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say, these hearings cover a great variety of resolutions, some dealing with 109, some with 51, and some with neither.

It is our desire to bring in the pattern of need before the committee and then have the committee, out of all the suggestions before it, write a committee bill which will seek the objective which we hope we can all agree upon as a result of these hearings.

Mr. LODGE. May I just ask one or two other questions?
Mr. MUNDT. Surely,

Mr. LODGE. I am a little disturbed about giving France and China one vote each; because, after all, France and China are both countries which are in the front lines of this struggle against communism.

Now, the forces of freedom having won the Italian election, it would seem to me quite questionable to relegate France to a position of having one vote whereas other powers have two. It appears to me that that might have a very serious effect upon the morale of that country.

I wonder whether the gentleman is prepared to give me his comment on that, and also in respect to China ?

Mr. Bloom. Do you mean one vote in the Security Council ?

Mr. LODGE. Yes, sir. The way it is set up in the resolution is two votes for Russia, two for Great Britain, two for the United States, one vote for China, one for France, and two more for the other small nations.

Mr. Judd. It specifies the British Commonwealth, not just Great Britain.

Mr. MUNDT. I think the morale of France, Italy, and China will be so tremendously strengthened by this type of approach that we do not have to worry so much about the impact of their particular representation on the Security Council.

For example, to go back to the Italian elections which you mentioned, had De Gasperi been able, which in this campaign with our assistance he won-had he been able to tell the Italians, “Your choice is between joining up with 12 countries of the world who have among them substantially less than 20 percent of the average resources with which wars are fought,” that“Ïour choice is between joining them or joining with the free countries of the world who have roughly 80 percent of the resources with which wars are fought,” he would have been in { much better position to make an appeal to the voters than in the pres ent situation, because he could not offer them any alliance now wit! any other countries.

He said, “Don't join with the 12, and if you don't, you will get th Marshall plan which we hope will continue,” and he could not guaran tee they anything permanent.

Mr. LODGE. I will say to my colleague that it seems to me that tha can be done under article 51 without attempting to revise the Unite Nations Charter without Russia and her satellites.

I have one more question and that is with respect to this armamen quota. It appears to me that you have limited the United States a to those very elements of power in which we are predominant and hav not limited Soviet Russia in the elements of power in which she is pre dominant. I will explain what I mean.

You talk of heavy armament. Our advantage is precisely in th fact that we have a highly industrialized economy which enables u to produce a large number of highly evolved, heavy armaments, far greater than any nation in the world, including Russia.

Russia has enormous manpower.

Now, I wonder whether it would not be advisable-assuming as you believe and hope and, indeed, we must all hope, that Russia would agree to certain amendments to revise that heavy armament quota criterion, and perhaps substitute something which would not penalize us more than it penalizes Soviet Russia.

I would like to have your comments on that.

Mr. MUNDT. May I say, first of all, that the quota provisions are simply a target at which to shoot? It is not our assumption that we have found the final answer to all the various armament quotas, but it suggests a modus operandi under which the conference can proceed in arriving at some workable and equitable distribution of arms quota.

Now, I quite agree there could be a change here or a change there and would not for a minute argue the fact that this particular formula is the final answer to the world agreement on the distribution of armaments. It is merely put there to suggest a pattern. It is a point of procedure on which men can argue and finally work out agreements.

Mr. LODGE. It is subject to redefinition?
Mr. MUNDT. That is correct.

Mr. LODGE. Thank you very much; and again I want to congratulate you on your very brilliant and illuminating statement.

Mr. CHIPERFIELD. May I ask a question?
Chairman EATON. Mr. Chiperfield.

Mr. CHIPERFIELD. I do not believe 59 goes far enough. I would like to see House Concurrent Resolution 163 or something similar adopted.

Mr. MuNDT. I am glad to hear you say that. We are really pushing 163 and its companion resolutions at this time. The other was a first step toward which we were moving and there is a more complete program than the other.

Mr. CHIPERFIELD. Let us suppose that this committee adopts some resolution similar to 163. What reason do you have to think that the quarterback would then call the team together!

Mr. MUNDT. My thought is that we should rephrase this resolution so as to place the responsibility definitely on the President of the United States to call it.

Then I think the pressure of public opinion, the influence of Congress, and his own good judgment will combine to motivate him to issue the call.

Mr. CHIPERFIELD. I want to thank you for a very excellent statement,
Mr. Mundt.

Mr. JONKMAN. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask a question.
Chairman EATON. Mr. Jonkman.

Mr. JONKMAN. I was rather intrigued by the colloquy between Mr. Judd and Mr. Lodge with reference to the possibility of the United States withdrawing from the United Nations. That 163 would have to be perfected in order to prevent that possibility.

Mr. Jupp. If that is a possible interpretation of the present language, then I want it revised, because my purpose is to work under article 51 within the United Nations, not go off and set up another.

Mr. JONKMAN. The reason that intrigues me is because I believe the inducement for this meeting was with reference to the expenditure and loan of $65,000,000 for buildings and purchase of a site.

Now, if we were to withdraw from the United Nations after we bought that site, who would the site belong to?

Mr. Bloom. Does not the resolution say that we should have a first mortgage or a lien upon the land and buildings and all the improvements for the loan that we give to the United Nations?

Mr. JONKMAN. We have a Trojan horse right in the heart of our country, controlled by those whom we could not control, or with that possibility eventually. There is no question but what the property would belong to the organization and not those who seceded from it. We are not talking about foreclosures.

Mr. Bloom. If we did not loan the $65,000,000 to the United Nations, and the building should be built, our proportionate share of assessments of the members of the United Nations would be about one-half or more of the $65,000,000, so we should be called upon to pay a certain amount of money.

The other way, if we loan $65,000,000 and get a first mortgage and lien upon improvements in the property, we have an asset there that is worth the $65,000,000.

Mr. JONKMAN. The gentleman is talking on matters that are entirely collateral. It is my assumption that if certain nations withdraw from the United Nations, the property would belong to the United Nations proper. If that was drawn down to the Soviets or the satellites, we would have a Trojan horse right in the heart of our country and could not stop it.

Mr. MUNDr. Let me point out that under the program as proposed, if carried out according to our intentions, if anybody secedes from the United Nations it will not be the United States; it will be Russia and her satellite interests, because the predominant strength, 46 of the 58 countries, would follow along on a program which we have in mind.

If anybody secedes it will be the Russian bloc and they lose their control in the United Nations property.

Mr. JONKMAN. I am inclined to believe the gentleman is right and I only raised the question because of the colloquy.

Mr. LODGE. Would the gentleman yield!
Mr. JONKMAN. I will be glad to yield.

Mr. LODGE. I would like to say to Mr. Mundt that I do not believe he is right about that. I think the United Nations Charter is very specific in saying that you can call a meeting by a two-thirds vote, but in order to change the Charter you must have unanimity. If you do not get unanimity you cannot revise the Charter within the terms of the Charter. Therefore, even if two-thirds decide to get out, they are the seceders and those who remain are still the United Nations.

Mr. Judd. There is nothing in this resolution that suggests that we are going to get out.

Mr. LODGE. You mentioned revision of the Charter.
Mr. Judd. Revision if possible.

Mr. LODGE. You do not say you are going to proceed under 51 exclusively.

Mr. JONKMAN. Mr. Chairman, I refuse to yield any further. Mr. Judd said in his prepared statement, on page 2, in referring to the United Nations Organization:

The machinery was workable for peaceful settlement of disputes, if there were the will and the good will to make it work.

Now, do you propose, by perfecting this machinery, to create the good will that is necessary to make it work?

Mr. MUNDT. No, but we do propose to prevent any one or two countries which lack good will, to prevent it from working.

Mr. BLOOM. It is to prevent the abuse of the Charter. Mr. JONKMAN. Mr. Judd said on page 3: Surely the part of wisdom now is to recognize frankly that as long as one of the Big Five nations obviously does not want the United Nations machinery to work, then the machinery, no matter how good it looks, is useless for such a crisis as we face today, until the monkey wrench is removed.

I want it understood that with every freedom-loving person in the world I want to strengthen the United Nations if it can be done.

You have talked along similar lines, constantly, you have talked about Russia withdrawing, as if Russia is going to withdraw. The question is whether you are basing that assumption on the same fallacy that has caused us to be disturbed about Russia continually.

Now, it is my understanding that there is no provision in the Charter for a nation to withdraw. Is not that correct?

Mr. MUNDT. I did not understand your question.

Mr. JONKMAN. There is no specific provision in the Charter for a nation to withdraw ?

Mr. MUNDT. Yes, I believe a nation can withdraw.

Mr. JONKMAN. I am pretty sure there is not. I would like to have you call my attention to it.

Mr. MUNDr. I think you will find there is a procedure for a nation to withdraw from the United Nations.

Mr. JONKMAN. I understand there is a provision in the Charter for expulsion of a nation that fails to pay its dues for more than 2 years without good reason, or for not living up to the provisions of the Charter.

Mr. Mundt. Also, I think you will find a provision there by which one can withdraw after serving due notice and paying all fees.

Mr. BLOOM. Will the gentleman yield? Mr. JONKMAN. If you have the provision. Mr. BLOOM. Is it not the fact that he can withdraw but for 2 years he would be obligated to the provisions of the Charter?

Mr. MUNDT. I believe so. May I correct any false impression which I may have left with you? It is our hope and belief that Russia will not withdraw, because she will find herself so hopelessly in the minority from the standpoint of the things a nation has to have with which to fight a war. We do not believe she can afford to withdraw.

Mr. JONKMAN. Understand, I am not trying to throw cold water on this resolution, by any stretch of the imagination. I would just like to see some reasonable, realistic means for attaining the objective.

you also


Now, the resolution for the revision of the Charter—that is to consider the resolution-is not subject to the veto. That is right, is it not?

Mr. MUNDT. Yes.

Mr. JONKMAN. When it comes to revising the Charter, that is subject to the veto.

Mr. MUNDr. Under 109, that is correct.

Mr. JONKMAN. Yes; and then it must have the consent of all the permanent members.

Mr. MUNDT. If it is done under 109; that is correct.

Mr. JONKMAN. You can have a meeting to consider that provision without the veto but when it comes to revision of the provision it is subject to the veto.

Do you think that Russia is ever going to consent to change it without using that veto? Mr. MUNDT. I do if it is handled in a manner in which

proceed through Article 51, to organize the strength of the world on the free side, in the event that she does exercise her veto under 109. Thịt is why we use this parallel approach. One is the ungloved hand and the other is the fist within the glove.

If you do not do it the way you can do it under 109, we have article 51 as a second approach, which they cannot veto.

Mr. JONKMAN. My point is that all the things you have fortified us with as to our ability to lead the world, suppose Russia refused to concur. Would you proceed to try to expel her from the United Nations Organization? Could she block that by the veto!

Mr. MUNDT. I do not believe you can stop her from doing what she is entitled to.

Chairman EATON. Article 5 of the Charter says: A member of the United Nations, against which preventive or enforcement action has been taken by the Security Council, may be suspended from the exercise of the rights and privileges of the membership in the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. The exercise of these rights and privileges may be restored by the Security Council.

Article 6: A member of the United Nations which has persistently violated the principles contained in the present Charter may be expelled from the Organization by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.

Unfortunately, of course, the Security Council has the veto.

Mr. JONKMAN. I was aware of that, and I have not yet had my attention called to a provision under which any member can resign from the organization.

Mr. MUNDr. You also have the power through article 51 to organize the strength of the world on the side of the freedom-loving countries.

Mr. JONKMAN. You have that now.

Mr. Munur. Yes; but you do not utilize it now unless you call a meeting for the purpose of getting a job done. There is power in article 51 which we propose in this resolution to activate. We feel that the possibility of that will force the Russians to come along with this procedure, because otherwise they would be tantamount to just setting off with 12 little countries by themselves.

Mr. LODGE. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. JONKMAN. I yield.

Mr. LODGE. I feel that calling a meeting under article 109 is desirable, but there are some grave questions with regard to 163.

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