briefings he received in Hawaii and Japan, but I feel confident that this matter was discussed. I would be very surprised if it wasn't. It would be a routine operational procedure. Mr. SLATINSHEK. In other words, your response is that you do not know whether there was any information to this effect given to the commanding officer or whether there was not? Admiral MOORER. My response is that I do not know specifically that one particular officer spoke to the captain and expressed it in the words you have set forth. Mr. SLATINSHEK. The simple question is whether or not the commanding officer was given any reason to believe, whether in writing, whether it was by formal briefing, or whether it was done informally, that there were plans in existence to go to his assistance in the event he was threatened by any foreign government? Admiral MOORER. I am sure he did get that while he was being briefed out in Japan, but I think you should ask the people who briefed him this question. I am confident he was told how the operation would go if he needed assistance. Mr. HALL. Mr. Chairman, in that connection, the sailing orders which the admiral very kindly quoted and alluded to in his statement under paragraph 4-correction, under paragraph 6, G “Special Instructions" says that reference D applies regarding conduct in event of harassment or intimidation by foreign units. I will ask the admiral or counsel if we have available a copy of reference D, and to what extent that answers the question now being posed by counsel. Admiral MOORER. We have a copy, sir. It is classified. This instruction is from the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet. Mr. PIKE. In fairness to Admiral Moorer, I want to say the subcommittee does have a copy of this particular document. Mr. HALL. Well, would it be appropriate, Mr. Chairman, at this time to ask the Admiral, Chief of Naval Operations, to simply comment as to whether that is applicable to the question by counsel in further enlightening the committee as to what to do in case of harassment, because the people in this ship were certainly harassed. Admiral MOORER. Yes, sir. This includes instructions as to what to do in the event of harassment. Mr. HALL. If I may continue, one other question, how is a sailing order delivered to a ship of the Navy prior to departure from his assigned port? In this case I believe Sasebo ? Admiral MOORER. By message, sir, by ordinary telegram, I guess you would call it. Mr. HALL. TWX radio communication? Admiral MOORER. Yes, sir. Mr. HALL. It is not handled in sealed orders after the ship has reported at sea when ready? Admiral MOORER. No, sir. Mr. HALL. Do you know how long it took this priority telegram 050512Z to reach the commanding officer of the Pueblo? Admiral MOORER. No, sir, but I can easily find out, but I would say a matter of hours. 37-066-69-No. 10 (The following information was received for the record:) Although the exact time of delivery of the message containing the sailing orders to the Commanding Officer of Pueblo (CTF 96 050512Z Jan 68) is not known, it can be considered that Pueblo received the message at the time it appeared on the intelligence channel of the Fleet Broadcast at 1630Z on 6 Jan 1968. This is substantiated by the fact that Pueblo did not report any missing messages on the serialized broadcast she copied, and that she carried out the sailing orders. Mr. HALL. A matter of hours. Admiral MOORER. Yes, sir. Mr. HALL. Not a matter of minutes? Admiral MOORER. No, sir, because this is essentially an administrative message which was sent out several days before he sailed, and there would be no need for putting that type of precedence on a message. Mr. HALL. But I believe you read yourself it is a priority message. I am interested in the order of communications and I will say to the Chief I have been interested in this every since I have been on this committee, whether it is a satellite in the military communications network, and I am keenly conscious about the military network and its control by Defense Communications Agency rather than communications agencies of the services themselves. It is in this background that I ask the question and want to establish some delivery time of a priority message. Admiral MOORER. Well, we received the message in Washington 4 hours and 31 minutes after it was dispatched. Mr. HALL. That is this sailing order? Admiral MOORER. Yes, sir. Mr. HALL. Can you determine how long it took the commander of the Pueblo to receive it from the time of dispatch? Admiral MOORER. I can get that perhaps, but since he was in Japan where the message originated, I would be very surprised if he didn't receive it in much less time. Mr. HALL. I would hope so, and I would want to know, and I would ask that this be determined and inserted in the record. Admiral MOORER. All right, sir. I am confident it would be less than 4 hours. Mr. PIKE. Mr. Stafford. Mr. STAFFORD. I would like to know if the Chief has available reference C, which is the reference applicable regarding rules of engagement under these special instructions. I presume it is classified, but I would like to know if the Admiral has it? Admiral MOORER. Yes, sir; I do, and I believe it is classified. Mr. PIKE. Has that been provided the subcommittee, Admiral? Admiral MOORER. It is classified secret, sir. Mr. STAFFORD. Mr. Chairman, I think it is important at the appropriate time that this committee also be made aware of the contents of reference C, since in fact an engagement in my opinion did occur here between the Pueblo and the North Korean vessels. Admiral MOORER. Yes, sir; I would be very happy to provide this for the record. Mr. PIKE. And that reference C has been provided to the subcommittee? Admiral MOORER. I believe so, but if it has not, we would be very (The following information was received for the record:) HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF, To: Distribution List. Subj: Air and Shipborne Reconnaissance Operations in Areas Proximate to (c) Joint PACOM Aerial Reconnaissance Operating Procedures (YR) Encl: (1) Territorial Waters claimed by Indonesia. (2) Format for Proposals List I (A-20, B-15, C-5, D-7, E-7, G-7, and H-7; includes copies for further distribution to COMINFLOT ONE, COMCRUDESFLOT THREE, COMCRUDESFLOT SEVEN, COMCRUDESFLOT NINE, COMCRUDESFLOT ELEVEN, COMSUBFLOT SEVEN, COM- CARDIV ONE, COMCARDIV THREE, COMCARDIV FIVE, COM- CARDIV SEVEN, COMCARDIV NINE, COMSERVGRU THREE, COMPHIBGRU ONE, CG FIRST MAW, COMFAIRWESTPAC, COMFAIRWHIDBY, COMFAIRWING TWO, COMFAIRWING SIX, CO MARCOMPRON ONE, CO MARCOMPRON THREE, CO FAIR- RECONRON ONE, COMFAIRWING FOUR, AND COMFAIRWING- SPAC) (ADMIN TYCOMSPAC less COMTRAPAC) List II (A-3, B-7, C-3, D-3, E-3, G-10; includes copies for further distribution to COMASWGRU ONE, COMASWGRU THREE, COMASWGRU FIVE, and COMTAIWANPATFOR) (FLEET & FORCE COMMANDERS less COMOPTEVFOR, DEPCOMOPTEV- List IV (C-1) (SEA FRONTIER COMMANDERS less COMHAWSEA- Stocked at: Headquarters of unit's respective Area or Type Commander. Mr. PIKE. Admiral, you have included in your statement a copy of the sailing orders given to the Pueblo. Is that a complete copy of the sailing orders given to the Pueblo? Admiral MOORER. Yes, sir. That was a complete copy. It was declas- sified by the Deputy Secretary of Defense. Mr. PIKE. In the process of declassification is anything removed Mr. PIKE. Admiral, I call to your attention under paragraph 6, special instructions, subparagraph D, and ask you to check with your staff as to whether anything has been changed in that? Admiral MOORER. I think in your copy there are three words missing. Mr. PIKE. Are they missing for security reasons? Do you have that? Mr. PIKE. I have a little more than that, Admiral. Admiral MOORER. Except to close briefly to 200 yards as necessary for visual/photo coverage. Mr. PIKE. And there was no reason to leave that out for security reasons? Admiral MOORER. No, sir. I am sorry if it was left out of your copy. Mr. PIKE. It was left out of the testimony as you gave it. Admiral MOORER. I was trying to shorten it and I left out two or three phrases, but the message has them all and they are for the record, sir. Mr. PIKE. Mr. Nedzi. Mr. NEDZI. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if we could get the Admiral to confirm or qualify his statement which I believe the Admiral made, and that was he was confident that the commander, the captain of the Pueblo, was told how the operation would go if he needed assistance? Admiral MOORER. I don't believe I said I was confident that he was told how it would go, because no one could predict Mr. NEDZI. I wrote your words down, Admiral, as I believe you said them, and that is why I thought I would give you an opportunity to confirm or qualify your statement. Admiral MOORER. I think the commanding officer knew the details of the assistance that had been arranged for the mission, sir, if that is what you are asking me. He knew of the arrangements and how the assistance would be provided in the event that it was required. Mr. PIKE. Mr. Slatinshek, would you proceed with the next question. Mr. SLATINSHEK. The 10th question: Were there any plans to protect the Pueblo or any similar ships? Answer: The answer deals with matters now under review by the court of inquiry. Can you address yourself to that question now, Admiral? Admiral MOORER. Well, sir, I can tell you that there were no what we call dedicated forces-in other words, standing by on alert-because, as I said before, the risk was evaluated as being minimal, since the ship was going to operate totally in international waters. There were plans Mr. SLATINSHEK. Don't your ships always operate in international waters? Admiral MOORER. Yes. There is an operation order that covers the procedures to be used in the event that it is necessary to provide. assistance. Mr. PIKE. Are you saying that there was a contingency plan, then, in the event of the contingency that did arise? Admiral MOORER. Yes, sir; I think I mentioned that. The plan of operations was contained first in the sailing order which I read, and secondly in the operation order prepared by the operational commander, CTF-96. Mr. PIKE. And there was no contingency plan other than that sailing order and that operational order; is that correct? Admiral MOORER. That is right, sir. There were no dedicated forces. As I said, the previous occasion with the Banner was not in this particular area and we provided dedicated forces in the event that the ship was accosted or an attempt was made to capture it. In this case, the evaluation of the risk was such that there was no dedicated or alert forces standing by for this specific purpose. Mr. PIKE. You used the phrase "dedicated and alert forces standing by." As a matter of fact, there weren't any available forces which could have gotten to the Pueblo in time to help it; isn't that a fact? Admiral MOORER. There were aircraft on the time-and-distance basis, Mr. Chairman, but there was no proper bombload and setup in that sense of being on the alert. Mr. PIKE. These aircraft, however, were they referred to in any manner as a contingency plan in part of these operating orders? Admiral MOORER. The aircraft were not referred to, I don't believe, in this standard plan. Mr. PIKE. This was the only plan you had, you said, Admiral. Were the aircraft referred to at all in the operating orders? Admiral MOORER. The aircraft were not referred to specifically in a sense of being rescue aircraft in the operations order, I don't believe. Mr. BRAY. Admiral, you mentioned just now that certain security measures or dedicated forces, or something of that kind, were in support of the Banner in its operations, and are you at liberty, or will you give us the security measures that were taken for the Banner which you stated previously was a ship similar to this, and made similar missions? Admiral MOORER. Well, Mr. Bray, I said that the Banner had made 16, conducted 16 missions of this type, and on two occasions out of the 16 when she was operating in another area, we had made provisions for these alert forces. Not every time for the Banner, but only twice out of 16. Mr. BRAY. Would you care to tell the committee who decided that such security measures as taken by the Banner in those two previous instances would not be taken in the defense of the Pueblo? Admiral MOORER. Yes, sir. Excuse me just a moment. In operations of this kind, an assessment is made of the risk, and in this case the assessment was the lowest category. And consequently, this did not provide for alert forces. Now, the procedure for establishing a mission of this kind is quite lengthy in the sense that it goes up the chain of command through the Pacific Fleet commander through the commander in chief, Pacific, and through the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to the Secretary of Defense. Mr. BRAY. I understand the chain of command, Admiral, but if you know, would you state who it was-somebody had to make the final decision-who it was that made the decision that placed this operation right off the shores of North Korea where everyone that even read the newspaper knew of threats and knew of constant attacks from North Korea on South Korea. Could you tell us who did make that final decision that, in effect, this was a safe mission? Admiral Moorer. Well, I think, sir, that the final decision-first, let me say that this ship was operating on the high seas. That Mr. BRAY. Was the Banner operating on the high seas? Admiral MoORER. Sir? Mr. BRAY. Was the Banner operating on the high seas? |