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men, hogmen, sheepmen, and over a hundred representative farmers coming together at least twice a year presenting their views, gentlemen, at times the fur flies. But those points of view had to be resolved, as you stated this morning, on a national basis because you are a national Senator, Congressman Cooley is a State Congressman but he must pass laws that represent every farmer in the United States. Am I right?

The CHAIRMAN. That is right, both of us.

Mr. HOKE. Now, then, we are in a situation of surplus. I have never liked the word "surpluses" and therefore in this statement as you will notice here, I put this in there:

The agricultural surpluses of this Nation (although a blessing from a grateful God who has blessed this Nation with abundance) poses a great threat to our whole economy.

I went through the depression of the 1930's and as we cattlemen say, I lost my shirt practically in cattle feeding.

I had plenty of that product which we as cattlemen know as B. S. I couldn't eat it, I couldn't pay taxes with it, but I had a spirit and determination and knew from the historic past of cattle people that that situation would pass. I lost money terrifically in 2 years feeding cattle. In 1934 and 1936 I regained more of my losses, far more than I had lost because of the severe drought years of the farmers in the Southwest and Northwest.

Here again I mention two facts in my opening remarks. We need but review the past history of agricultural programs to find that the farmers of the Nation were not permitted to solve their own problems, but that politicians felt they solve the farmer's problems through Government by conceiving various programs that cost us billions. We are spending billions today, gentlemen, to continue this program. There is a public relationship from the public who says that the American farmer is being treated to a billion-dollar grant every year, ACP payments, storage costs, and all this.

The CHAIRMAN. You don't believe that, do you?

Mr. HOKE. It is not much less than that, if you count ACP pay

ments.

The CHAIRMAN. If you will do like Secretary Benson did when he appeared before the committee in 1953 and put in ACP payments, REA, foreign aid, and everything else, you could maybe make it $25 billion.

Mr. HOKE. Isn't it money?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. HOKE. Taxpayers' money.

The CHAIRMAN. But get the amount correct. I don't care what it is. Here is the record taken from the Department of Agriculture itself.

Mr. HOKE. You read those.

The CHAIRMAN. If you had read it you wouldn't make the statement you made.

Mr. HOKE. I am not sure.

The CHAIRMAN. The price-support program on basic commodities that have been supported through June 30, 1955, that is this June, was $392,648,091. That is a pretty far cry from the billions you have been talking about, isn't it?

Mr. HOKE. It is all part of the cost of these programs. The CHAIRMAN. Let's put the facts as they are, sir. The commodities that have been assisted—that is, through a program of price supports, are the basics at 40 percent.

Mr. HOKE. My point is it is all money that is appropriated by the United States Congress for specific purposes.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right.

Mr. HOKE. That is my point.

The CHAIRMAN. It doesn't amount to billions, as you say it is. Mr. HOKE. I didn't say billions; I said approximately a billion, a billion a year.

The CHAIRMAN. A billion a year? The amount I have just indicated here is for a period of 22 years.

Mr. HOKE. It hasn't cost us a billion?

The CHAIRMAN. I am talking about basic commodities. If you add milk in that

Mr. HOKE. I am talking of all commodities.

The CHAIRMAN. If you add potatoes in that and if you add eggs and if you add all those other commodities, that were added during the war at the request of our Government in order to provide more of those commodities, of course you will find a total of $2,117,006,000 over a period of 22 years.

Mr. HOKE. All right. Now, I would like to go back to the statement you made in your opening remarks this morning. We would like for the farmers of these hearings to develop a program to lessen some of the government in this, if I recall, or something to that effect. I think every farmer in the United States is interested in having less government in farm programs.

The CHAIRMAN. I agree. That is what we are trying to do.

Mr. HOKE. We are in agreement on that. We could sit here and could debate a lot of questions on a partisan basis, which I am going to refuse to do.

The CHAIRMAN. I have refused to do it since I started these hearings. Mr. HOKE. Now, then, what is the solution?

The CHAIRMAN. That is what I want to hear. You give us a solution. That is why we invited you here.

Mr. HOKE. I was very happy this morning when I heard you make a statement if only for God's sake the American Farm Bureau Federation, National Grange, National Council of Farmer Cooperatives, I know most of those gentlemen, the Farmers Union, throw those in, would get together, work out a program and I was thinking of that. I put this in here. We are dealing with three things. We are dealing with land, and when I say "land" I mean whether you said commodities or land, to me it is the same thing because it is the same thing.

You produce commodities out of that land, food, and fiber. The farmer and the Government, I am not ready to throw off every program that is in existence now. I sat in a meeting in 1948 where a lot of us were discussing the Steagall amendment and the Steagall amendment was a cushion helping to solve even this rapid drop of farm prices.

The CHAIRMAN. No. The Steagall amendment when first put on the statute books was to provide an incentive that our Government asked be put on the statute books to provide for production of certain The crops that were short at the time, peanuts, they put pea

crops.

nuts in there, they put milk, they put eggs, they put even Irish potatoes. Whether that was wise or not

Mr. HOKE. It was wise at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course it was. We will agree because if those products had not been produced you know who would have paid through the nose, the consumer. That is who would have paid. Mr. HOKE. It was wise, it was an incentive.

The CHAIRMAN. The fact is that we provided somewhat of a cushion and the consumers benefited by that; won't you agree?

Mr. HOKE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly.

Mr. HOKE. Then we began to see, some of us who knew the 1921 period, and said here this war is going to end some day. Should we do something to remove this incentive? Well, we came along and of course started to talk parity; 1909-14.

Later we revised that and I sat in on some of that thinking. If the United States Government I think had listened to some of the farmer thinking during the period when we suggested that this thing should be reduced because we are going to create surpluses under this incentive program of 90-percent support price, I said to wheatgrowers who said we can produce wheat in the Middle West for 80 cents a bushel, why should the Government pay us $2.20 support price? I have heard the cattle men from the West and I always refused any support from the Government, I heard corn fellows say it cost us so much to produce corn, why should we support corn prices? We tried to temper this thing and bring it down where we wouldn't create these surpluses.

But without making a long story, we have the situation. Now, then, I believe this, that if the farmers in the farm organizations of this country will get together and work out a program, if you get them together, if we can do it on a nonpartisan, stewardship basis, which is the farmer and the land-use plan.

The CHAIRMAN. As chairman of the committee, I have invited them to do that, and I will expect them to respond and if they don't, we are going to have to do it ourselves.

Mr. HOKE. They are out doing it every day, policy development meetings, the Grange, National Farmers Union, and American Farm Bureau Federation.

The CHAIRMAN. They are so far apart that it is a disturbing factor on the Washington level. If you get one pulling this way, they will have a lot of Senators and Congressmen with them.

Mr. HOKE. They take their lessons from the Senators and Congress

men.

The CHAIRMAN. No, they don't, but they have a little influence on some of them, don't you see.

Mr. HOKE. The farmers or the Congressmen?

The CHAIRMAN. I am talking about the organizations. You know what I am talking about. I am talking about your organizations, the woods are full of them on the Washington level. That is why we came here, this committee decided to come here, to the grassroots and get this from the farmers themselves in the hope that we could find something to solve the problem.

Mr. HOKE. You are leading me to believe that you would not have too much confidence in the representatives that the farm organizations send to represent us.

Mr. UPCHURCH. Process it and sell it or feed it to cattle or do anything he wanted to, just like he owned it. He would put that grain back in 3 years, he would divide his loss in 3 years, it wouldn't make any more grain because he would have to grow the grain on allotted acres. I think it would save North Carolina farmers in the eastern part of the State a great deal of money right now. If a man lost his cotton crop loan him three-fourths of the number of bales he actually grew.

The CHAIRMAN. That cotton would find itself back in the channels of trade and it wouldn't lessen our burden any, would it?

Mr. UPCHURCH. It would to the extent that that farmer did not make any cotton that year.

The CHAIRMAN. The fact that he doesn't make it, of course it is too bad for him. We have had lots of people to suffer in my area with hurricanes and by the way, of course I don't wish any bad luck to anybody, but you know since 1926 we have been able to shoo most all the storms to the east of us and I hope we can get them farther east. But those are things you can readily understand, that if there is a calamity in one place, the farmer

Mr. UPCHURCH. I am not wanting the Government to give the farmer anything, just loan him something.

The CHAIRMAN. What good would it do if he put it back?

Mr. UPCHURCH. It would save the Government appropriating money to bail him out rather than loan him commodities they already have.

The CHAIRMAN. To fed his stock?

Mr. UPCHURCH. Yes, or in the case of cotton, loan a man threefourths of his cotton.

The CHAIRMAN. What would he do with the cotton?

Mr. UPCHURCH. Sell it.

The CHAIRMAN. How could you get rid of supplies that way? You take it out of the warehouse, give it to him, and let him sell it to the trade.

Mr. UPCHURCH. Yes, and he would put it back and the Government wouldn't be any worse off. They would save an average of 18 months' storage on the deal.

Mr. COOLEY. Did you explain who you are and your official connection?

Mr. UPCHURCH. I am president of the North Carolina Cotton Growers Association.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Sugg, please.

STATEMENT OF JOE S. SUGG, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, NORTH CAROLINA PEANUT GROWERS ASSOCIATION, INC., ROCKY MOUNT, N. C.

Mr. SUGG. I am Joe S. Sugg.

Mr. Chairman, here is my statement. I think it will require about 7 minutes.

I am here as executive secretary of the North Carolina Peanut Growers Association and as a peanut farmer of Edgecombe County, N. C. The North Carolina Peanut Growers Association is a non

profit, producer-supported organization representing the peanut growers of North Carolina, or approximately 60,000 farm families.

On behalf of these farm families, I wish to express their sincere appreciation for this opportunity to discuss with you briefly and, I hope, constructively, some modifications which we feel will improve the present peanut program.

Before discussing the proposed modifications, I wish to make it crystal clear that the peanut farmers of North Carolina have believed in, cooperated with, and approved overwhelmingly the peanut programs which have been in effect since 1933. This approval has been evidenced by the very substantial majorities with which all grower referendums have carried. These programs have added stability previously unknown to the peanut farmer. As aware as we are of the benefits which have accrued from the peanut programs, we are cognizant also of the criticisms which have been directed against it— particularly the alleged high cost to the taxpayer.

As a means of strengthening the peanut program, the following modifications and changes with price support and marketing quotas continued in effect as now provided by law are presented for study and consideration.

(a) The definition of "normal supply" would be corrected by changing the allowance for the carryover from 15 to 30 percent of the estimated domestic consumption, plus estimated exports. Such a change would assure consumers of ample supplies in years of abnormally low production and would not, when coupled with other changes proposed herein, create any excessive cost.

(b) The present national minimum allotment provision would be modified so that allotments and quotas for edible purposes would be fixed more closely in line with demand, except that such allotments could be reduced below the present minimum of 1,610,000 acres by more than 5 percent per year.

(c) Under the present program $9 per ton is deducted from the support price of all peanuts marketed by producers to cover the costs of handling and diverting those peanuts not needed to meet edible requirements. For example: With support now at 90 percent of parity or $242 per ton for the 1955 crop, the market level is established by the announced support less $9 per ton or an average advance of $233 per ton for all types.

We suggest for consideration that the full announced support be advanced to producers and a payment of not more than $12 per ton be paid on all peanuts marketed by producers to cover the cost of handling and diverting those peanuts not needed for edible requirements. The payment would not exceed $9 per ton for the 1957 and 1958 crops, or $12 per ton for the 1959 and subsequent crops.

If the fund was inadequate to pay diversion and other costs in any year, Commodity Credit Corporation would pay the deficiency and would be repaid out of the fund in later years.

The amount of payment would be fixed each year to provide estimated funds required to cover handling and diversion costs for the year plus any amounts owed to Commodity Credit Corporation or minus any surplus carried over in the fund from prior years.

(d) In lieu of the present penalty on peanuts marketed in excess of the farm quotas, an amount in addition to (c) above would be paid on all such excess peanuts equivalent to 60 percent of support price

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