Finally, it would prohibit the export of components and technology to be used in reprocessing in response to the serious questions raised about the safety and economic value of this process.

In my view, these restrictions are particularly appropriate in light of the apparent intention of the Reagan administration to continue promoting nuclear exports to nations that pose a serious proliferation risk.

In recent months, the administration has approved plans to supply nuclear reactor fuel and components to India; it has approved the retransfer of a computer and 143 tons of U.S.-origin heavy water to Argentina, and it is currently considering the licensing of an American company to service a nuclear reactor in South Africa.

STATE DEPARTMENT LETTER

I might parenthetically note in this connection that it is my understanding that the State Department is holding the letter that it has developed recommending approval to the Department of Energy of a license for American companies bidding for a management services contract to operate a nuclear plant within South Africa, pending the receipt of the letter that I am presently circulating among Members of Congress.1

With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask that that letter be inserted in the record at the end of my testimony. Mr. BONKER. Without objection, so ordered.

Mr. WOLPE. It is also my understanding that the African Bureau within the State Department has actually directly contacted some of the firms and told them to proceed on the assumption that the license will be granted, even before the approval process has run its course. I find that a very distressing development.

I might note that the administration decisions regarding India, Argentina, and South Africa have been made despite the fact that none of those nations has signed a nonproliferation treaty or agreed to international inspection of its facilities. Under the terms of H.R. 1417, all of these actions would be subject to NRC concurrence and/or congressional scrutiny.

A further concern is the administration's promotion of plutonium as a civilian nuclear fuel, despite the enormous danger of trade in the substance. Current world supplies of uranium will make plutonium fuel uneconomic for decades to come, and plutonium reprocessing technology is as applicable to weapons making as to commercial fuel development. My bill would discourage this practice by reinstating an export ban on reprocessing components and technology that has in fact been supported by past administrations of both political parties.

Mr. Chairman, the world events of the past few weeks have demonstrated the speed with which international crises can occur and the dangers of those crises escalating into conflict. I believe it is more important than ever before that we work to reduce the risk of nuclear attack or confrontation through serious negotiations on

arms reductions and new efforts to halt the spread of weaponsmaking capability.

I commend you and also Chairman Zablocki for convening these joint subcommittee hearings on this most serious question, and I thank you for this opportunity to testify.

Mr. BONKER. Thank you, Mr. Wolpe.

I see our other two witnesses are here. Since all are representing congressional views, I think at this time I will invite Chairman Udall and Mr. Markey to the table. Mr. Wolpe, if you can remain, I think that will give us an opportunity to hear from each of you and then proceed with questions.

Mr. Udall is chairman of the House Interior Committee and has had a longstanding interest in this subject. We are indeed privileged to have you before the subcommittees today, Mr. Udall. You may proceed.

STATEMENT OF HON. MORRIS K. UDALL, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF ARIZONA

Mr. UDALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a statement which has been submitted for the record. I will dispense with it and highlight a few things if I can.

I appreciate your persistence in seeking to close the gaps in our nuclear nonproliferation policy. The bill I come to support herethe two bills-one of them was by Congressman John Bingham who was one of the real leaders in this subject area for a long time, and his leadership I followed with a good deal of pride and satisfaction.

My personal view is that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act provided the President adequate authority to pursue the policy Congress intended. In the presence of an administration more sensitive to the proliferation issue, perhaps there would be no need for this legislation before us today.

FUTURE THREAT

When I think of all the concerns on the national or international scene, I would list the likely fact that within the next 15 or 20 years we are not going to have 6 or 7 nations with nuclear weapons, we will probably have 20 or 25-and they are not all going to be nice little ladies speaking the English language like Mrs. Thatcher, or the French, or some of our trusted allies. They are likely to be governments unstable, governments with a revolutionary twist who will be out to do more than just make threats about nuclear weapons.

I guess we all had different reactions over the Korean jetliner. I would share a couple of my personal apprehensions with the committees.

One is, no nuclear weapons were involved, apparently, with the planes that were involved. But if we had nuclear weapons on these planes the same people, the same Soviet leaders, with the same communication equipment, would have been making the key decisions on whether or not the world went to nuclear war.

I remember Senator Jackson, your great Senator from Washington, who used to say that his greatest fear was not a deliberate nu

clear war but war by accident. We have come, a time or two, quite close to that.

So, I think the attention paid to this issue by these subcommittees is critically important and I urge you to continue it and, certainly, I will do what I can to help.

Unfortunately, the current administration seems unconcerned about the hazards of the plutonium fuel cycle. It appears to believe that production of nuclear explosive materials for commercial purposes does not increase the risk of proliferation. The administration seems to think we can allow people to have nuclear explosive materials but somehow prevent them from taking the final step of converting these materials into bombs.

I think the administration's premises are wrong. There is, of course, a direct relationship between our commercial nuclear activities and other nations' potential and ability to acquire nuclear

weapons.

I am now skipping over to page 3.

ONGOING CONFLICTS

Current history provides a vivid picture of what might occur were nuclear weapons more readily available. There is a terrible and frightening aspect common_to_recent, ongoing conflicts in the Falklands, Iran and Iraq, and Lebanon. Each evolved in its own way such that its instigators would almost certainly have chosen a different course had they known the outcome beforehand. And unless we come to our senses, the potential for catastrophe inherent in such events will increase. As the number of nuclear nations grows, it is inevitable that at some point nuclear weapons will be used in circumstances which might now seem implausible.

Legislation incorporating the principles of H.R. 1417 and H.R. 3058 would tend to reinforce the message we intended in enacting the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978. We said then that we as a nation were willing to forgo certain of the benefits of nuclear commerce in order to achieve our nonproliferation objectives.

Skipping to the next paragraph, on page 4.

If we are to be successful in persuading other countries to pursue strong antiproliferation policies, it will be necessary to remove ambiguities from our own. We need to demonstrate our own determination to not conduct our nuclear trade in a business-as-usual manner. We need to affirm that our policy is to keep nuclear explosive materials out of commercial channels. Enactment of legislation containing the principles of H.R. 1417 and 3058 will be an important manifestation of our resolve.

Before concluding, I would like to make one comment about the provisions of H.R. 3058 which allows subsidized sales of enrichment services.

This represents a departure from past practice and affects the whole of our enrichment service marketing and building strategy. It would result in significant costs and risks for the American taxpayer and will be more fully examined. I think the subsidization approach is worth trying only if we are assured that we could prevent plutonium-related activities in other parts of the world. That concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman.

[Mr. Udall's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. MORRIS K. UDALL, A REPRESENTATIVE
IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF ARIZONA

I admire this Committee's persistence in seeking to close gaps in our nuclear nonproliferation policy. My personal view is that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 provided the President adequate authority to pursue the policy Congress intended. In the presence of an Administration more sensitive to the proliferation issue, there would be no need for the legislation that is before you.

Unfortunately, the current Administration seems unconcerned about the hazards of the plutonium fuel cycle. It appears to believe that production of nuclear explosive materials for commercial purposes does not increase the risk of proliferation. The Administration thinks it can allow people to have nuclear explosive materials, but somehow prevent them from taking the final step of converting these materials into bombs.

The Administration seems indifferent to the dangers of nuclear commerce conducted without effective safeguards. It appears to have closed its eyes to the unsettling fact that equipment and materials ostensibly destined for peaceful purposes can and do contribute to other nation's nuclear weapons programs. Furthermore, the President and his advisors seem to accept as gospel the notion that nations having an intent to acquire nuclear weapons will do so irrespective of efforts by us and others to restrict nuclear commerce.

The Administration's premises are wrong. There is of course a direct relationship between our commercial nuclear activities and other nation's potential and ability to acquire nuclear weapons. We need only recognize that by the end of this decade, some 50 tons of plutonium will be produced each year in the world's power reactors. From this amount of plutonium more than 2000 nuclear weapons could be fabricated. It takes little imagination to envision what would happen if a small portion of this plutonium should fall into the wrong hands whether by theft or by reprocessing with equipment obtained from us or other supplier nations.

I do not accept the Administration's negative and simplistic view. I believe we can take steps to stem the flow of nuclear weapons techonology; and I believe we have a responsbility to do so.

Current events emphasize our precarious state. International violence occurs for reasons that make no sense. The tragedy of Korean Airlines Flight 007 demonstrates how innocent beginnings can bring about consequences with dangerous implications for mankind.

Current history provides a vivid picture of what might occur were nuclear weapons more readily available. There is a terrible and frightening aspect common to recent and ongoing conflicts in the Falklands, Iran and Iraq, and Lebanon. Each evolved in a way such that its instigators would almost certainly have chosen a different course had they known the outcome beforehand. And unless we come to our senses, the potential for catastrophe inherent in such events will increase. As the number of nuclear nations grows, it is inevitable that at some point nuclear weapons will be used in circumstances which might now seem implausible.

While few of us here can expect in our lifetime to see the elimination of the threat of nulcear war, there are clear steps to be taken in that direction. Enactment of legislation to embody the principles of H.R. 1417 ad H.R. 3058 would be one such step.

This legislation will tend to reinforce the message we intended in enacting the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978. We said then that we as a nation were willing to forgo certain of the benefits of nulcear commerce in order to achieve our nonproliferation objectives.

I know this legislation is not perfect. It is intended to plug loopholes in the previous legislation. There are those who will say, as they have said in the past, that we will not be viewed as reliable suppliers. It will be said that the imposition of further restrictions upon our own corporations will simply result in the transfer of nuclear commerce to other countries. I do not accept this argument. I would rather that we would not be considered a reliable supplier if this means that we must be oblivious to our exports being used to make bombs.

If we are to be successful in persuading other countries to pursue strong anti-proliferation policies, it will be necessary to remove ambiguities from our own. We need to demonstrate our own determination to not conduct our nuclear trade in a business-as-usual manner. We need to affirm that our policy is to keep nuclear explosive mateirals out of commercial channels. Enactment of legislation containing the principles of H.R. 1417 and H.R. 3058 will be an important manifestation of our resolve.

Before concluding, I would like to make one comment about the provision in H.R. 3058 which allows subsidized sales of enrichment services. This represents a departure from past practices and could affect the whole of our enrichment services and marketing and building strategy. It would result in significant costs and risks for the American taxpayer and will be more fully examined. I think the subsidization approach is worth trying only if we are assured that we could prevent plutonium related activities in other parts of the world.

Mr. BONKER. Thank you, Mr. Udall. We certainly appreciate your appearance today and your commitment to this issue, as well as your support of the legislation that is pending before the subcommittees.

Finally, we will hear from Mr. Markey of Massachusetts who, I understand, is chairman of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Task Force and who is also the author of a book on this subject, "Nuclear Perils."

Mr. Markey, it is indeed a pleasure to have you before the subcommittees.

STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD J. MARKEY, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS

Mr. MARKEY. Thank you, and thank you for allowing me to testify before your subcommittees today, Mr. Chairman.

It is a pleasure to be here to support H.R. 3058, introduced by Mr. Ottinger. At the same time, I am also a cosponsor of the legislation introduced by Mr. Wolpe because I believe the goals are similar although there are some differences in approach in particular areas.

If enacted, H.R. 3058 would require the United States to undertake new initiatives and once again to assume a leadership role in nonproliferation efforts.

If the United States fails to assume that role, I would not be optimistic about the chances for limiting the spread of nuclear weapons around the world.

During the past 3 years, the present administration has done much to undercut the bipartisan nonproliferation of its predecessors and has taken every opportunity to circumvent the restrictions of the Non-Proliferation Act. It has not sought to halt the spread of plutonium around the world, and it has been willing to engage in commerce with countries such as Argentina and India, which do not meet our basic nonproliferation standards.

That the situation is not much worse than it is can only be attributed to the lucky fact that the economics of nuclear power are poor. But if the trend in this administration's policies is not reversed, there is a very real risk that not before long an Argentina, an India, or a South Africa will build a bomb from nuclear materials the United States or another country has supplied.

LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT

On May 18, 1983, when H.R. 3058 was introduced, I joined with other Members of Congress in writing to the President and expressing our profound concern over the administration's relaxation of efforts to curb the spread of nuclear weapons.

This letter documents the inconsistent actions of this administration, which have "all too often been motivated by undue concern