pocus about peace and democracy with which he pulled the wool over our war leaders' eyes. So when he saw that victory was in sight, he had his deputy, Vishinsky, make a speech, recalling these uncompromising texts of Lenin and giving explicit notice that they are still in force. And at the risk of all America's reading it even by some prodigious accident our great diplomats-he had this speech translated into English and published in Washington by the Soviet Embassy 6 month before the war ended. I quote two sentences from the Bulletin of the Soviet Embassy for November 17, 1945:

Lenin purged the teachings of Marx and exposed the sweet-sounding nonsense about a calm and smooth development of bourgeois society into socialism, nonsense to the effect that it is not in the fires of battle, not by means of revolutionary struggle, but in reconciling and smoothing out class contradictions that the Socialist transformation of the state is to be effected. Lenin developed the teachings of Marx on the important question of "smashing the bourgeois state apparatus."

Now everybody who is familiar with Lenin's writings knows what that phrase "smash the bourgeois state apparatus" means. It means in the United States take over the Government offices and purge them of every officer and every clerk and every clerk's assistant who believes in the ideals or is imbued with the habits of representative government or free enterprise. It means go into the buildings, disinfect them of democracy by means of summary arrests, executions, concentration camps, establish a ruthless, one-party dictatorship which will take over the industry and commerce and agriculture of the United States.

That was published in Washington long before we retired from Czechoslovakia and let the Soviets come in and take possession of it, long before we politely withdrew our troops and let them have Berlin and the eastern parts of Germany.

Now of course the Communist leaders do not intend this program for immediate execution. They are not dreamers. They are not fanciful people at all. They are people who believe in the Marxian technique of revolution. And the very essence of the whole Marxian system, insofar as it is a technique, is never to take any action until the conditions and particularly the economic conditions, are ripe. So they are not talking about now in this blueprint. They are awaiting the crisis which will give them their opportunity.

It is interesting, however, to note that as long as 17 years ago Stalin said this:

I think the moment is not far off when a revolutionary crisis will develop in America and when a revolutionary crisis develops in America, that will be the beginning of the end of world capitalism as a whole.

What Stalin thinks at present about the date is of course problematical. We don't know. But otherwise I think Russia's foreign policy is so plainly set down in those five quotations that only with an effort of will could one persuade himself there is any mystery about it.

The supreme conundrum to my mind is: Why does America, with the greatest scientific, industrial, and military power in history lack the courage to face political facts?

It is naturally very painful when you are attempting so nobly sensible a reform as a parliament of nations to end war, to have to admit that one of the great powers participating has other ends in

view. But it is a fact and there is no use deceiving ourselves about it. The fact is proven not only by the behavior of the Soviet delegates, but by specifications plainly written down in the Communist scriptures.

The United Nations, as I said, is a parliament. From their point of view it is a bourgeois parliament, and for the revolutionary use of parliaments these Communist scriptures contain very explicit directions, which I also want to read you. I quote from a resolution of the Second Congress of the Communist International.

The Communist Party enters a parliament not to participate organically in its activities, but to undermine the parliament from within

masses.

* *

to rally the

Is any further word needed to explain the Soviet boycotts, vetoes, the salvage calumnies of Gromyko, the abusive diatribes of Vishinsky? They are undermining the United Nations from within. They are rallying the masses for revolution in the other member nations. The resolution continues:

Every Communist representative is required to realize that he is not a legislator seeking agreement with other legislators, but an agitator of the party sent into the camp of the enemy in order to carry out the decisions of the party. He is not to make legal motions "with the aim of getting them adopted by the bourgeois majority," but only "for propaganda, agitation, and organization."

The Soviet delegates, you see, are not ill-bred or rough or crude as Mrs. Roosevelt and some other delegates imagine. Very far from it. They are pursuing a prescribed line of action to a clearly and coolly defined end.

The resolution continues in italics:

There can be no question of the utilization of bourgeois governmental institutions except for the purpose of their destruction.

And as to what follows their destruction, the resolution is equally explicit :

The present historical duty of the working class

1

which doesn't mean the working class, it means the world-wide Communist Party

is to snatch the parliamentary mechanisms from the ruling classes, to smash them, to destroy them, and substitute for them new organs of proletarian power.

The new organ of power to be substituted for the United Nations is, of course, the Federation of Socialist Soviet Republics, the worldwide totalitarian Communist empire.

Stalin's policy then, and the foreign policy of the General Staff of the World Revolution in Moscow, is abundantly clear. He regards the present situation as an armed truce between the Soviet Union and its "enemies," the western democratic nations. In that true he will jockey for every position within our country and without which will enable him and his followers, or their successors, when the hour strikes, to seize the power here and establish a one-party police state. In this enterprise the United Nations in his view is an instrument to be used for propaganda, agitation, and organization, for breaking the whole thing up, bringing about chaos in the world which produced it, and replacing it with an organ of his own power.

It seems to me the lesson for us here is perfectly clear. If the Communist world army, which is preparing an assault on us, is using the United Nations as an instrument of revolution, which means war, our sole intelligent policy is to use it as a real instrument of world peace. So long as the Soviet Union with this other purpose in view has the power to veto measures which look to guaranteeing peace, we cannot use it for our purpose.

I think the resolution introduced here by the Congressmen, H. Con. Res. 163, and which you are considering today, expresses an intention really to use this institution in behalf of world peace. It doesn't propose to make war on the Communists. It doesn't propose military measures at all. It proposes to outwit their warlike movement by waging peace intelligently and vigorously, but really waging it.

I should like to have you think of all of my remarks, which are just about finished, as directed against the statement of Secretary Marshall, in the papers this morning, that he hopes through continuing the United Nations as it is, to "dispel the misconceptions of the Soviet leaders."

I wish that Secretary Marshall could be locked up in a room with a convinced fanatical believer in the Marxian philosophy of history and try in 24 hours to dispel any one of his conceptions. He would learn something that he very much needs to know. These are not, in the first place, temporary and adventitious conceptions; they are religious convictions resting on a philosophy a hundred years old, and as complicated as anything of the kind that has ever appeared in the world. And in the second place, they are not convictions at bottomthey are intentions.

Nobody who had really read those quotations I presented to you would call them conceptions-least of all conceptions that can be dispelled. They are life purposes to which everybody in this army of 20,000,000 has consecrated everything he has got.

I think that is about all I had come prepared to say.

Chairman EATON. Mr. Eastman, you have lifted the veil off of a challenging and disturbing outlook.

Tell us what you propose to have the United Nations do to meet this situation.

Mr. EASTMAN. Well, I am appearing in behalf of this resolution. I think that the A-B-C measures proposed in this resolution might work.

Chairman EATON. Is that Resolution 59 you are interested in?
Mr. EASTMAN. Is that the number?

Mr. CHIPERFIELD. It is 163.

Chairman EATON. One hundred and sixty-three is the one you are advocating?

Mr. EASTMAN. Yes.

Chairman EATON. Have you thought through how that can be done? Does it mean, for instance, the expulsion of Russia from the United Nations?

Mr. EASTMAN. No, decidedly not. What I have set forth are the facts which we should confront before we even begin to discuss what we are going to do, or what we are going to say in an official way. But from there on we have got to proceed diplomatically. I think a lot more things about what we ought to do to prevent this totalitarianiza

orld to line up on one side or the other, that we would get r side than we have now? I refer to more nations? TMAN. I think if we had adequate military power so that beratic force in the world would feel that we were behind ay every totalitarian force feels that the Soviet Union is , all the nations which are not immediately under the Soviet dictatorship would be on our side. There might be nations that would hesitate because they don't quite bean business at all when we talk about democracy, they › disappointed in our conduct since we won the war. But sure of us, they would all be on our side. Certainly not, satellite nations.

. What is going to be persuasive, then, with the free e world and with the Soviets themselves is not our words s, is that not right?

AN. Well, our readiness to act, the belief that if it comes n we will act. And I think we will. I don't think anyhat.

aid this morning in his memoirs, Hitler believed we were

to gather our forces and fight at all, we Western Stalin has the same belief about democracies, and it ery much more plausible foundation and a more erudite Hitler's was, but it is no more true.

The action we could take that would be persuasive would
Dish aid to their economies; two, to prepare ourselves
tary aid to those who were attacked. What else?
hose actions speak far louder than any resolution we
any resolution that this Congress might approve?
. Well, we are taking the action, are we not? Only
it quite vigorously enough and quite explicitly enough
lemocratic forces-I mean not only the nations which
a democratic government, but the democratic forces.
Ps. There is a whole list of things we could do, but
>t. What we need now is a world instrument through
things?

me quite obvious. We may not get it now. Your ly be a resolution. But it will sway the opinion of all over the world and we will get that instrument

ategic position in having a United Nations which ized for world peace, although so imperfectly that munists to use it as an instrument of world revolu

All we have to do is fix it up a little bit. Then we hole. That is the way it looks to me.

t impresses me is that the United Nations, feeble as also proven to be a pretty good instrument to keep the fire in that they have to either agree or use so often and we have been apprized of situations ched from using the veto.

to see us do something that would destroy that nited Nations in keeping world attention on just entions are. How would you feel about that? Well, I think in the light of what they are really it advantage is slight.

That is a little aside from this resolution. I don't think this measure of revising the Charter of the United Nations, or forming under the present Charter an alliance of the genuinely democratic nations, a defensive alliance, bears necessarily on that. But that they are the general staff of an army of 20 million enemies, aiming to overthrow democracy and overthrow our Government-of that there is not the slightest doubt. And that should be the basis of any action we take. Chairman EATON. Mr. Chiperfield?

Mr. CHIPERFIELD. Mr. Eastman, you face facts, so far as Russia is concerned. Now let us face facts so far as this resolution is concerned. Suppose the Congress passes Concurrent Resolution 59, or the one you suggest, 163. We have been told this week that the Secretary of State is against Resolution 59, that he would not recommend the action that it advocates to the President.

We have been told by Senator Austin, a member of the United Nations, that he is against both of these resolutions and thinks they would be fatal to the United Nations and destroy the United Nations. What do you think under those circumstances we will accomplish by passing either of those resolutions?

Mr. EASTMAN. Well, I think by passing Resolution 163 you would take a long step toward accomplishing a reform of the United Nations which is absolutely essential to the preservation of world peace and of our democratic system, and which the statement of Secretary Marshall proves is essential. If he rests his advice to you on the assumption that there is a misconception in the Soviet Union and that we must preserve the status quo because the fundamental task of our foreign policy is to "dispel the misconceptions of the Soviet leaders," then in my opinion his advice, not being based on the facts, is no good.

Mr. CHIPERFIELD. But you must not forget, we are a legislative body. All we do by this type of legislation is express an opinion of the Congress. We can do that. Say it is a pious gesture of perhaps futile, but unless something happens in the executive branch, we accomplish nothing as I see it.

Mr. EASTMAN. I don't agree with you. I think you accomplish an enormous amount in the effect you have on public opinion, and in the last resort we have got to build up public opinion. Suppose the Executive doesn't do anything right off. They often don't do anything right off when you pass a resolution, but your resolutions amount to more than anything any other body or any other group of persons could possibly publish. Is that not true?

Mr. CHIPERFIELD. You feel then by expression of the Congress favoring something to be done towards revision of the Charter of the United Nations we would be bringing together public opinion and that would be helpful?

Mr. EASTMAN. Yes, and not only in the United States but all over the world.

Mr. CHIPERFIELD. Thank you very much.

Chairman EATON. Mr. Mansfield?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I have no questions.

Chairman EATON. Mr. Vorys?

Mr. VORYS. Mr. Eastman, do you think that if we passed a resolution and the executive branch took actoin, would tend to force the