You have to look, as each Government has to look at it, at its situation as a whole and figure out how you can get the most defense effort from the resources that it has and can get hold of.

Certainly, if the defense support is not available and their defense programs are drastically cut, even in that case, it will probably be more expensive, not less, for us, because to the extent that we get the strength, the multiplied strength that we get from our allies this way, is strength that we do not have to pay for ourselves and, even more important, it is strength that we do not have to recruit and train American soldiers to provide for.

Mr. VORYS. The multiplier effect I have looked at as carefully as anybody on this committee, and it just boils down to the fact that for $1.4 billion you get $1.7 billion and the rest of it is extrapolating where I simply do not follow you. That is all. Maybe others do.

Chairman RICHARDS. John, he did not say that. He said basically in production you got that much, but when you came to what that production would do, plus the men in the military-aid program, I think he said you get about three times as much.

Mr. VORYS. He says so, and then he cannot prove it, as far as I am concerned. Maybe I am dumb. It adds up to me to where you say we can get it cheaper over there if we put up enough money. Of course, you can if we put up enough money.

Chairman RICHARDS. If we want to build up our defenses, and we have taken on an obligation over there, and the world knows it, from the Atlantic pact right on through, what is the best way to build up those defenses?

Economic aid, according to these witnesses, is not the objective. Leave that out. Let us say we have quit it. But we have a military program, and what is the cheapest way to produce it? And then you go back and say, "If you want to spend your dollars and do not give them economic aid, all right. If you want to spend it at about three to one, do it that way." But if you have the program and this is the best way and cheaper, then go on and give that aid.

(Discussion off the record.)

Chairman RICHARDS. Why was it necessary to do it here when it was not necessary to do it in Turkey? Is that what you are talking about?

Mr. VORYS. We have poured a lot of money into Turkey. Turkey is the low man on the totem pole as far as gross national product. They are poor people. They are the 1 country of the 14 that says, "We are going to cut our peacetime budget this coming year." The Turks are ready to fight. They are fighting in Korea; they are ready to fight where they are.

We have played around, and I have certainly participated in it, for 4 years, to build up an economy and a spirit in Western Europe such as we have in Turkey.

Chairman RICHARDS. Was the basic economy in Turkey destroyed during the war or was it a neutral that profited by the World War situation? To start with, it was not destroyed at all.

Mr. VORYS. They have not any basic economy.

Chairman RICHARDS. Anyway, it was not disrupted. It was not dislocated.

But what do you answer to John when he puts the proposal to you that he can get that in Turkey, plus the will of the Turks to do something about it? Why can you not get it somewhere else?

Mr. Wood. There are many things, I think, that have to go into the answer. I want General Olmsted to cover some of them.

I think from what I know, Mr. Chairman, that the answer involves such things as the mission of the Turkish Army, the size of their divisions, the customs that have gone on for decades as to their military expenditures.

I think General Gruenther testified, for example, that a Turkish soldier gets paid something like 21 cents a month. Even the French conscript gets many times that, and whether you could, however inadequate the French conscript's pay is, suddenly move him back to what the Turkish conscript gets, I rather doubt.

General Gruenther also by way of example told me I do not know if he told the committee-the story of arriving in Ankara, the wind was blowing a gale, and the temperature was 28 and of asking the Turkish Chief of Staff at what temperature do you maintain your barracks, and of having him look back blankly and say, “We never considered having heat in the barracks."

Whether you can suddenly wave a wand and get the French or British soldier to put up with such conditions is another matter. The Turkish Army, I believe, has not got and will not for some time have anything like the jet aircraft force that is now considered essential in Western Europe.

Mr. VORYS. There is a program for them this year.

Mr. WOOD. There is a program, I believe General Olmsted is to start that. But the fact is that you do not get the same number of men armed to carry out their particular missions in Western Europe for the same amount of money that you get the same number of divisions in Turkey to carry out their particular mission.

You cannot equate these things any more than you can equate the cost of an American division to the cost of a French division.

Chairman RICHARDS. They tell me they do not mind marching barefooted.

Mr. WOOD. I have been told they get one uniform and if it should be torn or develop holes they have to mend it themselves-and one pair of shoes a year.

Chairman RICHARDS. You will not see Americans doing it. Mrs. Kelly.

Mrs. KELLY. Who within NATO is going to check for us, as they do in Greece, the amount that is coming out of this military program? You take for granted the countries present their program. Mr. Lovett made the statement that he cut it a certain amount and the President cut it and we are maybe going to cut it. Who within NATO does that for the forces within these countries, the military items? We are paying the bill and presenting the money individually to these countries. But who is responsible within NATO?

Mr. WOOD. I would like General Olmsted to answer that question, if he will.

General OLMSTED. Mrs. Kelly, perhaps I could explain it this way. When we make up our statement of net deficiencies, which process started last summer, our military people in the country sit down with our economic mission people in the country and their respective opposite numbers in the Government.

Out of that they conclude there is a certain list of items that would be required for the forces in being and for the forces to be brought into

being within the next year. From that total is then deducted the things that everybody agrees the country can make.

One of the assumptions in that is that the country will receive a certain amount of defense support in the way of the necessary things that it would take to make possible the production of the items that the country is at that point undertaking to produce for itself. Mrs. KELLY. Who supervises that?

General OLMSTED. Who polices it?

Mrs. KELLY. Yes, it is going to end up with General Ismay?

General OLMSTED. NO. The administration of this program is entirely United States. It is not international. Our military mission is responsible for policing the end items. Our economic mission is responsible to see that the economic program as envisaged and agreed to and the budgetary commitments, and so forth, are carried out.

All of this is supplemented with the assistance of our embassies, our diplomatic team, the Ambassador and his people.

In the event there is a fall-down in this program, say, they do not activate the force they agreed to activate, then our military mission does not call the equipment forward.

The procedure that we follow is when a tank is ready to be shipped, or airplane, we tell our mission chief. If the forces over there are not ready to receive it and take care of it properly, he does not call it forward until they are. The mechanics of policing the economic side of the defense support side I would rather ask Mr. Cleveland to answer for you.

Mrs. KELLY. I am more interested in the military than the economic side.

General OLMSTED. No weapon or round of ammunition goes abroad until first we have advised our mission chiefs that it is available here now for shipment and he, in turn, has ascertained to his satisfaction that the forces

Mrs. KELLY. That is from our angle. Who within NATO is taking the fat out of the program, so-called, before it is presented to our side? General OLMSTED. NATO, being an international organization, is in an advisory relationship only. They do not have anything to say about how much aid we give, either in the form of military end items or defense support aid. They make certain recommendations to us about priorities of equipment for units.

Mrs. KELLY. Who is going to do that?

General OLMSTED. SHAPE headquarters makes those recommendations to us. We ask them periodically.

Mrs. KELLY. After they have received them from whom? General OLMSTED. From their commanders in the field. They evaluate by inspection and the reports of the commanders the readiness of the various units.

If there is a unit, let us say, that does not have the equipment that its own country had agreed to provide for it, then of course that unit would not be ready to receive the portion of equipment we had agreed to provide for it, and therefore SHAPE would not recommend it be given a higher priority but be given a lower priority.

We do not have to take SHAPE's recommendation of priority, but we are inclined to do so to the extent that we can. SHAPE does not undertake, however, to make recommendations to us about the total

amount or the character of our program other than the missions that the SHAPE planners assign to these various forces, and the commitments that the countries make to provide these various forces to SHAPE's command.

If, up to that point, they have not performed, then they are not eligible for a program anyway.

Mr. VORYS. How does that tie in? Lovett was at Lisbon. Do you not know anything about this $5.45 billion?

General OLMSTED. No, sir. That is a new figure to me. I do not know where that figure came from. It obviously relates only to the NATO countries, Greece, Turkey, and, of course, Yugoslavia, and title II, title III, and title IV countries. That might account for the difference.

Mr. RIBICOFF (presiding). For the benefit of the members here, I have inquired about the situation downstairs. They contemplate finishing this immigration bill about 5 o'clock, and then they are going to stay through tonight to finish it. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. VORYS. I am trying to dig into this. This is a pretty small contingent of this committee that is getting any benefit out of it. There is the fiction that they are going to read all of this.

Mr. RIBICOFF (presiding). The idea is that we cannot rely upon the fact that the other members will be here another day. As long as you are interested in it, and those members who are here are, I think it would be unfair not to continue. These people are here, and so are you. I think we ought to go along until the parliamentary situation on the floor is such that we ought to be down there.

Mrs. KELLY. Are we going to finish the immigration bill today? Mr. RIBICOFF (presiding). So the information is given to me. Mr. WOOD. We are eager to carry on. Mr. Vorys is the man who is particularly good at these figures. We welcome the opportunity to go over them with him.

Mr. VORYS. You are now going to insert that table, which is not inserted in tabular form, but from which Mr. Lovett testified, is that right?

General OLMSTED. That is right, sir.

Mr. RIBICOFF (presiding). Without objection, the table will be inserted in the record at this point.

(The table referred to is as follows:)

Department of Defense, MDAP funds of Department of Defense, estimated unexpended

Funds available to Department of Defense:

balance as of June 30, 1953

Fiscal 1950, 1951, and 1952 programs.
Proposed fiscal 1953 programs..

Total, all programs.

Expenditures (Form 133 basis):

Fiscal 1950 and 1951 (actual).

Fiscal 1952 (estimate).

Fiscal 1953 (estimate).

Total through 1953

Estimated unexpended balance June 30, 1953---.

Millions

$11, 481

5, 350

16, 831

$946

2,713

7, 714

11, 373

5, 458

Mr. VORYS. What are the estimated expenditures for fiscal-that is your next figure-1954 out of the combined amounts you expect to get? Is that on there?

General OLMSTED. Perhaps I can give it to you like this: Assuming again that the 1953 appropriation is made, and without making any assumption about a 1954 appropriation, we would have unexpended at the end of fiscal 1954, $1.240 billion. We have made our estimates on the basis that we would get a 1953 appropriation, but we have made no assumptions about a 1954 appropriation.

Mr. VORYS. That is unexpended at the end of fiscal 1954?

General OLMSTED. NO. At the end of fiscal year 1953 the unexpended balance will be $5.45 billion.

Mr. RIBICOFF (presiding). I think for the purposes of the record, right at this point you should explain why that sum of money will be unexpended at the end of 1953 and at the end of 1954. I think it would help to complete the picture.

General OLMSTED. The breakdown of the $5.45 billion unexpended at the end of fiscal 1953 would be $2.24 billion for Army. That would almost wholly be Army.

Mr. RIBICOFF (presiding). That would be tanks ordered, but not delivered?

General OLMSTED. Ordered just as soon as we got our money, but with the lead time they would not be deliverable until fiscal 1954.

$0.631 billion of that would be Navy. That would be deliverable in fiscal 1954, and $0.119 billion would be Navy that would not be deliverable until after fiscal 1954. That would be in the vessel category.

$1.346 billion would be Air, deliverable in 1954, and $1.121 billion would be Air, deliverable after 1954. There again that would be the long lead time aircraft.

Summarizing that, of the $5.45 billion unexpended at the end of fiscal 1953, $4.22 billion would be expended in fiscal 1954, and $1.23 billion would be expended after fiscal 1954.

Mr. VORYS. Just say that again. Of the $5.45 billion, is that right? General OLMSTED. Yes, sir.

Mr. VORYS. Unexpended?

General OLMSTED. At the end of fiscal 1953.

Mr. VORYS. That is four

General OLMSTED. $4.22 billion would be expended in fiscal 1954. Those items would ripen into delivery in the 12 months following fiscal 1953, and $1.24 billion

Mr. VORYS. That is the figure.

General OLMSTED. Would not be deliverable, and therefore the expenditure would not be made until fiscal 1955.

Mr. VORYS. Could you tell us what is that longest lead-time stuff? Does it vary?

General ŎLMSTED. Your F-84 aircraft is your longest lead-time item. Heavy aircraft are longer lead-time items, but we do not program those.

Mr. VORYS. Over there?

General OLMSTED. That is right.

Mr. VORYS. The F-84 is the biggest one that you furnish? B-29's are going over, are they not?