for promoting nuclear export sales." I do not intend to repeat today all the points made in that letter. With the permission of the chairman, however, I would like to submit a copy for the record.1

Mr. MARKEY. The administration, unfortunately, does not appear to have taken our criticism to heart. Several events since May 1983 confirm the continuing lack of wisdom in this administration's policies on nonproliferation.

First, on June 30, 1983, the Secretary of State assured the Indian Government that it would be supplied reactor components for its Tarapur Atomic Power Station. This commitment was made even though India still refuses to budge on nonproliferation and reports have surfaced that it is preparing for another nuclear test. Indeed, shortly after that announcement, India indicated that it might go ahead and begin reprocessing Tarapur fuel into plutonium without U.S. approval, in contravention of our Agreement for Cooperation.

ADMINISTRATION POSITION ON INDIA

How the administration can give India what it wants while exacting nothing in return is inconceivable to me. Along with a number of Members of Congress, I have introduced a resolution urging the U.S. Government not to export or arrange for the export of additional components for Tarapur unless stronger nonproliferation guarantees are obtained.

Second, the administration announced on August 2 that it had approved the retransfer from West Germany to Argentina of 143 tons of heavy water. It approved this retransfer even though Argentina is not a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, does not have international safeguards on all its facilities, and, like India, has a strong interest in nuclear explosives. Because of the lack of clarity in existing law, the Department of Energy approved this retransfer without the concurrence of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission or notification of Congress.

Plainly, unless Congress takes the lead, this administration will continue on its disastrous course. The bill before the subcommittees is an essential part of the effort to change that course. It is time to lay down some rules that cannot be blithely ignored in the interest of commercial advantage or political expediency. It is time to lay down some rules that will insure that this and subsequent administrations act with consistency of purpose and strength in pursing our nonproliferation objectives.

H.R. 3058

H.R. 3058 has three principal objectives:

First, to restrict commerce in the most dangerous nuclear substances-plutonium and highly enriched uranium;

Second, to offer nations positive incentives not to use these dangerous substances in their nuclear programs; and

Third, to strengthen safeguards criteria in existing law and to insure, most importantly, that no U.S. exports will go to nations which do not have full-scope safeguards or agreements for cooperation with the United States.

1See letter in app. 4.

It is, in short, a carefully balanced package of "carrots," "sticks," and improved export procedures, crafted to insure consistent and fair treatment of those countries which meet our basic nonproliferation criteria, while barring nuclear commerce with those countries which do not. It builds upon the excellent work done by former Chairman Bingham and others in the 97th Congress. In my judgment, if enacated, it will truly strengthen U.S. ability to stem the global spread of nuclear weapons.

The bill contains a number of detailed provisions to implement the basic policies I have just mentioned. Rather than take up the subcommittees' time with the description of these provisions, with the permission of the chairman, I would like to submit for the record a section-by-section analysis we prepared when the bill was introduced. I believe this summary sets out the rationale for and effect of the bill's specific elements.1

Nonproliferation is something of a moving target, and H.R. 3058 can be viewed as still a work-in-progress. The events of the past summer have indicated to me that yet further refinements may be appropriate. In particular, the Indian and Argentine cases make it clear that the retransfer provisions of the Non-Proliferation Act can and should be tightened considerably. I urge the subcommittees to give consideration to this issue.

In addition, the bill was introduced before the Supreme Court's action last term striking down the legislative veto. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act established a delicate balance between the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the executive branch, and Congress. If Congress is now deprived of its ability to check the Executive, then I would favor imposing greater limitations on Presidential waiver powers. Again, I hope the subcommittees will give attention to this problem.

In closing, let me reiterate the importance of the task before the subcommittees. We have all spent a great deal of time this past year debating the nuclear freeze and expressing concern about the superpowers' arms buildup. But proliferation poses threats which may be just as great as the superpowers' arms race and it is just as critical to take action to insure that a nuclear holocaust is not triggered by the spread of nuclear weapons under the guise of purportedly peaceful nuclear commerce.

Prompt and favorable action on H.R. 3058 is thus essential for our national security and for the cause of world peace. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BONKER. Thank you, Mr. Markey.

I certainly appreciate references that you and your colleagues have made to the work of my predecessor who was chairman of this subcommittee, Mr. Bingham, who really led the efforts early on to come up with an effective policy on nonproliferation. Though he no longer serves on this committee and in the Congress, it is heartening to know that others share that commitment and are continuing his work. Please be assured that the chairman of this subcommittee will continue to work closely with you to expedite legislative action on the legislation that is pending before the subcommittees.

1 See app. 5.

As you know, nonproliferation is a very complex issue. I think Mr. Roth properly compared it to the Export Administration Act which has been a controversial and complicated issue before the subcommittee for the past 8 months. It is complex because it deals with technology; it involves a number of Federal agencies, and a delicate relationship between the two branches of Government. This is a policy not wholly confined to institutions of this country but involves other countries as well which are trying to enhance their own nuclear capability. Also we have the problem of making these controls and safeguards requirements universal so that we have an international approach to this deadly problem of nuclear development.

So, we have our work cut out for us, and I am hopeful that Mr. Roth and others on the committee will be cooperative as we attempt to seriously evaluate the legislation before us and, hopefully, are able to recommend something to the House floor in this 98th Congress.

ADMINISTRATION LIFTS BAN

Mr. Wolpe, the administration has lifted a ban on commercial reprocessing which was begun by the Ford administration and continued by the Carter administration, thus spanning both political parties. This is a serious new precedent for the export of reprocessing technology at a time when we are not clear what our own domestic policy should be with respect to this activity.

Do you know of instances where that technology has actually been exported and how would your legislation affect the export of technology? Is the criterion that you suggest sufficient to provide safeguards on the export of reprocessing technology?

Mr. WOLPE. The legislation would impose a flat ban on the export of components and technology to be used in the reprocessing. I cannot give you specific examples right now of the instances in which that exportation is already occurring. I do not have that at my fingertips.

Mr. BONKER. Are there any countries who have not signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty that really have this capability? Mr. WOLPE. My understanding is that there has been no such transaction yet. But the Japanese have expressed an interest in acquiring a reprocessing capability.

Mr. BONKER. I mean, who really has that capability beyond the United States, to supply reprocessing technology?

Mr. WOLPE. The French do; they have an expensive breeder program.

Mr. BONKER. What do they do with the wastes of reprocessing? Mr. UDALL. Mr. Chairman, the Germans have one of the most ambitious high-level waste disposal programs. I visited that with some other people a couple of years ago.

The Germans have decided to settle for deep geologic storage and they are working on a program now that may get them there before anybody else.

Mr. BONKER. Well, then, if we have not clearly developed our own reprocessing capability and if the ban applies to our own ex

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ports of that technology, how effective will it be if other countries possess the capability but do not subscribe to a similar ban?

Mr. UDALL. Well, that is the job-if I may interject-of leadership in this country. We simply have to get tough with the nations that have this capacity and, working with our allies and friends and through international organizations, say we are not going to go that step. We are not going to go down that road. We are not going to provide nuclear technology to countries that now do not have it unless, at the minimum, they join the club, the nonproliferation club and sign the agreement.

Mr. BONKER. Well, I am not sure this administration even wants us in the club. It seems to me that we are going in the opposite direction. Instead of providing the leadership to encourage other countries to extend the prohibition on the export of reprocessing technology, we are actually lifting that.

What kind of signal is that sending to France, West Germany, and other countries?

Mr. WOLPE. Well, it is precisely that set of concerns that has motivated the introduction of both of the bills that are before the committee.

The point that you make, though, is an appropriate one: It is the same point that Mr. Udall was emphasizing just now. There is no easy way to discourage other countries short of our willingness to exercise that kind of leadership.

We have in fact embraced in both bills incentives as well as penalties for the transfer of nuclear technology-incentives in the form of provision, for example, of low enriched uranium where appropriate so that the result is an approach that other countries can perceive as rational and in their own national economic interest and ultimately in their survival interest as well.

REPROCESSING TECHNOLOGY

One of the ironies about the reprocessing decisions that are being made by this administration is that they are occurring precisely at a time when it is becoming increasingly clear that the economics of reprocessing technology are not working out as had been originally contemplated. This is in addition to all of the concerns with respect to the implication of plutonium on the world economy.

Mr. BONKER. The same trend is now taking place with the nuclear industry in this country. More than the danger, or environmental or safeguards problems, it is the economic factor that is causing the closedown of plants.

Yes, Mr. Markey.

Mr. MARKEY. If I might interject. India is trying to develop reprocessing capacity. Argentina is trying to develop reprocessing capacity. Mexico wants reprocessing capacity. The French have it, the British have it.

During the Ford administration, only intense pressure on the French was able to block a sale of this technology to the Koreans. So, it is something that clearly is a problem. It has been commercial interest that overly influenced our nonproliferation policy. We believe that, in spite of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, there have

been efforts to circumvent the spirit of this treaty through its loopholes.

Mr. BONKER. Mr. Markey, who are the leaders internationally in disseminating this technology? Is it the French?

Mr. MARKEY. Well, the French, of course, are known now as the "whores of international nuclear commerce." But they are only following an example which was set years before by our government, although we are not the worst now.

We have opportunity to give the leadership now to the rest of the world. That can only take place if we, in our dealings with the Argentines, with the South Africans, with others, now take into account our own breaking of the spirit of this treaty.

I do not think we are probably as bad as the French but we are dealing in degrees that are sometimes indistinguishable.

Mr. BONKER. Mr. Udall, you were here last session when Mr. Bingham's bill was reported out of the committee but, as I understand it, it was a respectful gesture to Mr. Bingham. There was an understanding that it would not be taken up on the floor. There appeared to be considerable opposition. That seems strange in view of the fact that Mr. Bingham's first bill was broadly supported in the Congress, and this is simply an effort to tighten up some of those loopholes.

Has the public's consciousness about this issue changed or are the political dynamics a little different? Or are the nuclear special interest groups so strong in the Congress that we cannot seem to strengthen an effort to contain this awful and frightful technology?

Mr. UDALL. I do not know, probably a combination of things have brought about the result. I think clearly the failure to bring up the Bingham bill in the closing hours without a serious attack on actually getting it passed was probably due to lack of support at that point.

I agreed with the strategy that Jack Bingham, after all these years of work, at least ought to have his bill reported out of his own committee.

But I think probably there is more support in a sense out in the public as they begin to focus on these issues and that maybe, if those of us who believe that there is great peril here keep fighting the fight, we may do it. We may get something done.

We were talking a minute ago here about the Korean airplane. You know B-52's-our major intercontinental bomber. For a long time, and it may still be the case, for a long time some of those B-52's crusing over international waters, making flights around the globe, actually carried nuclear weapons in their bomb bays.

INCIDENT IN SPAIN

There was a celebrated incident over Spain, a place called Palamaris, I think, where a B-52 went down and nuclear weapons sprayed their insides all over the countryside and it took years to track down every bit of radiated soil and track it down.

The outline, the silhouette of a B-52, is much more similar in my recollection than this intelligence plane that we had flying out of the Aleutians the night of the tragedy with 007.