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to occupy in fact some defenseless minor country, it is by no means certain, if one remembers the record of the League of Nations, that the other major powers would send their troops to eject it. And if they did, in order to send the troops of the aggressor power back to the country from which they came, it might well be necessary to bomb and destroy the cities, territory, and people of the unfortunate occupied country, something we would hesitate to do. Furthermore, the aggressor country would undoubtedly have tried to make allies among the other major powers and might have succeeded. History does not tell us that nations always keep their promises, always send their troops to rectify injustices in other parts of the world, when it does not seem to their governments or to their peoples that their own interests are at stake in the matter sufficiently to warrant going to war.

Note here the inherent weakness of the plan proposed by Resolution No. 163; namely, that the only way to enforce the provisions of the proposed revised United Nations is to go to war against some country in order to compel it to obey.

The definition of "armament for aggression" in 7-a seems likewise inadequate and unworkable. If one of the major nations invents a new type of airplane more powerful and destructive than before, or some new and more destructive weapon, it certainly will not be willing to give it up to the proposed new United Nations as long as there is any danger that its national army (retained up to a certain quota by the express provisions of this resolution) may be used in combat against national army retained by one of the other major nations, or by the proposed revised United Nations itself.

So far as definitions are concerned, it seems highly inadvisable to try to commit the convention or organization which will form such a proposed United Nations to specific wording which is highly controversial and not subject to exact definition and interpretation. Such wording had better be left to such convention.

In line 22 on page 3 we find representation in the proposed new Security Council to be rigidly fixed, on the ratio of 2–2–2-1-1-2. There is no provision for change if the situation and the relative importance of nations change. There is no flexibility. Moreover, this provision seems to preserve forever the alliances and hostilities now existing between nation states, the national loyalties and distrusts. It provides no hope, as the United World Federalists plan ultimately does, in my opinion, of creating a separate loyalty to a United Nations federal government.

This allocation of representation in the proposed new Security Council definitely seems to exclude Russia. Russia certainly could not accept what under present conditions would be a majority against it in the Security Council, unless it retained its veto. Indeed, since we cannot be certain that over the years other countries will not go Communist in addition to Soviet Russia, I feel that it is practically certain that the United States itself would not accept this rigidly determined quota of representation.

On page 4 line 4, an International Court of Justice is to be reorganized "simi larly.” This seems to me that its composition shall be based upon identica representation in the 2–2–2–1-1-2 ratio, from the countries mentioned.

This proportionate representation in the proposed Security Council World Court seems radically unfair to the smaller nations, to such a degree that in my opinion few, if any of them, would accept.

Paragraph 7-b : Since the United States proposal for an Atomic Developmen Authority has now been refused by Russia and further discussion discontinued it would seem that this provision beginning on line 9 on page 4 would likewis definitely exclude the possibility of Russia becoming a member. Indeed, I an personally doubtful of the operation of the United States proposal under suc arrangement as that provided for in Resolution No. 163. For further discussio of this proposal, in its effect on Russia and on the United States, may I respect fully refer the committee to the book I mentioned in my oral testimony, Peac or Anarchy, by Cord Meyer, Jr., pages 129 to 147, inclusive. This material i my opinion is worthy of very serious consideration,

Beginning at page 4 line 16, Resolution No. 163 sets up up armament quota for the world's nations again on the 2-2-2-1-1-2 ratio. Such a quota seen unrealistic. Russia has manpower beyond ours; we now have production powe beyond that of Rusia. To allocate to each country equal quantities numericall or in dollar value or by any other measure of so-called heavy armament, woul leave out of consideration all practical differences between the two countries an the same difficulty would be created in respect to all the other powers major an minor. The impossibility of reaching any fair result by such a formula is illu

MEMORANDUM BY PAUL SHIPMAN ANDREWS FOR THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

The following memorandum on House Concurrent Resolution No. 163 is respectfully submitted to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the House of Representatives.

The writer shares the opinion which he believes to be that of General Marshall as expressed at his appearance before the committee on Thursday, May 6, 1948, with apparent reference to this resolution, that its adoption would not be wise or helpful.

The following references are to the numbered paragraphs of House Concurrent Resolution 163.

Paragraph 1: This paragraph expresses a sentiment which all must approve. I should, however, prefer to delete the word "shall” in the expression “the United Nations Charter shall be revised," and substitute some form of recommendation.

Paragraph 2: No particular objection except that it hardly seems useful that the member states shall retain their full sovereignty; what is important is to provide in any revised United Nations Charter that all powers not expressly delegated to the United Nations Federal Government to be formed, or necessary in order to carry out those powers, etc., are expressly reserved to the member states. The exact language of this and all other provi ons should be agreed upon in the couvention proposed to be called to revise the charter,

Paragraph 3: Lines 2 to 5 on page 2 would probably be objected to by the U.S. S. R., and seem to me to add little if anything.

Paragraph 4: No objection.

Paragraph 5: I should prefer not to use language at this time which raises. any doubt, and registers the doubt of Congress, as to whether or not the U. S. S. R. would join. If it seems advisable to use any such language and to bring up the question at this time, I should prefer language which expressed the firm intention of the Congress that every last possible effort to satisfy the desire of the U. S. S. R. and to bring that country within the fold, should be taken before the formation of any United Nations federal government without the U. S. S. R. should be contemplated or undertaken. Furthermore, the "more effective international organization" which under this paragraph is to be established if Russia will not join, seems to me to give expression to an idea which, either in words or in fact, I should prefer to avoid ; namely, that of an alliance against the U. S. S. R.

This new international organization would supersede and, I think, would wreck the United Nations. Certainly if it were based upon a charter containing the provisions, or a number of the provisions hereinafter pointed out, Russia could never thereafter join and the world would, I think, be permanently divided.

Paragraph 6: I should prefer to assume the “unbending will to peace” not of America alone but of all nations including the U. S. S. R.

Paragraph 7: No comment, except that some of the language here does not seem suitable for any joint resolution of Congress.

Paragraph 7-a : This phraseology about the elimination of the veto is either designed to exclude Russia, or seems certain to do so.

The definition of aggression contained in this paragraph is, I think, wholly inadequate. Would an incursion by Mexican bandits into Texas and an attack by them on an American citizen be an aggression by Mexico? What of the American landing and occupation of Vera Cruz? There seems to be an infinity of other situations as to which this definition would not be clear. As to “illegal occupation" the same difficulty exists.

Furthermore, every nation always claims it is fighting a defensive war. Who is to determine when aggression exists and which nation is the aggressor? If the proposed new Security Council is to determine this with or without the World Court, then in the case of a determined aggression by one of the major powers an entire country could easily be occupied, in fact, before any decision could be made by the Security Council and the World Court. Furthermore, in unclear cases where neither side can be stigmatized as the aggressor, wars not of aggression are apparently still to be permitted. Furthermore, who is to determine that an illegal entry on foreign territory has been committed? The same comments apply. There is, however, a further comment; if one major power had gone ahead, while the Security Council and World Court were debating, to occupy in fact some defenseless minor country, it is by no means certain, if one remembers the record of the League of Nations, that the other major powers would send their troops to eject it. And if they did, in order to send the troops of the aggressor power back to the country from which they came, it might well be necessary to bomb and destroy the cities, territory, and people of the unfortunate occupied country, something we would hesitate to do. Furthermore, the aggressor country would undoubtedly have tried to make allies among the other major powers and might have succeeded. History does not tell us that nations always keep their promises, always send their troops to rectify injustices in other parts of the world, when it does not seem to their governments or to their peoples that their own interests are at stake in the matter sufficiently to warrant going to war.

Note here the inherent weakness of the plan proposed by Resolution No. 163; namely, that the only way to enforce the provisions of the proposed revised United Nations is to go to war against some country in order to compel it to obey.

The definition of "armament for aggression” in 7-a seems likewise inadequate and unworkable. If one of the major nations invents a new type of airplane more powerful and destructive than before, or some new and more destructive weapon, it certainly will not be willing to give it up to the proposed new United Nations as long as there is any danger that its national army (retained up to a certain quota by the express provisions of this resolution) may be used in combat against national army retained by one of the other major nations, or by the proposed revised United Nations itself.

So far as definitions are concerned, it seems highly inadvisable to try to commit the convention or organization which will form such a proposed United Nations to specific wording which is highly controversial and not subject to exact definition and interpretation. Such wording had better be left to such convention,

In line 22 on page 3 we find representation in the proposed new Security Council to be rigidly fixed, on the ratio of 2-2-2-1-1-2. There is no provision for change . if the situation and the relative importance of nations change. There is no flexibility. Moreover, this provision seems to preserve forever the alliances and hostilities now existing between nation states, the national loyalties and distrusts. It provides no hope, as the United World Federalists plan ultimately does, in my opinion, of creating a separate loyalty to a United Nations federal government.

This allocation of representation in the proposed new Security Council definitely seems to exclude Russia. Russia certainly could not accept what under present conditions would be a majority against it in the Security Council, unless it retained its veto. Indeed, since we cannot be certain that over the years other countries will not go Communist in addition to Soviet Russia, I feel that it is practically certain that the United States itself would not accept this rigidly determined quota of representation.

On page 4 line 4, an International Court of Justice is to be reorganized "similarly.” This seems to me that its composition shall be based upon identical representation in the 2–2–2–1-1-2 ratio, from the countries mentioned.

This proportionate representation in the proposed Security Council World Court seems radically unfair to the smaller nations, to such a degree that in my opinion few, if any of them, would accept.

Paragraph 7-b : Since the United States proposal for an Atomic Development Authority has now been refused by Russia and further discussion discontinued, it would seem that this provision beginning on line 9 on page 4 would likewise definitely exclude the possibility of Russia becoming a member. Indeed, I am personally doubtful of the operation of the United States proposal under such arrangement as that provided for in Resolution No. 63. For further discussion of this proposal, in its effect on Russia and on the United States, may I respectfully refer the committee to the book I mentioned in my oral testimony, Peace or Anarchy, by Cord Meyer, Jr., pages 129 to 147, inclusive. This material in my opinion is worthy of very serious consideration.

Beginning at page 4 line 16, Resolution No. 163 sets up up armament quotas for the world's nations again on the 2-2-2–1–1–2 ratio. Such a quota seems unrealistic. Russia has manpower beyond ours; we now have production power beyond that of Rusia. To allocate to each country equal quantities numerically or in dollar value or by any other measure of so-called heavy armament, would leave out of consideration all practical differences between the two countries and the same difficulty would be created in respect to all the other powers major and minor. The impossibility of reaching any fair result by such a formula is illus

trated in numberless examples, to enumerate which would take too long here, but most of which will occur to the members of the committee.

Each nation may well need different numbers or quantities of heavy bombers, pursuit planes, battleships, submarines, because of its own particular and peculiar tactical situation.

Furthermore, some nation as above mentioned, possessing great capacity for quick production of new weapons (a highly industrialized nation) might invent some new weapon. If there was a dispute between that nation and some other major nation such as might lead to trouble (and indeed because under 163 each nation must rely for defense to some extent and perhaps to a considerable extent on its own army), the nation making the invention certainly would not willingly give up the secret. Moreover, 20 percent of heavy armament in the hands of a great industrial power could be expanded far more quickly in a war than the 20 percent of a less industrialized power and much more than the 20 percent of the small nations.

As long as each nation or major power is supposed to retain its national army and must rely on it in part at least for its own defense, just so long would every major nation and patricularly the united States refuse to be bound by any such rigid and inelastic allocation of heavy weapons.

Paragraph 7-c: Page 5, line 7: The “international contingent” is to be under direct control of Security Council in which a majority would exist against certain desires and interest of the U. S. S. R. This, too, definitely seems to exclude Russia. Note that it is to consist of volunteers from smaller states only and is to be equipped with the entire quota of heavy armament allocated in 7-b to the small nations; namely, 20 percent of the total. This leaves the small nations, of course, stripped of heavy armament and unable to even delay aggression by a major state. This provision creates an army ready to attack. There seems to be no doubt in the minds of the authors of this resolution, so one would infer, as to whom the object of that attack might be.

The question immediately arises as to where the small nations are to get the quota of heavy armament which they are to contribute to the international contingent. Obviously it would have to be manufactured in the major nations, and obviously in the more industrialized major nations, if there was to be any great quantity of it. The small nations do not have the industrial potential for manfacturing battleships, carriers, submarines in quantity, bombers in quantity, etc., etc. The small nations, moreover, do not have as far as we know secrets of some of the more important weapons or the industrial potential to manufacture them. This seems to rule out the small nations, since few if any of them would be willing to be completely stripped of heavy armament such as they might hope to make for themselves or purchase, in a world in which the major nations were all armed.

Page 5, line 20, creates or rather recognizes a fatal weaknes in the plan proposed in 163. The national contingent army of the United States obviously cannot be sent into battle to enforce the provisions of the proposed world divided nations without complying with the constitutional provision that the United States Congress must declare war. This is the "constitutional process” referred to at line 21, so far as the United Sates is concerned. France and Britain likewise have constitutional processes. This would delay, and unless Congress were willing, would so far as the United States is concerned prevent sending of the American national contingent to the aid of the internatioal contingent in case of aggression by some other major power. The national contingents are to be called upon on the majority decision of the revised Security Council and World Court. Thus, while one of the major nations is engaged in aggression against a minor country, the Security Council and World Court must seek information, investigate, debate, report, and decide, while aggression and perhaps occupation of the minor country become accomplished facts.

It is important also to note that peace-loving nations if they trust in such a plan as this to prevent war would almost certainly allow their army to deteriorate as the United States has in the recent past been known to do! The aggressors, do not do this.

In line 6, page 6 it is strongly suggested that authors of this resolution were fully aware, as indeed was admitted on Friday morning by one of their representatives on the stand, that Russia could not well be expected to become a party to any such arrangement.

May I respectfully refer the committee to the list of general considerations which I gave on the stand on May 7 in response to a question by Congressman

Lodge of Connecticut as to my feeling about Concurrent Resolution No. 163. For the convenience of the committee I will repeat them here.

(A) All executive and legislative powers existing under 163 are vested in one body, the proposed Security Council; the judicial power is vested in a body of precisely the same relative national components, and subject to the same proportionate nationalistic interests and divisions.

(B) There seems to be no power to make laws operative and binding on individuals.

(C) There is no pre-existing body of law capable of being amended, on which the Security Council as proposed is to act. For all its appearance to the contrary it is to make its own law for the occasion, ex post facto, and then convict and act to punish. There seems to be no provision for raising money by taxaiton, Apparently money is to be raised by requesting it from the member nations. If any nation refuse to contribute, the only way to compel it to do so would be by going to war against it. (Remember the American Articles of Confederation which preceded the United States Constitution, and their weakness).

(D) The reliance of Resolution No. 163 is on a force exerted against nations (by going to war) not on individuals; and on national armies which are supposed to spring to the aid of the international contingent when any violation occurs and to threaten or to fight other national armies of any recalcitrant or obstreporous nation. But the committee I am sure will remember that under the League of Nations certain countries refused to send troops for certain purposes, for fear it might mean war!

(E) Resolution 163 leaves all national rivalries undiminished, with a strong incentive on any major nation desiring to violate the revised charter, to seek allies among the other major nations. Arms and armies are left in the hands of the major nations, which of course are the ones most likely to start aggression such as might lead again to a world war.

(F) Russia is completely and automatically ruled out. The United Nations it seems to me is destroyed. Russia certainly would not accept a situation in which she could be out-voted in a world of nations still armed. I doubt very much if the United States would do so. Equally, the small nations could not accept, because they are deprived of anything remotely approaching a fair representation, and because they are stripped of all heavy armament.

(G) There is no protection in the arrangement proposed by 163 against biological weapons such as can be made in destructive quantities by any competent chemist in a bathtub. Indeed, the only protection against such biological weapons seems to me to be the prevention of war itself; seems to be to take the national armies away from each of the nations and leave them no power to begin a war.

(H) Aggression by a major nation against a small and unimportant country might well be accomplished while the Security Council debated. The other major nations might be divided, or might well be reluctant to send their troops, or their constitutional processes might result in a refusal to do so; or the Council itself might hesitate to order the derastation and destruction of the unfortunato occupied country in order to drive out the aggressor's army.

Dr. ANDREWS. These are the summary reasons only for my opposing House Concurrent Resolution 163.

The executive and legislative powers are vested in one body, the judicial power in a body of exactly the same nationalistic composition, and I use the word “nationalistic" advisedly.

There are no preexisting flexible laws on which the Security Council-revamped by this resolution-can act. It seems to make its own law for the occasion, ex post facto, and then convicts and acts to punish.

It has no law binding on individuals; there is no legislature. Its court, however, is given a jurisdiction over individuals, but it is difficult for me to understand, although perhaps I am just stupid about that, how the court could get jurisdiction unless the police could arrest an individual.

Any change in the law would have to be by the unanimous vote of the Security Council, I think.

Again, I am not quite sure I understand the resolution in that regard.

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