trated in numberless examples, to enumerate which would take too long here, but most of which will occur to the members of the committee.

Each nation may well need different numbers or quantities of heavy bombers, pursuit planes, battleships, submarines, because of its own particular and peculiar tactical situation.

Furthermore, some nation as above mentioned, possessing great capacity for quick production of new weapons (a highly industrialized nation) might invent some new weapon. If there was a dispute between that nation and some other major nation such as might lead to trouble (and indeed because under 163 each nation must rely for defense to some extent and perhaps to a considerable extent on its own army), the nation making the invention certainly would not willingly give up the secret. Moreover, 20 percent of heavy armament in the hands of a great industrial power could be expanded far more quickly in a war than the 20 percent of a less industrialized power and much more than the 20 percent of the small nations.

As long as each nation or major power is supposed to retain its national army and must rely on it in part at least for its own defense, just so long would every major nation and patricularly the United States refuse to be bound by any such rigid and inelastic allocation of heavy weapons.

Paragraph 7-c: Page 5, line 7: The "international contingent" is to be under direct control of a Security Council in which a majority would exist against certain desires and interest of the U. S. S. R. This, too, definitely seems to exclude Russia. Note that it is to consist of volunteers from smaller states only and is to be equipped with the entire quota of heavy armament allocated in 7-b to the small nations; namely, 20 percent of the total. This leaves the small nations, of course, stripped of heavy armament and unable to even delay aggression by a major state. This provision creates an army ready to attack. There seems to be no doubt in the minds of the authors of this resolution, so one would infer, as to whom the object of that attack might be.

The question immediately arises as to where the small nations are to get the quota of heavy armament which they are to contribute to the international contingent. Obviously it would have to be manufactured in the major nations, and obviously in the more industrialized major nations, if there was to be any great quantity of it. The small nations do not have the industrial potential for manfacturing battleships, carriers, submarines in quantity, bombers in quantity, etc., etc. The small nations, moreover, do not have as far as we know secrets of some of the more important weapons or the industrial potential to manufacture them. This seems to rule out the small nations, since few if any of them would be willing to be completely stripped of heavy armament such as they might hope to make for themselves or purchase, in a world in which the major nations were all armed.

Page 5, line 20, creates or rather recognizes a fatal weaknes in the plan proposed in 163. The national contingent army of the United States obviously cannot be sent into battle to enforce the provisions of the proposed world divided nations without complying with the constitutional provision that the United States Congress must declare war. This is the "constitutional process" referred to at line 21, so far as the United Sates is concerned. France and Britain likewise have constitutional processes. This would delay, and unless Congress were willing, would so far as the United States is concerned prevent sending of the American national contingent to the aid of the internatioal contingent in case of aggression by some other major power. The national contingents are to be called upon on the majority decision of the revised Security Council and World Court. Thus, while one of the major nations is engaged in aggression against a minor country, the Security Council and World Court must seek information, investigate, debate, report, and decide, while aggression and perhaps occupation of the minor country become accomplished facts.

It is important also to note that peace-loving nations if they trust in such a plan as this to prevent war would almost certainly allow their army to deteriorate as the United States has in the recent past been known to do! The aggressors, do not do this.

In line 6, page 6 it is strongly suggested that authors of this resolution were fully aware, as indeed was admitted on Friday morning by one of their representatives on the stand, that Russia could not well be expected to become a party to any such arrangement.

May Irespectfully refer the committee to the list of general considerations which I gave on the stand on May 7 in response to a question by Congressman

Lodge of Connecticut as to my feeling about Concurrent Resolution No. 163. For the convenience of the committee I will repeat them here.

(A) All executive and legislative powers existing under 163 are vested in one body, the proposed Security Council; the judicial power is vested in a body of precisely the same relative national components, and subject to the same proportionate nationalistic interests and divisions.

(B) There seems to be no power to make laws operative and binding on individuals.

(C) There is no pre-existing body of law capable of being amended, on which the Security Council as proposed is to act. For all its appearance to the contrary it is to make its own law for the occasion, ex post facto, and then convict and act to punish. There seems to be no provision for raising money by taxaiton. Apparently money is to be raised by requesting it from the member nations. If any nation refuse to contribute, the only way to compel it to do so would be by going to war against it. (Remember the American Articles of Confederation which preceded the United States Constitution, and their weakness).

(D) The reliance of Resolution No. 163 is on a force exerted against nations (by going to war) not on individuals; and on national armies which are supposed to spring to the aid of the international contingent when any violation occurs and to threaten or to fight other national armies of any recalcitrant or obstreporous nation. But the committee I am sure will remember that under the League of Nations certain countries refused to send troops for certain purposes, for fear it might mean war!

(E) Resolution 163 leaves all national rivalries undiminished, with a strong Incentive on any major nation desiring to violate the revised charter, to seek allies among the other major nations. Arms and armies are left in the hands of the major nations, which of course are the ones most likely to start aggression such as might lead again to a world war.

(F) Russia is completely and automatically ruled out. The United Nations it seems to me is destroyed. Russia cértainly would not accept a situation in which she could be out-voted in a world of nations still armed. I doubt very much if the United States would do so. Equally, the small nations could not accept, because they are deprived of anything remotely approaching a fair representation, and because they are stripped of all heavy armament.

(G) There is no protection in the arrangement proposed by 163 against biological weapons such as can be made in destructive quantities by any competent chemist in a bathtub. Indeed, the only protection against such biological weapons seems to me to be the prevention of war itself; seems to be to take the national armies away from each of the nations and leave them no power to begin a war. (H) Aggression by a major nation against a small and unimportant country might well be accomplished while the Security Council debated. The other major nations might be divided, or might well be reluctant to send their troops, or their constitutional processes might result in a refusal to do so; or the Council itself might hesitate to order the devastation and destruction of the unfortunate occupied country in order to drive out the aggressor's army.

Dr. ANDREWS. These are the summary reasons only for my opposing House Concurrent Resolution 163.

The executive and legislative powers are vested in one body, the judicial power in a body of exactly the same nationalistic composition, and I use the word "nationalistic" advisedly.

There are no preexisting flexible laws on which the Security Council-revamped by this resolution-can act. It seems to make its own law for the occasion, ex post facto, and then convicts and acts to punish. It has no law binding on individuals; there is no legislature. Its court, however, is given a jurisdiction over individuals, but it is diffi cult for me to understand, although perhaps I am just stupid about that, how the court could get jurisdiction unless the police could arrest an individual.

Any change in the law would have to be by the unanimous vote of the Security Council, I think.

Again, I am not quite sure I understand the resolution in that regard.

There is no provision for raising money by taxation. Indeed I found no provision for raising money at all. Perhaps everybody would give his services free!

If any nation refuses to contribute when requested, as I suppose must be the idea of the resolution, then the only way you can compel it to give money is to go to war against it.

The resolution relies on force exerted against the nations, not against individuals, and on national armies supposed to join with an international contingent, to threaten or fight other national armies, provided for and allowed expressly by this resolution. But the nations under the League of Nations, the old League of Nations, refused to send troops for fear it might mean war, and one does not know of any reason for assurance that the new League of Nations would not do the same thing.

It leaves all national rivalries undiminished, with the incentive to split up and take sides, since it leaves arms and armies in the hands. of all the major nations, the ones most likely to start a world war, and expressly strips arms and armies from all of the small nations, whose enthusiasm for that provision I should hardly expect.

Russia is completely and automatically ruled out because of the evident unacceptability to her of provision after provision.

I will rely on my memorandum to cover that in detail, sir.

Russia would be outvoted in a world of nations still armed, and the small nations would be stripped of all protection in the form of heavy armaments against other small nations, and would be given no protection by a law over them and by an adequate force, except the international contingent.

There is no protection against biological weapons.

Indeed, of course I assume that the committee would agree that the only protection against biological weapons is to prevent war itself, whereas this resolution, by preserving national armies, contemplates that there may be international war.

Aggression by a major nation against a small and unimportant one might be accomplished, while the Security Council debated.

You see, you cannot call out the national contingents under Resolution 163 until both the Security Council and the World Court have debated, argued and decided, if they ever do decide, to request the major nations to send their national armies. And then, each Nation's pledge to send troops is subject to its own constitutional processes. The major nations might be divided or might well be reluctant to send their troops to engage in a quarrel which their people would think was not their own; or their constitutional processes might result in refusal.

In other words, there is no obligation on the United States, as I understand this resolution, to send its contingent of troops anywhere at the behest of the United Nations created here, unless through its constituional processes it approves.

That means, of course, that under our Constitution, obviously we could not take away from Congress the power to declare war, nor would we. If Congress refused to declare war, the appeal of the United Nations for an American contingent would be void.

The Council itself might hesitate to devastate and destroy a country occupied by one of the major aggressor nations, for the sake of driving back the aggressor nation's troops into its own country. You

would hesitate, if France were occupied by Russia, to bomb Paris and all the cities of France in order to drive the Russians back.

That is just a brief and very partial summary of a very few of the objections I have to 163, sir.

Mr. LODGE. Thank you very much.

Mr. JUDD. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a "yes" or "no" question? Chairman EATON. Proceed.

Mr. JUDD. Dean Andrews, if we cannot get Russia to go along in provisions such as you advocate, do you favor our working for an association of like-minded nations for collective self-defense under Article 51?

Dr. ANDREWS. Do I have to answer "yes" or "no"?

Can I not ask, What are "like-minded nations"?

Mr. JUDD. Well, nations that are opposed to Russia, like-minded in at least that respect. They are afraid of Russian aggression.

Dr. ANDREWS. The answer is "yes," but only as a last resort, and only with the confident hope that Russia would ultimately and perhaps soon come in.

Mr. JUDD. Precisely, and that is what is contemplated in 163.

Chairman EATON. Thank you very much, and we will await with great anxiety your memorandum.

Dr. ANDREWS. Might I venture to recommend a little home reading for the committee, Peace or Anarchy, by Cord Meyer, Jr.?

Chairman EATON. I think that is very important. Fe will be here next week.

STATEMENT OF CHAT PATERSON, NATIONAL CHAIRMAN OF THE AMERICAN VETERANS COMMITTEE

Mr. PATERSON. I would like to put in a plug for Mr. Meyer's book. Mr. Meyer was one of the founders of the American Veterans Committee and has been extremely active in our organization and has been frankly the leader on world government and I think a recognized leader throughout the United States.

Also, Charles Bolte, who was our previous chairman, was a student of world government and worked with Mr. Meyer in the prepara

tion of that book.

Any questions which I am unable to answer, I am sure Mr. Meyer will be able to answer beautifully when he comes before the committee on Tuesday.

The members of the American Veterans Committee recognize that the growing competition for arms, bases, and allies between the United States and the Soviet Union does not lead to peace but may eventually result in an utterly devastating war. Although no program of preparedness can guarantee the security of the United States, we recognize fully the fact that this Nation will not disarm itself until it is safe to do so. While we were the first national organization to specifically support the American proposals for international control of atomic energy, we recognize the futility of unilateral disarmament and believe that the United States must maintain its stock of atomic weapons until an effective system of international inspection and managerial control can be agreed to.

Disarmament will only be safe at such time as the United Nations has been given the power of law to prevent war. The only real secur

ity for the United States will lie in the elimination of war itself, as was so clearly stated in the report of the President's Air Policy Commission, headed by Thomas Finletter, himself an advocate of world government..

The American Veterans Committee supports the United Nations as the only existing means of international cooperation, but we realize that in its present form it is incapable of providing its members with protection against aggression. We therefore urge that the United States fulfill its responsibility as the sole possessor of atomic bombs by proposing such amendments to the Charter as are essential if the United Nations is to be capable of controlling effectively the new

methods of destruction.

We believe that our Government should take the initiative in the United Nations in advocating an over-all security program for survival. We believe that our Government should assert aggressive world leadership and should use every means of friendly persuasion to obtain the voluntary agreement of all nations to conferring the following powers on the United Nations:

These recommendations are from our platform, adopted at our last convention.

1. The power to administer laws binding the individual citizens of every nation as their first duty. This legal authority of the United Nations must be limited to only those matters essential to security. They are (1) the prohibition of the national manufacture or ownership of all weapons of mass destruction; (2) the prohibition of the planning or initiation of war and the prohibition of national armed forces beyond the size required for the maintenance of domestic order; (3) the managerial control of those aspects of the peaceful development of atomic energy that can be diverted with dangerous ease to the secret manufacture of bombs.

2. The power to arrest and try in United Nations courts with compulsory jurisdiction those accused of violating the basic security laws whether they be private citizens or officials of national governments. 3. The power to conduct an international system of inspection, staffed with competent scientists recruited from the member nations. These inspectors must have the right of free access into every country and the right to all scientific information of military value. Through aerial and ground surveys and through investigation of industries, mines and underground structures, they must maintain a continuous search for all attempts to construct the prohibited armament.

4. The power to raise and support a world police force recruited from individuals of the United Nations and armed with the most effective modern weapons. Located in strategic areas throughout the world, this police force must be sufficiently powerful to insure swift and decisive preventive action against any government that defies the international inspectors.

If these basic security laws are to provide protection, no national government can be allowed to obstruct their operation by a single negative vote and protect its own citizens from the consequence of their guilt. The permanent members of the Security Council must agree to surrender their right to veto United Nations action to enforce the laws essential to security, while retaining the right of veto over all other matters.