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Mr. FINLETTER. Yes.
Mr. LODGE. In other words, you recommend the abolition of the veto in certain instances, but you would also agree that you could not commit the armed forces of the United States in that fashion!
Mr. FINLETTER. I think this is a tremendously difficult question. Mr. Armstrong did propose that the United States forces could be committed in that fashion.
Mr. LODGE. I know it is a very difficult question, and that is the reason I asked you the question, because I think you are well able to answer difficult questions.
If you must refer the question, if your own representative to the United Nations must refer this to Congress, you have not in fact abolished the veto, have you?
Mr. FINLETTER. No.
Mr. JUDD. You have not abolished a nation's veto on the use of its armed forces, but you certainly can abolish the use of the veto by an aggressor whereby legally and without reproach he can under the present Charter prevent any action against himself.
Mr. LODGE. I will say to the gentleman that that is precisely what General Marshall favors. He favors abolishing the veto in chapter 6, but keeping it in chapter 7, which deals with aggression.
So I find the distinguished gentleman from Minnesota lined up with our distinguished Secretary of State on that issue.
Mr. JUDD. It says in Resolution 163 that use of national contingents must be according to the constitutional processes of the respective governments, and that means the Congress of the United States alone cản declare war,
I think we are daydreaming if we imagine we can get the Congress of the United States, or probably any other country, to agree at this stage to allow an international organization to commit its own contingents.
Mr. LODGE. I think that is quite true.
Mr, FINLETTER. With the one qualification, if full-out war came about, but not in a policing operation for the enforcement of law. That is a vital distinction.
By the way, I think the Rio agreement can give us some light on that. They went all the way up to the two-thirds provision, as I remember it.
Mr. LODGE. I think you will agree with me, Mr. Judd, that the abolition of the veto becomes largely an illusory matter if the Congress must ratify what the United States representative has done.
Mr. Judd. The Congress of the United States would not hesitate right now to abolish its veto either here or by our representative at Lake Success, in action against us if we were to start an aggression, because we never intend to start one. We pledge ourselves to two things: Not to start an aggressive war ourselves, and to help prevent others from doing so. I think we are willing to give up the veto on those two pledges.
Mr. LODGE. That is an impingement on our national sovereignty to which I am willing to agree.
Mr. Judd. First, we pledge ourselves not to start an aggressive war. Why should we hesitate to do that? Secondly, we pledge ourselves to help put down immediately anybody who does start an aggressive war. Why should we hesitate to pledge that since our own security will require that we do it ultimately?
I am from Minnesota, and one of our best known products is Gold Medal flour. Its slogan is "If eventually, why not now?” Twice in a generation it has been proved that we have to get in eventually. Why not do it at once and cheaply, instead of later and under the most costly and difficult circumstances possible. I think the Congress of the United States will go along with that. That is a policing action and not an all-out war, in fact, the best way to avoid an all-out war.
Mr. LODGE. I thank the gentleman from Minnesota for his able contribution.
While there is a definite difference between Resolution 59 and Resolution 163-and I think the difference was well stated by Mr. Meyerthere is at best a very slight difference between Resolution 59, plus your proposal, and Resolution 163.
Mr. FINLETTER. I do not think I quite go along with that, because I think if you restrict that to the article 51 section I would agree.
Mr. LODGE. Aside from the details of the amendments. I am referring to the procedure of going ahead under 51.
Mr. FINLETTER. My recollection is that that is substantially correct. Mr. LODGE. Thank you very much.
Mr. JONKMAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield to me for a question?
Mr. CHIPERFIELD. Mr. Jonkman.
Mr. JONKMAN. Mr. Finletter you have emphasized that time is running against us, and that is of course a very, very compelling argument.
However, assuming that a resolution to revise the Charter was defeated, and certain of the nations were to organize under the plan that you propose, in the nature of a secessionist organization, under which I think is a poor color of right, and continue to sit alongside the United Nations, would you then have resolved anything?
Mr. FINLETTER. I think that would be most unfortunate if the secessionist idea got in at any point. I do not see why we cannot take the Charter which encourages these subsidiary arrangements, which arrangements have been approved by the Secretary of State as being bulwarks of the Charter.
Mr. JONKMAN. Do you not think you are straining the interpretation of regional organizations when you ask for a universal organization as far as it may go, out of the United Nations? Are you not in reality, under color of right, creating a competitive organization?
Mr. FINLETTER. I cannot agree, Congressman, that you are creating a competitive organization. The fact is I think you must be careful not to create a competitive organization. I think if you had all the nations of the world, except the Soviet ones, you would be setting up an organization which the men at San Francisco did not contemplate. That is not to say that this Congress has not enacted laws which have developed out of interpretations that were not contemplated.
Mr. JONKMAN. Suppose we jump that hurdle. Would you not have two organizations that are constantly debating within themselves and against themselves, without resolving the fact that time is running
against us on the use of the atomic bomb, or anything else? What is your remedy there?
Mr. FINLETTER. I would hope that the remedy would be that if an article 51 federation were set up, and clearly pointed out to show every action on its part, that it was an organization for peace, that that idea would get into the heads of the other abstaining states, and they would stop abstaining.
Mr. JONKMAN. Then if that did not work, time would be running against you, would it not?
Mr. FINLETTER. Time would march on, and it would be a question of whether war got there ahead of the abstaining states.
Mr. LODGE. The virus which you see in Resolution 163, as it is now written, is, as I understand it, that it gives the impression that we are in effect seceding from the United Nations; that we are in effect sabotaging the United Nations by setting up another one with these reforms.
On the other hand, you feel that there is a difference of form which may be very important, but there there is no substantial difference between an article 51 federation and the idea of going ahead under article 51 to form another organization.
Now, do you believe that your idea of an article 51 federation will not contain the same virus, in that it will give the world the same impression as the suggestion contained in resolution 163 ?
Mr. FINLETTER. In the first place, I cannot agree, Congressman, that any resolution proposed by Mr. Judd would have the virus that you mentioned in it. I think if that virus has been injected, it has come from the interpretations of it and I am sure those were erroneous interpretations.
Secondly, I think we are up against an enormously subtle thing. It is the subtle thing of being prepared to defend ourselves and simultaneously urging for peace. I think only by putting peace in the speeches and debates that are made can we eliminate that virus. That virus is not in there unless you gentlemen allow it in.
Mr. Lodge. Of course, the Citizens Committee for United Nations Reform say that theirs is a suggestion that we proceed with Russia, if possible; without Russia, if necessary, but not against Soviet Russia.
My question is, Will the form that you recommend, the article 51 federation, be so understood that it will not contain the virus that you see in Resolution 163 as it is now drafted ?
Mr. FINLETTER. It will not have that virus, or will not appear to have that virus if the men in charge of forwarding it through this Government see to it that it does not have that virus.
Mr. JUDD. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. Jupp. Is is not true, according to your own statement, that the proponents of the ABC resolution did not intend to have that virus in there?
Mr. LODGE. That is right. Mr. Judd. We have had testimony from eminent American officials which was directed toward knocking down a proposal which nobody had made. They were against what they said we were suggesting; but what they were against, we were not suggesting. They said we must
not weaken, we must not wreck, we must not destroy the United Nations. That is precisely our own view. There was no other purpose or desire in the minds of anyone except to strengthen it.
Too many people have felt there are only two alternatives, that we either had to yield to Russia or go to war with her.
We say there is a third alternative. We should, with all nations if possible—if not possible, then with as many as we can-build constructively an edifice of world law, world order, and thereby world peace.
to war, on the one hand; not appease and succumb, on the other; but work for order under law and justice. That is what we must keep ahead of us. That is the objective of the American people. We do not want to yield to aggression; we do not want war. There is no other method except world order based on world law and with world force.
Mr. LODGE. Some of the language used by the sponsors made it appear to be an attempt to set up another United Nations.
Mr. Judd. But the authors of it disavowed that interpretation from the outset.
Mr. CHIPERFIELD (presiding). Thank you for a very, very constructive statement.
It has been suggested we meet at 2:30 instead of 2 o'clock. We will meet, then, at 2:30 and adjourn at this time.
(Whereupon, at 1:05 p. m., the committee adjourned until 2:30 p. m. of the same day.)
(The committee reconvened, pursuant to the luncheon recess, at 3:10 p. m.)
Mr. CHIPERFIELD (presiding). The committee will be in order. Our next witness is Mr. Holliday.
STATEMENT OF W. T. HOLLIDAY, VICE PRESIDENT, UNITED
Mr. HOLLIDAY. Mrs. Bolton, and gentlemen of the committee, my name is W. T. Holliday; my residence is Cleveland, Ohio. For 20 years, from 1908 to 1928, I was an attorney, engaged in general practice of law in the city of Cleveland. Since then, for the past 20 years, I have been the president of the Standard Oil
Co. of Ohio. I happen also to be a vice president of United World Federalists.
The views which I give are personal and are not given in any representative capacity.
For the past 2 years I have been devoting most of my spare time and energy to writing and speaking about world peace, and the only way in which the prevention of war can possibly be attained. Perhaps as an individual citizen I might not have had the temerity to do this. but I felt compelled to do so because of my responsibilities as a business executive.
I feel very strongly that there is no group of citizens in this country who should be more concerned about prevention of war than the American businessmen. They have all of the usual emotional pulls of concern about country and their families, their children, and grandchildren. But they have, in addition, a specific obligation. They are, as it were, the trustees of our economic welfare, concerning which they must be ever alert. It is their duty to insure against every possible hazard, and to a very large extent they perform this duty. But there is one loss against which they cannot take out insurance. They cannot insure against the consequences of modern war. There would probably be no one from whom to collect the insurance. The only thing which they can do in the way of insurance is to try to help prevent war.
Businessmen, like everyone else and especially statesmen today, have many immediate problems with which they must grapple, but they must do two things at once: They must deal effectively with the immediate problems, and they must also deal with the long-run and more fundamental problem of the survival of the very environment in which they operate. Solution of short-run problems will be of little consequence if there is no decent civilization left within which to operate. I am not talking about business enterprises which may have investments or businesses on other continents which they wish to preserve; I am talking about enterprises like my own company which have not investment or business in the Eastern Hemisphere, and I am talking about preservation of civilization and the American way of life here in the United States.
This same principle applies to our Government. It, too, must do two things at once: Concern itself vigilantly with the immediate problems but at the same time, continuously and with undiminished vigor, keep in mind the long-run point of view and fundamental objectives.
From the short-run view, our Nation must strive to keep itself, militarily, politically, and economically, the strongest nation in the world. It must strive on the economic front to restore the economy and social structure in western Europe. We must seek on the political front to encourage and help the political unification of western Europe.
But these things, imperative as they are, are short run in viewpoint, and negative. They cannot indefinitely postpone war. They must be accompanied by an ultimate objective, a goal. If we are to have world peace they can only be a shield behind which we may hope to gain time for the accomplishment of a worthy ultimate objective. So far, I regret to say, the United States appears to me to have evidenced no ultimate objective, but it rather appears to rely permanently upon the maintenance of peace by power. The original concept of the United Nations appears to have been the maintenance of peace by power enforced through the unanimous agreement of the three strongest nations. I do not believe that we can properly blame our public officials for this. The fundamental responsibility rests upon the people of the United States. A democratic government such as ours cannot, with confidence, go beyond what, it clearly appears, will be supported by public opinion. Likewise, foreign nations will not have confidence in the representations of our Government while there is doubt as to its popular support. Over all international negotiations of the United States hovers the shadow of the Senate's two-third ratification.
If the world is to take the only road to peace, the American people, themselves must take the lead through their elected representatives.