is characteristic of the metaphysical. In enumerating the kinds of motion, Aristotle is not always consistent with himself. Sometimes he makes motion synonymous with change (μeтaßoλn), sometimes he gives the latter the wider signification. In the former case he admits four kinds of motion: (1) essential (ý Kar' ovolav or Kaтà TÒ Tí), origination and destruction; (2) quantitative (ʼn KaTà TÒ μéуelos Or TÒ TOσóv), increase and diminution; (3) qualitative ἡ κατὰ τὸ πάθος or τὸ ποιόν), transmutation ; (4) local (ἡ κατὰ τὸν) TÓTTOV Or TÒ TOû), locomotion. In the latter case he omits the first of these, and calls it change, of which he admits three kinds: (1) from an existent to an existent, (2) from an existent to a non-exexistent, (3) from a non-existent to an existent (VTоKEίμevov). The primitive form of motion is the local, from which all the others, except, to some extent, the first, are derivative. The perfect local motion is the circular, because it is uniform and complete, that is, it returns upon itself. We might sum up Aristotle's view of motion thus: All movement is evolution.

“Nature (þúσis), in its primal and proper signification, is the essence of things which have in themselves a principle of movement, as being what they are. The material is called nature, because it is receptive of this essence, while developments and growth are so called because they are movements proceeding from it. And this is the principle of movement in all natural products, being somehow immanent in them, either potentially or actually (evteλexeía) (Metap., iv, 4). Aristotle distinguishes five meanings of nature: (1) the development of things that grow (pûσis); (2) the first immanent matter out of which that which grows grows; (3) the first moving cause in any individual product of nature, in so far as it is what it is; (4) that first something out of which any product of nature is made, and which is incapable of being shaped or changed by any power of its own; (5) the essence of natural products." (Ibid.)

"OPPOSITES (AVTIKEíμeva) is used to mean: (1) Contradiction. (ἀντίφασις), (2) contraries (ἐναντία), (3) correlatives (τὰ πρός τι), (4) privation and possession (σTÉρnois Kai ë§is), (5) the ultimate From-what and To-what of certain processes-e. g., generation and dissolution, (6) things that cannot coexist in a subject capable of admitting either by itself. Not only these are said to be opposites, but also the things from which they are. White and gray cannot

coexist in the same thing, hence the things from which they are are opposites." (Metaph., iv [4], 10.)

PRINCIPLE, BEGINNING, AUTHORITY (apx").-" By principle," etc., is meant (1) that part of a thing from which one would set out to move along it. . . . (2) That from which any particular thing can best arise. Even in the case of learning, for example, we have sometimes to begin, not with what is first and with the beginning of the subject, but with that from which we can most easily acquire knowledge. (3) The internal groundwork upon which anything is built up-e. g., the keel of a ship. . . . (4) That external source from which a thing first derives its origin, and from which motion and change naturally first begin. Father and mother stand in this relation to their child, and so does insult to battle. (5) That according to whose choice the things that move move, and the things that change change-as, for example, in states the authorities (apxaí). . . . (6) That from which a thing is first known. . . for example, the presuppositions upon which demonstrations are based. The term 'cause' is used in all the above significations; for all causes are principles. The common element in all principles is that they are the first source from which anything is, becomes, or is known. Some of them are internal, others external. Hence nature is a principle, and so are element, thought, choice, essence, and aim. In many cases, indeed, the Good and the Beautiful are the principles of knowing and moving." (Metaph., iv [4], 1.)

SENSE OF SENSATION, SENSITIVE, SENSIBLE (αἴσθησις, αἰσθητικός, aloonτós).-Sense stands opposed to Intellect, as the Transient does to the Eternal. It is conversant with what is in motion or change, and is itself essentially movable and changeable. And, just as Intellect is essentially active (πointikós, évepyelą), so Sense is essentially passive (TalηTin, dvváμe)-passive to the sensible. All sensation consists of particulars, not particular things (ovoiai), but particular affections. These are felt by different organs, and meet in a common SENSORIUM (alonτýρiov), where, to use a modern expression, they form a "cluster." This cluster Aristotle calls once the passive or possible Intellect (νοῦς παθητικός, νοῦς δυνάμει), meaning that it is that which, when actualized and "separated" by the act of the Divine Intellect, becomes an intellect proper (vous évepyeía). Until this takes place, the intellect "thinks nothing"

(oudèv voeî)-that is, knows no universal--by which it can rise above time and place. (As to the limits of Sense, see chap. x, third paragraph from the end.)

THEORY (Oewpía) is used in two senses by Aristotle: (1) as investigation, inquiry, in which case it is always followed by a limiting genitive or its equivalent (ἡ περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας θεωρία, etc.). Cf. Bonitz, Metaph. ii, 127; Trendelenburg, Elementa Log. Aristot., p. 82; (2) in its literal sense, as the vision of divine things (Tò ópâv тà Oeia, Alex.), and then has no limiting word or words. It is used in this sense in chap. vii of this book, and in Eth. Nicom., x, 8, and in both cases is identified with the supreme happiness. That Aristotle held this happiness to consist in the contemplation of essences, there can be no doubt. It is somewhat difficult to say which meaning it bears in the opening words of this book, and I know that, in rendering it as I have done, I am departing from the opinion of Bonitz, Schwegler, and others. I think the context justifies my version.

66

UNIVERSAL (TO кalóλoν).—“ I mean by universal' that which is (τὸ καθόλου). capable of being predicated of more than one; by PARTICULAR that which is not-e. g., man is a universal; Callias, a particular” (De Interp., vi). According to Aristotle, universals have no separate existence; they are always combined with matter and particularized by it. Only first essences have a separate existence, universals (genera and species) are second essences (deÚтepai ovoíai, Categ., v). God, of course, is the farthest of all beings from being universal, as well as from being particular (κað' ExaσTOV). He is the source of both universality and particularity. Zeller (Die Philosophie der Griechen, Bd. iii, S. 309, sqq., 802, sqq.) seems to me to have entirely misunderstood Aristotle's doctrine of the relation of the universal to the particular, when he thinks that Aristotle contradicts himself in maintaining that all actual existence is particular, and yet all knowledge of the universal. The statements are entirely compatible, and, indeed, are both true. The universal, as universal-that is, as something capable of being predicated of many particulars-exists only in the mind, and is by it used as a means of knowing. Outside the mind it. exists only as particular, as which it is an object of knowing. There is no contradiction in saying that particulars are known by a means which is universal, that the quo cognoscimus differs from

the quod cognoscimus. Of course, Aristotle holds that the first. to us is the universal, while the first in nature (and last known to us) is the particular, which is aπeipov.

THE RELIGION OF THE OLD TESTAMENT.

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN OF G. W. F. HEGEL'S "PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION BY J. MACBRIDE STERRETT.*

The Religion of Sublimity.

There is one element which this religion has in common with the religion of the Beautiful [that of Greece]. That is, the subjection of the merely natural to the spiritual. Mere nature is idealized, deprived of its merely quantitative or external valuation, and considered the rather as plastic material for the divine artificer or artist. In both these religions God is known as free Spirit, as Spirit with rational and ethical attributes. In the religion of the Beautiful, however, God does not appear in full independent absolute Being. He is manifested as having definite limited content. The beautiful, in which this divine manifestation is made, in which the ethical and spiritual attributes of the Divine appear, is that of sensuous material and form. At most, the plane on which this manifestation is made is that of pictorial thought, of imagination, and fantasy. The idealization of the natural is thus not yet complete. This can only take place where the ground of the Divine. revelation is spiritual thought.

The delightful, friendly forms of the Greek deities lacked that absolute and independent character which is essential to the eternal Divine existence. Religion must rise to sublimer conceptions. These specialized forms of the Divine must be seen to be phases of the One Divine life. An absolute spiritual unity is the ultimatum for thought. This the Greeks did not reach, but the Jews did. Such a unity, too, must be fully concrete, containing all particular ethical and spiritual forms in itself. It is only thus

* The translator frequently resorts to paraphrasing in order to avoid the continuous abstruse technique of the original.

concrete subjectivity. This is really attained only in the Christian religion. It is held by the Jews in an abstract form. This in turn is mediated by the specialized forms of the Divine in the Greek religion, an apostasy which is to be reconciled in the absolute religion.

The plane upon which the revelation of the Divine unity can alone be made is that of thought freed from all sensuous and pictorial elements. Thus we have its first abstract form of pure independent subjective unity in pure thought. Here we have this pure subjectivity entirely free from all elements of the merely natural in the form of either sensuous or mental representation. Here for the first time is reached the conception which is worthy of the name of God.

This subjective unity is far more than substance. It is absolute power, before which the natural appears in its true light as something created (Gesetztes) and not independent. It finds its congenial instrument of revelation not in nature but in thought.

Absolute power, however, is not its only characteristic. That is also found in the East Indian religion. The chief point here is that it is characterized as concrete and not as abstract power. Hence it is absolute wisdom. The rational characteristics of freedom unite in this one-that is, in an end or aim. Hence holiness is the chief characteristic of this subjective unity.

The higher truth of the subjectivity of God is not to be found. in the characteristic of beauty, where the absolute content is scattered in particular forms, but it is found in this characteristic of holiness. The difference between the two is like that between animals and man. Animals have particular characters, while the character of universality is human. The truest subjectivity is that of self-characterization as rational freedom. This is wisdom. and holiness. The Grecian gods were not holy, because they were limited and separate.

A. The General Characteristic of the Idea (Begriff).

God as the absolute is characterized as the One pure subjectivity, and hence as universal. Or, to put it the other way, this subjectivity which is in itself universal, is absolutely only One. It is not enough that bare unity be shown as the ground, as in the Indian and Chinese religions. In these God is not posited as infinite