B. North/south boundaries are: 6. Special instructions: A. Collect ELINT IAW provisions REF B, on not to interfere basis with basic mission. B. CPA to Korcom/Soviet land mass/off-shore islands will be thirteen NM. C. Upon establishing firm contact with Soviet naval units, break EMCON and transmit daily SITREP. D. Operate at least five hundred yds from Soviet units except to close briefly to two hundred yds as necessary for visual/photo coverage. E. Do not interfere with Soviet exercises but maintain a position on the periphery for observation purposes. F. If unable to establish or gain contact with Soviet units within twentyfour hours arrival Tsushima Straits area, advise ORIG. immediate precedence. G. Provisions REF C apply regarding rules of engagement. REF D applies regarding conduct in event of harassment or intimidation by foreign units. H. Installed defense armament should be stowed or covered in such a manner as to not elicit unusual interest from surveying/surveyed unit(s). Employ only in cases where threat to survival is obvious. DEFINITIONS AIG SEVEN SIX TWO TWO (Address Indicator Group 7622 which consists of the following addressees and which were enumerated by ADM Moorer.) Commander in Chief, Pacific Commander in Chief Air Forces Pacific Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet Chief of Naval Operations Commanding General Fifth Air Force Commander Fleet Air Wing SIX Commander Service Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet Commander, U.S. Seventh Fleet Director Naval Security Group Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadron ONE Headquarters National Security Agency Pacific Joint Chiefs of Staff Navy Field Operational Intelligence Office. Navy Security Group Activity (KAMI-SEYA) CONSERVGRÚ THREE-Commander Service Group THREE DIRNAVSECGRUPAC-Director Naval Security Group, Pacific COMNAVFORKOREA-Commander U.S. Naval Forces, Korea PACOMELINT CENTER-Pacific Command Electronics Intelligence Center RFS-Ready for Sea MOVREP-Movement Report OPAREA(S)-Operating Area (s) OPS-Operations IAW-In Accordance With REF-Reference EMCON-Emission Control KORCOM-Korean Communist ELINT-Electronic Intelligence CPA-Closest Point of Approach On January 8, the Pueblo's departure was delayed to complete final repairs to her electronic equipment. After completing these repairs on January 11, 1968, she sailed in accordance with the sailing order which directed her to depart when she was ready for sea. The Pueblo's entire mission was conducted under the immediate command of Commander Naval Forces Japan in his operational role as CTF 96. Since the events from the time Pueblo sailed are included in the investigation by the court of inquiry in San Diego, I shall not cover these details further in this statement. There are, however, facts of which I am aware through my own personal knowledge, which are of interest to the subcommittee. Upon receipt of Pueblo's first message reporting a North Korean attempt to board, actions were taken by various commands in immediate response but no force could arrive on the scene in time to prevent the North Koreans from seizing the ship. For example, commander 7th Fleet ordered U.S.S. Enterprise and U.S.S. Truxtun, which were 600 miles south of Wonsan, to proceed north at best speed. He also ordered three destroyers to join Enterprise and Truxtun. Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet ordered a destroyer to proceed to a position off Wonsan Harbor. Upon receipt of a secure phone call direct from the CTF 96 Operations Center, the commander of the 5th Air Force took preparatory steps to deploy available fighter aircraft to the area. However, a number of factors which included time, distance, and approaching darkness led to the decision that Pueblo could not be rescued by any military action before it had entered Wonsan Harbor. I want to assure you that while the court of inquiry may well point out in its recommendations other measures that should be taken, we have not waited for the court of inquiry to complete before doing all that can be done to guard against recurrence. With the piracy against Pueblo, we faced a new situation. Therefore, I immediately directed a number of actions to be taken. These actions included a reexamination of all aspects of the naval seaborne intelligence program within my purview. I directed that changes, where necessary, be initiated, as a matter of priority, to the procedures existing in January 1968. The aspects of existing procedures to be examined in the course of this review included the following: Operational concepts and procedures for AGERS; Control of classified material and equipment; Manning criteria; and Protective measures. There are other classified areas which I can cover in executive session. In summary, I have covered surveillance operations and their importance to U.S. security; origin and development of U.S. seaborne surveillance operations; selection of ships, and conversion and training of Pueblo; chain of operational command; the CNO's responsibilities for personnel and material; instructions issued to the Pueblo; and, finally, actions I have taken to improve capabilities and guard against a recurrence of such an incident. Mr. Chairman, there is one final thought I would like to emphasize. The Pueblo was operating in international waters. Her seizure by the North Koreans was an act of piracy in direct violation of international law. From all reports, the treatment accorded her crew while in confinement was brutal and inhumane. Measured by any yardstick, this seizure and retention of a U.S. ship-which is a sovereign part of the United States-and the brutal treatment of American citizens represents a gross violation of the accepted standards of international conduct and of human decency. Mr. Chairman, this completes my statement, sir. Mr. PIKE. Thank you very much, Admiral. Admiral, before we go into substantive matters, I would like to go into a little bit of the procedural disagreement which we have which both of us have alluded to in our statements, and that is the question of your commenting on facts surrounding the capture of the Pueblo. As I understand it, in your review capacity you have the right to make and change determinations of fact as found by the court of inquiry, is this correct? Admiral MOORER. I can't change a fact, sir. I can change the determinations of the court. Mr. PIKE. You change only their recommendations, then, is that correct? Admiral MOORER. I can either keep or reject their recommendations and can take additional action on the basis of information I have from the court or from sources outside of the court. Mr. PIKE. So if you have no power to change facts which they determined, what is your objection to testifying as to facts which you know? Admiral MOORER. I have no objection to testifying as to facts, Mr. Chairman, but I would call your attention to the fact that in the testimony so far there are conflicting statements relative to the situation and the actions that obtained on the day the ship was captured, and consequently I think that since the court is still in session, and they may develop other facts, I would be out of order if I preempted the court. Now, I am quite willing to discuss any fact which I have access to that I am confident is a fact. But the court testimony, as it has progressed so far, I think you can appreciate that if you have one individual that says one thing, and another individual says a second thing, that it would be out of order for me to take sides, so to speak. Mr. PIKE. Well, at this point I would like to insert in the record a list of questions which were submitted by Chairman Rivers to the Secretary of the Navy some time ago, and as to which-Mr. Slatinshek, how many of the questions were not answered? Mr. SLATINSHEK. Thirteen of the 29 questions that were proposed by the Chairman came back with essentially no reply, if any, Mr. Chairman. I would like to read the questions. The response from the Navy has been identified as top secret, and I will simply read the questions and read the responses, which I am sure do not provide any break in security. Question 5. Was there any difference whatsoever in the manner in which these previous missions were conceived, approved and implemented? Answer. The answer to this question deal with matters now under review by the Court of Inquiry and can't be answered until the report of that Court has been completed and reviewed by cognizant authority. Question 6. Were those who established the mission informed as to the conditions of the Pueblo insofar as her protective armament was concerned, and her lack of self-destruct capability for both the vessel itself and its intelligence gathering equipment? Answer. The answer as in Question 5 deals with matters under review. Question 7. Were those who prepared the operations plans for the Pueblo informed of the condition of the Pueblo so far as its armament was concerned and so far as its lack of self-destruction equipment was concerned? Answer. The answer to this question deals with matters now under review by the Court of Inquiry. Question 9. Was the Commanding Officer of the Pueblo given any reason to believe that there were any plans in existence to go to his assistance in the event he was threatened by any foreign government? Answer. The answer to this question also deals with matters now under review by the Court of Inquiry. Question 10. Were there any plans to protect the Pueblo or any similar ships? Answer. This deals with matters under review by the Court of Inquiry. Question 11. Were orders ever given to execute such plans if they existed and were orders rescinded if they were given? Answer. The answer to this question deals with matters now under review by the Court of Inquiry. Question 13. Did the Commanding Officer of the Pueblo request destruct equipment and, if so, please furnish copies of the request? Answer. The answer to this question deals with matters now under review by the Court of Inquiry. Question 14. Is it true that destruct equipment was available in a Japanese port for the Pueblo? Was the Commanding Officer advised of this fact, if it is a fact? Answer. The answer to this question deals with matters now under review by the Court of Inquiry. Question 16. Give the time sequence (using Washington, D.C. time as well as local time) of the sending of the messages from the Pueblo and the receipt of the messages, starting with the day before the ship was boarded. Was there a breakdown in communications or was there a breakdown in Command responsibility? Answer. The answer to this question deals with matters now under review by the Court of Inquiry. One other question was only partially responded to, and I neglected reading it because part of the answer might deal with security. Mr. PIKE. Admiral, aren't the answers to at least some of these questions purely documentary? For example, it doesn't seem to me that the question of whether there was or was not a contingency plan for a situation such as this should have to be determined by five Admirals. Either there was such a plan or there was not such a plan, and aren't you in an unlikely qualified position to answer that question without preempting the judgment of this Court? Admiral MOORER. Well, I think it depends upon the question, sir, and I suggest that you ask me the question. Mr. PIKE. Well, one of the questions Admiral MOORER. And I will do my best to answer them. Mr. PIKE. I would be delighted, and I would suggest, Mr. Slatinshek, that you repeat the questions and to the extent possible, let's get the answers. Mr. SLATINSHEK. Question No. 5. Was there any difference whatso ever in the manner in which these previous missions were conceived, approved, and implemented? Admiral MOORER. Not to my knowledge. Mr. SLATINSHEK. This question relates to the Pueblo mission as distinguished from other missions of a similar manner in which the Banner and Otter vessels were employed? Admiral MOORER. No. This was the Pueblo's first mission, Mr. Slatinshek, but the general concept of operations was the same. Mr. SLATINSHEK. The general concept, but the question says was there any difference whatsoever in the manner in which these previous missions were conceived, approved, and implemented? In other words, the conception of the mission, the essential purpose of the mission, the manner in which the chain of command reviewed the purpose of the mission and reviewed all the elements of the mission, the risk factor, the desirability, and the implementation and the manner in which it was approved and ultimately implemented? Admiral MOORER. Not to my knowledge. As you know we had a ship that was operating, as I mentioned in my statement; the Banner had performed 16 of these missions previously, and this was handled in the same way. Mr. SLATINSHEK. It went through the same process of scrutiny by the various individuals in the chain of command? Admiral MOORER. Yes. Mr. SLATINSHEK. Since we are on that subject now, could you review that? Mr. PIKE. Let's go through the questions first, because I am sure many of the other members of the subcommittee want to ask some questions. Mr. SLATINSHEK. Were those who established the mission informed of the condition of the Pueblo, and the lack of self-destruct capability for both the vessel itself and intelligence gathering equipment? Admiral MOORER. Well, I am confident that they were. I haven't asked the commander, who was Admiral Johnson, commander, Task Force 96, the direct question, but I would be very confident in giving a "Yes," answer to that question. Mr. SLATINSHEK. Was everyone in the chain of command also informed, the approving command? Admiral MOORER. Well, I don't think that everyone in the chain of command was familiar with the details that you have described, Mr. Slatinshek, but I think the operational commanders were. As the request goes up the chain of command, of course, they don't get into the details to which you refer, but I think the operational commanders were familiar with the details. Mr. SLATINSHEK. I won't pursue this, but I would like to note for the record this is a very important question, and it relates to whether those in the approving chain of command were aware of this element of the operation, the risk factor and the capability or the potential for compromise? Admiral MOORER. I might comment on that. As I told you, we have had the Banner operating for 16 missions previously, and this ship was a sister ship of the Banner. Perhaps that answers your question. Mr. SLATINSHEK, I don't believe it does, Admiral, but I will go on. Question 8. Were those who prepared the operations plans of the Pueblo informed as to the condition of the Pueblo insofar as its armament was concerned, and the self-destructing equipment was concerned? Admiral MOORER. Yes; those who planned the operations were thoroughly familiar with the ship. Mr. SLATINSHEK. Question 9. Were there any plans to go to his assistance in the event he was threatened by any foreign government? Admiral MOORER. Well, I am sure that I wasn't present at all the |