is a germ of terrible social malignancy, while the spirochete of syphilis, transcending the imagination of Ezekiel, visits upon the innocent mother and children the iniquity of the father, perhaps after long years of bitter repentance for his trespass that he hath trespassed and for the sin that he hath sinned.' But there is a silver lining to the luetic cloud, in the steady fall in the incidence of the disease in the Army and Navy, and in the greater efficacy of treatment since the discovery of the germs. 'Nerves.'-While infection with germs of various kinds is the most serious factor in war, always more fatal than the enemy, inefficiency may come from many other causes, among which mental strain stands first. I asked an old veteran, thin, brown and worn from twentyone days' continuous fighting in the trenches, what would be the deciding factor in the war. He answered, 'Strain. The side with the strongest nerves will win.' Neurasthenia, mental breakdown and forms of insanity are common results of the nerve-shattering experiences of the war. Hysteria has shown possibilities of protean manifestations unrecognised by this generation in British constitutions. Strange functional types of nervous diseases occur which will demand most careful treatment. In many, psychic shock has so disturbed the working of the higher brain-centres that all sorts of weird delusions and hallucinations have been experienced, even to the strong level flight of a group of angels during the retreat from Mons! On the whole, the country may be congratulated on the comparatively small part disease has so far played in the Great War. There has been no epidemic on a large scale; and with effective measures it may be hoped that we shall escape the terrible experiences of South Africa and the Crimea. WILLIAM OSLER. Vol. 224.-No. 444. M Art. 10. THE CALIPHATE. WHEN the Fatimid Caliph El-Mo'izz entered Cairo in triumph in 973, he was required to show proof of his preposterous claim to represent the sacred lineage of the Prophet. So he called a general assembly, including many Sherifs or 'Honourables' of the true stock, who were fully prepared to scrutinise his genealogy; then, half drawing his sword from the scabbard, he said, 'Behold my pedigree,' and, scattering gold among the crowd, 'Behold my proofs!' The assembly could only profess itself completely satisfied. Moslems are quick to recognise the inevitable; and, apart from certain sects, the caliphate has usually belonged to him who could seize it, on the good old rule, the simple plan, That they should take who have the power, The probability in the near future of the demise of the Turkish empire, which now represents the orthodox caliphate, has naturally excited speculation as to the future of the formal headship of Islam. Into such it is not proposed to enter here. As the Secretary of State for India said, the future of the caliphate is a matter for the decision of Moslems alone; and in a letter to 'The Times,' April 24, 1915, Lord Cromer joined his experienced judgment to Lord Crewe's. No one doubts that they are right. But they wisely left the question open, how such a decision of the Moslem world was to be arrived at. As a matter of history, there has hardly ever been unanimity on this critical point. It is perhaps a popular opinion that there is only one caliph; but there are, in fact, at the present time, six. So erroneous is the impression that Islam acknowledges but one caliph, that it would be less untrue to say that there have usually been two or more. In the tenth century the Mediterranean washed the territories of three rival caliphs. Not only have Moslems frequently disagreed as to who was the true caliph, but a large minority have been, and still are, firmly persuaded that there is no caliph in the flesh, but that one will be manifested in the fulness of time and will usher in a millennium. Of such are most of the Persians, many Indians, including the Isma'ilis headed by the Aga Khan, and some powerful orders of dervishes. All this complexity arose from the Prophet Mohammad's neglect to appoint a rule of succession. The caliphate is no divine institution; it was founded neither on revelation in the Koran nor on prescription by the Prophet. It rose out of an urgent public necessity, which was met by a hurried, unpremeditated, informal expedient. Mohammad's unexpected death found his disciples wholly unprepared for the emergency. He had neither nominated a successor nor prescribed any rule for choosing one. The tradition that he limited the succession, or caliphate, to his own tribe of the Kureysh must be rejected.* Yet someone had to be chosen, and chosen at once, to fill, as far as might be, his supreme place. The occasion was momentous. Mohammad had been not only the religious leader, the 'Imam,' of Islam, but also the legislator, administrator-in short, the autocrat of the Moslem State. Only his tremendous personality kept the jarring factions and half-converted tribes together. It was of the first importance to find a 'successor,' a ' Khalifa,' who could carry on his gigantic work. A mistake might mean the ruin of the young State, not yet bound indissolubly by the ties of unswerving faith and rooted tradition. Already there * Modern criticism of Moslem traditions by Goldziher, Wellhausen, and Guidi, ably represented in the great' Annali dell' Islam' of Leone Caetani, Principe di Teano, though sometimes hypercritical, has exposed the frequently tendenziös character of traditions, invented to bolster up some dynasty or politico-theological view. The postulate that a caliph must belong to the Kureysh was the product of the historical fact that a long series of caliphs did belong to it. A tradition representing popular opinion based on experience was easily found'; and a speech, corroborating it, was put into the mouth of Abu-Bekr, to the effect that only the Kureysh could secure the allegiance of all the other Arab tribes. There is no evidence of any such tribal pre-eminence, outside Mecca, in pre-Islamic times; and the idea seems to be purely Moslem and post facto. The Prophet's reiterated insistence on the perfect equality of all true believers makes his alleged limitation of the headship to one tribe or family exceedingly improbable; and the fact that the leading citizens of Medina, where he had ruled for ten years and where he died, assembled on the day of his death, were within an ace of choosing a caliph out of their own number, and not one of the Kureysh, shows that any such limitation was unknown in the city; otherwise it would certainly have been respected. were signs of cleavage. Before the Prophet's body was cold, the 'Defenders' of Medina, following the usual Arab custom on the death of a tribal chief, had met together to elect a new leader. They were on the point of nominating one of themselves, when Abu-Bekr and 'Omar, and others of the Meccan Emigrants,' rushed in, and a stormy debate was soothed only by the tact of Abu-Bekr. Fortunately for the hopes of the Meccans, the men of Medina were of divided opinions, and other parties confused the issue. It was even proposed that there should be two caliphs, one for Mecca, the other for Medina. In the result, the choice of Abu-Bekr was carried chiefly by impulse, without formal voting; but, once accepted by this casual group of notables, his position was secure, and the great congregation in the Prophet's mosque next morning duly acclaimed the First Caliph, 'KhalifaTM-Rasul'-llah,' 'Successor of the Messenger of God'; or, to use the title assumed by 'Omar, the second caliph, and ever afterwards the official style of all caliphs, Emir-el-mu'minin,' 'Commander of the Faithful.' Abu-Bekr became caliph solely in right of his personal pre-eminence. He was one of the earliest converts to the faith, the Prophet's close friend and counsellor in his adversity as in his triumph. He had (but so had others) given him his daughter in marriage; and, when his Master fell ill, it was to Abu-Bekr that he deputed * In a previous article on the Sultanate of Egypt (‘Quarterly Review,' No. 443), stress was laid on the authoritative evidence of coins for official titles. The Omayyad caliphs put no names or titles on their official (gold and silver) issues, but are styled Emir-el-mu'minin on local copper coins. The 'Abbasids, from the third caliph onwards, called themselves, or were styled on subordinate currencies, Emir-el-mu'minin, and only five of them (El-Mahdi to El-Ma'mun) also used the title Khalifa. El-Ma'mun, who was strongly under the influence of Persians, who laid special stress on the Imamate, used Khalifa alternatively with Imam; and the last title was adopted by all later caliphs of this line, if they used any title at all on their coins. Imam and Emir-el-mu'minin are the titles on the coins of the Idrisid caliphs of Morocco, the Omayyad caliphs of Cordova, the Fatimid caliphs of Africa and Egypt, the Sherifs of Morocco and other Moorish caliphs, some of whom also called themselves 'sons of the caliphs.' Only the Almohades consistently used the title Khalifa; but it also appears sporadically on the coins of a Shi'a vezir in Egypt in 1130, on those of Mohammad Sheybani at Herat, etc., in the 16th and of Haidar at Bukhara in the 18th century. The Turkish Sultans employed none of these three titles on their coins, nor any other word to indicate caliphship. the exalted duty of leading the public prayers—an appointment which acquired a perhaps unintended significance. But all this would not have assured his succession if his personal character had not won general respect and affection. His simple piety, single-hearted loyalty, calm and moderating temper, sound good sense and transparent honesty marked him out for the great office. 'Vir pietate gravis,' he appealed to every true Moslem heart. Yet even he could not escape stifled murmurs. 'Ali, the Prophet's son-in-law, the Achilles of Islam, sulked in his tent; and a few others, who thought they had a claim to the headship, held aloof. There was some feeling that the electing conclave had been irregular, and that Abu-Bekr had got in by a 'fluke.' 'Certainly,' says Prof. Macdonald, in his brilliant survey of Moslem Constitutional Theory," 'the people of Islam had little conception of what was involved in the great precedent that they were about to establish; but nevertheless there lies here, in the first elective council which they called, the beginning of all the confusions, rivalries, and uncertainties that were to limit and finally to destroy the succession of the Commanders of the Faithful.' We should say, rather, that it was the lack of authority for the precedent, and the informality of the impromptu conclave, that worked the mischief. In the early days of Islam the elective principle was far from settled, and the first precedent was disregarded. AbuBekr himself set it aside when he personally nominated 'Omar as his successor; and 'Omar, after failing to obtain the consent of his own nominee, appointed six chief men, who were to choose the next caliph from amongst themselves. Soon afterwards we find the Omayyad caliphs nominating sons as their successors, and even ordering the succession of one son after another. Thus nomination superseded election; and, though it was doubtless confirmed by the acclamation of the people, such recognition, rarely denied to the man in power, can hardly be regarded as a technical election. Afterwards the succession to the caliphate became practically hereditary, as with * D. B. Macdonald, Development of Muslim Theology, Jurisprudence, and Constitutional Theory' (1903), p. 8. |