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that way,

Resolution 163, as I said the first day, is, so to speak, a second line of defense. If we cannot move in the direction of Resolution 59 to amend the whole UN, then go as far as we can within the organization under article 51. To me 163 encompasses less ground. Its very specificity limits it.

Chairman Eaton. Would the gentleman repeat that word?

Mr. Judd. I will spell out my meaning this way. The very fact that it is specific makes it less all-inclusive than is 59.

The sky is the limit under 59, as you said, but if I cannot hit the stars I want at least to clear the tree tops. Therefore, it was put in

Now, this working paper which the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations has just issued goes at the thing in the opposite way, Mr. Holliday, from the way you are suggesting. It reaffirms the policy of the United States to work for peace and security through the United Nations, and then suggests six objectives to pursue under the United Nations Charter. All of them are covered in our resolutions and have been proposed and discussed here:

(1) Voluntary agreement to remove the veto from all questions involving specific settlements of international disputes and situations, and from the admission of new members.

(2) Progressive development of regional and other collective arrangements for individual and collective self-defense in accordance with the purposes, principles, and provisions of the Charter.

(3) Association of the United States through constitutional processes with such regional and other corrective arrangements as are based on self-help, and mutual aid, and as affects its national security.

(4) Contributing to the maintenance of peace by making clear its determination to exercise the right of individual or collective self-defense under article 51 should any armed attack occur affecting its national security.

(5) Make efforts to provide the United Nations with armed forces as contemplated by the Charter, and to obtain agreement among member nations upon universal regulation and reduction of armaments under adequate and dependable guaranty rights against violation.

(6) If necessary, after adequate effort toward strengthening the United Nations, review of the Charter at an appropriate time by a general conference called under article 109 or by the General Assembly.

So the Senate committee is definitely working more along the direction, just for the information of the committee, of 163, trying to develop and strengthen the present machinery, which, as you say, is based on a league, and the assumption that the independent sovereign nations will go ahead together. Only if these measures fail, try to get a revision of the Charter.

Mr. HOLLIDAY. I do not think that resolution moves toward peace at all, because it either relies on a league or upon a group of coalitionists.

Mr. LODGE. Mr. Chairman, may I just revert for a moment to the original discussion which seems to resolve itself into a question of semantics. When Mr. Holliday says on page 17: “Frankly, however, I do not see why we need to consider this proposition at this time"? which is the question of a 51 federation. I interpret that to mean that we do not need to go as far as that at this time.

Now, what you mean by going as far as, is a question of semantics, and it is perhaps somewhat fruitless to go into it any further.

It seems to me, from my interpretation of the words, that 163 goes further, in that it recommends what we should do if we fail under article 109.

Mr. CHIPERFIELD. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. LODGE. I yield.
Mr. CHIPERFIELD. I agree with your position on that.
Mr. LODGE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chiperfield.

I would like to ask one more question, if the chairman would allow me to, and that is this: Mr. Finletter's suggestion for amending Resolution 59 provides, as I recall it from memory, that there must be discussions of proposals and let us say an agenda must be set up before this meeting is called, in order that we may have some assurance of its success.

Well, would you suggest in that connection proceding under article 108, submitting amendments under article 108 of the Charter, to see how they take hold, and if they do not take hold, do not go ahead under article 109?

Mr. HOLLIDAY. That would be the other alternative.
Mr. CHIPERFIELD. Will the gentleman yield at that point?
Mr. LODGE. I will be delighted to.

Mr. CHIPERFIELD. Has not that procedure under article 108 already been tried ?

Mr. LODGE. I believe that it has, but the thought that I have is this: It was brought out this morning by Mr. Finletter that it would be unwise to proceed under article 109 unless there was some modicum of assurance that something could be achieved. In other words, he did not want this to be just a futile gesture. After all, our representative, Senator Austin, and our Secretary of State have told us that there have been continuous attempts to amend the Charter—perhaps not in this fashion, but in other ways. Some of those attempts have proved successful and others have not. I was just trying to point out that there is machinery other than 109 under which the Charter can be amended.

In view of this recommendation of Mr. Finletter's for amending 59, I wanted to ask Mr. Holliday whether he would therefore favor, first, proceeding under 108.

Mr. HOLLIDAY. The veto power applies in 108, does it not? I think it does. The only place where you can get around the veto power is under 109, following the precedent of our United States Constitution.

Mr. LODGE. May I point out there, Mr. Holliday, that that does not really vitiate the suggestion. The veto power applies in 108 as to the adoption of amendments. The veto power also applies under 109 as to the adoption of amendments. It does not apply as to the calling of the meeting, but it applies as to the adoption of any alterations agreed to at the meeting.

Mr. HOLLIDAY. Only when it gets to the matter of the vote by the constituent states.

Mr. LODGE. You cannot veto the calling of the meeting under 109, but you can veto the amendments under 109.

Mr. HOLLIDAY. No; the General Assembly cannot.

Mr. LODGE. The General Assembly cannot under 108, either. You have to have the consent of all of the permanent members of the Council, whether it is under 108 or 109.

Mr. HOLLIDAY. Not before the submission. You have called the conference and your constitutional convention adopts a new constitution, and then the question comes up in assembly, and in the Security Council as to whether that should be submitted to the states, and there is no veto there, either. It is two-thirds of the General Assembly, and 7 of the 11 of the Security Council. If they say this should be submitted to the states it has to be submitted.

Mr. LODGE. Including all the permanent members of the Security Council ?

Mr. HOLLIDAY. Not on that step.
Mr. JONKMAN. I think you are wrong.
Mr. HOLLIDAY. There is no veto power until you get to the matter
of the individual states ratifying.

Mr. LODGE. I have it right here in front of me, Mr. Holliday.
Mr. JUDD. Read it.

Mr. LODGE. Article 109 provides that you have to have only twothirds for the calling of the meeting, but you must have the unanimous consent of the members of the permanent members of the Security Council in order to effectuate any change:

Any alteration of the present Charter recommended by a two-thirds vote of the conference shall take effect when ratified in accordance with their respective constitutional processes by two-thirds of the members of the United Nations "in. cluding all the permanent members of the Security Council.”

Mr. HOLLIDAY. That is just what I say. That is the first place where your veto power comes in.

Mr. LODGE. That is the place where it can prevent any amendment to the United Nations Charter. There is no difference in substance between them.

I have attempted to express agreement on the thought that you do not need to have unanimity for calling the meeting, but you do need to have unanimity as far as the permanent members of the Council are concerned for the purpose of changing the Charter.

Mr. HOLLIDAY. However, there is an intermediate step. Your constitutional convention adopts the constitution that it recommends.

Mr. LODGE. There is no mention of the constitution.

Mr. HOLLIDAY. All right, the alteration. Then that goes to the General Assembly and the Security Council to decide whether they are going to refer it to the states. If two-thirds of the General Assembly and 7 of the 11 vote to refer, then it must be referred. You cannot veto the referring.

Mr. LODGE. “Including all permanent members."
Mr. HOLLIDAY. That is on the ratification.

Mr. LODGE. The point is it cannot become law without the consent of all the permanent members.

Mr. HOLLIDAY. The point I make is that we have the precedent of showing the way in which you get around that. Your convention might say that this constitution shall go into effect when ratified by two-thirds of the constituent states. If that then went to the General Assembly and the Security Council, and two-thirds of the General Assembly approves submittal, and 7 out of the 11, it would have to go for reference or for adoption or rejection, in accordance with the terms of the constitution itself. That was exactly what our founding fathers did.

Mr. LODGE. It says here, “Including all the permanent members of the Security Council.”

* * *

Mr. HOLLIDAY. That is on the last step of ratification.
Mr. LODGE. It cannot be amended, Mr. Holliday, until that is done.

Mr. HOLLIDAY. Of course, that gets back to the question that was asked me, "What became of the Articles of Confederation?” The Articles of Confederation were never amended.

Mr. LODGE. Oh, you are suggesting, then, at this time that we set up a separate organization without the consent of Soviet Russia?

Mr. HOLLIDAY. That is what it would amount to under that procedure. Understand, I am not saying that that should be done, and certainly this Congress should not say that.

Mr. LODGE. The point I am trying to get at, Mr. Holliday, is that effectively you cannot amend the charter, whether you proceed on 108 or 109, without unanimity of opinion among the permanent members of the Security Council. I believe that is the fact.

That being so, and in view of Mr. Finletter's suggestion for amending Resolution 59, would you think—and I am simply asking for your opinion on this—that it would be advisable first to test out these amendments under article 108 before we proceed under article 109?

Mr. HOLLIDAY. That might be. I simply mentioned the different ways in which this might be done. I mentioned this procedure that was followed by our country, not meaning that that is what should be done. I have said there that that is up to the members of that constitutional review body to decide. We should not try to decide that now.

Mr. LODGE. The language in 108 is, I think, almost exactly the same in that connection as 109. In 108 it says:

ratified in accordance with their respective constitutional processes by two-thirds of the members of the United Nations, including all the permanent members of the Security Council.

That was the formula that was adopted at the San Francisco Conference and it was made applicable to both the sections.

In view of the qualification of Resolution 59 introduced this morning by Mr. Finletter, it seemed to me that in engaging in this preliminary stage, perhaps 108 might be the way to proceed.

Mr. HOLLIDAY. I think perhaps you have something there. If you follow Mr. Finletter's suggestion, he said we should not proceed under article 51, until we have had negotiations and have clearly determined that Russia will not come in.

Mr. LODGE. That is correct.

Mr. HOLLIDAY. You suggest a quicker way that 109. You suggest you throw that out in the open by trying to do it under 108, and then you have a public refusal of Russia to go along. I think you have something there, as a substitution for this negotiation.

Mr. LODGE. I suggest that that might satisfy Mr. Finletter's proposed amendment. Thank you very much.

Mr. CHIPERFIELD (presiding). Mr. Austin has informed this committee already that we have a public refusal by Russia on that very issue.

Mr. VORYS. And four out of five of the permanent members.
Mr. CHIPERFIELD. They are not in favor of it.
Mr. COLMER. May I ask a question?
Mr. CHIPERFIELD (presiding). Yes, Mr. Colmer.

Mr. COLMER. Mr. Holliday, as I understand your position, we have had 2 years of this now, and we have gotten no place; we have been

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continuously met with obstacles, hurdles, and obstructions, and that the United States should take some lead in trying to get something concretely done to bring about the objective that we fought the war for, and that we are aiming at as our goal, which is world peace.

Mr. HOLLIDAY. This is my own personal opinion: I think we should go boldly down the line under section 109 and put it right up under Russia's nose, and let her take it or leave it. I think you will get a very different reaction out of Russia if you approach them that way. Mr. COLMER. I feel that Russia is playing an obstructionist game. She does not want war any more than we want war, but she is taking alvantage of our known desire for peace and intends to obstruct everywhere she can. In other words, we are following the same old appeasement policy that we have followed all the way through, that we intimate every so often we are going to get away from, but we do not get far away from. As I understand your position—and I think it is my position, and those of us who are sponsoring these resolutions—that we ought to have a show-down on that question before it is too late. I think the record will bear out the statement that they have been playing a bluffing game; that every time we have called their hand they have backed up. It is true that Russia will take a new needling angle

, but she will back up from that also when her hand is called. That is indicative, of course, of what I have just tried to say: That they do not want a show-down and do not want any war.

Jr. HOLLIDAY. Personally, I feel that if we proceeded under 51 that that would be an anti-Russian coalition. You could never expect Russia to come in, and there would never be any hope of getting world order out of that. I think the courageous thing to do would be to go straight down the line under 109 and if Russia says that she will not come in, put in a ratification that you can put it into effect without her and say good-by to the old United Nations.

Mr. COLMER. If we have to face that issue further down the road, we might just as well face it now.

I want to emphasize what has been pointed out here: That we certainly cannot travel upon the assumption that Russia will not come in. On the contrary, it is my honest, candid opinion that she would come in, when that time came. Mr. Lodge. Will the gentleman yield? Mr. COLMER. Yes, I yield. Mr. Lodge. It seems to me, Mr. Holliday, you are going a great deal further than Mr. Finletter and Mr. Meyer and Mr. Culbertson. Mr. HOLLIDAY. I think I am. Mr. LODGE. They do not suggest abandoning the United Nations; they suggest operating within the United Nations under 51.

Mr. HOLLIDAY. I do not know. I have not had a chance to confer with them, but I rather suspect they have rather come over to this sl idea because of General Marshall's insistence that the United Nations ought to be retained as a talking place.

Mr. LODGE. As far as the Citizens Committee for United Nations Reform is concerned, they have had the idea of proceeding under article 51 for some time, as I understand it, and Mr. Finletter suggested this morning what he called an Article 51 Federation, but none of them suggested that we simply abandon the United Nations.

you very much, Mr. Colmer.

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