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to accept a different representation if it had real power. He was heartily applauded by most of the small nations present at that meeting.
Mr. LODGE. That is an extremely interesting thing.
As I see it, if we call this meeting under 109 and we reach an impasse, then the only difference between your suggestion and that of Mr. Churchill is that you want it to be a federation of every nation in the world, except for Russia and her satellites-because at that moment they will have excluded themselves, whereas Mr. Churchill is content to start with Europe and let the matter grow.
Mr. MEYER. I think part of Mr. Churchill's decision in that respect is because of the Europeans deciding to do only what they can do, and the other decision is one that we in the United States must make. Mr. Churchill recently said that a European federation was not a real solution and unless we have a world governing authority within the next 5 years we are finished.
Chairman EATON. Thank you, sir.
STATEMENT OF THOMAS K. FINLETTER, VICE PRESIDENT OF
UNITED WORLD FEDERALISTS
Mr. FINLETTER. My name is Thomas K. Finletter. I am a lawyer, of New York City. I am vice president of United World Federalists. I have recently served as Chairman of the President's Air Policy Commission which reported to the President on January 1 of this year. The following statement, however, represents only my personal views.
I appear in support of the proposal that the United States take the initiative in calling a general conference of the United Nations pursuant to article 109 of the Charter. I support House Concurrent Resolution 59 with the exception that I recommend that the resolving clause read as follows:
Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That it is the sense of the Congress that the President of the United States should initiate conversations with the other members of the United Nations and particularly with the permanent members of the Security Council to explore the possibility of a successful General Conference under Article 109 of the United Nations Charter for the purpose of making the United Nations capable of enforcing a world law prohibiting war or other use of force in international relations.
I believe that in the conversations referred to, the United States should put forward a proposal, the purpose of which, would be to give to the United Nations the minimum physical and legal powers to enable it to enforce world law against aggression and against armaments intended for international war.
If this proposal is not adopted by a two-thirds vote of the Conference, or is not ratified as required by article 109, section 2, I believe that the United States should of course accept the decision, should continue with its full support of the United Nations in exactly it present form, and should take the initiative in establishing, as an in terim measure, a federation for collective self-defense of those state: willing to join pursuant to the authority of article 51 of the United Nations Charter.
The purpose of this federation under article 51 should be; first, to fortify the political and military strength of its members by unifying
that strength; and second, to create a wider basis of law which, it would be hoped, would soon extend to the whole world by the adherence of the states which might originally abstain.
I suggest that the proposal which the United States should make at this general conference under article 109 should be along the following lines :
1. The transfer of military forces to the United Nations by its members as authorized by article 43 of the United Nations Charter, to the end that the United Nations shall have a preponderant military policing force in the world.
2. The elimination of the so-called veto right of the permanent members of the Security Council.
3. The amendment of the statute of the International Court of Justice so that the force of the United Nations will be applied through and be controlled by the standards and processes of a code of law applicable to individuals as well as governments and specifying the prohibited armaments and acts of aggression and the forms of law by which the Security Council shall enforce these substantive prohibitions.
My reasons for supporting this proposal are: I believe that the American people want urgently to eliminate war as a human institution. The crescendo of the destructiveness of war has increased since 1870 to a point where either war must be conquered or our civilization will be destroyed. The scientific revolution in the weapons of destruction and the means of delivering them will, I fear, compel us to maintain a Military Establishment in time of peace costing substantially more even than the present high expenditures—a Military Establishment which will seriously impair our economy, our civil liberties, and our way of life. And if war with these modern weapons takes place it seems probable that neither side will survive no matter who wins.
War cannot be eliminated except under a rule of law enforced by an organization to which the nations of the world will delegate the authority necessary to keep the peace—an organization operating under a code which will prohibit aggression and the possession of the armaments which make aggression possible and possessing the legal and physical powers, under this code of law, to enforce obedience by individuals and governments to the code. The legal powers of such an organization would thus be extremely limited, with every other attribute of sovereignty reserved to the member states. But in the fields of controlling armaments and prohibiting war an international organization would have to be supreme.
This institutional arrangement is the essential ingredient of a world of peace. It is not the only ingredient. Institutions of themselves will not create peace. There must be a constant bettering of the economic and social levels of the peoples of the world and a deepening and widening of the world community by tolerance and interchange of persons and ideas. But it is a fallacy to think that peace can be accomplished without the institutions of peace. It is no argument against the institutions to say that they cannot accomplish peace alone. They and the underlying factors of community both are necessary if war is not to destroy mankind.
What about the time element? How does one meet the argument that we must work now to establish this community basis, and particularly a community basis between the Soviet Government and the Government of the United States, before we try to build world institutions!
Certainly the community between the Soviet Government and the United States is not now firm, and it will be a hard task to build it up. But I believe that the time to start building it is now. Time is against us. The community between the Russian Government and the United States has gone steadily downhill since the San Francisco Conference. It will continue to go downhill unless it is pulled up short now. The Marshall plan and our armaments program will not alone better the community between us and the Soviets nor will they force the Soviets, through this display of our power, to agree to a peaceful way of life. Indeed, these measures and especially the armaments program may have just the opposite effect. On the other hand, a policy of peace backed by specific proposals, by a search for
nstitutions of peace, will tend to restore the community of purpose which existed among the great powers at the time of the San Francisco Conference.
History also warns that time is against us. We must profit from and be guided by the story of the League of Nations. That story shows thre clear phases of the League's life, which phases are being followed with dismal faithfulness by the course of the United Nations. The first phase was that of big-power solidarity-the time when it was vainly hoped that the solidarity created by the common war-time danger would survive in time of peace. The second phase was that of the attempt to restore that solidarity through international arrangements for the control of armaments. This phase collapsed, in the case of the League, when the Geneva protocol was rejected and the Locarno pact substituted for it; and I fear that this second phase has ended in the case of the United Nations with the present stalemate in the disarmament discussions, of which the abandonment of all efforts toward the control of atomic energy announced last Friday in the Atomic Energy Commission is the latest step. The third phase, with both the League and the United Nations, is that of the bypassing of the international crganization-of almost exclusive reliance on measures outside it taken by direct government-to-government action. That phase for the League of Nations spelled the end. The lesson of the League is that when we reach this third phase and we are in it now in the United Nations—something drastic must be done to halt the downhill course and to restore the high hopes with which the international organization was originally built, or else the cause of peace is irretrievably lost.
A second factor shows that time is against us and that the time to act is now. Russia is still exhausted from the effects of the war, and she is still behind us in the race for new weapons and the aircraft to carry them. But she is hard at work. She is no doubt diverting a great share of her wealth and effort to the building of new jet fighters and long-range inhabited and uninhabited aircraft, and, of course, to the building of atomic and bacteriological weapons. The date is not far away when she will have these things. I believe that we cannot safely assume that she will not have them by the end of 1932, perhaps earlier. Surely we are in a better position to lead for the organization of peace while we are in our present relatively strong position. Surely the atmosphere is better now than it will be when we will be under the menace of atomic bombardment.
For these reasons I believe that the time has come for us to make the great offer under article 109 which I have referred to. Such an offer, far from being taken amiss by Russia, should reassure her. For us to make this offer now should create a new atmosphere in our relations with the Soviets.
Let us suppose, however, as is so generally forecast, that the Soviet Government will reject this proposal. What do we do then?
The first thing we do is of course to abide by the terms of the United Nations Charter. If the necessary votes are not obtained-specifically if the Soviet Government vetoes the proposal—we may reserve the right to keep on talking to the Soviet Government to try to persuade it to agree. But we certainly should not think of breaking up the United Nations just because our proposal has not been accepted. After all, we have had other proposals rejected in the United Nations without going to such extremes.
There is, however, something that we can do, strictly within the terms of the United Nations Charter and in fulfillment of the authority that it grants, and that is to create the limited federation under article 51 of which I have spoken,
I cannot understand why it should be said that to act under article 51 would break up the United Nations, or would force Russia out of it. Certainly that is not the legal consequence of creating an article 51 federation. The setting up of collective self-defense or regional arrangements is expressly authorized by the Charter itself. Indeed, we have just finished creating such an organization of the American states at Bogotá under the authority of article 51 in fulfillment of earlier agreements at Chapultepec and Rio de Janiero, and I have not heard it suggested that these arrangements involved any impairment of the authority of the United Nations.
I cannot see how one can disagree with the statement of Secretary of State Marshall before this committee on May 5, when he said that such arrangements under article 51 not only were within the Charter but were to be commended as constructive steps to bulwark international security and the maintenance of peace.” On that occasion the Secretary of State told the committee:
The United States is acutely aware that the return of a sense of security to the free nations of the world is essential for the promotion of conditions under which the United Nations can function. The necessary steps for self-protection against aggression can be taken within the Charter of the United Nations. The Charter recognizes, in article 51, the right of individual and collective selfdefense against armed attack until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to preserve peace and security.
The Secretary of State then referred to the treaty concluded under article 51 between the United States and the other American Republics at Rio de Janeiro last year and to the recent Brussels treaty between Great Britain, France, and the Benelux countries, also concluded under article 51, and continued :
By such arrangement under article 51 of the Charter and the articles providing for regional arrangements, constructive steps have been taken to bulwark international security, and the maintenance of peace.
Is it then for some practical reason as opposed to a legal reasonthat the article 51 federation of which we have been speaking would be improper and would break up the United Nations, while the organization of the American states and the western union would achieve just the opposite result of bolstering the United Nations? If so, what is this practical reason? Is it that the federation of which we are speaking would have more states in it? Is it because the proposed federation would be more powerful than the others? Is it because one federation of which we are speaking would tie the United States in with the critical strategic area of western Europe?
I believe that none of these questions can be answered, for the truth is that any article 51 arrangement is a great thing if entered into with the right motives. I believe that the only way in which the article 51 federation of which we have been speaking could be harmful to the United Nations would be if it were conceived with animus toward the Soviets and with the hidden purpose of war against her. As long as that is not our purpose, as long as our purpose is to unify for defense and for the extension of the rule of law in the interests of peace, we have the right to enter into any arrangements with other states which is permitted by the terms of the United Nations Charter.
How would this article 51 organization be set up? What would be its political and military advantages? How could it be used to create the peaceful world which is the main purpose of all this?
I suggest that the following should be the characteristics of the article 51 organization:
1. It should be set up with the dominating purpose of world peace in view. To this end it should be constructed with a view to evolving into a world-wide organization comprised of all the states of the world. It should therefore be given the institutions on a regional basis which, it would be hoped, would evolve into the world institutions to be taken over by the United Nations at the time when all the so-called abstaining states would stop abstaining and would join their fellows in organizing the United nations for peace.
The original proposal for an article 51 set-up—which was made, I believe, by Mr. Hamilton Fish Armstrong-did not go into the question whether the protocol which he proposed as the basis for the arrangements should be or should not be backed up by institutions; that is, by a regional security council, a regional international court of justice, a regional military staff committee, and so on.
House Concurrent Resolution 163 appears to contemplate that the article 51 organization shall have these regional institutions.
It is important, I think, that it should. Otherwise the set-up under article 51 may be nothing more than a defense pact of the traditionally ineffectual kind which, being based mainly on broad generalized commitments, lacks almost all value as a deterrent to a determined aggres
Even worse, the failure to give to the article 51 arrangement the necessary institutions would deprive it of any value as an intermediate step toward the full world organization enforcing the peace every, where. Without the necessary institutions the article 51 arrangement would be of little value either as a military instrument or as a device for world peace.
2. The institutions of the article 51 organization should be, I suggest: (a) A regional security council which would operate by a majority