PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE NUCLEAR TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 20, 1983 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AF- Washington, D.C. The Subcommittees on International Security and Scientific Af- Mr. BONKER. The subcommittees will come to order. This morning the Subcommittees on International Security and Specifically, the subcommittees which share jurisdiction in the Since the enactment of the NNPA 5 years ago, we have wit- weapons. The legislation pending before the subcommittee will attempt to The legislation seeks to respond to the lessons we have learned 1 See texts of H.R. 1417 and H.R. 3058 in apps. 1 and 2, respectively. to those who are not signatory to the various international treaties that attempt to discourage the production of nuclear weapons. I have a statement that is prepared by the chairman of the International Security and Scientific Affairs Subcommittee that I would like to enter in the record at this time. [Chairman Zablocki's prepared opening statement follows:] OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI, CHAIRMAN This morning the Subcommittees on International Security and Scientific Affairs and on International Economic Policy and Trade meet to hear testimony from Congressional witnesses on H.R. 1417 and H.R. 3058, amendments to the Nuclear NonProliferation Act of 1978. Hearings were held during the 97th Congress on the predecessor to H.R. 1417, sponsored by our former colleague from New York, the Honorable Jonathan Bingham. While some differences arose over mechanical aspects of that legislation, there were no differences over its ultimate goals. Today's hearing continues the examination by these two subcommittees of ways to strengthen the international nuclear nonproliferation regime, and I look forward to hearing the views of our distinguished colleagues. We welcome the Honorable Howard Wolpe, a Member of Congress from the State of Michigan and Chairman of the Subcommittee on Africa, the Honorable Morris K. Udall, a Member of Congress from the State of Arizona and Chairman of the Interior Committee, and the Honorable Edward J. Markey, a Member of Congress from the State of Massachusetts and a subcommittee chairman of the Interior Committee. Mr. Wolpe, would you proceed? Mr. BONKER. I would also like to ask if the ranking member of the International Security and Scientific Affairs Subcommittee has an opening statement. Mr. Broomfield. Mr. BROOMFIELD. No. Mr. BONKER. If not, Mr. Roth who is ranking member of the International Economic Policy and Trade Subcommittee. Mr. ROTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am pleased to be here today at this joint hearing to hear the three distinguished colleages discuss the important issue of nonproliferation. I believe each and every one of us agrees that the proliferation of nuclear technology in the wrong hands may be the greatest danger for the future of our civilization. Mr. Chairman, I want to take the slight liberty this morning to discuss certain provisions of the legislation before us. I have reviewed the provisions of this legislation and I was struck by the similarity between much of the terminology in the proposed Nuclear Explosives Control Act and the Export Administration Act. H.R. 3058 For example, H.R. 3058 speaks of controls on the export of technology, so does the Export Administration Act. H.R. 3058 spells out the end-use restrictions which can only be labeled as the extraterritorical application of U.S. policy. Statements by the former distinguished chairman of this subcommittee, Mr. Bingham, described the conflict among agencies involved in the licensing of nuclear-related materials and technology. The same problem is found upon examination of licensing within the Export Administration Act. Now, the bill before us places additional responsibility with the Secretary of Defense, in essence, to veto nuclear exports. The very same issue has arisen in the current EAA debate; that is, whether or not the Secretary of Defense should have a greater role in approving or disapproving export license applications for reasons of national security. The legislation before us addresses the problem of end-use restrictions and the prevention of diversion. Preventing diversion is a problem for both nonproliferation and the Export Administration Act. COSTS TO AMERICAN INDUSTRY It is argued that the costs to American industry of nuclear export controls are necessary costs because an overriding national policy to prevent diversion and the likelihood of the improper use of nuclear products and technology. The same issues exist with the export of high technology, even with our closest friends and allies in Western Europe and Japan, the so-called Cocom countries. Mr. Chairman, still another concept emerges, that of foreign availability. With nuclear exports, the legislation appears to advocate unilateral controls. The same issue is hotly debated within EAA. If we see justifications for unilateral controls here, how can we argue they are inapplicable to the sale of our most advanced technology which could enhance Soviet military power. Finally, Mr. Chairman, the bill we examine today extends the reach of U.S. law and regulation to foreign subsidiaries and affiliates of U.S. companies as well as to goods and technologies controlled by the United States. It seems to me that this type of extraterritorial control is accepted by many members to carry out U.S. policy for compelling national security factors. Such extraterritorial jurisdiction within the Export Administration Act is also considered essential for reasons of national security and foreign policy. I raise these similarities because accepting them or rejecting them in H.R. 3058 regarding nuclear nonproliferation or in the Export Administration Act is a matter of policy, not of law; a question of what Congress thinks is best for the country, as opposed to their regulatory burden. A measure of consistency is necessary because of the similarities between pieces of legislation. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. BONKER. Thank you, Mr. Roth, for an excellent statement and appreciate your reference to the similarities with the Export Administration Act. Given that fact and your position on the EAA, I trust you will be supporting tighter controls when the legislation is before the subcommittee. [Laughter.] Mr. ROTH. I thank the chairman. Mr. BONKER. We have three distinguished witnesses, each of whom has taken special interest and is sponsoring legislation concerning nuclear nonproliferation. I would like to welcome first the distinguished member of this subcommittee, Howard Wolpe of Michigan, who is the sponsor of H.R. 1417. Mr. Wolpe, you may proceed. STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD WOLPE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MICHIGAN Mr. WOLPE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I greatly appreciate the opportunity to be before you this morning in a different kind of capacity, testifying before the committee on a subject that I believe is among the most important that the committee and the Congress will consider. The issue is worldwide nuclear proliferation, and at stake is the very survival of our Nation and our civilization. The spread of nuclear weaponry to nonnuclear weapons states and groups is often obscured by the debate over the superpower arms race, a subject which itself impacts directly on the future of this planet. But in a sense, global proliferation represents an even more dangerous threat. Through a combination of self-interest and restraint, the superpowers have successfully avoided the use of nuclear weapons for 28 years. But the spread of nuclear technology, materials, and information increases the threat of such capability being acquired by a nation or group that would not treat it so responsibly. With only a small supply of plutonium, a terrorist group could hold the entire world hostage. With materials and technology diverted from certain kinds of commercial nuclear facilities, a small nation could turn a regional conflict into a catastrophic nuclear war. Indeed, one of the most likely scenarios for a nuclear exchange between the superpowers is one in which an initial attack is launched by a third party. The United States, as the original nuclear weapons state and, until the mid-1970's, the world's largest supplier of nuclear materials, has a special responsibility to insure the prudent and peaceful use of this technology. Europe and the U.S.S.R. now supply about as much enriched uranium as we do. We have always been mindful of that responsibility. From the passage of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, we have sought to regulate the flow of materials, equipment, and information relevant to nuclear weapons development. A host of other responsible nations has joined with us, pledging to halt the trade in weapons-making technology and to accept international inspection of their own commercial nuclear facilities. INSPECTION PROBLEMS Nevertheless, numerous problems persist in the international inspection system created to safeguard against diversion of civil nuclear power to weapons development. A number of nations have refused to ratify the nonproliferation agreements, creating doubt about the true nature of their nuclear programs. The trade in commercial nuclear materials and equipment continues unabated, with many of those materials easily adaptable to weapons-making programs. And the International Atomic Energy Agency is woefully overburdened in its efforts to acquire data and inspect the safety of nuclear facilities to assure there have been no diversions. The IAEA is really the only agency, a minuscule agency exists for Latin Amercia-OPANOL-but it has no budget and little power. In light of the continuing and increasing proliferation risk, I believe this country must redouble its efforts to restrict access to materials and information that facilitate weapons development. Passage of the landmark Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 was a crucial step in that direction. NNPA OF 1978 That act, passed with overwhelming bipartisan support, provided incentives to those nations that support strong nonproliferation policies; at the same time, it blocked exports to nonnuclear weapons states that were unwilling to submit all of their facilities to safeguards or to pledge they would not explode nuclear devices. This law serves U.S. interests well. But 5 years of experience with it have also demonstrated ways in which it should be strengthened and improved. SUBSTANCE OF H.R. 1417 This year, I introduced legislation that I believe would close many of the loopholes of the NNPA and create an even more rational, consistent nuclear export policy. H.R. 1417 is identical to a bill sponsored in the 97th Congress by our distinguished former colleague, Jack Bingham, who also of course, was the chief sponsor and advocate of the original Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act. That bill was unanimously approved by the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade and subsequently approved and ordered reported by the full Foreign Affairs Committee. The bill is cosponsored by 51 of our colleagues, including 13 members of the Foreign Affairs Committee. The bill addresses five major points: First, it would make acceptance of internationally recognized safeguards a prerequisite for all U.S. nuclear exports, regardless of the reviewing or licensing agency. These guidelines currently apply to nuclear reactor and fuel exports licensed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, but not to nuclear-related assistance and technology authorized by the Departments of Energy and Commerce. Second, it would provide stiffer criteria for the export of highly enriched uranium, requiring the use of less dangerous alternative fuels where possible and encouraging the development of more widely usable low enriched fuel. Third, it would toughen current law regarding "subsequent arrangements," which allow the reprocessing of U.S. exported fuel. Under the bill, NRC concurrence would be required before the United States could grant approval for another nation to reprocess U.S.-supplied fuel into plutonium. Additionally, long-term "programmatic approvals" for reprocessing could only be approved if the grantee prohibited sales to nations that do not accept full-scope safeguards. Fourth, it would give a stronger role to the Defense Department in the approval of commercial nuclear exports, providing the Secretary of Defense with a de facto veto over such arrangements if he determines that they pose a threat to national security. |