Chairman EATON. Are there any other questions from the members of the committee?

Mr. LODGE. I would like to ask a number of questions, if I might. Chairman EATON. Mr. Lodge.

Mr. LODGE. I would like to compliment my friend Mr. Mundt on the brilliance of his statement. I certainly think he has posed the problem when he says that we have by ERP purchased time within which to take the leadership.

Now, there is one very fundamental question with respect to his resolution which disturbs me, and that is that as I understand the Charter and I do not have a copy of the Charter before me—it is under 109 that a meeting of the United Nations is to be called for the purpose of devising ways and means to strengthen the Charter but article 51, as I recall it, is a provision which allows for the forming of regional, multilateral pacts.

I am a little confused by the fact that in Resolution 163 on the one hand a revision of the Charter is provided for, and on the other hand we are proceeding under 51. It would seem to me that under the Charter, in order to obtain a revision, you have to have unanimity, after you have called your meeting by a two-thirds vote. You must then have unanimity.

Why is it not possible to proceed under 51, to organize the multilateral regional pacts and still retain the United Nations as a possible ultimate meeting place after some kind of a settlement has been arrived at with the Soviet Union?

Mr. MUNDT. If I understand the question the gentleman poses, I would say, "Yes," in reply to your question, that such a procedure is possible.

As you know, we are considering here before our committee a long series of resolutions, some of which specify article 109, some of which specify article 51, and it would be my hope that in formulating a committee bill, and report, that we would so phrase our legislation that it would provide for a meeting of the member nations of the United Nations for purposes of studying the reasons why the Charter and the organization is not now functioning satisfactorily, or for the purpose of proposing the essential provisions and urging the countries to retain and establish a United Nations under this new Charter, and to be followed by leadership on our part to organize the rest of the countries of the world as I have indicated, if the Russians and the satellites at that time refuse to go along.

Mr. LODGE. My point is that it seems to me there is a tremendous difference between Resolutions 59 to 68 and 163. Under 59 you call your meeting by a two-thirds vote.

If the Soviet Union blocks any attempt to revise the Charter, then you have a choice. Either you amend the charter without the Soviet Union in which case you are making a breach of the provisions of the United Nations Charter, or you decide that you can do nothing at this time to amend the Charter.

Now, as to this question of leadership with which I sympathize, why is it not possible to proceed with this leadership under article 51, without a revision of the United Nations Charter.

Mr. MUNDT. It would be; except if you do that, the onus of breaking the world up into two organized segments might be ours, and I think if we do the thing correctly, we can place the onus upon the Russians

should they elect to divorce themselves from the world organization by refusing to sign up in conformity to the provisions of the Charter. Mr. LODGE. I do not quite follow you there. It would seem to me that if a meeting were called and the Soviets refused to agree to these strengthening amendments, the onus is on them. But if we decide to go ahead and write our own charter, exclusive of Russia and the satellites, we are divorcing ourselves from the UN. We should say, “All right, we will leave the United Nations there for service which we hope it can perform when we have reached a settlement. In the meantime, we will exercise our leadership by proceeding under articles 51 and 52.” Mr. JUDD. Will the gentleman yield? Mr.MUNDT. I will be happy to yield.

Mr. JUDD. That is exactly what House Concurrent Resolution 163 contemplates. It does not contemplate that if Russia blocks any amendments which practically all the other countries want to have adopted, we will then pull out and form a separate organization. It merely means that we are serving notice in advance that if she blocks such changes then those who want them will go ahead under article 51 within the United Nations to adopt them as the basis for relations between themselves on a more closely integrated and firmly committed basis.

Mr. LODGE. It does not seem to me that that is what the resolution says.

Mr. JUDD. Then we will change the resolution. That is what it was intended to say.

Mr. LODGE. The resolution says, "under the provisions of the Charter."

If you are going to revise the Charter, you must either get the unanimous consent of the members of the United Nations or you are going to revise them without it, in which case you are breaching the Charter of the United Nations.

It seems to me that the Charter has been well devised. You can proceed under 51 and 52 without breaking up the United Nations.

I think we have a tendency in this country to think too much in terms of two alternatives and we are apt to grow impatient. Either we must reach an immediate settlement or we have to prepare for war, and there is no land in between.

It seems to me that we can proceed under article 51 to organize the freedom-loving nations of the world for the purpose of achieving a settlement with Russia, and keep the United Nations as a possible meeting place for that eventuality.

This resolution appears to me to contain two thought which are contradictory.

One, we proceed under 51; and the other, we revised the Charter. I cannot see that those two thought can be coordinated if Soviet Russia decides to veto changes in the Charter.

Mr. JUDD. I agree.

Mr. MUNDT. I do not quite follow the gentleman as far as his contradictory elements are concerned. Certainly the procedure which he has outlined is virtually the procedure which we have discussed in our meetings, Dr. Judd and the rest of us, as to the way in which this reform is to be implemented. If there are clauses about the resolutions which disturb you, it is not our thought that either one of these resolutions be adopted in the language as now appears; because, as I

say, these hearings cover a great variety of resolutions, some dealing with 109, some with 51, and some with neither.

It is our desire to bring in the pattern of need before the committee and then have the committee, out of all the suggestions before it, write a committee bill which will seek the objective which we hope we can all agree upon as a result of these hearings.

Mr. LODGE. May I just ask one or two other questions?

Mr. MUNDT. Surely.

Mr. LODGE. I am a little disturbed about giving France and China one vote each; because, after all, France and China are both countries which are in the front lines of this struggle against communism.

Now, the forces of freedom having won the Italian election, it would seem to me quite questionable to relegate France to a position of having one vote whereas other powers have two. It appears to me that that might have a very serious effect upon the morale of that country.

I wonder whether the gentleman is prepared to give me his comment on that, and also in respect to China?

Mr. BLOOM. Do you mean one vote in the Security Council?

Mr. LODGE. Yes, sir. The way it is set up in the resolution is two votes for Russia, two for Great Britain, two for the United States, one vote for China, one for France, and two more for the other small nations.

Mr. JUDD. It specifies the British Commonwealth, not just Great Britain.

Mr. MUNDT. I think the morale of France, Italy, and China will be so tremendously strengthened by this type of approach that we do not have to worry so much about the impact of their particular representation on the Security Council.

For example, to go back to the Italian elections which you mentioned, had De Gasperi been able, which in this campaign with our assistance he won-had he been able to tell the Italians, "Your choice is between joining up with 12 countries of the world who have among them substantially less than 20 percent of the average resources with which wars are fought," that "Your choice is between joining them or joining with the free countries of the world who have roughly 80 percent of the resources with which wars are fought," he would have been in a much better position to make an appeal to the voters than in the present situation, because he could not offer them any alliance now with any other countries.

He said, "Don't join with the 12, and if you don't, you will get the Marshall plan which we hope will continue," and he could not guarantee they anything permanent.

Mr. LODGE. I will say to my colleague that it seems to me that that can be done under article 51 without attempting to revise the United Nations Charter without Russia and her satellites.

I have one more question and that is with respect to this armament quota. It appears to me that you have limited the United States as to those very elements of power in which we are predominant and have not limited Soviet Russia in the elements of power in which she is predominant. I will explain what I mean.

You talk of heavy armament. Our advantage is precisely in the fact that we have a highly industrialized economy which enables us

to produce a large number of highly evolved, heavy armaments, far greater than any nation in the world, including Russia.

Russia has enormous manpower.

Now, I wonder whether it would not be advisable-assuming as you believe and hope and, indeed, we must all hope, that Russia would agree to certain amendments to revise that heavy armament quota criterion, and perhaps substitute something which would not penalize us more than it penalizes Soviet Russia.

I would like to have your comments on that.

Mr. MUNDT. May I say, first of all, that the quota provisions are simply a target at which to shoot? It is not our assumption that we have found the final answer to all the various armament quotas, but it suggests a modus operandi under which the conference can proceed in arriving at some workable and equitable distribution of arms quota. Now, I quite agree there could be a change here or a change there and would not for a minute argue the fact that this particular formula is the final answer to the world agreement on the distribution of armaments. It is merely put there to suggest a pattern. It is a point of procedure on which men can argue and finally work out agreements. Mr. LODGE. It is subject to redefinition?

Mr. MUNDT. That is correct.

Mr. LODGE. Thank you very much; and again I want to congratulate you on your very brilliant and illuminating statement. Mr. CHIPERFIELD. May I ask a question?

Chairman EATON. Mr. Chiperfield.

Mr. CHIPERFIELD. I do not believe 59 goes far enough. I would like to see House Concurrent Resolution 163 or something similar adopted. Mr. MUNDT. I am glad to hear you say that. We are really pushing 163 and its companion resolutions at this time. The other was a first step toward which we were moving and there is a more complete program than the other.

Mr. CHIPERFIELD. Let us suppose that this committee adopts some resolution similar to 163. What reason do you have to think that the quarterback would then call the team together?

Mr. MUNDT. My thought is that we should rephrase this resolution so as to place the responsibility definitely on the President of the United States to call it.

Then I think the pressure of public opinion, the influence of Congress, and his own good judgment will combine to motivate him to issue the call.

Mr. CHIPERFIELD. I want to thank you for a very excellent statement, Mr. Mundt.

Mr. JONKMAN. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask a question.
Chairman EATON. Mr. Jonkman.

Mr. JONKMAN. I was rather intrigued by the colloquy between Mr. Judd and Mr. Lodge with reference to the possibility of the United States withdrawing from the United Nations. That 163 would have to be perfected in order to prevent that possibility.

Mr. JUDD. If that is a possible interpretation of the present language, then I want it revised, because my purpose is to work under article 51 within the United Nations, not go off and set up another. Mr. JONKMAN. The reason that intrigues me is because I believe the

inducement for this meeting was with reference to the expenditure and loan of $65,000,000 for buildings and purchase of a site.

Now, if we were to withdraw from the United Nations after we bought that site, who would the site belong to?

Mr. BLOOM. Does not the resolution say that we should have a first mortgage or a lien upon the land and buildings and all the improvements for the loan that we give to the United Nations?

Mr. JONKMAN. We have a Trojan horse right in the heart of our country, controlled by those whom we could not control, or with that possibility eventually. There is no question but what the property would belong to the organization and not those who seceded from it. We are not talking about foreclosures.

Mr. BLOOM. If we did not loan the $65,000,000 to the United Nations, and the building should be built, our proportionate share of assessments of the members of the United Nations would be about one-half or more of the $65,000,000, so we should be called upon to pay a certain amount of money.

The other way, if we loan $65,000,000 and get a first mortgage and lien upon improvements in the property, we have an asset there that is worth the $65,000,000.

Mr. JONKMAN. The gentleman is talking on matters that are entirely collateral. It is my assumption that if certain nations withdraw from the United Nations, the property would belong to the United Nations proper. If that was drawn down to the Soviets or the satellites, we would have a Trojan horse right in the heart of our country and could not stop it.

Mr. MUNDT. Let me point out that under the program as proposed, if carried out according to our intentions, if anybody secedes from the United Nations it will not be the United States; it will be Russia and her satellite interests, because the predominant strength, 46 of the 58 countries, would follow along on a program which we have in mind.

If anybody secedes it will be the Russian bloc and they lose their control in the United Nations property.

Mr. JONKMAN. I am inclined to believe the gentleman is right and I only raised the question because of the colloquy.

Mr. LODGE. Would the gentleman yield?

Mr. JONKMAN. I will be glad to yield.

Mr. LODGE. I would like to say to Mr. Mundt that I do not believe he is right about that. I think the United Nations Charter is very specific in saying that you can call a meeting by a two-thirds vote, but in order to change the Charter you must have unanimity. If you do not get unanimity you cannot revise the Charter within the terms of the Charter. Therefore, even if two-thirds decide to get out, they are the seceders and those who remain are still the United Nations.

Mr. JUDD. There is nothing in this resolution that suggests that we are going to get out.

Mr. LODGE. You mentioned revision of the Charter.

Mr. JUDD. Revision if possible.

Mr. LODGE. You do not say you are going to proceed under 51 exclusively.