fort they could effect nothing, but they are ever accomplishing a mighty result when they are in constant, even though unconscious, union with the highest; on the other hand, it is possible for them just as unconsciously to occasion mischief and corruption. Here

we have the great Giant, "who with his body has no power; his hands cannot lift a straw, his shoulders could not bear a fagot of twigs; but with his shadow he has power over much-nay, all. He is strongest, therefore, at sunrise and sunset." How true! In the youth of a people myth is everything to it; moreover, this myth-making power never dies in the mass of the people; but it expresses itself in a thousand-fold different ways, and, when existing forms of culture decline, how powerful in good and ill do these illusions of the masses show themselves to be, who, seeking with an unerring instinct for a justice the lack of which is felt, are not warned by an indwelling law and sense of proportion from the most frightful errors! A typical and altogether objective symbol of all religious, political, and social disorders that have ever shaken the world.

Again, at mid-day, when the Sun, standing high in the heavens, now spreads his light everywhere, the green Snake, vaulted to form a bridge, can make a way into the realm of the fair Lily for individual travellers who desire it.

The questions, what is intended by this Suake, and what the enigmatical Ferryman means, demand a reference to the concrete action of the Märchen; for I would here remind the reader that the Märchen does not treat symbolically of the relation of general ideas and forces to one another, but that it refers allegorically to the circumstances of the German people at a definite time, and to how they may shape themselves in the future.

I spoke above of the condition of German affairs in the eighteenth century. The deep feeling of insufficiency and inadequacy aroused then for the first time a movement in science and literature which was rich in results. It was confined, however, to a relatively narrow circle; the mass of the German people still turned, to gratify its spiritual needs, to what was offered by religious forms and manifold popular fancies, some inherited, and some newly shaping themselves. For the help and comfort of those who sought them, the treasures of the ancient world again offered themselves, which science as well as

art eagerly sought to appropriate. Moreover, men turned their eyes to nature, and the literature of that time began to devote itself with care and love to the observation and description of natural objects. Not only did the great characteristics of the universe become the theme of its representations, but it dwelt with. greater love on the observation of landscape pictures which were narrowly restricted, and sought to paint them with the utmost care even to the smallest details.

The literature of this epoch has many beauties of a high order to show, and its aim is everywhere seen to be directed to the noble and spiritual, though it could not free itself from a certain dullness and formal pedantry, which impeded its higher movement and held it down to earth, as it were. There breathes in it a strong breath of patriotic enthusiasm, though it was far from presenting to itself the past and future of the fatherland in clearly defined forms, and vague feelings still stood in place of distinct and clearly conceived ideas.

This was, on the whole, the position of our beautiful literature in the first half of the last century. In thinking upon Lessing, we are accustomed to bring the great development of the second half of the century prominently into connection with his struggle against the deformities which imitation of the French brought with it. Nevertheless, the influence which the literary stars of France exercised at that time upon the very best spirits of our people is a very powerful one-indeed, it is incalculable. Not only did they rule almost like sovereigns the whole of what is called polite society; not only under their influence was Wieland able to clothe the German language with the lightness and grace which alone enabled it to gain the victory in those circles over its foreign rival; but who will estimate what part the reading of Rousseau, Diderot, and Voltaire played in the spiritual development of Lessing, Goethe, and Schiller?

Think, moreover, of Frederick the Great and the immense influence of the whole French philosophy of enlightenment in the religious and the political spheres! It was precisely the French lightness, coupled on the one hand with remarkable clearness and pointedness, on the other with some narrowness and often with frivolous superficiality, that obtained for these new ideas their wide dissemination and popularity, through which they brought light XXII-21

to all civilized Europe. From it German literature received an impulse most rich in results on a side on which it most needed to be aroused. For while it now took to itself that lightness and grace, that verve and animated precision, while it replenished itself with those ideas which enkindle the people and exert an immediate and practical influence, it still remained true to itself, it knew how to melt that gold in its veins, it cleansed it from those elements which were foreign to itself, and a light was enkindled in it which has ever since lighted the nation on all its paths with an ever-increasing brightness.

The figure of the green Snake, which Goethe chose to represent this stage of German literature, seems to me a very happy invention. Let one read the first part of the Märchen and see if, when the meaning which I have given is accepted, the most manifold relations do not everywhere spring into view, carrying along the characterization, now in an earnest and again in a satirical and ironical spirit.

I will return to this point again at the proper place. Let us now follow the action of the Märchen from the beginning.

(To be concluded.)

CAN ECONOMICS FURNISH AN OBJECTIVE
STANDARD FOR MORALITY?

BY SIMON N. PATTEN.

It is affirmed by Mr. Herbert Spencer, in his Data of Ethics, that all current methods of ethics have one general defect-they neglect ultimate causal connections. Now that he has added another method of ethics to those we previously possessed, certainly it is not out of place to examine whether he has neglected any of those ultimate causal connections which were overlooked by previous moralists. It must be conceded that he has brought out many causal connections by which a much clearer view of ethics can now be had than was formerly possible; but that he has clearly enumerated or even consciously recognized those ulti

mate causal connections which lie at the basis of the true ethical system must be doubted even if we accept those general principles from which he proceeds. Mr. Spencer affirms that it is the business of Moral Science to deduce from the laws of life and the conditions of existence what kinds of actions tend to produce happiness and what kinds to produce unhappiness. An examination of his books, however, will reveal that he has deduced most of his conclusions from the laws of life alone. A reader is left in complete darkness as to what those ultimate conditions of existence are to which humanity must ultimately conform to obtain the highest type of existence. When I endeavor to determine these ultimate conditions and seek aid from Mr. Spencer's writings, I find that be, as well as his predecessors, has an inadequate idea of causation, and at some points he seems to have no idea of causation at all. To be specific, I would say that Mr. Spencer asserts that on our planet an evolution is taking place in which the fittest tend to survive and through which the surplus of our pleasures above our pains is constantly increased. Now, if such an evolution is taking place, it must be due to the peculiar natural conditions of our planet. Whoever asserts that a progressive evolution. must take place on Mars, Jupiter, or any other planet regardless of their peculiar natural conditions, certainly lacks an adequate idea of causation. The same would be true of any one who asserted that a progressive evolution would take place on our planet if all the soils and climates were like that of Greenland, Sahara, or many other places. Evolution can be progressive only under peculiar natural conditions, and only when all these conditions are present can we expect a progressive evolution.

Mr. Spencer, however, asserts more than that we have a progressive evolution. He also asserts that this evolution has a given goal-an ideal social state where pleasure is unalloyed with pain anywhere. In asserting the possibility of an ideal state where all right conduct has no necessary painful consequences, he either has an inadequate idea of causation or he means to affirm merely that the natural conditions on our planet are such as to allow an ideal social state.

Supposing that in his two main propositions we have a progressive evolution and that an ideal social state is for us possible, he means only that these two propositions are true of the natural

Uor M

conditions of our planet, there is still need to examine the natural conditions which each of these propositions presupposes to see if they harmonize enough so that both of them could be true of one planet. If the natural conditions needed for an ideal social state where pleasure is unalloyed with pain are anywhere different from those which a progressive evolution demands, then an ethical system which endeavors to ground itself on both of these propositions lacks consistency, and one or the other proposition must be given up so as to harmonize our ethical ideal with natural conditions.

If Mr. Spencer wished to show that his idea of causation was more developed than that of his predecessors, he should have shown that these two fundamental points of his system harmonize. He has, however, avoided all discussion of the necessary condi tions of existence and has sought only to elucidate the laws of life; yet these laws are not ultimate, but depend on the external conditions of existence.

I wish to discuss in detail the external conditions upon which these two propositions depend, and think it can be made clear that they require for their realization radically different natural conditions-so different that it is impossible for one planet to have all the natural conditions necessary to make both of these ends possible. I shall endeavor to determine what natural conditions a progressive evolution demands, and then these natural conditions. can be compared with those which Mr. Spencer's ideal social state presupposes.

The evolution of life, we are told, is a continual adjustment of internal relations to external conditions. We thus have two distinct problems to investigate the fixed external conditions and the internal relations which must adjust themselves to the external conditions. To the second of these problems evolutionists have devoted their entire attention, bringing in the external conditions in a casual way. They presuppose such a set of external conditions. as would make a progressive evolution possible and then investigate the changes in the internal relations which take place as these relations gradually adjust themselves more and more to external conditions.

What, then, are the external conditions which favor a progressive evolution? To answer this question we must first determine