are qualities, and, being mental states, are not extended in space and cannot be divided as everything extended in space can be. It follows that one sensation cannot be greater or less than another, for to say that one thing is greater than another means that it occupies more space. Yet we certainly regard one sensation as capable of being more intense than another; for instance, at one time I feel an intenser heat than at another. What, then, can this mean? After a long psychological discussion he decides that, when a sensation is said to grow in intensity, this means one or more of the following things: either that there occurs an increasingly large number of qualitatively different mental states, or that more and more reactions take place in the body, or that the external cause of the sensation is an increasing quantity.

Let us take a simple instance. It is misleading to say that, when I enjoyed my dinner more than my breakfast, I got a greater intensity of pleasure from the one than from the other. A correct statement of what happened would run to the effect that at dinner-time a greater number of changes took place in my nervous system or in my mind. But perhaps it will be objected that this is a circular definition: in defining what is meant by 'greater quantity of pleasure' as 'greater number of physical or mental changes,' are we not introducing again the very notion of quantity that we wanted to define? To this objection, in so far as his proposal is to define 'intenser sensation' as meaning 'greater number of physical changes,' Bergson seems to have no clear reply; for he holds that 'quantity' is only another name for number as applied to physical things. But, in so far as the definition asserts that 'intenser sensation' means merely more mental changes,' his reply consists in a theory which must be briefly noticed. According to this theory, the notion of quantity or number is never involved when we speak of 'a greater number of mental states'; for the words, in such a phrase as this, that seem to have a numerical meaning, really only have that meaning when used of physical objects. We must recognise, in fact, two kinds of multiplicity-one, which may be called 'quantitative' multiplicity, connected with numbers and counting; and another, purely 'qualitative,' which alone is applicable to mental states.

e the only difference between two mental states alitative difference (it is not even true to say that .re 'two' states), and one quality can never be d from another.

lation of inner causality' (he says)' is purely dynamic, 3 no analogy with the relation of two external phe→ which condition one another. For, as the latter are of recurring in a homogeneous space, their relation expressed in terms of a law, whereas deep-seated states occur once in consciousness and will never gain.' ('Time and Free Will,' p. 219.)

ner words, the freedom of the will is a fact. But on does not hold that all our acts are uncaused or indeed, free acts are exceptional, and many people perform any at all. For freedom is a matter of e, only those acts being perfectly free which, at the crises of life, spring from the innermost core of ature. This is connected with his doctrine that in of us there are two different selves, one which we by deep introspection, and another, more super, which is its 'spatial representation.' The latter t free, and is subject to the laws of cause and effect. his account of the nature of mind, then, is Bergson's step in trying to give a general description of the ents of the universe; and a very surprising account It is surprising, for instance, to learn that no one ever, in the whole course of his life, had a sensation one moment, and then after a definite lapse of time had another sensation, since no one can be said, etly speaking, ever to have had two sensations or have had them at different times. I defer the stion whether this account is true, as it will be re convenient first to complete the description of the atents of the universe as Bergson conceives them. He kes the second step in 'Matière et Mémoire,' which is cupied mainly with discussing the relations between le mental part of reality and the material part. His lution of the two great classes of philosophical diffialties which arise in considering the connexion between aind and matter is extremely complicated; but I think hat its principal points can be put in a fairly simple way. To begin with, it is evident that there really are two

It is important to distinguish clearly between these two kinds of multiplicity, since many fallacies as to the nature of reality spring from confusing them, though Bergson confesses that the notion of qualitative multiplicity 'cannot be translated into the language of common sense. One point, however, is plain: his distinction between the two kinds of multiplicity is based on the view that mathematics depends upon space and counting. 'Counting material objects,' he says, ' means thinking all these objects together, thereby leaving them in space.' Number, in fact, is the juxtaposition of objects in space. Now mental states are not, like material objects, arranged in space side by side; hence they cannot be counted, and numbers do not apply to them. And observation bears this out. All our mental states run indistinguishably into one another; they are fused like the notes of a tune, and are not outside one another as are the parts of space and the objects in it. So, when I watch the beats of a pendulum, I do not really have, in the course of a minute, sixty distinct perceptions all exactly alike; what occurs is one complex mental event, unique in quality, with no sharp distinctions between its parts. But for purposes of convenience I count my perceptions; I put them side by side, that is to say, in a medium composed of exactly similar parts. This medium I call time; but, being 'homogeneous,' it can be nothing but space. In other words, we vitiate all our mental processes by the introduction into them of the notion of space; this 'time' in which we spread our processes out into distinct parts is a spurious space, quite unlike real time or duration,' which is perfectly heterogeneous.' Space admits only of juxtaposition, not of succession; to understand true succession we must banish the idea of a homogeneous medium and turn to 'pure duration.'

Thus the true duration of our mental life is purely qualitative; it is not a 'static' thing, but a 'dynamic' process, which cannot be broken up into parts or measured. And this shows, according to Bergson, that our minds possess a further property which distinguishes them from material objects-the property, namely, of not being subject to the law of causality. A mental state cannot be the effect of previous mental states; indeed, it cannot be the effect of anything at all,

because the only difference between two mental state is a qualitative difference (it is not even true to say thi they are 'two' states), and one quality can never be inferred from another.

'The relation of inner causality' (he says)' is purely dynam and has no analogy with the relation of two external phe nomena which condition one another. For, as the latter are capable of recurring in a homogeneous space, their relation can be expressed in terms of a law, whereas deep-seated psychic states occur once in consciousness and will never occur again.' (Time and Free Will,' p. 219.)

In other words, the freedom of the will is a fact. But Bergson does not hold that all our acts are uncaused or free; indeed, free acts are exceptional, and many people never perform any at all. For freedom is a matter of degree, only those acts being perfectly free which, at the great crises of life, spring from the innermost core of our nature. This is connected with his doctrine that in each of us there are two different selves, one which we reach by deep introspection, and another, more superficial, which is its 'spatial representation.' The latter is not free, and is subject to the laws of cause and effect. This account of the nature of mind, then, is Bergson's first step in trying to give a general description of the contents of the universe; and a very surprising account it is. It is surprising, for instance, to learn that no one has ever, in the whole course of his life, had a sensation at one moment, and then after a definite lapse of time has had another sensation, since no one can be said, strictly speaking, ever to have had two sensations or to have had them at different times. I defer the question whether this account is true, as it will be more convenient first to complete the description of the contents of the universe as Bergson conceives them. He takes the second step in 'Matière et Mémoire,' which is occupied mainly with discussing the relations between the mental part of reality and the material part. His solation of the two great classes of philosophical difficulties which arise in considering the connexion between mind and matter is extremely complicated; but I think that its principal points can be put in a fairly simple way. To begin with, it is evident that there really are two