ization work, to see that the spirit and intent of the Yalta formula are fulfilled. They must remember and live up to what they said at San Francisco in the Four-Power declaration to which they all subscribed:

"It must not be assumed that the permanent members would use their 'veto' power wilfully to obstruct the operation of the Council."

Mr. President, I was a United States Delegate at San Francisco and in the committee took part in the debate on the voting formula. Among other things I said:

"It is our theory that they (the permanent members) will be sensible of that sense of responsibility and that they will discharge the duties of their office not as representatives of their governments, not as representatives of their own ambitions or their own interests, but as representatives of the whole Organization in behalf of world peace and in behalf of world security. Any other course, Mr. President, would over a period of time cause the disintegration of this Organization. Fifty nations would not permit the arbitrary or wilful use of the powers of the Security Council when it was adverse to the interests of all of the Organization or of world peace.'

I regret to say that developments have not entirely fulfilled my hopes. But I still maintain that "arbitrary or wilful use" would over a period of time cause the disintegration of the Organization. The life of the Charter depends upon the lofty and unselfish discharge of their duties by the members of the Security Council.

Senator Austin in his address in the Assembly made reference to the general principles which should control the Security Council.

The permanent members of the Security Council are members of the United Nations before they are members of the Council. They are obligated to perform their duties to the Organization just as are all other members. Membership on the Council does not exempt them from any duties or responsibilities. Membership on the Security Council carries no title of nobility nor privilege nor preference. The permanent members of the Security Council have a heavier responsibility for the successful operation of the United Nations than those of any other organ or agency. The members of the Security Council are trustees for all the members of the United Nations. The Charter lays upon them "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security" and the members of the United Nations "agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf". Note the solemn statement"under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf". The responsibility of the five permanent members of the Security Council is momentous. It is tremendous. It may have the effect of shaking the very foundations of the earth. How can any member of the Security Council consider lightly or selfishly that lofty responsibility?

I shall say little about the record of the Council to date. I do wish to point out, however, that the picture is not all black. The Council's record has not been one of unrelieved frustration. Remember its successes when you are weighing the worth of the Yalta formula. Place against the exercise of the veto such items as the agreement of Britain and France to evacuate their troops from Syria and the Lebanon, and the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Iran.

So much for the background and the record of the Security Council. The question remains-what of the future? What can we do now to insure the success of the Security Council?

First, I want to say a few words about what should not be done. The United Nations is barely ten months old. During the short period of its existence some things have gone well and others have gone badly. There may be parts of the Charter that will prove absolutely unworkable and have to be changed ultimately. Article 27 may be one of those parts, but we do not know that now and we shall not know it for some time to come. During the first hundred years after the adoption of the Constitution of the United States and the Bill of Rights, it was amended only five times. But all that time it was growing and developing and was meeting the needs of an expanding nation. The United Nations Charter also has in it the potentialities of growth and development. The way to find out what these potentialities are is to test it, to build slowly on the foundation that we so successfully laid at San Francisco. Let us not, therefore, in haste attempt to amend the Charter. Let us profit by experience and a better understanding of the functions and obligations, powers and purposes set forth in the Charter.

On the other hand, there are certain important steps that we may take, where already we have that wide area of agreement that is so necessary for their success. It is my conviction that many of the difficulties encountered in the Security Council during the first year of its operation have been due to lack of certainty and differences of opinion regarding the practical application of the voting formula adopted at San Francisco.

Let me be more specific. You will recall that when the Charter prescribed two types of votes in the Security Council, it was intended that there should be little confusion as to when the Council should use one method and when it should use the other. I have before me the Four-Power statement made at San Francisco on June 7, 1945. That statement listed quite a number of instances where the Council's decisions would be procedural and where the veto would not apply. The statement went on to predict that "it is unlikely that there will arise in the future any matters of great importance on which a decision will have to be made as to whether a procedural vote will apply." That prediction fell far short of its mark. Many matters have arisen where there had been real difference of opinion as to which type of vote to use. The Security Council should proceed to settle the doubts. That is part of the unfinished business from San Francisco.

The Security Council should put in its rules of procedure as soon as possible as complete a list of procedural decisions as the Council can agree upon. This would mean that in the future, whenever a question arises as to the kind of vote that is required, the Council could in most cases solve the problem by a simple reference to the list.

There is still another matter where I believe the stage has been set for progress. There is a provision in paragraph three of article 27 of the Charter that a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting in the Security Council in decisions relating to chapter VI of the CharterPacific Settlement. It is perfectly clear that the purpose of this was to prevent the party from being a judge in its own cause, to establish in the Charter à principle of justice which is elementary in every legal

system. We would not permit a party to a lawsuit to sit as a member of the jury.

President Roosevelt firmly believed that this principle constituted a very great contribution to the development of international organization. Its acceptance first at Yalta, and then at San Francisco, is a landmark. However, because of some technicalities which I do not intend to explore, doubts have been suggested as to whether it can be effectively applied to the operations of the Security Council.

My own view is that the requirement that a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting constitutes an exception to the general rule set forth in the preceding part of article 27. It is the considered opinion of the United States Delegation that article 27 lays down clearly and without equivocation the fundamental principle that in the field of peaceful settlement under the Charter no state shall be a judge in its own cause. No legal technicalities or mental excursions into the stratosphere should be permitted to becloud this important concept.

I was much interested, Mr. President, in what the distinguished Delegates of El Salvador and New Zealand had to say about the possibility of a permanent member abstaining from voting on a matter without vetoing it. This problem deserves very careful consideration. It would be particularly helpful with respect to the peaceful settlement of disputes if a way could be found to permit a permanent member which does not want to block action by the Council to abstain from voting.

As it stands today a great power may find itself in the utterly ridiculous situation of voting for a measure which it does not entirely approve or else blocking the wheels of justice by the unwilling use of its veto. There should be some middle ground if the machinery of peaceful settlement is to function smoothly.

If progress can be made along these lines in the Security Council, it will not accomplish everything that some would like to see accomplished. But it will help. It will ease the task of the Security Council in arriving at satisfactory decisions relating to the pacific settlement of disputes. It will eliminate many of the arguments that have at times frustrated the work of the Council. The operations of the Council will move forward more smoothly.

I must remind those who criticize the United Nations that it takes more than mere machinery to bring world peace. In my opinion the machinery that we have is in the main adequate. But if the raw material that goes into the machine is bitterness and friction among the member states we cannot expect harmony and unity to result.

How can we in the General Assembly best contribute to bringing about the progress we so earnestly desire with respect to the work of the Security Council? I think that a full discussion of this problem in the General Assembly is bound to be helpful. The General Assembly may wish to go so far as to make recommendations to the Security Council. That also would be helpful. However, I think that the discussions and the recommendations should be focused on the general objectives that we hope will be attained. Clearly the General Assembly cannot assume to dictate technical details. The Security Council itself must determine the techniques, the methods for accomplishing these objectives. If the best way to accomplish the ob

jectives which we may recommend is for the Security Council to adopt rules of procedure, then clearly it is only the Security Council that can perform the task.

Any resolution that the General Assembly may see fit to adopt should concern itself only with the broad outlines of what we hope to achieve. Anything that we recommend should be realistic, should be attainable, should be in the direction of substantial and certain progress.

With this in mind, I think it is appropriate to indicate specifically the United States attitude towards the proposals advanced thus far in the General Assembly.

The United States opposes any steps in the direction of amending the Charter. It is well known that amendment of the Charter is impossible at this time. The resolution proposed by Australia is moderate in that it deals with general objectives. We believe however that the specific recommendation that the permanent members shall refrain from exercising their veto power except in the cases under chapter VII of the Charter should first be considered by the permanent members of the Council.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to review briefly the position of the United States.

1. We regard the principle of unanimity as of the highest importance for the success of the United Nations.

2. We believe that the responsibility imposed upon the great powers by the Charter requires them to exert every effort to reach agreement on important issues before the Security Council.

3. We reaffirm the position we took at San Francisco that the veto should be used only in the very rare and exceptional cases.

4. We insist that the use of the veto cannot relieve any state from its fundamental obligations under the Charter.

5. We do not favor amendment of the Charter at this time, although we hope that full agreement, including of course that of the five permanent members, may make it possible in the future to modify the practice of great-power unanimity as it applies to the peaceful settlement of disputes under Chapter VI.

6. We believe that the voting formula should be clarified in the light of experience and practical need. The Security Council should embark upon this task at the earliest practicable time.

7. In particular, we believe that the Security Council should agree upon as complete a list as possible of types of decisions where the veto does not apply.

8. We believe that article 27 makes it clear that in the field of peaceful settlement no state should be a judge in its own cause.

9. The problem of great-power abstention should be carefully considered, particularly with respect to the peaceful settlement of disputes. Mr. Chairman, digressing a moment from the written text, I want to say that while we are opposed at this time to the amendment of the Charter, we are in favor of making the Charter work. Mr. Chairman, let me issue this warning to all the members of the United Nations and to the Security Council itself. If this Charter does not work, if its functions are not properly performed, this Organization may ultimately go down in ruins. The League of Nations perished; this Organization must not perish. It must go on; it must succeed. There is beyond these doors, there is out on the far-flung reaches of the earth,

a force greater than the Security Council, a force greater than the Assembly, and that is the crystallized opinion of the peoples of the world. If we cannot attain our objectives through the United Nations, that public opinion will seek another remedy.

Mr. Chairman, I would, therefore, warn all who are in authority in this Organization to stop, look, listen, and consider their high duties and responsibilities with a view to making this Organization work.

In conclusion, let me stress that members of the Security Council in good conscience do not represent in the Security Council their own governments. They represent the entire membership of the United Nations. Their right to vote is not a personal possession. They have no right to cast a vote in any narrow or nationalistic or selfish interest. At the bar of history they are responsible for administering their high functions in the interest of international peace and in the interest of the entire United Nations Organization. Any member of the Security Council who fails to perform these high functions has no proper conception of his duties and responsibilities. Those duties and responsibilities require that they be performed in accordance with the principles and purposes of the Charter and in a manner to attain its lofty objectives. Let there be no embezzlement of power by the Security Council or by any member. Standing at the highest point of the world's history, the Security Council has a magnificent opportunity to set before all living men and the generations that come after us a commanding example of high duty nobly performed. Humankind will pour out its gratitude and will bless them if they will preserve the peace of the world. May God endow it and its members with a clear vision of their duties and with a high courage to perform every obligation to the United Nations and to the world!

227. VOTING PROCEDURE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Resolution of the General Assembly, December 13, 1946

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,

1

MINDFUL of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and having taken notice of the divergencies which have arisen in regard to the application and interpretation of Article 27 of the Charter:

EARNESTLY REQUESTS the permanent members of the Security Council to make every effort, in consultation with one another and with fellow members of the Security Council, to ensure that the use of the special voting privilege of its permanent members does not impede the Security Council in reaching decisions promptly;

RECOMMENDS to the Security Council the early adoption of practices and procedures, consistent with the Charter, to assist in reducing the difficulties in the application of Article 27 and to ensure the prompt and effective exercise by the Security Council of its functions; and FURTHER RECOMMENDS that, in developing such practices and procedures, the Security Council take into consideration the views expressed by Members of the United Nations during the second part of the first session of the General Assembly.

1 The United States and the United Nations: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1946, Department of State publication 2735, the United States and the United Nations Report Series 7, p. 98.