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ment when properly organized and administered is no natural or integral part of society. "Society originates in our wants-government in our wickedness." Society consists of all the relations and interrelations between and among individuals and groups of individuals. Because of man's wickedness and need for restraint, government is an institution created by society to restrain and punish, through manmade laws and courts, the people who do not voluntarily obey all of God's laws, chief of which is the law of love. If all people would voluntarily obey all of God's laws, there would be no need for manmade laws. Government when properly organized and administered has absolutely no functions or powers other than strictly police powers.

In substantiation of the facts stated in the above two paragraphs, we quote one of the wisest of our Founding Fathers. Current historians have uncovered ample evidence to show that he had fully as great a part in the formulation of our Declaration of Independence as did Thomas Jefferson.

On January 10, 1776, Thomas Paine published the following as the first paragraph and a half of his pamphlet "Common Sense." He was writing on "The Origin and Design of Government"—

"Some writers have so confounded (or confused) society with government, as to leave little or no distinction between them; whereas they are not only different, but have different origins. Society is produced by our wants, and government by our wickedness; the former promotes our happiness positively by uniting our affections, the latter negatively by punishing our vices. The one encourages intercourse, the other creates distinctions. The first is a patron, the last is a punisher.

"Society in every state is a blessing, but government, even in its best state, is only a necessary evil; in its worst state an intolerable one; for when we suffer, or are exposed to the same miseries by a government, which we might expect in a country without government, our calamity is heightened by the reflection that we furnish the means by which we suffer. Government, like dress, is the badge of lost innocence; the palaces of kings are built upon the ruins of the bowers of paradise. For, were the impulses of conscience clear, uniform and irresistibly obeyed, man would need no other lawgiver."

In the last sentence above, Thomas Paine uses the word "conscience" with much the same content and meaning as we give to the word God several paragraphs above. His sentence says in effect that "if all people would voluntarily obey all of God's laws, there would be no need for manmade laws.

Those who consider revisions in the U. N. Charter must keep the above truths in mind and they must not be violated in any amendments adopted. The U. N. must not be suddenly or precipitately abolished. It should be preserved indefinitely as a great world debating society; a place where people from all nations can gather in a friendly atmosphere to discuss and suggest solutions for all human problems; a place for the creation of world public opinion. But it should never have power to enforce any of its opinions. Persuasion, the power of love and the force of ideas, is the only power or force it should ever be allowed to use.

When all nations are simultaneously and totally disarmed in all categories of weapons on a safe basis, the world police force contemplated in the original U. N. Charter should be allowed to carry no firearms, only night sticks, such as the London police carry. The London police is said to be the best and most effective police force in all the world.

A United Nations with power to enforce decisions would soon degenerate into a world superstate. People, on the average, are not yet good enough to make a superstate either safe or tolerable. If they were good enough to make it so there

would be no need for such a state.

Government should never have any administrative or executive powers or functions in the fields of economics, education, philosophy, or religion. Thank God, our Founding Fathers separated church and state in America. In this country religious bodies are not supported by taxation. The state has no power to organize religious bodies, to administer their affairs, or to interfere with their free exercise and control of their own affairs. The separation of church and state has taken much evil out of both church and state. The total separation of all aspects and activities of society from all state influence will take a still greater number of evils out of both society and government than did the separation of church and state.

The same principle of separation should be established as between government and all the other fields or aspects of society, namely, economics, education,

and philosophy. None of the functions or activities of society should ever be supported by taxation. They should be supported by voluntary gifts, just as the Red Cross, the Boy Scouts, community chests, chambers of commerce, churches, etc., are now supported.

"The power to tax is the power to destroy," has been said by a very wise person. Government or the state should never be allowed to levy taxes except for its only true function, namely, police power. Certain people are seeking an amendment to the charter which would give the U. N. certain powers of taxation. This is extremely dangerous, and such an amendment should never be adopted. The U. N. should not be supported by grants or appropriations from governments. All its functions and activities should be supported by voluntary gifts from individual citizens and private business concerns in all nations.

A proper revision of the United Nations Charter would totally disassociate and separate it from all governments. If that were done the tone and quality of all present agencies for education and human welfare such as UNESCO, U. N. Children's Fund, World Health Organization, International Labor Organization, and the Food and Agricultural Organization would be greatly improved. The United Nations should not be abolished but it should be thoroughly transformed, by taking away from it all political aspects and relationships. It should have no dealing or relationships with any government.

Gentlemen of the subcommittee, some of you may say that most of our testimony, thus far, has been impractical and utopian. If so, please let us remind you that everything right in the sight of God is practical; also that nothing wrong, or contrary to His will and His laws, is practical. God made a very practical universe. All His laws are very practical, including both the law of gravitation and His most important law, so far as mankind is concerned, the law of love.

All His laws of biology, chemistry, heredity, psychology, and physics, as well as His laws in all the fields of science, philosophy, and religion are practical. This world would be an actual utopia, a heaven on earth, if even a two-thirds majority of people would obey all God's moral and spiritual laws, especially the law of love, as precisely, and even minutely, as the engineers, who design and build our marvelous modern automobiles and airplanes, obey the laws of physics.

I repeat that everything right in the sight of God is practical and that everything wrong, or contrary to His will and His laws is impractical. We have war, crime, juvenile delinquency, dishonesty in business, and all other evils in the world because a vast majority of the people who teach in our public schools, our colleges, and universities, and especially the men in politics who determine both domestic and foreign policy are impractical people.

No possible amendment to the United Nations Charter will be practical, which does not conform to the basic and eternally true principles set forth in our testimony.

No person will be competent to be a member of the committee or commission which deals officially with possible amendments to that charter unless he or she understands and accepts the basic principles hereinbefore set forth.

Again we thank you for the high privilege and honor of presenting testimony to your honorable subcommittee, which we believe is honestly seeking the truth.

A PROPOSAL FOR WEIGHTING VOTES IN THE U. N. ASSEMBLY BY CATHERINE SENF, WASHINGTON, D. C.

In its 10th year, the United Nations faces an uncertain future. A tiny minority of the peoples of the world think it has failed of its purpose and should be disbanded. Another handful of people seek for it the impossible goal of sudden transition into world government. The great majority of people and of responsible leaders anxiously hope that it will somehow learn to cope more effectively with the vast problems which it faces. Some farsighted statesmen have begun to point to the voting procedures of the U. N.'s most representative, and in many ways most powerful, organ as a possible key to the development of a more effective organization.

As provided in the charter, decisions are now made in the General Assembly by a simple majority, or for "important" matters, a two-thirds majority-of those present and voting. Each of the 60 member states has 1 vote. Under these conditions a simple majority (31 out of 60 votes) can be made up of countries representing less than 6 percent of the total population of the members. A tw thirds majority can be obtained by votes representing 11 percent of the pop

tion. On the other hand, the formation of a two-thirds majority can be prevented by the 21 smallest countries representing only 2.3 percent of the total population. Countries contributing about 1 percent to the regular budget of the organization for 1955 have enough votes to block affirmative action on "important" matters.

Of course the smallest countries do not band together in this extreme fashion, but it has happened often enough that the voice of the world forum is really that of a minority of the peoples represented in the U. N. Sometimes decisions which, to be effective, would require large voluntary contributions, are passed without the support of the powers whose contributions are most essential.

Careful students of international organization have long foreseen that an equitable system of weighted voting or weighted representation must be developed before any substantial increase can take place in the powers of such an organization as the U. N. Some observers who believe that this is not the time for a grant of additional powers to the General Assembly, nevertheless think that the discharge of present responsibilities of that organ would be facilitated by a more realistic voting system. Among those who have called attention to the desirability of modifying the one-state, one-vote system in the Assembly are Sir Mohammed Zafrullah Khan of Pakistan, Paul-Henri Spaak of Belgium, Carlos Romulo of the Philippines, Carl J. Hambro of Norway, Dr. Van Balluseck of the Netherlands, and John Foster Dulles of the United States. Several of these, including Mr. Dulles, have specifically suggested consideration of the possibility of weighted voting at the forthcoming charter review conference.

A properly designed plan for weighted voting in the Assembly could do much to promote the sense of responsibility by members for carrying out the decisions voted upon there. It is equally true and more important to note that no plan for weighted voting can be adopted unless there is a considerable sense of responsibility beforehand, especially on the part of the smaller States. Many of these small countries would have to exchange an equal voice in resolutions which are often ineffectual, for a smaller part in actions having a greater chance of being effective. The great powers have a veto over any proposal for weighted voting. However, since they would be the principal beneficiaries, they have an immediate incentive to reach agreement on such a plan. The decision whether or not any plan for weighted voting will be adopted is up to the small countries, since they have enough votes to prevent it. The following proposal therefore seeks to retain a respectable share of power for the small nations, while suggesting some principles for arriving at an equitable gradation of voting strength for all countries.

Description of the proposal.-In this proposal it is assumed that decisions of the General Assembly will continue, as now, to be recommendatory in most fields rather than legally binding. The purpose of weighting votes, therefore, is to increase the force and effectiveness of the Assembly's recommendations by making them more representative of the peoples of the United Nations, while reflecting also their differing capacities and responsibilities for the organization's work.

The principal features of the proposed weighting method are the kind of mathematical function to be used in arriving at the weights, the variates whose values are to be used in this function, and the kinds of decisions for which the weighting would be used. The function proposed is the square root or some other root of the variate, and the variates proposed are population and assessment share in the regular budget of the United Nations, each to be used for weights in different classes of decisions. The square root, or some other root, of population is proposed for resolutions expressing the Assembly's function as a forum of world opinion, and generally for all recommendations. Votes on budgetary matters would be weighted by the square root or another root of the assessment, except that determination of the scale of assessments itself would remain a subject for equal voting, as would certain other constitutional questions involving amendment of the charter. This classification of decisions to which the respective weights would apply is somewhat tentative.

The size and kind of majorities to be used for various kinds of decisions under the weighting, is left open as a point for negotiation, as are a number of other matters affecting the balance of power which will result. An important point of this kind is the multiple membership of the U. S. S. R. arising from the Yalta agreement to accept as members of the U. N., two of the constituent republics of the U. S. S. R. as well as the U. S. S. R. itself. Under the formula proposed here, this results in somewhat greater voting strength than the U. S. S. R. would

have if treated as a single member with the same total population and assessment.

The use of weights proportional to a fractional power of a factor rather than to the factor itself, has the effect of reducing the great disparities among countries which would result from the latter method. It does this without arbitrarily introducing maximum and minimum weights, which would discriminate against certain countries. The use of square roots or other powers between 0 and 1, affords a natural compromise between equal voting (zero power) and voting proportional to a factor (first power).

Effect of the proposal for small and large countries.-To illustrate the watering down effect of fractional powers, for example, in weights proportional to population the United States would have about 100 times the weight of Paraguay, but only 10 times as much if weights proportional to square root of population were used, and less than 5 times as much if cube roots were used. India would have 20 times the weight of Burma in the first case, 4 to 5 times as much in the second case, and 2 to 3 times as much in the third.

It is convenient to scale the weights obtained in various ways to add to a total of 1,000 for easy comparability. Then each country's percentage share in the total vote is obtained by marking off one decimal in its allotted number of votes. Weights computed in this way based on the square roots and cube roots of the proposed weighting factors are shown in table I.

TABLE I.-Two possible applications of the formula proposed for weighting votes-votes based on square roots and cube roots of population and assessment percentage

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TABLE I.-Two possible applications of the formula proposed for weighting votes-votes based on square roots and cube roots of population and assessment percentage-Continued

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1 Population for an earlier year was used in computing population weights as no official U. N. estimate was available for 1953.

The author believes that the square root weights would accomplish the purposes of weighted voting better than the cube root weights, and therefore the former are referred to as recommended weights in this paper. If states are unwilling to depart so far from equality, the cube root weights illustrate one possible alternative use of the general formula of weights proportional to a fractional power of the factor. Weights can also be computed on the basis of other fractional powers.

To see how the recommended population weights affect small countries compared with large countries, cumulative totals of the population weights were obtained for countries listed in order by population. Population totals were also cumulated. This analysis gave the following results:

If voting strength were proportional to population itself, the 30 smallest countries, instead of having 50 percent of the total vote, as now, would have only about 5 percent. Under the recommended weights, however, they would have about 21 percent. The next 15 countries by population now have 25 percent of the total vote. Under simple proportionality they would be reduced to about 11 percent, but under the recommended weights they would retain nearly their present total voting strength (in fact, 5 would gain in relative voting strength). The largest 15 countries also have 25 percent of the total now. Under simple proportionality to population, they would have 84 percent of the total, while under the recommended proposal they would have 56 percent. In all, under the recommended population weights, 40 countries would lose relative voting strength and 20 countries-all those with over 15 million people would gain. The recommended population weights would give the most populous country, China, 89 votes compared with 2 each for Iceland and Luxembourg, the least populous. Under simple proportionality the maximum-to-minimum ratio would be about 3,000 to 1.

The smallest population group that could theoretically form a simple majority under the recommended population weights would consist of the 49 least populous countries, with 21 percent of the total population of all members. At present such a majority can be formed of 31 countries with only 5.5 percent of the total population.

One final point may be noted: Only the six most populous countries have a smaller weight under the recommended proposal than under simple proportion

1 Since official U. N. population estimates have been used, China's population includes that of mainland China and Formosa, with data relating to 1951.

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