vested in the Secretary for the purpose of carrying out this section. Approved January 28, 1948.

VOTING Procedure in the sECURITY COUNCIL

225. FOUR POWER STATEMENT AT SAN FRANCISCO CONFERENCE ON VOTING PROCEDURE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL, JUNE 7, 19451

Specific questions covering the voting procedure in the Security Council have been submitted by a Sub-Committee of the Conference Committee on Structure and Procedures of the Security Council to the Delegations of the four Governments sponsoring the Conferencethe United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Republic of China. In dealing with these questions, the four Delegations desire to make the following statement of their general attitude towards the whole question of unanimity of permanent members in the decisions of the Security Council.

1. The Yalta voting formula recognizes that the Security Council, in discharging its responsibilities for the maintenance of international peace and security, will have two broad groups of functions. Under Chapter VIII, the Council will have to make decisions which. involve its taking direct measures in connection with settlement of disputes, adjustment of situations likely to lead to disputes, deter

1 U. S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, the Charter of the United Nations, hearings, 1945, pp. 213-215.

mination of threats to the peace, removal of threats to the peace, and suppression of breaches of the peace. It will also have to make decisions which do not involve the taking of such measures. The Yalta formula provides that the second of these two groups of decisions will be governed by a procedural vote-that is, the vote of any seven members. The first group of decisions will be governed by a qualified vote-that is, the vote of seven members, including the concurring votes of the five permanent members, subject to the proviso that in decisions under section A and a part of section C of chapter VIII parties to a dispute shall abstain from voting.

2. For example, under the Yalta formula a procedural vote will govern the decisions made under the entire section D of chapter VI. This means that the Council will, by a vote of any seven of its members, adopt or alter its rules of procedure; determine the method of selecting its president; organize itself in such a way as to be able to function continuously; select the times and places of its regular and special meetings; establish such bodies or agencies as it may deem necessary for the performance of its functions; invite a member of the Organization not represented on the Council to participate in its discussions when that Member's interests are specially affected; and invite any state when it is a party to a dispute being considered by the Council to participate in the discussion relating to that dispute.

3. Further, no individual member of the Council can alone prevent consideration and discussion by the Council of a dispute or situation brought to its attention under paragraph 2, section A, chapter VIII. Nor can parties to such dispute be prevented by these means from being heard by the Council. Likewise, the requirement for unanimity of the permanent members cannot prevent any member of the Council from reminding the members of the Organization of their general obligations assumed under the Charter as regards peaceful settlement of international disputes.

4. Beyond this point, decisions and actions by the Security Council may well have major political consequences and may even initiate a chain of events which might, in the end, require the Council under its responsibilities to invoke measures of enforcement under section B, chapter VIII. This chain of events begins when Council decides to make an investigation, or determines that the time has come to call upon states to settle their differences, or makes recommendations to the parties. It is to such decisions and actions that unanimity of the permanent members applies, with the important proviso, referred to above, for abstention from voting by parties to a dispute.

5. To illustrate: In ordering an investigation, the Council has to consider whether the investigation which may involve calling for reports, hearing witnesses, dispatching a commission of inquiry, or other means might not further aggravate the situation. After investigation, the Council must determine whether the continuance of the situation or dispute would be likely to endanger international peace and security. If it so determines, the Council would be under obligation to take further steps. Similarly, the decision to make recommendations, even when all parties request it to do so, or to call upon parties to a dispute to fulfill their obligations under the Charter, might be the first step on a course of action from which the Security Council could withdraw only at the risk of failing to discharge its responsibilities.

6. In appraising the significance of the vote required to take such decisions or actions, it is useful to make comparison with the requirements of the League Covenant with reference to decisions of the League Council. Substantive decisions of the League of Nations Council could be taken only by the unanimous vote of all its members, whether permanent or not, with the exception of parties to a dispute under article XV of the League Covenant. Under article XI, under which most of the disputes brought before the League were dealt with and decisions to make investigations taken, the unanimity rule was invariably interpreted to include even the votes of the parties to a dispute. 7. The Yalta voting formula substitutes for the rule of complete unanimity of the League Council a system of qualified majority voting in the Security Council. Under this system nonpermanent members of the Security Council individually would have no veto. As regards the permanent members, there is no question under the Yalta formula of investing them with a new right; namely, the right to veto, a right which the permanent members of the League Council always had. The formula proposed for the taking of action in the Security Council by a majority of seven would make the operation of the Council less subject to obstruction than was the case under the League of Nations rule of complete unanimity.

8. It should also be remembered that under the Yalta formula the five major powers could not act by themselves, since even under the unanimity requirement any decisions of the Council would have to include the concurring votes of at least two of the nonpermanent members. In other words, it would be possible for five nonpermanent members as a group to exercise a veto. It is not to be assumed, however, that the permanent members, any more than the nonpermanent members, would use their veto power willfully to obstruct the operation of the Council.

9. In view of the primary responsibilities of the permanent members they could not be expected, in the present condition of the world, to assume the obligation to act in so serious a matter as the maintenance of international peace and security in consequence of a decision in which they had not concurred. Therefore, if majority voting in the Security Council is to be made possible, the only practicable method is to provide, in respect of nonprocedural decisions, for unanimity of the permanent members plus the concurring votes of at least two of the nonpermanent members.

10. For all these reasons, the four sponsoring governments agreed on the Yalta formula and have presented it to this Conference as essential if an international organization is to be created through which all peace-loving nations can effectively discharge their common responsibilities for the maintenance of international peace and security.

II

In the light of the considerations set forth in part 1 of this statement, it is clear what the answers to the questions submitted by the subcommittee should be, with the exception of question 19. The answer to that question is as follows:

1. In the opinion of the delegations of the sponsoring governments, the Draft Charter itself contains an indication of the application of the voting procedures to the various functions of the Council.

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2. In this case, it will be unlikely that there will arise in the future any matters of great importance on which a decision will have to be made as to whether a procedural vote would apply. Should, however, such a matter arise the decision regarding the preliminary question as to whether or not such a matter is procedural must be taken by a vote of seven members of the Security Council, including the concurring votes of the permanent members.

226. UNITED STATES POSITION ON THE VETO QUESTION Statement by Senator Tom Connally, United States Delegate to the General Assembly, November 15, 1946 1

1

The Committee is considering a number of resolutions relating to the "veto". It is a term that has obtained wide usage. The press constantly refers to it-it is a short and suggestive word.

The so-called "veto question" arises from the construction of the voting formula in the Charter of the United Nations. In effect, the veto does reside in the permanent members of the Security Council. However, if we consider the Yalta formula-the formula proposed by President Roosevelt at Yalta, accepted there by Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin, and incorporated into the Charter as article 27-we must not think of it in the narrow sense of a veto. We must not ignore the history and purpose of that formula.

Let us look at paragraph 3 of that article the paragraph that causes much of the controversy. Let us examine the rule of unanimity. Those of you who were at San Francisco will recall how the importance of the unanimity of the great powers in preserving peace influenced our action in adopting the Charter and approving article 27. We were convinced that the great powers alone possessed the strength and military and naval resources necessary to crush aggression and to enforce peace. World War II demonstrated that fact. We were further persuaded that the powers who in unity had won the war could through unity and a common purpose win the peace. We also believed that division between the great powers over intervention or the use of force might result in war instead of peace.

Can you imagine what would happen if four of the smaller states and three of the great powers decided to use force against a stateperhaps against a great power-over the determined opposition of two permanent members of the Council? That would mean warnot the preservation of peace.

The unanimity of the great powers on important matters is, in the opinion of the United States, essential for the successful functioning of the Security Council and for the future of the United Nations. But the words we stress are successful functioning. The requirement that the permanent members must concur in a decision must not be made use of by any of them to frustrate that functioning. On the contrary, the United States believes that the permanent members of the Security Council have a special responsibility to make the Organ

1 Department of State Bulletin of December 1, 1946, pp. 987-991. (See also "Statement on the Veto" by Bernard M. Baruch, December 27, 1946, printed under International Control of Atomic Energy.) Made in Committee 1 (Political and Security) of the General Assembly on November 15, 1946 by Senator Tom Connally. Senator Connally was United States Delegate to the General Assembly and a member of Committee 1.