Similarly it is unwise to ignore the justice or to minimise the significance of Pan-Turanianism, PanIslamism, Pan-Asianism, or whatever term we may apply to the revival of self-consciousness among the Muhammadan peoples of the East. The attitude of the Turks and Tatars is actually the more aggressive manifestation of this movement-not yet co-ordinate nor co-operative-which exists in Syria, Egypt, Persia, Central Asia, Afghanistan, and India.* It has been exploited by Germany in a war against Powers with large Muhammadan populations, and by adventurers of the type of Talaat and Enver. But, at its best, it signifies what Mr H. M. Hyndman, in a somewhat unequal book, has styled 'The Awakening of Asia.' It represents the protest of educated and active Asiatics against the political domination and economic exploitation of Asia by foreigners.

Pan-Asianism is neither pro-Bolshevik nor proEntente, though the Bolsheviks, like the Germans before them, are making great efforts to turn it to their advantage. Their present success can but be gauged by the fact that, while their 'Conference of Eastern Peoples' sits at Baku, Tatar bands are harassing the PetrovskBaku railway line; a formidable insurrection, under a certain Usun Hadji, has broken out against them in Daghestan; and they are fighting against Muhammadans in Bukhara and Ghilan. It would be difficult to believe that the Soviet Government, whatever its political and social ideals, can genuinely desire to arouse the Mussulman world to a great aggressive rising; for unconditional access to the oil of Baku and Trans-Caspia, and to the cotton of Turkestan, is vital to the reconstruction of their industries. It would seem rather that their encouragement of Pan-Asianism is merely opportunist, their propaganda, dangerous and malicious though it be, merely a weapon against British interests.

The aroused self-consciousness of the races of the Middle East should, if wisely directed, prove the salvation of those countries, and should afford a far more satisfactory guarantee of future peace for Britain than any

In a recent article Prof. Rostovtsev notes the spread of this movement to French North Africa. See The New Russia,' June 29, 1920.

costly and widely-developed strategic system. And it is to Britain, whose Imperial policy, unhappy though some phases of it have been, contrasts so favourably with that of rival Powers, that these races must inevitably look for guidance. The great problems, the foci of which are alternately Anatolia, Trans-Caucasia, Syria, Mesopotamia, and Persia, require to be approached in a spirit of firmness tempered with moderation. The constitutional reforms in India, the Persian Treaty-which has unfortunately been misinterpreted-the consideration given to Mussulman opinion at the Peace Conference, and lastly, the Egyptian agreement, are tokens of a wise statesmanship which can hopefully approach other questions.

For the present, however, the situation is far from satisfactory. The Turkish settlement, while apparently securing the success of British strategic policy in the Middle East, has placed Britain in a position politically precarious and morally false. A number of difficult circumstances, which it would be unprofitable to criticise, have impelled the Supreme Council to permit Greece to assume a position in Asia Minor which can scarcely be conducive to permanent peace. The Turks, who at the Armistice, were utterly exhausted and anxious for peace, have been driven to giving a desperate support to their old chauvinist leaders. The Arabs have been disappointed and antagonised in Mesopotamia by an administration which appears to have lacked sympathy with the native population and its leaders; in Syria by the conduct of an Allied Power which has signally failed to give expression to the democratic principles enunciated during the last months of the war; and in Palestine by a movement as aggressive as it is artificial. In Persia, the British appear to be continuing the Tsarist policy of supporting a regime, which in the opinion of patriotic Persians, requires radical reformation. Lastly, it has proved impractical to succour the remnants of the Turkish Armenians, who for two years after the Armistice have been the victims, at the hands of the Young Turks, of a policy of extermi nation, the admitted aim of which is to make impossible the establishment of an autonomous Armenian area in Eastern Turkey.

The result is anarchy and famine in Anatolia, a hideous racial conflict in Cilicia, and formidable unrest

in Syria, Persia, and Mesopotamia. It will be possible to crush and to hold down by force of arms each of these insurrections. Militarily neither the Turkish Nationalists, nor the Arabs, nor the Persians are strong. Militant Pan-Islamism is a movement, itself vague and sporadic in manifestation, which is not based on numerical strength, and has its seat among races undeveloped and unorganised, incapable of any effort more significant than guerilla warfare. But it is disconcerting in that it involves unlimited anarchy over an area in which Great Britain is naturally desirous of good order, for the purposes of trade and Imperial communication; and it is dangerous when considered in relation to the menace of aggressive Bolshevism. The Bolsheviks, antipathetic though all their theories be to the cultural ideals of PanIslamism and to the nationalism of the leaders of Turan, can and will exploit the unrest in Middle Asia in furtherance of their professed aim of World-Revolution. Controlling the Caspian and the railway system of Turkestan, they can threaten all the lands between the Black Sea and the Hindu Kush that form the British front in Asia. Hence the pacification of Anatolia, the satisfaction of Arab aspirations, and the assumption of a sympathetic attitude towards the Persian Nationalist movement-a movement which is the only living and regenerative force in modern Persia-are immediate and necessary developments of British policy, the achievement of which will be difficult but by no means impracticable.

The consolidation of Georgia and Armenia as independent States represents both a favourable initiation of the policy of understanding outlined above, and an effective check on Bolshevik militarism south and east of the Caspian. There is good reason to hope that the period of intransigent nationalism in the Caucasus States is past, and that the leaders both of the Georgians and of the Armenians, and indeed of the Tatars, are anxious for peace and reconciliation. The Governments of Tiflis and Erivan have withstood the manifold perils of two most difficult years, and their position may now be regarded as comparatively stable. The surrender by the Allies of Batum to Georgia-an action which has met with no little criticism, but which was, in the circumstances, the only logical solution of a tiresome

problem-has further improved the relations of Georgia with the Entente, whilst tending to solidify the internal situation in that country.

The future is naturally dependent on the greater issues which are now under discussion in London. If hostilities between the Western Powers and the Bolsheviks continue, there can be no doubt that the Caspian countries will be the centre of grave military developments during the coming year. If the Bolsheviks should attempt to raise an extensive Muhammadan insurrection against the British in Turkey and Persia, Armenia would certainly be disastrously involved. But for the winter the position of Georgia and Armenia may be deemed secure. The Georgians hold the Caucasus passes from the Dariel to the Black Sea, and they are capable of withstanding any attack which may come from the direction of Baku. The activities of General Wrangel must prevent any formidable concentration of Bolsheviks against the Caucasian States in the immediate future; in fact, these latter have, for the moment, more to fear from cholera, typhus, and famine than from invasion. On the other hand, if the British Government should arrive at any broad basis of agreement with the Soviets, the question of the future of the Caucasian States must form the subject of discussion in common with that of Finland and the Baltic States. Morally it must be recognised that these border communities have every right to a reasonable degree of self-expression; and politically it would be a mistake to allow them to be absorbed into the body of the Soviet State, in which case they must inevitably endure the imposition of the Bolshevik system of social organisation.

If peace be concluded with Soviet Russia, the independence of Georgia and Armenia, which the Bolsheviks appear to be willing to recognise, at least provisionally, must be secured. Situated on the very borders of Bolshevik Russia and of the restless Muhammadan world, their interests are of extreme importance to ourselves. Propaganda of the subversive doctrines of Bolshevism must inevitably continue; and whether an understanding is arranged or not, the Soviet Government will make great efforts to perpetuate discontent and to arouse mistrust against Great Britain, in

Turkey, Persia, and Mesopotamia, during the coming difficult half-century of reconstruction and pacification. Georgia and Armenia should constitute the outposts of British influence in the Middle East. Their political and economic orientation must necessarily be towards the power controlling Constantinople and the Mediterranean, and their position on the flank of the Russian oil areas should be significant; whilst Batum, as an advanced naval base from Constantinople, should be a potential menace to the South - Russian grain ports.

The idea of a Trans-Caucasian Federation may now be effectively revived. It failed during the crisis of the Russian collapse and the Turko-German invasion, for it was hastily conceived, and its authority, neither recognised nor organised, was impotent to cope with adverse circumstances. It is now regarded with favour not only by representative Georgians and Armenians, but by Mussavetist Tatars. The inclusion of Azerbaijan must, however, remain hypothetical. The future independence of that country is indeed in doubt, and, while Baku forms a component part of the Russian economic system, the Tatars of Azerbaijan have a culture in common with large communities whose territory must inevitably form an integral part of Soviet Russia. Forming, with the Kazan Tatars and the Turkish peoples of Turkestan, a solid group of 17,000,000, their influence in any future Russian State should be considerable. On the other hand, the Georgians and the Armenians have little in common with Russia; and Georgia's largest potential industry, forestry, in contrast to the petroleum industry of Baku, has suffered by the economic union with Russia, since it was the policy of the Imperial Government to restrain the development of a Georgian timber-trade, in favour of the forests of Russia proper. Now, adequately exploited, the forests of Georgia should prove a valuable economic asset to the Mediterranean countries. Further, any coalition between Georgia and Armenia will be but another manifestation of the movement towards cooperation among the groups of smaller states in Central Europe, who find themselves unable politically and economically to stand alone, as, for example, the Scandinavian countries, and, more recently, the Little Entente Vol. 234.-No. 465.

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