D. Applicability of Spanish Maritime Support Techniques to the United States The U.S. economic environment is so different from the Spanish one that few of the Spanish support techniques would appear to be applicable to U. S. conditions. The payment of a fixed percentage of the selling price on any vessel built in a national yard has considerable advantage in permitting the yard and its customers to contract quickly without having to wait for government decision-making. It also creates stronger incentives to build and sell the type of ship for which a yard's construction costs are lowest compared to those of its competitors. Otherwise, the Spanish system of maritime support has been heavily dependent on state-trading with respect to ocean-shipping services and on de facto cargo preference related to such state-trading. Its shipyards that compete on the international market are also governmentowned enterprises, with some private equity participation. With increased building capacity in the yards and a much larger fleet, Spain is likely to become an increasingly important factor in the international market for ships and shipping services. The OECD Arrangement is effectively limiting the government's penchant for subsidizing the maritime industry. Strong support for that Arrangement would appear to be of considerable significance to U. S. operators and shipyards who must compete for business against Spanish counterparts. (1) Business-Government Relations 17 Government Ownership and Capital Contribution 17 (2) Anti-Trust Regulations 18 (1) Financing of Swedish Ocean-Going Operators (2) 29 B. Net Value of Government Support to Buying a Ship 32 C. Net Value of Government Support to Operating Costs 33 D. Applicability of the Swedish Maritime Support Techniques to the United States 33 The average annual rate of growth of the Swedish economy for the period of 1960 to 1970 was about 4. 1%, which was slightly below the average rate for the industrialized countries of West Europe and the rate for the United States (4.5%). Over the first half of the 1960s, the Swedish GNP grew at the average annual rate of 5.4%, but slowed to 3.9% for the last half of the decade. The lower rate of economic growth for the last half of the decade has been attributed to three factors, namely a diminishing supply of labor; slackening international business activities resulting primarily from the restrictive economic policies implemented by a number of countries to correct disturbances in internal and external balances; and deficits in the Swedish balance of current payments which limited the possibilities for making the economy more expansionary. As the supply of labor slackened in the period from 1965 to 1970, growth of production could only be achieved by improvements in productivity, which is reported to have increased by over 5% per year. This increase in production has been attributed to increased investments in plant and equipment, application of new technology, improved quality of labor and the transfer of labor and capital from less to more productive firms through structural change. The principal elements of the structural change have been closure of firms, mergers, and cooperation agreements. Some of these have led to partial or full ownership of enterprises by the government. Until about 1965, the combination of modern manufacturing industries and the availability of important natural resources provided the |