There may be other powers added, but that, I think, is the irreducible minimum for an effective world government.

As to Russia, I am no prophet, sir. The members of the Congress, the members of the House and Senate, are in better place to predict than I am, but I believe few of them would be willing to stake their reputations on a prediction. Certainly, every last possible effort should be exerted to induce Russia to come in.

Here is where we, the United States of America, must be willing to give up, not factors making for our security, not our military strength, until this world government is formed, not our right to resist aggression, if aggression there be from now on, but we must be willing to make liberal concessions if we mean that we want a world government and do not want to wreck the United Nations.

We must leave the door always open for Russia or any of her satellite countries to come in.

Now, men wiser than I think that Russia, being quite realistic, having no apparent objection to losing face, and being perfectly willing to back down when confronted with the necessity or wisdom of doing so, that Russia, being quite realistic, then, might come in at the beginning, or soon, and disarm with the rest.

For example, Mr. Grenville Clark, a leader of the New York bar, has suggested that we could well make concessions to Russia, to a Russia which with other nations has given up her armies and her armament to a world federal government, such concessions, for example, as joint access to and joint control of the Dardanelles and of near-eastern oil.

We would then have no reason to be afraid of Russian aggression, if Russia had given up her arms, and a United Nations federal government had been formed, sufficiently strong, as it would have to be, of

course.

With that, Mr. Clark suggests that we should share control with the United Nations world government of all key points-Suez, Gibraltar, the Panama Canal, and others.

Of course, if we are not willing to make any sacrifices and if Russia is asked to make all the sacrifices, one doubts if she will come in. Russia would, if she came in, have a greater share in the world's commerce, because there would then be no fear that exports sent to Russia would be used by her in preparation for war. She would save billions in military expenditures, avoid the armaments race, and be able to insure her people a greater welfare, a higher standard of living, which would be perhaps as strong an argument for the administration in power in Russia to make to its people, as strong an assurance of its continuing in power, as it would be to feed its people upon a diet of danger, sacrifice, hunger, fear, and terror of war.

Russia would have an equal share in the world's government and would have the assurance of avoiding what its leaders must know, as well as ours do, would be a reciprocally suicidal war.

I have said there is a law of survival of the fittest, sir, in politics as well as in biology.

and

I have said, and it is true, that throughout all history, groups races and civilizations have disappeared, finding themselves suddenlyperhaps overnight-in an environment into which they were no longer adapted to survive.

We today, and more than any other group in the world, I think, the Congress of the United States, is engaged in the very act of creating the environment in which we and our children will live tomorrow. It is our task, I think, to see that that environment is one in which the peoples and the nations loving peace, freedom, and kindliness are adapted to survive, not one in which either only the dictatorships, the war-loving nations, are adapted to survive, or else one in which the free nations can no longer survive and still remain free.

It is a hard task, sir. It is a task to which a man like Lincoln perhaps would have dedicated his heart's blood. It is a task of creation, no less. In the words of an older time, the high enterprise in which our country is the predestined leader, is nothing less than to make invincible among the nations a Commonwealth to invite the souls of men. Chairman EATON. Thank you, sir.

Mrs. BOLTON. I am exceedingly sorry to have missed the first part of Dean Andrews' talk.

Dr. ANDREWS. Thank you.

Chairman EATON. Mr. Judd.

Mr. JUDD. Dean Andrews, I want to express my appreciation that you made clear the point that these proposals are not an attempt to destroy the United Nations, despite the repeated efforts of others to present that as the objective of the sponsors.

Dr. ANDREWS. It is certainly not and never has been and never will be the objective of the United World Federalists.

Mr. JUDD. Does it not come out of a conviction that unless some such action is taken the U. N. will be destroyed; will go the way of the League of Nations, because it simply does not count?

Dr. ANDREWS. Sir, it has gone.

Mr. JUDD. I am glad that you are frank enough to say that.

In its present form, it does not count in dealing with the only thing that really matters in today's struggle the control of power; power that can destroy not only us but the world.

Dr. ANDREWS. Or a power that can impose a law on the nations. That counts too, sir.

Mr. JUDD. Another thing I am glad you brought out is the interest abroad in this matter. General Marshall gave us the impression that the United States would be just going off on a sort of wild-goose chase; that there was no interest in it abroad; that there would be serious objection on the part of other countries to the United States or the Congress taking action of this sort.

Well, Mr. Bevin could hardly object to it when he has already expressed himself in favor of something more radical than anything we have written into our resolutions.

Dr. ANDREWS. I might add that at least 102,000 paying members of a sister organization are in Italy and I am told that 200,000 people are in Sweden and something like 100 members of the British Parliament or perhaps more now, have committed themselves to this proposal.

Mr. JUDD. I have been told that about 200 members of the Italian Parliament-not the new one but the one in existence before the recent election-have expressed approval of such action, and a similar number in the French Parliament and 140 members of the British Parliament. Another red herring which has been dragged across the trail is

to occupy in fact some defenseless minor country, it is by no means certain, if one remembers the record of the League of Nations, that the other major powers would send their troops to eject it. And if they did, in order to send the troops of the aggressor power back to the country from which they came, it might well be necessary to bomb and destroy the cities, territory, and people of the unfortunate occupied country, something we would hesitate to do. Furthermore, the aggressor country would undoubtedly have tried to make allies among the other major powers and might have succeeded. History does not tell us that nations always keep their promises, always send their troops to rectify injustices in other parts of the world, when it does not seem to their governments or to their peoples that their own interests are at stake in the matter sufficiently to warrant going to war.

Note here the inherent weakness of the plan proposed by Resolution No. 163;| namely, that the only way to enforce the provisions of the proposed revised United Nations is to go to war against some country in order to compel it to obey.

The definition of "armament for aggression" in 7-a seems likewise inadequate and unworkable. If one of the major nations invents a new type of airplane more powerful and destructive than before, or some new and more destructive weapon, it certainly will not be willing to give it up to the proposed new United Nations as long as there is any danger that its national army (retained up to a certain quota by the express provisions of this resolution) may be used in combat against national army retained by one of the other major nations, or by the proposed revised United Nations itself.

So far as definitions are concerned, it seems highly inadvisable to try to commit the convention or organization which will form such a proposed United Nations to specific wording which is highly controversial and not subject to exact definition and interpretation. Such wording had better be left to such convention. In line 22 on page 3 we find representation in the proposed new Security Council to be rigidly fixed, on the ratio of 2-2-2-1-1-2. There is no provision for change if the situation and the relative importance of nations change. There is no flexibility. Moreover, this provision seems to preserve forever the alliances and hostilities now existing between nation states, the national loyalties and distrusts. It provides no hope, as the United World Federalists plan ultimately does, in my opinion, of creating a separate loyalty to a United Nations federal government. This allocation of representation in the proposed new Security Council definitely seems to exclude Russia. Russia certainly could not accept what under present conditions would be a majority against it in the Security Council, unless it retained its veto. Indeed, since we cannot be certain that over the years other countries will not go Communist in addition to Soviet Russia, I feel that it is practically certain that the United States itself would not accept this rigidly determined quota of representation.

On page 4 line 4, an International Court of Justice is to be reorganized "similarly." This seems to me that its composition shall be based upon identical representation in the 2-2-2-1-1–2 ratio, from the countries mentioned.

This proportionate representation in the proposed Security Council World Court seems radically unfair to the smaller nations, to such a degree that in my opinion few, if any of them, would accept.

Paragraph 7-b: Since the United States proposal for an Atomic Development Authority has now been refused by Russia and further discussion discontinued, it would seem that this provision beginning on line 9 on page 4 would likewise definitely exclude the possibility of Russia becoming a member. Indeed, I am personally doubtful of the operation of the United States proposal under such arrangement as that provided for in Resolution No. 163. For further discussion of this proposal, in its effect on Russia and on the United States, may I respectfully refer the committee to the book I mentioned in my oral testimony, Peace or Anarchy, by Cord Meyer, Jr., pages 129 to 147, inclusive. This material in my opinion is worthy of very serious consideration.

Beginning at page 4 line 16, Resolution No. 163 sets up up armament quotas for the world's nations again on the 2-2-2-1-1-2 ratio. Such a quota seems unrealistic. Russia has manpower beyond ours; we now have production power beyond that of Rusia. To allocate to each country equal quantities numerically or in dollar value or by any other measure of so-called heavy armament, would leave out of consideration all practical differences between the two countries and the same difficulty would be created in respect to all the other powers major and minor. The impossibility of reaching any fair result by such a formula is illus

MEMORANDUM BY PAUL SHIPMAN ANDREWS FOR THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

The following memorandum on House Concurrent Resolution No. 163 is respectfully submitted to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the House of Representatives.

The writer shares the opinion which he believes to be that of General Marshall as expressed at his appearance before the committee on Thursday, May 6, 1948, with apparent reference to this resolution, that its adoption would not be wise or helpful.

The following references are to the numbered paragraphs of House Concurrent Resolution 163.

Paragraph 1: This paragraph expresses a sentiment which all must approve. I should, however, prefer to delete the word "shall" in the expression "the United Nations Charter shall be revised," and substitute some form of recommendation. Paragraph 2: No particular objection except that it hardly seems useful that the member states shall retain their full sovereignty; what is important is to provide in any revised United Nations Charter that all powers not expressly delegated to the United Nations Federal Government to be formed, or necessary in order to carry out those powers, etc., are expressly reserved to the member states. The exact language of this and all other provisions should be agreed upon in the convention proposed to be called to revise the charter.

Paragraph 3: Lines 2 to 5 on page 2 would probably be objected to by the U. S. S. R., and seem to me to add little if anything.

Paragraph 4: No objection.

Paragraph 5: I should prefer not to use language at this time which raises any doubt, and registers the doubt of Congress, as to whether or not the U. S. S. R. would join. If it seems advisable to use any such language and to bring up the question at this time, I should prefer language which expressed the firm intention of the Congress that every last possible effort to satisfy the desire of the U. S. S. R. and to bring that country within the fold, should be taken before the formation of any United Nations federal government without the U. S. S. R. should be contemplated or undertaken. Furthermore, the "more effective international organization" which under this paragraph is to be established if Russia will not join, seems to me to give expression to an idea which, either in words or in fact, I should prefer to avoid; namely, that of an alliance against the U. S. S. R. This new international organization would supersede and, I think, would wreck the United Nations. Certainly if it were based upon a charter containing the provisions, or a number of the provisions hereinafter pointed out, Russia could never thereafter join and the world would, I think, be permanently divided. Paragraph 6: I should prefer to assume the "unbending will to peace" not of America alone but of all nations including the U. S. S. R.

Paragraph 7: No comment, except that some of the language here does not seem suitable for any joint resolution of Congress.

Paragraph 7-a: This phraseology about the elimination of the veto is either designed to exclude Russia, or seems certain to do so.

The definition of aggression contained in this paragraph is, I think, wholly inadequate. Would an incursion by Mexican bandits into Texas and an attack by them on an American citizen be an aggression by Mexico? What of the American landing and occupation of Vera Cruz? There seems to be an infinity of other situations as to which this definition would not be clear. As to "illegal occupation" the same difficulty exists.

Furthermore, every nation always claims it is fighting a defensive war. Who is to determine when aggression exists and which nation is the aggressor? If the proposed new Security Council is to determine this with or without the World Court, then in the case of a determined aggression by one of the major powers an entire country could easily be occupied, in fact, before any decision could be made by the Security Council and the World Court. Furthermore, in unclear cases where neither side can be stigmatized as the aggressor, wars not of aggression are apparently still to be permitted. Furthermore, who is to determine that an illegal entry on foreign territory has been committed? The same comments apply. There is, however, a further comment; if one major power had gone ahead, while the Security Council and World Court were debating,

to occupy in fact some defenseless minor country, it is by no means certain, if one remembers the record of the League of Nations, that the other major powers would send their troops to eject it. And if they did, in order to send the troops of the aggressor power back to the country from which they came, it might well be necessary to bomb and destroy the cities, territory, and people of the unfortunate occupied country, something we would hesitate to do. Furthermore, the aggressor country would undoubtedly have tried to make allies among the other major powers and might have succeeded. History does not tell us that nations always keep their promises, always send their troops to rectify injustices in other parts of the world, when it does not seem to their governments or to their peoples that their own interests are at stake in the matter sufficiently to warrant going to war.

Note here the inherent weakness of the plan proposed by Resolution No. 163; namely, that the only way to enforce the provisions of the proposed revised United Nations is to go to war against some country in order to compel it to obey.

The definition of "armament for aggression" in 7-a seems likewise inadequate and unworkable. If one of the major nations invents a new type of airplane more powerful and destructive than before, or some new and more destructive weapon, it certainly will not be willing to give it up to the proposed new United Nations as long as there is any danger that its national army (retained up to a certain quota by the express provisions of this resolution) may be used in combat against national army retained by one of the other major nations, or by the proposed revised United Nations itself.

So far as definitions are concerned, it seems highly inadvisable to try to commit the convention or organization which will form such a proposed United Nations to specific wording which is highly controversial and not subject to exact definition and interpretation. Such wording had better be left to such convention. In line 22 on page 3 we find representation in the proposed new Security Council to be rigidly fixed, on the ratio of 2-2-2-1-1-2. There is no provision for change if the situation and the relative importance of nations change. There is no flexibility. Moreover, this provision seems to preserve forever the alliances and hostilities now existing between nation states, the national loyalties and distrusts. It provides no hope, as the United World Federalists plan ultimately does, in my opinion, of creating a separate loyalty to a United Nations federal government. This allocation of representation in the proposed new Security Council definitely seems to exclude Russia. Russia certainly could not accept what under present conditions would be a majority against it in the Security Council, unless it retained its veto. Indeed, since we cannot be certain that over the years other countries will not go Communist in addition to Soviet Russia, I feel that it is practically certain that the United States itself would not accept this rigidly determined quota of representation.

On page 4 line 4, an International Court of Justice is to be reorganized "similarly." This seems to me that its composition shall be based upon identical representation in the 2-2-2-1-1-2 ratio, from the countries mentioned.

This proportionate representation in the proposed Security Council World Court seems radically unfair to the smaller nations, to such a degree that in my opinion few, if any of them, would accept.

Paragraph 7-b: Since the United States proposal for an Atomic Development Authority has now been refused by Russia and further discussion discontinued, it would seem that this provision beginning on line 9 on page 4 would likewise definitely exclude the possibility of Russia becoming a member. Indeed, I am personally doubtful of the operation of the United States proposal under such arrangement as that provided for in Resolution No. 163. For further discussion

of this proposal, in its effect on Russia and on the United States, may I respectfully refer the committee to the book I mentioned in my oral testimony, Peace or Anarchy, by Cord Meyer, Jr., pages 129 to 147, inclusive. This material in my opinion is worthy of very serious consideration.

Beginning at page 4 line 16, Resolution No. 163 sets up up armament quotas for the world's nations again on the 2-2-2-1-1-2 ratio. Such a quota seems unrealistic. Russia has manpower beyond ours; we now have production power beyond that of Rusia. To allocate to each country equal quantities numerically or in dollar value or by any other measure of so-called heavy armament, would leave out of consideration all practical differences between the two countries and the same difficulty would be created in respect to all the other powers major and minor. The impossibility of reaching any fair result by such a formula is illus