a party matter. Whether or not such a system will ultimately prove to be necessary to bring the war to a successful conclusion, is at present a matter of conjecture. All that can be said is that the national resources, industrial or military, cannot be developed to the fullest extent by disconnected individual effort; and that the attainment of the present state of development has entailed much unfairness to individuals, some dislocation of vital industries-those on which the army and our export trade depend-and the adoption of methods for stimulating recruiting which are discreditable to a great nation. Another thing that is quite certain is that any measure which may be adopted, to prepare for a full expansion of our resources if required, will take an indefinite time to complete; and, if subsequently put in operation, will need many months to take effect.

So far as recruiting is concerned, the so-called ' voluntary' system has produced what is, for us, a great army of the highest possible quality as regards personnel. What is wanting at the moment is munitions-a broad term which includes guns, howitzers, machine-guns, rifles, ammunition, and every kind of equipment. Whether the necessary expansion of the means of manufacture can be attained by controlled voluntary efforts will soon be seen. If not, it will be necessary to adopt other means; and the lives of our soldiers and the national independence must not be jeopardised by slavish adherence to the dogmas of party politics. Again, a time may come when the production of matériel will outstrip the supply of recruits. This is a contingency which must be foreseen and provided for months in advance, for soldiers take months to train. It is not one that can be left to chance, or contemplated in an attitude of hope or pious aspiration.

Judging from the tone of a considerable portion of the daily Press, there seems to exist a widespread misapprehension of the gravity of the present situation. The foolish optimism which prevailed during the first eight months of war has been succeeded by a more reasonable attitude; but few people seem, as yet, to have contemplated the possibility of the Germanic Powers being ultimately victorious, or to have realised that to secure ourselves against such a fatal possibility it

is necessary to concentrate all our national resources on the prosecution of the war. It is time to cease recrimination, and, instead of harping on the failure of the late Government, to rise to the occasion, to face the situation with which we are confronted, and to apply our undivided energies to preparing for the future. There will be time enough to fix blame for the present state of things when the war is over.

Lord Curzon showed a just appreciation of the present outlook when, in the House of Lords on July 2, he spoke of the situation being one of 'grave anxiety,' and of the country being in 'grave peril.' As he put it plainly, we are held up.' In France and Belgium, the Allies have been held up for seven months. They are also held up in the Dardanelles; and the Italians have been able to make but little impression on the strong defences opposed to them. The great offensive which was promised in France has not matured. Our Russian Allies have been compelled to abandon the invasion of Hungary and to evacuate nearly the whole of Galicia, while Germany has added a considerable area to the territories previously occupied by her armies. When we seek the causes of the Russian failure we find that they lie not in any ineptitude of the commanders or inferiority of the troops, but in the want of artillery capable of coping with that of the enemy, and in the inability to provide sufficient ammunition.

When we turn from the causes of the enemy's success in Galicia, and consider its probable consequences, we find nothing to excuse over-confidence. The Russian positions on the Dunajetz and Biala were believed to be as impregnable as those of the Allies in France and Belgium; but Von Mackensen crashed through the defences in a few hours, and subsequently scored the greatest offensive success of the war. Galicia has been practically reconquered; and the enemy are within measurable distance of securing possession of Warsaw and the line of the Vistula, the acquisition of which would defer indefinitely the invasion of Germany and Austria, even if the Russians should be able to make good their deficiencies in munitions of war. There are indications that Germany is already withdrawing some of her forces-whither, is as yet uncertain-and that the

Austrian army on the Italian frontier is being reinforced. Whatever may be the enemy's plans for the immediate future, it is certain that the Germans will soon renew their attempt to obtain a decision on the western front, the necessity for which was discussed in the last article ; and, having already tested the strength of the Allies' position, it is equally certain that she will concentrate all her available resources in men, and in mechanical and scientific accessories, on this object, in the hope of achieving a success similar to that which has attended her Galician campaign. If the result depended on the courage and resolution of the Allies' troops, there would be no room for uncertainty; but the recent experience of our Russian Allies has proved that these qualities are not in themselves decisive.

But in the appreciation of the paramount part played by artillery under present conditions, and of the need for an unlimited supply of ammunition, there lies the danger that other important factors may be neglected. It is a national characteristic to concentrate on one thing at a time, and to miss the inter-relation of the various factors which combine to form every problem of life. Public opinion, moreover, is liable to swift and unreasoning fluctuation. Not long ago the talk was all of a war of attrition, in which the Allies should stand on the defensive, and wear down the enemy's strength by obliging them to attack. Now, with strange inconsistency, people are impatient at the continuance of the attitude which they formerly commended. A few months back all our efforts were directed to stimulating recruiting. Now the cry is for munitions, and there is some danger that the need for men--who take as long to train as the heaviest guns to manufacture-may be overlooked. The fact is that our needs in each respect are interdependent; and hence the need for organisation to regularise and co-ordinate the supply. The Government, by introducing legislation on both subjects simultaneously, have shown that they grasp the situation. It is only to be hoped that they will not be deterred from taking any steps they may deem necessary, by the prospect of opposition on the part either of a knot of doctrinaires in the House of Commons or of any faction outside.

W. P. BLOOD.

II. AT SEA.

་

DURING the past three months the British Navy has suffered losses, and a large number of merchant vessels have been sunk by German submarines. In addition to the battleships 'Irresistible' and 'Ocean,' the operations in the Dardanelles have cost us the battleships Goliath,' ‘Triumph,' and 'Majestic'; and the destroyers 'Recruit' and 'Maori,' two modern torpedo boats (Nos. 10 and 12) and at least two submarines, E10 and E15, have been destroyed. On the other hand, Germany has during this period been deprived of no large ship,* though she has lost several submarines and two patrol vessels. On the balance, it may appear to the casual observer of the course of events that British sea-power has been definitely weakened, both actually and relatively, and that in consequence we hold in less secure control the maritime communications of the world. Such a conclusion would be incorrect.

There can be no victory without sacrifice; and, when our victory comes, we shall owe it, in no small measure, to the influence which sea-power has been patiently and successfully exercising against the two Central Powers of Europe. When hostilities opened, no disciple of the blue-water school would have dared to prophesy what has in fact occurred under our very eyes. We were accustomed to regard the military power of the British Empire as the extension of its naval power, and to insist that, if we were to exercise any influence on land, either in distant parts of the Empire or on the Continent, it was essential that we should maintain a fleet of unchallengeable strength. What has been the experience of war? The British Navy, reinforced by the naval power of the French Republic, has proved the keystone of our warlike operations. Without undisputed command of the sea, we could have rendered no military assistance to our Allies on the Continent; and the raising of new armies, except for purposes of home defence, would have been useless. Without command of the maritime

The Russians claim to have sunk, by submarine attack, a battleship of the 'Deutschland' class, on July 2; the Germans deny the claim. It now appears that the action was due to a British submarine.

communications of the world, neither we nor our Allies could have drawn supplies of war-material and food from other countries, America in particular. Only by exercising sea-command has our credit been maintained, enabling as to act, in some measure, as paymasters in the promotion of the common cause. We can only estimate with any degree of accuracy the debt which is due to the British Fleet, and to the lesser Navy of France, if we endeavour to visualise the course which events would have taken if, either by our abstention from participation in the war or our failure to secure command of the sea, the German Fleet had been in a position to exercise that authority which for eleven months past we have been exercising on all the seas of the world.

Every development of the methods and instruments of warfare at sea, as well as on land, has contributed to the strength, efficiency, and cheapness of the passive defensive and increased the difficulties and risks associated with the virile exercise of sea-command. That is a conclusion which was frequently controverted before the opening of the present war, when it was stated as an argument against the probability of these islands being invaded. What has happened? With the aid of the mine, the torpedo, and powerful shore fortifications, Germany has been able to maintain an attitude of passive defence without material losses of such a character as seriously to cripple her battle fleet, whatever moral injury her Navy may have suffered; while at the same time she has pursued, by the aid of the mine and submarine, an active campaign against our men-of-war and our merchant ships.

In these circumstances losses were to be expected on our side, and losses have been sustained. Studied in isolation they may appear heavy, but, if they be reviewed in relation to the vast benefits-economic, financial and military-which have accrued to us and to our Allies, owing to our command of the sea, and if it be borne in mind that they have been spread over a period of many months during which industry has been active in fashioning new instruments of war, they are revealed as insignificant both in respect to the loss of material and of life, deeply regrettable though the latter has been.