the effects of this statute, the U.S. Court of Military Appeals has repeatedly counseled all the services to avoid any actions which tend toward unlawful command control. My statement has been prepared accordingly. The operations of the U.S.S. Pueblo were part of our national effort to gain information concerning our potential enemies. The security of the United States requires that we be aware of and understand fully the military capabilities of potential enemies. The best means of collecting and analyzing such information must be considered and exploited. Therefore, the United States engages in overt surveillance with aircraft and ships in order to acquire essential technical and operational information. This information is essential to our own self-defense. It is a vital element in the development of plans for contingencies which we must expect to face and in the development of new weapons systems needed to prevail against potential enemy military and technical advances. I believe that the greatest military danger facing our country lies in the possibility of a major technical surprise. Failure to guard against this possibility would constitute a dereliction of duty to the American people. Military surveillance can be performed by aircraft and ships. Each of these has its advantages and limitations. Each is an overt operation. Each has proved of great value when effectively used, individually or together. For example, you will recall that electronic intelligence, acquired by ships, led to the photographic intelligence from aircraft which gave us indisputable evidence of the installation of Soviet missiles in Cuba in 1962. If we had not gathered this intelligence in such a timely manner, the consequence of a more extensive, completed installation in Cuba would have been a far more serious threat to the security of the United States. Since the Pueblo was engaged in seaborne surveillance operations, I shall address the remainder of my statement to this area. Seaborne surveillance has certain particular advantages. It is carried out on the high seas where, under international law as commonly observed by nations of the world, a ship is a part of the sovereign territory of the country whose flag she flies and, according to international law, is free from armed attack and seizure. From the collection standpoint, a ship can provide continuous presence since she can remain on station 24 hours a day for an extended period. Also, ships are comparatively inexpensive to configure for the surveillance mission. The Soviets recognize the value of the surface ship in this role and, in fact, employ about 40 unarmed intelligence collection ships, which we call AGI's, that operate freely, far from home waters and well beyond the protective reach of other Soviet forces. These AGI's are stationed regularly off Holy Loch, Scotland; Rota, Spain: Guam; and Charleston, S.C., the bases from which our Polaris submarines operate. They also operate in the vicinity of the 7th Fleet in Southeast Asia, of the 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean and along our east coast. They maintain surveillance over Cape Kennedy operations, B-52 operations originating from Guam to Vietnam, and our fleet exercises. Some of these AGI's occasionally have violated our territorial waters but none has been attacked or fired upon by our forces nor has any of their crew been seized or killed. In fact, when these ships have been notified that they were in U.S. territorial waters and, in accordance with international law, were requested to leave, they did so. The effort which the Soviets put into this peripheral intelligence collection points out its usefulness to them. It is of no less importance to the United States. In 1965 the use of small and comparatively inexpensive noncombatant ships to perform U.S. reconnaissance at sea was discussed with the Office of the Secretary of Defense. After these discussions, the use of three ships to be converted from one Navy light cargo ship and two Army freighter hulls was determined to be feasible. The ships selected were recognized as old since they were built during World War II; but, with proper refitting, they could quickly and economically provide acceptable seaborne platforms to carry the additional equipment necessary for their mission. In the meantime, we have made preliminary investigations of a new ship designed specifically for this mission. U.S.S. Banner was the first seaborne surveillance ship of her class, which we designated AGER. After conversion from a Navy light cargo ship, she commenced operations in October 1965. In November 1965, the Deputy Secretary of Defense approved the use of two additional ships and the refitting and conversion of Pueblo and Palm Beach was commenced shortly thereafter. The refitting and fitting as an AGER involved two principal tasks: First, to make the ship seaworthy, operational, and habitable; second, to install the additional equipment necessary to perform her mission. The conversions were accomplished at the Naval Shipyard in Bremerton and, except for minor differences, the three ships received similar conversions. Pueblo was originally built in 1944 and was inactivated in 1954. After 12 years of inactivation, the conversion to her new role was commenced in April 1966. Thirteen months later she was commissioned as a ship in the Navy in May 1967 and her conversion was completed in September of that year. Some aspects of this conversion were somewhat different than those normally encountered in Navy ship conversion. Not only was this a completely new class but since Pueblo had not previously been a Navy ship, many details such as allowance lists of equipment and spare parts and supply lists of stores for the special equipment were not in existence and had to be generated by the commissioning crew with the assistance of appropriate Navy technical offices. Coordination with other Government agencies with respect to special equipment installation was unusual but not too dissimilar from the coordination now occurring with the various systems commands in conversions of other ships to use new weapons and new equipment. Ship characteristics including such items as armament, communications equipment, and machinery are the responsibility of the Chief of Naval Operations. Originally, no armament was included in Pueblo's characteristics due to the nature of her mission. For physical security of personnel aboard the ship, however, her allowance included submachineguns, pistols, and hand grenades. In August 1967, light ship armament was added to the allowance of Pueblo and certain other unarmed Navy ships. In Pueblo's case, two 50-caliber machineguns were provided. Due to the size, construction, and weight distribution of the ship she would not accommodate guns larger than heavy machineguns. Therefore, it was never intended to provide the Pueblo-type ships with a capability for a pitched battle at sea, but rather a means of defending against personnel and small boats. The addition of more or heavier armament to Pueblo would have left her with insufficient space and reserve stability to permit the installation of her special equipment and insufficient accommodations on board for the personnel. In converting the ship to conduct this kind of operation, however, piracy on the high seas was considered to be unlikely. Pueblo was not nor could she be considered a combatant ship. With respect to destruction devices there are three requirements: First is scuttling the ship, second is destruction of paper, and third is the destruction of hardware or classified equipment. Each requirement presents different problems. Ships are designed for survivability and not for easy scuttlingPueblo was no exception. When installed, the scuttling devices must be safe, remotely controlled, and under firm control of the commanding officer at all times. In order to dispose of or destroy classified papers and documents, the ship was provided with weighted canvas bags for use at sea, two paper shredders, and an incinerator. Gasoline was also available. The need for emergency destruction of classified equipment was considered in connection with the use of this class ship for the surveillance mission. The use of incendiary devices was initially rejected because of Navy shipboard safety considerations. However, during conversion, the Pueblo was provided with fire axes, sledge hammers, hand grenades and hand tools for equipment destruction. A remotely controlled, sophisticated, fail-safe destruction system under the complete control of the commanding officer, was not available to be installed aboard Pueblo. Moreover, there was simply no such thing as going to a hardware store and pulling an operationally satisfactory scuttling or destruction device off the shelf. Ships face many hazards-potential enemies, fires, storms, accidental floodings, explosions of combustibles, ammunition, and so forth. Therefore, in determining whether to install destruction devices those responsible must be sure that in solving one problem they do not create other more serious problems. Effective systems are now installed in Pueblo type ships. When Pueblo completed her conversion in September of 1967, she was given a "shakedown" training period in October as is customary for every newly commissioned Navy ship and every Navy ship completing an overhaul. During this training, the ship's departments and teams were evaluated on the basis of various exercises and on the overall performance of the ship during the final problem. Evaluations were made in the area of ship control, seamanship, operations, communications, and engineering. All the exercises required to be accomplished were satisfactorily completed and Pueblo received an overall grade of "good" for the training accomplished. A mark of "good" is between the highest obtainable, "excellent" or "outstanding," and the lowest passing grade of "satisfactory". Upon completion of this training and some routine postconversion repair work, Pueblo reported to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, in November 1967, and sailed for Japan where she received a final upkeep and repair period just prior to commencing her operations. Pueblo was assigned to the Pacific Fleet and further assigned to the service force, Pacific Fleet, for administrative purposes. For the operational mission during which she was seized, Pueblo was assigned to the operational control of Commander, Task Force 96, who was also Commander, Naval Forces, Japan. In his operational capacity as CTF 96, Commander, Naval Forces, Japan, was a subordinate of Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, who is the naval component commander of Commander in Chief, Pacific, a unified combatant commander under the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, of which the Chief of Naval Operations is the Navy member, exercise command of all operating forces. Thus, in the case of Pueblo, the command chain ran up from CTF 96; to Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet; Commander in Chief, Pacific; to the Joint Chiefs of Staff who, in turn, report to the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces through the Secretary of Defense. As the Chief of Naval Operations, I have a direct personal responsibility in matters relating to the provision of logistic support in the form of personnel and material to the unified and specified combatant commanders. I do not exercise operational control of any forces or units. Operations such as those scheduled for Pueblo are subject to established procedures for scheduling, approval, and assessment of the risks involved. In the case of Pueblo, her specific operations, as proposed by Commander Naval Forces, Japan, and approved initially by Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, were subjected to review and approval up the chain of command via the Commander in Chief, Pacific, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and ultimately to higher authority. I would now like to call your attention to one matter which has been the subject of a great deal of misunderstanding the so-called North Korean "warnings." These have been construed by some to refer to the Pueblo patrol or similar patrols but there was no mention of Pueblo or other U.S. Navy ships in the North Korean "warnings." Similar "warnings" had been issued on prior occasions and there was nothing to indicate that the North Koreans were referring to anything other than fishing vessels. They were also similar, in tone, to the numerous and customary "serious warnings" issued by the Chinese Communists for several years in conjunction with their allegations of United States' intrusions into Chinese-claimed territory. Since the seizure of Pueblo and with regard to future missions, we are unquestionably faced with the need to reevaluate the risk to our ships in light of the North Korean act of piracy. It is noteworthy that, prior to Pueblo's mission, a sister ship, Banner, had completed with success 16 similar patrols in the Western Pacific including the Sea of Japan. For her mission off North Korea, Pueblo operated under a plan contained in CTF 96 Operation Order 301-68 augmented by a sailing order also issued by CTF 96. The operation order provided specific guidance for the assigned mission, reporting instructions, operating о and communications plans, and specific instructions relating to details of the mission off North Korea. The sailing order included special instructions with respect to the closest points of approach to North Korea, the Soviet land mass, and offshore islands; operating instructions when in the vicinity of Soviet units; and use of her machineguns. I shall now read the complete sailing order: (The actual SAILORD in its entirety as transmitted is shown below. Admiral Moorer paraphrased and eliminated portions during his reading in order to save time. He also used the full meaning of several abbreviations which are italicized in the text below. These means are listed at the end of the message text.) From: CTF Nine Six To: USS Pueblo PRIORITY 050512 Z Info: AIG SEVEN SIX TWO TWO (Address Indicator Group 7622 consists of the following addressees which were enumerated by ADM MOORER) Commander in Chief, Pacific Commander in Chief Air Forces Pacific Chief of Naval Operations Commanding General Fifth Air Force Commander Fleet Air Wing SIX Commander Service Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet Commander, U.S. Seventh Fleet Director Naval Security Group Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadron ONE Headquarters National Security Agency Pacific Joint Chiefs of Staff Navy Field Operational Intelligence Office COMSERVGRU THREE DIRNSA DIRNAVSECGRUPAC COMUSKOREA COMNAVFORKOREA PACOMELINT CENTER ICHTHYIC ONE SAILORD A. CTF 96 OPORD 301-68 NOTAL B. PACOM ELINT CENTER 210734Z DEC 67 PASEP NOTAL C. CINCPACFLTINST 003120.24A D. CINCPACFLTINST 03100.3D 1. ICHTHYIC ONE FORMERLY PINKROOT ONE. 2. Depart Sasebo JAPAN when RFS about 8 Jan 68. Check out of MOVREP system and proceed via Tsushima Straits to arrive OPAREA Mars about 10 Jan. 3. Attempt to avoid detection by Soviet naval units while proceeding OPEREA Mars. 4. Upon arrival Mars, conduct ichthyic OPS IAW provisions REF A. A. Operate OPEREAS Mars, Venus and Pluto, concentrating efforts area (s) which appear most lucrative. B. Depart OPAREAS 27 Jan and if not under surveillance, maintain strict EMCON condition. Proceed south along Korean coast to vicinity Tsushima Straits. C. Intercept and conduct surveillance of Soviet naval units operating Tsushima Straits. D. Terminate surveillance to arrive Sasebo 4 Feb. 68. Earlier departure authorized to ensure ten percent on-board fuel upon arrival Sasebo. 5. OPAREAS defined as follows: A. East/west boundaries all areas are contiguous to KORCOM coast extending from thirteen NM CPA to land mass/off-shore islands seaward to sixty NM. |