A great deal of good has been done by the United Nations and thank God for it, but in the crucial question of the control of military power and of preventing aggression, it simply is not succeeding, and all the other gains will go by the board if it is not possible to prevent the unleashing of an atomic war.

Recognizing that Russia is not going to cooperate voluntarily, then it is our own drift and indecision and failure to try to organize the other nations that will cooperate, that are leading to the destruction of the United Nations. I reject the argument that we must not do anything about the UN machinery at this time lest it offend Russia and lead to a rupture in the United Nations; that we must wait until we get Russia to come along. Is a rupture in name any worse than a rupture in fact?

I am convinced that as long as we tell her in advance that we will not do anything because we are afraid of a rupture, she will of course always threaten a rupture and we can never get agreement. To do nothing about UN reform is the surest way to its destruction.

As Secretary Marshall said yesterday, the organization was set up on certain assumptions, one of which was that the big powers would continue to work together. Those assumptions have not been fulfilled. My contention is, and I think it is the viewpoint of those who introduced these resolutions, that inasmuch as the situation is not as we hoped it would be, we must adjust the organiaztion to the situation and not sit around until perchance the situation can be adjusted to the organization. We must modify or correct our remedy to deal with the disease that exists, not imagine we can persuade the disease to change so it fits our remedy.

None of us is contending that the proposals in the resolution are the final word. They represent what we believe are basic suggestions on which to begin discussion, points of departure.

Now, in conclusion let me read some comments by Winston Churchill in his article in Life 2 weeks ago. He records that in January 1938 Mr. Sumner Welles approached the British Ambassador here with a message from the President to Mr. Chamberlain. [Reading:]

The President was deeply anxious at the deterioration of the international situation and proposed to take the initiative by inviting the representatives of certain governments to Washington to discuss the underlying causes of present differences.

Then he says on the next page:

Mr. Chamberlain's reply was to the effect that he appreciated the confidence of President Roosevelt in consulting him in this fashion upon this proposed plan to alleviate the existing tension in Europe, but he wished to explain the position of his own efforts to reach agreement with Germany and Italy, particularly in the case of the latter. Would it not therefore be wiser to postpone the launching of the American plan?

Mr. Churchill says this was the last chance to prevent war by getting together in unity the nations that did not want war. Instead, Mr. Chamberlain disastrously insisted on continuing to try to get agreement with Hitler and Mussolini.

Similarly now, we are told that the peaceful nations of the world must not go ahead but instead try to get agreement with today's dictator, Mr. Stalin. I predict the results of such limited action will be as disastrous.

Mr. Churchill speaks of later communications [reading]:

The substance of these replies was that the Prime Minister warmly welcomed the President's initiative, but was not anxious to bear any responsibility for its failure if American overtures were badly received.

He would not take the responsibility for failure of an attempt to organize for peace, but before God and history he must take the responsibility for the ghastly, tragic failure of doing nothing to unite the peaceful nations, which led to the worst possible results. [Reading:]

Mr. Chamberlain wished to point out that we did not accept in an unqualified manner the President's suggested procedure, which would clearly irritate both the dictators and Japan.

It is all right to walk out on the peaceful nations of the world, but we must not irritate the dictators!

Then he says:

* * *

Thus it was that President Roosevelt's proposal to use American influence for the purpose of bringing together the leading European powers to discuss the chances of a general settlement, this of course involving, however tentatively, the mighty power of the United States, was rebuffed by Mr. Chamberlain. Poor England: Leading her free, careless life from day to day, amid endless good-tempered parliamentary babble, she followed, wandering along the downward path which led to all she wanted to avoid. She was continually reassured by the leading articles of the most influential newspapers, with some honorable exceptions, and behaved as if all the world were as easy, uncalculating, and well meaning as herself.

I apologize for trying the patience of the committee, but it seemed to me that statement described so vividly in retrospect the kind of drift and indecision we ourselves are now engaged in. I am convinced that if we do not act vigorously, not trucculently, not arrogantly, not with a chip on our shoulder, not with the slightest intention of imposing our will upon anybody, if we do not mobilize the determination of the peaceful people of the world at this critical juncture of history to explore every possible avenue of making this organization work-not destroy it-we will march as blindly to war as did Chamberlain, thinking he was working for peace. On the other hand, if we take the lead, I believe we will find enormous support, and fewer obstacles than we anticipate. That is, instead of finding and propounding reasons for not taking such action, we must find means by which we can take it. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman.

Mr. LODGE. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. JUDD. I yield.

Mr. LODGE. I would like to say that as always I am tremendously interested in everything the gentleman has to say, and I agree with your postulates, and I agree with the desire you have to achieve cer

tain results.

I have for some time been in favor of Judd Resolution 59, and I have an open mind on your resolution 163. The question I would like to ask you is, if a conference is called under 109 and Soviet Russia refuses to accept the suggested amendments contained in 163, do you then propose going ahead under 51, to set up another United Nations organization?

Mr. JUDD. No; I do not think it is possible under article 51 to set up another United Nations organization. It is possible to set up an alliance or inner organization for collective self-defense. I would

not in any sense suggest that unless Russia agrees to the revisions proposed in 163-just as they are now-we should move out and set up a separate United Nations.

They are a starting point. I think they have great merit. My position is that if we cannot get agreement in a conference under article 109 on a modification of procedures so there is a better pros pect than now of their being workable, then we should move ahead under article 51 to achieve a better arrangement-I will not call it a new world organization-under which the nations who want to would agree on the modifications which they thought under article 109 ought to be made, but which were blocked by Russia's veto: They could say, "For ourselves, we are going to operate on that basis. We are still in the United Nations. We are not pulling out, we are not destroying it, we are not driving Russia out, and we do not want her to go. But we are saying for ourselves, that we are going to adopt these revised procedures whereby we agree among ourselves as to allocations of armaments, as to a police force, as to giving up the veto among ourselves on matters of aggression. In no sense are we trying to destroy the United Nations; we are working within it. If we cannot get all nations to agree, we will get as many as we can." We would have under article 51 a group of nations organized for collective self-defense on what we believe to be a workable basis. In my judgment, if we have such a plan as an alternative when we go to the conference, then we will have a good chance of getting agreement under 109. I do not think we will get agreement under 109 unless we have some such alternative plan. That is why I say, "With Russia, if possible; without Russia, if necessary."

If after exploring every possible avenue we cannot get agreement. including Russia, then and then only do certain nations move under article 51 within the United Nations Charter into a more closely knit arrangement committing the nations therein to abide by the procedures, which all of them have agreed to accept.

Mr. LODGE. Then, as I understand it, what the gentleman wants is an agenda, when we proceed under article 109, and the question then is: "Does the gentleman feel that that agenda must include the amendments in 163 as they are there set forward?"

Mr. JUDD. No; although I think they should be included. The gentleman knows that practically every bill that is introduced is worked over and modified by this committee. If either of these resolutions comes out, I will bet 999 to 1 that it will not be exactly in its present form. I want them improved wherever possible.

Mr. LODGE. Then, as I understand the gentleman, he realizes that if Russia does not agree, no revision of the present United Nations Charter is possible?

Mr. JUDD. Certainly.

Mr. LODGE. You would not necessarily call upon the nations to proceed under 51 to organize another United Nations, so that under your interpretation of this legislation we may end up with the United Nations exactly as it is, and then with the other nations proceeding under 51, and not necessarily organizing another United Nations?

Mr. JUDD. It certainly would not be called another United Nations, and it would not even be called, I suppose, an international organization. It would be an arrangement for collective self-defense within. the United Nations under article 51 of the Charter.

་་

Mr. LODGE. Presumably it would be similar to the western union, only it would be larger.

Mr. JUDD. That is right. We cannot possibly get a revision of the Charter unless Russia agrees.

Mr. LODGE. It seems all you have, then, in 163 is 59, plus the expression of a desire to proceed under 51.

Mr. JUDD. Yes; that is right; 163 reads:

Revision of the United Nations Charter shall be carried out with the approval of all member states if possible, but in the event that any permanent member should veto the proposal for revision, the United States shall join with other like-minded States in accordance with article 51 of the United Nations Charter, or any other manner acceptable to the majority, establishing on the basis of the revised United Nations Charter

to

If we cannot get a revised United Nations Charter, we would have go ahead on the revised procedure with as many as agree.

Mr. LODGE. The thing I am trying to suggest is that the resolution as now written suggests that if the Russians will not cooperate the 45 other nations will revise the United Nations Charter. Now, they cannot do that under the Charter; therefore, they have to breach the Charter to do it, and if they do that you have two United Nations organizations, and this is an entirely different situation than that set out in the statement you have just made.

Mr. JUDD. That is the reason I am grateful to the gentleman for bringing this up. I wanted to get this colloquy on the record. I think he has rendered a service in calling attention to the fact that the present language in 163 can conceivably be interpreted as meaning that, if Russia does not agree, we are going to start another UN. No one conneced with the resolution has had any such thought. That would be rupturing the Charter. That was not my intention, but I recognize the language can be so construed, and I will personally do my best to see that it is changed.

Madam Chairman, I wanted this clarification in the record so no one will be shooting at straw men hereafter.

Mrs. BOLTON. The business of the committee being concluded for this morning, we will adjourn to meet tomorrow morning at this place at 10 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 12: 40 p. m., the committee adjourned.)

(The following communication has been submitted for inclusion in the record:)

STATEMENT OF HON. KARL M. LECOMPTE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE

STATE OF IOWA

Mr. Chairman, may I express my appreciation to the committee for the opportunity to be heard on House Concurrent Resolution 163, offered by our colleague, Mr. Judd, of Minnesota. Of course, we all know that the realm of foreign negotiations and foreign relations rests with the Chief Executive, and more especially with the State Department. I feel certain that no Member of Congress wants to do anything that will raise any obstacles in the way of the State Department maintaining friendly relations with all nations in the world. The United Nations is the greatest hope we have for future security and peace. I believe your concurrent resolution suggests certain changes, such as eliminating the veto, if this can be accomplished through friendly negotiations and with the approval of other nations. I am for the United Nations, but I am also in favor of improving it in any way that we can, and, as I read and study Dr. Judd's resolution, I come to the conclusion that this is his purpose.