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the world that it would have a legitimate right to join a regional arrangement anywhere, under your interpretation of what was meant by “regional arrangements”?

Mr. DULLES. I believe that the interests of the United States are so close, not only with the American states, the states of this hemisphere, but also with the European group with which we have such long historic ties—also let us say with China—if you put together the different groupings into which the United States logically forms a part, that that includes most of the world.

Mr. JAVITS. Thank you.
Mr. CHIPERFIELD (presiding). Mr. Lodge.

Mr. LODGE. Mr. Dulles, I would like to congratulate you on a very significant statement which has been very helpful to the deliberations of the committee.

At page 3 you state [reading]:
A time may

me when it would be useful to confront the Soviet Union with a conference for revision of the Charter.

I take it therefore you do not favor Resolution 59 at this time; is that correct?

Mr. DULLES. No; I do not favor Congress calling—the immediate calling of a general conference. I say the time may come when it is appropriate to call such a conference but I do not think it can be said that it should be called immediately.

Mr. LODGE. You said a little while ago, sir, that you felt that the emphasis should be rather on proceedings under 51, than on the more universal level.

Does that mean that you favor Resolution 163 as an expression of that particular thought?

Mr. DULLES. I would not want to be committed to the precise language in every respect of 163, but I do think that in general a statement of the purposes sought and an expression of the various alternatives by which the Administration might develop that result, either through a general conference or through an article 51 arrangement, that seems to be entirely appropriate in a resolution to be passed.

I do not want to be committed to the precise language, you understand.

Mr. LODGE. You did express the belief that it would be appropriate and helpful for the Congress to express itself on that matter, to the extent, at least, of indicating that the sentiment of the American people as expressed through the Congress is that we aspire for a world in which there shall be Government by international law rather than by force.

Mr. DULLES. Yes.

Mr. LODGE. You would prefer a resolution along the lines of 163, than one along the lines of 59, for that purpose?

Mr. DULLES. Yes.

Mr. LODGE. Yet I am sure you realize that 163 contains the implication that, first, all possibilities of achieving a stronger United Nations Charter have been exhausted and the only way you can exhaust those possibilities is by attempting to amend the Charter.

Therefore, it seems to me that 163 contains the implication that you will call a conference under 109.

Mr. DULLES. I think I expressed myself very accurately in answering what Mr. Judd put to me. He asked my opinion as to whether the emphasis should be put upon 51 or upon 109 and I said I felt the emphasis should be put upon 51.

However, in the main, what I conceive as being the appropriate role of Congress in this matter is to indicate the goal which is to be sought, and in my opinion those goals are very well put, on the whole, in 163; namely, that we at least start with a rule of law in relation to some matters like atomic energy, armament, and so forth; secondly, to make clear that the United States is willing itself to accept a rule of law on those matters; thirdly, to make clear that the achievement of that goal is looked upon by the Congress, speaking for the American people, as a matter of urgency; and, finally, to leave the administration with all reasonable latitude as to how to get to the goal. It is impossible, in my opinion, for Congress to wisely prescribe the steps which should be taken.

I say, today, that in my opinion, proceedings under 51 offer more hope than proceedings under a Charter amendment. It may be that that could change overnight. I think it would be a great mistake in carrying out this great purpose of declaring the policy of the Congress and of the American people in this matter, to get itself too much involved in attempting to prescribe the detailed procedure which is involved.

Mr. LODGE. Yes, sir. I think that is a very wise and interesting answer.

The thought I had in mind was that I think it has been assumed by many of us that you can proceed under 51 as it has been done at Rio, at Brussels, and at The Hague, but that in order to form a 51 federation, as Mr. Finletter put it, in order to attempt to form all the world except the recalcitrant nations into a federation, it would be advisable, first, to attempt to amend the Charter of the United Nations by calling a conference under 109.

I take it that you would not subscribe to that view, that you feel we should go ahead under 51 anyway.

I would then like to ask you this:

Would you feel that we should satisfy ourselves with proceeding under 51, as is being done at the moment at Brussels and at The Hague. or should we attempt to do as was done under the Articles of Confederation, attempt to organize all the rest of the world into another federation ?

Mr. DULLES. I think it is quite impractical to organize all the nations of the world except the Soviet block into a federation. That is just as impossible as proceeding under 109. The number of nations that you can draw together on a basis that would be acceptable to us, is relatively few. They are what I might call the free societies, which have a long-established condition of democratic practice and have among themselves the machinery and procedures for establishing and carrying out law.

Mr. LODGE. May I interrupt you there, sir.

Under 163, what is called for is precisely what you have just now disapproved of. In other words, the organization of all the countries which are willing to amend the Charter, the organization of them under 51.

Therefore, it seems to me that you really disapprove of both of these resolutions.

I think it is important for this committee to get your views on these resolutions which are before us and which we must consider when the hearings have been completed.

Mr. DULLES. I have not attempted to discuss in my statement the precise language of each of these three resolutions that are before you. If the committee would like me to do so I would be glad to submit a written memorandum on that.

Mr. CHIPERFIELD (presiding). Or any other suggestions you might have as to what should be the resolution. Mr. FULTON. That would be a very great help.

Mr. LODGE. Mr. Finletter suggested that we amend Resolution 59, in such a way as to make it clear that we do not call upon the United States representatives to the United Nations to ask for a conference under 100 until we are sure or have some reasonable assurance that such a conference can prove successful.

In that connection it would occur to me there are two ways of amending the Charter of the United Nations. One is a conference under 109, and the other is under 108.

If Resolution 59 is to be amended in the manner suggested by Mr. Finletter, can that not be done by testing these amendments out under 108, without the calling of a general conference, and therefore in effect would that not be watering down Resolution 59 to such a degree that it would be in effect asking for a proceeding under 108 rather than 109?

Mr. DULLES. My opinion is that you must first find out through diplomatic channels how much progress you could make. It would be a great catastrophe to launch anything here that you could not carry through reasonably to success.

This business is kind of like a rubber band, you know. If you pull it very

thin you can make it go a long ways. If you want it to be strong and solid, you cannot stretch it out.

Now, there are all kinds of variations. You say you want as many nations as possible to join this.

Then there is this proposition; the more universal it is, the more diluted it is. If you are going to have it tight you will only have a few. If you are willing to have it fairly loose, you will have more. If you want to have it universal you must have it thinner yet.

Nobody can predict in advance as to how many nations will subscribe to one formula, how many to a little different formula, and how many to a formula a little different than that.

I think that the main role of Congress here is to indicate what the United States wants, what we are willing to accept ourselves, and what we want to give our people who are charged with the conduct of foreign affairs a mandate to do and leave them with very great latitude as to how to do it.

Mr. LODGE. Would it be fair to summarize your point of view as follows:

You do not favor Resolution 59 because you consider that such a move would be at best a tactical move and the time for that tactical move has not yet arrived?

Mr. DULLES. That is right.


Mr. LODGE. You do not favor 163 because you do not believe it is right at this time to attempt to organize all the rest of the world into another federation under 51.

You do favor the Congress expressing itself as to the general proposition

Mr. CHIPERFIELD (presiding). I might suggest the gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. LODGE. You do believe the Congress should take some action to indicate our hopes and aspirations in this matter?

Mr. DULLES. If all you want to do is to unite as many nations as possible on a concrete program for the control of atomic energy, Then I think you could get a very large number of nations into such a compact; almost all except the Russian group.

If you want a tighter basis you will lose some.
If you want to get together on a tighter basis still, you will lose

There must be a lot of latitude for negotiating as to how many you bring in, and if you limit yourself to one purpose, namely, the control of atomic energy, you can probaly get a lot more unanimity than you could on any other single thing.

As you expand the number of things you want to cover, you reduce automatically the number who will come in under it. Therefore, you do not have anything that you could deal with on a rigid basis.

As I say, it is like a rubber band that you can pull out or draw together again.

Mr. LODGE. Thank you very much, Mr. Dulles.
Mr. Bloom. May I ask Mr. Dulles a question?
Mr. CHIPERFIELD (presiding). Yes, Mr. Bloom.

Mr. Bloom. Mr. Dulles, in answer to Mr. Judd's question with reference to this House Concurrent Resolution 59 and House Concurrent Resolution 163, I believe you stated that if the Congress should express an opinion that it would have a very material effect upon the other nations; is that right?

Mr. DULLES. That is right.

Mr. Bloom. If the House would pass House Concurrent Resolution 59, or 163, or some resolution, and if the Senate did not pass that resolution—if it was a concurrent resolution instead of a simple House resolution, and the resolution should die in this Congress, what effect would that have on the balance of the world?

Mr. DULLES. A bad effect.

Mr. BLOOM. Then in answer to Mr. Judd's question, are you not taking a chance if you have a concurrent resolution, instead of a simple House resolution, and then if the Senate wants to have their own resolution, all right, but for the House to pass the simple House resolution that goes out before the world, the House has expressed itself and it has not had the effect of being killed in the other body; is that not right? It should be a simple House resolution instead of a concurrent resolution?

Mr. DULLES. You are involving me in parliamentary problems of which you are a master, you know.

Mr. BLOOM. I am taking Mr. Judd's question.

Now, the question is, What would be more effective, to have a concurrent resolution passed in the House and die in the Senate or a

simple House resolution passed in the House, that goes out to the world as the expression of the House of Representatives of the United States ?

Mr. DULLES. In order to have an effect upon the conduct of our foreign policy and upon the attitude of other nations, it is perfectly obvious that the United States ought to speak with a united and single voice.

If you have one point of view expressed in the House and another point of view expressed in the Senate, all it shows is that there is divided council within the United States, and our ability to negotiate with other countries disappears.

Mr. BLOOM. Then you are taking a great chance in having a concurrent resolution instead of a House resolution?

Mr. DULLES. You gentlemen can tell how much of a chance you are taking better than I can.

Mrs. Bolton. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question?
Mr. CHIPERFIELD (presiding). Mrs. Bolton.

Mrs. BOLTON. You say it grows more and more difficult as you try to include different things in this, that the nations would not come in for this purpose or that purpose.

Would they not come in for the express purpose of creating an atmosphere where peace could live?

Mr. DULLES. I think you could probably get all the nations again to reaffirm the Kellogg-Briand Act, which is a general platitudinous expression of the desire to have peace.

Mrs. BOLTON. That is not my point at all. I wonder whether they could not be persuaded to enter a conference, rather than atomic energy or something of that kind. The purpose of the thing is peace of the world. Certainly every country is interested in the peace of the world.

Mr. DULLES. I do not believe there are any people who treat peace as the ultimate end. Permanent freedoms, rights, and liberties are the ultimate ends. As far as peace assures them, people want peace. You can have world government today if you will take Mr. Stalin and make him dictator.

Mrs. BOLTON. Would they not come to a council meeting on the basis of peace?

Mr. DULLES. We had one in San Francisco, yes.
Mrs. BOLTON. I cannot make myself clear.

Mr. DULLES. The general problem of peace has been pretty thoroughly threshed out, so it now comes down to the proposition of the relationship of what you do for peace as to your individual rights, freedoms, and liberties.

Peace means one thing to us. We are willing to have peace on certain terms.

Other people think of peace on different terms. They are willing to have peace on those terms.

As long as you talk about peace as a generality, people are for it; but, when you discuss the method by which you get it, it is difficult.

The Soviets say their system is the only system that will bring peace to the world because that involves forcing all human beings into a common mold; that the trouble with the world is there are too many different people in it and they think different ways, and you get diversity and disharmony. They say, “We are going to eliminate all the disharmony. They will be just like sheep; they will all go to

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