it is by democratic principles that you operate within the United Nations?

Mr. MEYER. I will take one exception to that. I think the sovereign equality in which each country has one vote is not a democratic principle.

Mr. FULTON. But action is by voting under certain systems, is it not? Mr. MEYER. Yes; it is by voting.

Mr. FULTON. When you come to a certain level in the member states you come to the head of the state government, and from there down it may be democracy or it may be dictatorship.

Mr. MEYER. That is right.

Mr. FULTON. Then could you not be just a little inadequate in your statement when you say that you would first enforce world laws binding on individuals and prevent them from committing aggression, inferring that you mean "aggression" extranationally, when you will not have world laws binding individuals from aggression against their own fellow men within their own country?

Mr. MEYER. I will agree with you that if we had a completely mature world in which all nations were fully rounded out and established democracies, this job would be a great deal easier. On the other hand, we have the fact that a number of different systems exis and a number of different types of government. Secondly, the reality of the weapons. We are dealing with the situation as it is, and having laws that operate in a limited and defined area, and that can proceed against individuals insofar as they are concerned with international peace and security.

Mr. FULTON. Then why do you not go the full way and say we are going to stop aggression every place in the world and have these world laws apply both to individuals and nations within and without? How can you make a division between individuals within the nation and individuals without the nation?

Mr. MEYER. It is the same division that has prevailed in many federal systems.

In Switzerland we had a federation formed that consisted of people's democracies, monarchies, absolute obligarchies, and all types of systems, but they agreed to do certain things together while retaining the various forms of government that they were operating in their own area at the moment.

Mr. FULTON. Are you not up against this: Suppose A is the citizen of one country and B is a citizen of a second country and C commits aggressive acts against A or B. In your system he can do it all right against B if C is a citizen of the second country but not against A, the citizen outside his country?

Mr. MEYER. I agree. We would not want to give to the international authority the right to proceed in the 14 southern states with the immediate establishment of total civil liberties in that area. We feel that this is a gradual process. We feel that a similar gradual process will have to proceed elsewhere, and if we would attempt direct enforcement of freedom throughout the world we would be faced with many serious problems we could not solve in that way.

Mr. FULTON. Are you willing to deal with dictatorships and try to make agreements with them, even though we know that Molotov agreed with Ribbentrop at one time and did it only for an advantage?

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Mr. MEYER. If they accept international inspection, free access to information, jurisdiction of the world court, and if they accepted multilateral disarmament and the creation of a world police force where they were allowed only a certain limited number of men, as other na tions would be allowed a certain limited number of men-if they accepted all those provisions, in a sense they would no longer be capable of performing an aggressive move without all the world. knowing of it in advance.

Mr. FULTON. Suppose we have two systems: First, the United Na tions, which is a debating society; and secondly, a group of nations under that which will go along and try to work under a parallel federation. But would you then say, that both the nations outside, who will be as afraid as ever-that would be the Soviets-and those within that federation would both have to arm?

Mr. MEYER. I agree that until you have a universal structure you do not have a solution. All we can do is take all the steps within our power to take, and the decision as to whether other governments will come in or not is a decision those governments and people will have to make for themselves.

If you cannot get universality, the next best thing you can get is a partial federation that is open, and over a period of time, we hope can be expanded by the voluntary inclusion of those which first remain outside.

As in our own Government in 1787, some of the larger States at first did not adhere to our Union.

Mr. FULTON. Do you think that by putting all the nations into two camps, each of which are armed, you then are not running a small arms race but a larger arms race?

Mr. MEYER. I would say that the arms race is now in full career. The arms race exists. The question is now, How can we end it, and if we cannot end it, how can we put ourselves in the best position to wait out a change in those governments that are unwilling to end it? Mr. FULTON. Thank you very much.

Chairman EATON. Mr. Javits.

Mr. JAVITS. So that you may understand the questions I am going to ask Mr. Meyer, I will say that I consider the World Federalists the men and women of the future.

Chairman EATON. How about the present?

Mr. JAVITS. I think we are of the present, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Myer, the great argument which is made for the so-called ABC plan which is contained in Senate Concurrent Resolution 50 and a resolution put in here by Dr. Judd, is that this is a plan to deal with the near-term risk that the Soviets will discover the atom bomb and, as soon as they do, some dire thing will occur-such as, for instance, an attack on the United States-hence the necessity to take the action specified in the ABC plan in the following words— and I will read them to you. On page 2, lines 13 and 14 of House Concurrent Resolution 163, it says:

But in the event that any permanent member states should veto the proposals for revision, the United States shall join with other like-minded states in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Charter.

In short, we will immediately put the Russians on a basis of either you take it or you leave it.

It is the core of the argument; that we are racing against the time when the Soviets discover the atomic bomb.

Of course, the advocates of that position forget that the Soviets may now have pretty deadly bugs, a business in which I was engaged during the war. In any case, our attention is fixed on the atom bomb. Will you differentiate for us in your approach in principle and policy and the approach of the school which advocates the action I have alluded to, which is racing against that eventuality-when the Soviets get the atom bomb?

Mr. MEYER. I think a clear distinction should be drawn between House Concurrent Resolution 59 and House Concurrent Resolution 163. They advocate different things and advocate different ways of getting the different things they advocate.

In 163 it does seem to me that Secretary of State Marshall was correct in that the nature of the representation system proposed in the Security Council, in which the United States would have two votes, Russia two, Britain two, China one, France one, and the rest of the nations two votes, is not a system that would be readily acceptable by many of the other nations.

Certain aspects of the quota force plan would be technically impossible of achievement, and it would actually put our own Government in a considerably embarrassing position, because the disarmament provisions relate to large-scale scientific weapons, while the actual manpower, it seems to me, is not recognized as a problem in this plan. You are leaving the separate governments with 20 percent of the total force-that is, the three large ones and you therefore are facing 20 percent with the United States or Britain and a 20 percent international police force, and in enforcement you have your large-scale war just as you had it before. You are trying to have your cake and eat it, too.

Mr. JAVITS. I would like to have an answer to this direct question: What does your plan do about the legitimate fear expressed by the advocates of the ABC plan-that we are racing against the day-2, 3, or 4 years hence-when the Soviets are producing the atom bomb in quantity?

Mr. MEYER. I would say, first, that what we are attempting to do is first sound out in a very thorough fashion the chances of getting a universal structure, carrying on those negotiations with all governments, including the Soviet Union. In other words, we realize that a universal structure in which the police and inspection systems operate in every country is the only way to effectively end the arms race. want to make that thorough attempt.

We

If we cannot proceed on that level we would propose to proceed with this partial federation while holding the United Nations together for what it is worth, but creating a partial federation that is politically stable in the sense that it cannot be chipped away at in detail by attacking first one nation and then another-an attack against it would be an attack against the whole.

Secondly, we would try to make it as economically healthy as we could, using the institutions of the federation which have proved perhaps the most effective method in administering large-scale economic projects.

Thirdly, the military defense of such a structure would be much more simple to make. In other words, the problem of defense is the problem of invasion across the Elbe. If you face such an invasion, if you have a federation including all the other nations outside of the Soviet Union and its satellites, a common defense structure could be built on the Elbe River which would be effective in stopping what so many people fear-which is an immediate inundation and taking over of western Europe-in event of attack.

In other words, you would be in a much better position-from the political point of view, the economic point of view, and the military point of view-if you created that federation.

You would not, however, deal with the problem of continued atomic bomb production in the Soviet Union. That is a problem I see no answer to unless and until the Soviet Union and the Soviet people change their policy and come in to such a structure.

Mr. JAVITS. Why do you see no answer to the fear that Russia will have the atom bomb in this ABC plan?

Mr. MEYER. I would like to be straightened out on this. If the assumption is that the advocates of the ABC plan would advocate an immediate attack on the Soviet Union to stop it from making atomic bombs, that is another problem. I think that would result in complete destruction of western Europe. We might not win the war; and if we did, we would have to establish an absolute dictatorship to determine that those people were not making for use against us the weapons we used for aggressive purposes.

Mr. JAVITS. I must say that I agree with you thoroughly on that. Chairman EATON. Mr. Lodge.

Mr. LODGE. Mr. Meyer, I was very much interested in your eloquent and sensitive statement, and I was particularly interested in the point on which you say you disagree with the Secretary of State.

I would like to refer to page 10 of your statement, where you say, in the last paragraph:

It would be a grave mistake to call a general conference of the nations before there was substantial majority support and understanding of the proposals to be put forward by our own Government.

Now, our own Government, through the Secretary of State and through Senator Austin, have informed us that they have already put forth certain proposals which have become part of the United Nations but that they regard it as utterly futile to call a meeting under 109, because they know in advance that there would be no agreement.

From that sentence of yours it would seem to me that you are really not fully in favor of Resolution 59, unless there be ample evidence that the Government has at this time proposals to put forward to such a general conference and that there would be substantial majority support-it would have to be two-thirds, by the way of those proposals.

In other words, it seems to me that actually you are in agreement with Secretary of State Marshall.

Would you care to comment on that?

Mr. MEYER. I would agree with him in this respect: That first a major policy decision by our Government, the executive and legislative branches, is required; that this policy decision must define in some

detail what we are willing to do in the way of accepting the necessary restrictions on our sovereign independence; and that that major policy pronouncement that this Government is now committed to the changing of the United Nations into an effective federation at the earliest possible date is the first step. The second is to open negotiations with other nations as to how they would react to the idea of taking those steps; and the final step is the calling of a general conference.

I think those steps could well be spelled out in an amended resolution, making it clear that that sequence, or logical sequence, of steps is what we are actually proposing.

Mr. LODGE. Secretary Marshall and Senator Austin feel that it would scare the smaller nations, and you would not get a sufficient two-thirds to call a conference.

I have for some time favored Resolution 59. I have asked the Secretary to submit a suggestion to us if he did not approve of that. He said he would approve of some resolution along that line.

It seems that there is a small disagreement between you and the Secretary of State, if indeed there is any, in view of what I just said.

Mr. MEYER. There were some contradictions in the general's testimony. The original written testimony said one thing, and his answer to a question which I think was posed by you said something quite different. I am a little confused as to what was really the statement.

Mr. LODGE. I can understand that. But there is this further fact in that connection, which is that on page 6, you say:

The policy of containment is apparently predicated on the assumption that a contained and thwarted Russia will eventually suffer such internal stress as to cause the regime to collapse or, at least, modify its basic policy.

As I take it, you feel that the policy of containment, which is predicated on force, to some extent, or the threat of force, economic and military, will not be nearly as strong a deterrent to Soviet Russia as would the action which you propose. But the action which you propose depends on getting majority support.

Does it seem to you, at this particular juncture, that the Soviet Union will be more influenced by a movement to start a world federation, or a partial world federation, than it would by the policy of containment?

To put the question differently: Do you not believe that the European federation to which Mr. Churchill referred and the work we have done with respect to the Western Hemisphere at Rio, Bogota, and Chapultepec are already evidence of what the world is ready to do at this time, and that there is very little more under article 51 that can be done at this time in that connection?

Mr. MEYER. I think you have two problems; one is the short-term problem. You have to face the need of preparing this country as best it can against the possibility of attack. I think in that policy the things that you mention were required.

I do not think, however, that that policy is meeting the over-all problem of attempting to get a solution to the arms race itself, and, for that reason, these steps should be proposed at the earliest possible date because the arms race has a momentum of its own and the race is