Mr. JUDD. Are you in favor of it exactly as it is written, or are you in favor of the things it tries to do but recognize there may be some proper revision and improvement of the language? Mr. RIMANOCZY. I say I am in favor of it as it is in the light of what I know about the legal machinery that might have to be used. I think you would have to start with section 109. It is possible you could stop there, if Russia were sufficiently apprized of the temper of the United Nations, you might stop there. Otherwise, you would have to go to article 51 and set up a club within a club. Mr. JUDD. You say if we can get agreement under 109 that is the No. 1 objective? Mr. RIMANOCZY. That is right. Mr. JUDD. But that the proposal as outlined in 163 is a second line of defense in case we cannot get agreement? Mr. RIMANOCZY. That is exactly my feeling. Mr. JUDD. I was interested in your phrase "a club within a club," because that idea has been discussed repeatedly here, but not expressed so succinctly. Is it your view that if we cannot get Russia to agree to some changes which would make the United Nations as a whole workable, then we should not secede and go off and set up a completely separate organization but should work under 51 to make a portion of the United Nations work-although the language "to establish a more effective international organization" is susceptible of misinterpretation as meaning a wholly separate organization? Mr. RIMANOCZY. Yes; I do not like that one phrase in there. Mr. JUDD. I want to understand your intent because you are one of the backers of 163. Your intention is to develop a club within a club in case we cannot get everybody to go along? Mr. RIMANOCZY. That is correct. Mr. JUDD. There has been talk about a bridge, that we must not take this action lest we offend Russia and break the bridge between us and Russia. Do you think the Russians are as interested in keeping such a bridge as we are? Mr. RIMANOCZY. I have never seen any such bridge. I think we are just hollering at each other across the canyon. Mr. JUDD. Well, there is a one-way-traffic bridge. They have access to us and our information but we have none of theirs. Some talk as if they would want to break the bridge. They have much more to gain by keeping the bridge as it is, than we have. What we want is a two-way-traffic bridge. Mr. RIMANOCZY. I think it is unrealistic to say that this would antagonize Russia any more than we have already antagonized her. This is merely putting into words the situation that already exists. Mr. JUDD. General Marshall says if we call a conference it is liable to disrupt and destroy the United Nations because of threatening Russia. Do you think putting navies in the Pacific and Mediterranean and building air bases all around Russia might possibly be regarded by the men in the Kremlin as threatening them? Yet General Marshall does not oppose that action. Mr. JUDD. If Russia refused to agree to a general revision that would make the UN workable, and then we went ahead under article 51, do you think Russia would pull out? Mr. RIMANOCZY. No. That forum is too valuable to her. Mr. JUDD. Therefore it would not disrupt the United Nations, in your opinion? Mr. RIMANOCZY. No. Mr. JUDD. Do you think it would precipitate attacks by Russia against the nations in Europe? I am talking about timing now. If we were to do it now before the Marshall plan has had time to operate enough to get the western nations strengthened, if we were to pick this moment to do it, might it in your opinion, precipitate action by Russia to grab those countries right now while they are still weak?" Mr. RIMANOCZY. There are three reasons for my thinking that that would not happen. If they contemplated anything like that at this time they would have already done it. In that respect time is working against them. Second, they certainly must know and every military expert knows that the land mass of Europe is untenable. They would not have a chance. Their supply lines would be riddled. They would not even control the seacoast of the area they occupied. The third and perhaps the most important immediate reason is that they would be taking over a poorhouse. They could not possibly take over the load of the Marshall plan which is not a particularly generous plan. I do not think even with the Marshall plan the people of Europe are going to live in anything but pretty grim discomfort. But for Russia to undertake to control those people under the conditions she would have to force them to live, I think is completely unrealistic. I do not think they would try it. Mr. JUDD. Do you believe that as long as Russia is under the group of people who presently control her, there must be somewhere in the world an organized force of equal or greater strength to prevent further aggression by her in accordance with her own announced intentions? Mr. RIMANOCZY. I think there must be and I think it must be rather prompt. There are two forces in Russia, one which is quite nationalistic. I mean there is a strong nationalistic feeling in Russia, as against the international. The nationalists have been taking a beating because the internationalists have had victory after victory to hang up. If that stops, the nationalists will have a far more potent argument in the council than they have now. If we wait long enough, obviously Russia is going to be sufficiently strong so that even our superiority will not be enough because of the logistics in the problem-the distance we are from the battlefield. If we wait too long, I think the internationalists will prevail in Russia and then we have an all-out fight on our hands. Obviously, the Christian culture could not accept communistic domination. Mr. JUDD. The way to help out the nationalist group as against the ones who want world domination is to get a world organization based on justice so they do not need to go to war and with sufficient strength so that they know they cannot succeed even if they do? Mr. RIMANOCZY. That is correct. Mr. JUDD. If there must be a counter force of equal or greater magnitude, where can it come from? Are there any other possibilities besides these two? Either the United States alone, or an organization of the United States and all the other peoples who want to stay free? Mr. RIMANOCZY. That brings up an economy item I should have brought out: If Russia stays in, our armament costs will go down. If Russia stays out, our armament cost will still go down because if there is 1 bully in a group of 10 people, each person has to be as strong as the bully if he is going to survive, unless the other 9 are in agreement. If the other nine have a mutual defense agreement, they need to be but one-ninth as strong as the bully. Mr. JUDD. You represent an economic foundation of businessmen. Do businessmen who are interested in reducing our expenditures for armaments and therefore our taxes favor some such proposal as this, in your experience? Mr. RIMANOCZY. All of them that I know support, almost right down to the details, an action of this kind. Mr. JUDD. Then it is not a matter of day dreaming; it is a matter of hard, practical sense, as far as the solvency of the United States and their taxes are concerned? Mr. RIMANOCZY. As I tried to point out here, this is not my approach to it. It is what I have gathered from talking to hundreds of these people. There are three thing that everybody knows they need; a law, a court, and a cop. It is their way of getting the problem down to the grass roots. Mr. JUDD. Do you think if we do not succeed in getting some such voluntary organization of free peoples to resist further aggression, that a war is probable or inevitable? Mr. RIMANOCZY. I think it is inevitable. In fact, it might be inevitable regardless of what we do but it will certainly be inevitable if we do nothing. Mr. CHIPERFIELD (presiding). Mr. Lodge. Mr. LODGE. I would like to extend to Mr. Rimanoczy a word of warm welcome. Mr. RIMANOCZY. Thank you. Mr. LODGE. For some time I have favored the Judd Resolution 59, which, as you know, provides for the calling of a meeting under article 109, and I have also favored taking action under articles 51 and 52. As I understand the difference between your point of view and that short statement is that you believe that they should proceed under article 51 to revise the charter if no agreement can be reached under article 109? Mr. RIMANOCZY. As I said, I do not like that phrase, "on the basis of a revised United Nations." I think it is an unfortunate phrase. am partly responsible for it being there, and would like to see it changed. You do not have to revise the United Nations to form a club within the club. Mr. LODGE. The sentence I am familiar with, which I believe has been advanced by several of the sponsors of this legislation, is to revise the United Nations Charter with Russia, if possible, and without Russia, if she will not go along. Mr. RIMANOCZY. That is correct. Mr. LODGE. Then you do favor revising the United Nations Charter if she will not go along? Mr. RIMANOCZY. Yes. Not to revise the Charter in the sense that you start a new, revised United Nations. That is not the case. You simply make a revision which is already allowed for. I think the Southern Hemisphere arrangement is under article 51. Mr. LODGE. That is not a revised United Nations Charter. Mr. RIMANOCZY. This would be exercising a right that already exists. Mr. LODGE. Then the literature on the subject has misled me because the literature on the subject which I have read says: Revision of the United Nations Charter, without Russia if Russia will not go along. You would say that is in error? Mr. RIMANOCZY. I think that wording is unfortunate, yes. Mr. LODGE. In other words, you would not favor the revision of the United Nations Charter if Russia does not agree to such revision? Mr. RIMANOCZY. I do not quite folow that one. Mr. LODGE. Let us assume that a conference is called under article 109. There is an agenda of amendments to which Russia agrees. As you pointed out, that is that. If Russia does not agree, then you favor proceeding under article 51, but you do not favor attempting to revise the United Nations Charter without Russia? Mr. RIMANOCZY. Certinly I do. That is the practical result. Mr. LODGE. How will that be done? How can you revise the United Nations Charter without Russia's consent? Mr. RIMANOCZY. I am not enough of an international lawyer to tell you much about that but I know enough about it to say that it is perfectly feasible to form a club within this club. Mr. LODGE. What would you call that club, a United Nations? Mr. LODGE. I yield. Mr. JONKMAN. I understand thoroughly the idea of a club within. a club if all you need is a two-thirds vote. If you do form a club within a club, how do you get away from the veto? Mr. RIMANOCZY. There could be no veto in matters of aggression. Mr. JONKMAN. Then you still must come to the conclusion that you have to revise the Charter. Mr. JUDD. Will the gentleman yield? Mr. LODGE. I should just like to follow through for a bit if I may, Dr. Judd. I am trying to find out whether in the event that Russia will not agree to any amendment proposed in a conference called under article 109, you feel that revisions of the United Nations Charter should be made without Russian consent? Mr. RIMANOCZY. With the full understanding that Russia is free to join any time that she decides that she likes it. Mr. LODGE. At that point you will have two Charters. You have the revised Charter and the original Charter. Is that not correct? Mr. RIMANOCZY. I assume that would be correct. Mr. LODGE. But there is no provision in the United Nations Charter for amending it without Russian consent. Therefore, the United Nations Charter remains and you have another United Nations Charter which is revised in accordance with Resolution 163; is that correct? Mr. RIMANOCZY. Yes; I think that is correct. Mr. LODGE. That would be correct. I am glad to get that definitely established because that is a point which has been puzzling me and I thing it has been puzzling my good friend from Minnesota, too. I think he had the opposite interpretation of that. I do not think you and Dr. Judd agree on this particular point. Mr. JUDD. Will the gentleman yield? Mr. LODGE. I will be glad to. Mr. JUDD. I think our difference may be in the words "revision" and "amendment." You cannot amend without Russia's consent. You can have a revision in structure and not have an amendment of the Charter. Mr. LODGE. How can you have that? Mr. JUDD. It is unfortunate and inaccurate that the resolution uses the phrase "revise" the Charter under article 51. Of course, we could not amend it without Russia's consent, what would happen would be that the club within a club would set up a compact for itself or a constitution for itself or a charter for itself, which would be like the United Nations Charter, except in three essential procedures but it would not be the United Nations Charter and it should not be said that we revise the United Nations Charter. Mr. LODGE. But you create another charter. Mr. JUDD. Yes; we create a charter for the club within a club. Its constitution would be like that of the UN except for certain changes. To avoid misunderstanding they should not be called revisions of the U. N. Charter. Mr. JONKMAN. Will the gentleman yield to me? Mr. LODGE. I will be glad to. Mr. JONKMAN. Then you take the abuse away from the club within the club but not away from the Soviets. Mr. LODGE. We have the United Nations Charter still in existence, presumably with Russia and the satellites the only nations belonging. Then we have what we might call a United Nations charter, the signatories of which are the 45 nations which might secede from the United Nations. Mr. RIMANOCZY. I would not say secede. If the legal technicalities. are essential here, I will say that they can belong to two United Nations but I think that is a distinction rather than a difference. Mr. LODGE. Now I come to this point: Would you say that the trouble with the United Nations was a defective Charter, or the actions of the Soviet Union? Mr. RIMANOCZY. I am sorry, I missed your question. |