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combined interests of all countries is too obvious to stand in need of refutation. Is the welfare of Britain synonymous with the interests of Soviet Russia?

The first International,' founded in 1862, came to an untimely end immediately after the Franco-German war of 1870. A second was founded in 1882; it became Germanised and was suspended by the Great War of 1914. The Labour Party is now trying to revive it. The Labour Party's preamble to the draft constitution states that the object is:

"The political and economic organisation of the working classes for the purpose of abolishing the capitalistic form of society, and achieving complete freedom for humanity through the conquest of political power and the socialisation of the means of production and exchange, that is to say, the transformation of capitalistic society into a collectivist or communist society.'

Lenin proposes yet another 'International,' the qualification for membership being belief in Soviets, the dictatorship of the proletariat, and the arming of the proletariat for the forcible expropriation of the bourgeoisie.

How comes it then that Labour is making such headway in the constituencies? It is due largely to the humanistic ideals which underlie its social policy. It would be too much to say that the Labour Party was first in the field in urging these ideals on Parliament, or that social reform was left on the shelf till Labour representatives took it up. The whole series of Factory Acts, the Education Act of 1870, and many other measures designed designed to ameliorate the conditions of manual labour, are sufficient evidence to the contrary. But it is probably true to say that in quite recent years, owing to a variety of causes, social reform somewhat retreated into the background; and that the Labour Party, since it became effective in the House, has taken the leading part in bringing such questions into prominence. Another factor has contributed to Labour's recent political successes. The Coalition Government promised large measures of social reform, and has had to lay its foundation first and deal with fundamentals; while obviously progress would be slow, many fantastic promises were unfortunately made by enthusiastic but

irresponsible Coalitionists at the last election. As a consequence, the Labour Party has been able to compare wild promises with sober performance, and has not hesitated to say that the disparity measured the Government's betrayal of the confidence reposed in it by the electors. High prices and profiteering, which the Labour Party said they easily could, while the Government would not, put an end to, have also assisted Labour at bye-elections. But where, at bye-elections, the Labour Party has been definitely pinned down to its Socialistic programme, it has not gone ahead.

While I suggest that, were a Labour Government in power, the extreme sections of Labour would govern their leaders, I am far from suggesting that Labour has no leaders fit to govern. It possesses outstanding men of tried experience, ability, and judgment, and others, untried as yet, but of equal capacity and ability. I had the good fortune during the war of serving at different times directly under the Right Hon. Arthur Henderson, the Right Hon. G. N. Barnes, the Right Hon. John Hodge, and the Right Hon. G. H. Roberts. I had also the opportunity of comparing their ministerial gifts with those of other Cabinet Ministers and Ministers of State. The Labour Ministers do not suffer from the comparison; their respective records are unsurpassed for foresight, decision, balance of judgment, statesmanship, organising and administrative ability, power of evoking the loyalty of their Departments and commanding the confidence of the public. The weakness of a Labour Government will assuredly not lie in the personnel of its Ministersif they lead.

When fully developed, the Labour Party's local machinery will be the most powerful party organisation in the country. There is no space at the moment in which to describe it. But notwithstanding that, I believe that Labour will not come into office, or, if it does succeed in climbing into power, will not be able to form a stable administration unless it makes up its mind to do certain things. First to eschew its present ideal of hybrid Syndicalism and Collectivist Socialism, which is alienating its best friends. The country distrusts it and will never vote for it. No more will the ordinary British working man; the choice for the Labour Party

is undoubtedly between it and the fruits of office. To jettison this mongrel conception involves in no way the abandonment of a sane, solvent, and humanitarian industrial and social policy.

Secondly, the Labour Party will have to dissolve the Council of Action and excommunicate inexorably its extremists. What it would lose in industrial strength it would gain in public support. The pruning process involves conjoint action by each individual Trade Union, and, where the latter is recalcitrant, by the Trade Union Congress, and also by the Labour Party. Not merely is the Labour Party's accession to power hindered by official adherence to the policy of direct action, but the whole existing organisation of Trade Unionism is threatened. Labour thinks that these revolutionaries, with their threats of direct action, help to haul the coach along the rough road of opposition, and that a sense of responsibility will supervene when Labour has come into power. But those who thus extenuate this anti-social policy have no conception of the extent to which support is being withdrawn from the Labour Party because of this insurrectionism' and the Party's complacency towards the attacks, whether covert or open, upon the Constitution. Quite recently, indeed, Mr J. H. Thomas acknowledged that the threat of a general strike to influence the policy of the Government towards Russia was both unconstitutional and dangerous, but declared it to be necessary. It is the old plea, Necessity knows no law. If organised Labour may thus override the will of the nation expressed in Parliament, what is to prevent any other organised body-say, the army-from seizing power?

Thirdly, Labour must purge itself of that insensate jealousy of its own leaders which in the Labour Movement more than in any other movement, social or political, seems to fetter the leadership of the most prominent members. No Labour administration of a solid kind is practicable if accredited Labour Ministers are always to be liable to intriguing envy within their own party.

LYNDEN MACASSEY.

Art. 7.-GERMAN PUBLICATIONS ON THE POLITICAL CONDUCT OF THE WAR.

1. (a) Stenographische Bericht über die öffentlichen Verhandlungen des Untersuchungsausschusses. (b) Beilagen: Aktenstücke zur Friedensaktion Wilsons, 1916, 1917. Berlin: Norddeutsche Buchdrückerei, 1920. 2. Betrachtungen zum Weltkriege. Von Th. von Bethmann-Hollweg. Two vols. Berlin: Hobbing, 1919. 3. Vom Kriegsausbruch bis zum uneingeschränkten UBootkrieg. Von Karl Helfferich. Berlin: Ullstein, 1919. 4. My Memoirs. By Grand-Admiral Von Tirpitz. Two vols. Hurst & Blackett, 1920.

5. My Three Years in America. By Count Bernstorff. Skeffington, 1920.

6. In the World War. By Count Ottokar Czernin. Cassell, 1919.

7. Ursachen und Ausbruch des Weltkrieges. Von G. von Jagow. Berlin: Reimar Hobbing, 1919.

And other works.

PREVIOUS articles in this Review have briefly examined some of the most important works which have appeared in Germany on the military conduct of the war. We propose now to supplement these by some comment on the political and diplomatic disclosures of which we have had so many. As the list of books at the head of this article will show, the material already available is very large; and on the present occasion all that we can do is to indicate the chief points of interest, the more thorough investigation of which will occupy historians for many years.

It is a sign of the new world in which we live that we have not had to wait, as has previously been the case, for at least a generation until the secrets of the war are disclosed. It has indeed always been characteristic of Germany that things cannot be kept secret. German statesmen and officials have never shown that appreciation of the deeper requirements of loyalty which, at any rate in the past, was so characteristic of English public life; they have always hastened to inform the world of what they themselves have done, and have never scrupled to attempt to clear themselves of charges publicly made

against them, even at the cost of the welfare of their own country. In this Bismarck set a very bad example. As his whole treatment of the press did more than anything else to demoralise Germany, so also, both before and after his retirement, he never had any hesitation in taking the world into his confidence when by so doing he thought he could justify his own actions; and, when this was at stake, he seems to have cared little for the larger interests of Germany. Prince Bülow's well-known volume on German Policy is another illustration of this characteristic. Bülow was too anxious to show the world how astute and clever a statesman he had been; and so he divulged the Arcana Imperii.' The note of personal vanity is apparent in all he said and did; and personal vanity is the most dangerous quality that a statesman can possess. To do the best one can in a difficult position, to accept in silence the rebuffs and injustices which must befall every man who holds high office, whether under a monarchy or a democracy, and to leave one's reputation for future generations to discuss-this is the highest test of the moral qualities of the statesman, and it is one in which the Germans, with one conspicuous exception-Caprivihave failed.

Quite apart from this, however, it was inevitable that the Revolution should throw open all the most secret records. One of the first acts of the new Government was to appoint a Commission to inquire not only into the origins but also into the conduct of the war; and it is owing to their work that we have had what is apparently a complete record, for instance, of the interchange of telegrams with America with regard to the very difficult questions which arose about both submarine warfare and peace offers. In addition to these official documents we have also the evidence, given before the Commission, of those who took a chief part in the negotiations. Side by side with this official material there are the Memoirs issued by most of the men who held important posts. These vary much in value. Herr von Jagow confines himself to the origins of the war; and he, as well as Bethmann-Hollweg, tell us little that was not already known. Far more valuable are the books of those who, while closely connected with affairs,

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