let us say, calling upon the nations to settle a dispute by means of their own choosing, why is that not a procedural matter?

There is no substance at all; two nations are arguing and fighting and the Security Council says, "Gentlemen, please try and find a procedure for settling your dispute."

I do not think that is anything but a procedural matter.

Mr. FULTON. That is procedural, but the real meat, if you make chapter 6 chiefly procedural, is being lost. Actually the reason chapter 6 cannot be used at the present time is a practical difficulty not that it is a procedural difficulty. Therefore I was pointing out to you in reference to page 3 that probably because of the present practical difficulties, it is limited to procedural, but it is not the limit of article 6 as a theoretical question, which you comment on here. That is a practical difficulty at the present time that we are experiencing.

Do you agree with that?

Mr. DULLES. I would still adhere to the statement I made, that in my opinion most of the matters hat are dealt with by chapter 6 could legitimately be considered procedural. [Reading:]

The Security Council may call upon parties to settle disputes by means of mediation

and so forth.

I would say that is procedural—

The Security Council may investigate any dispute.

There are possibly some types of investigation which might be substantive but in general, this preliminary investigation is primarily a procedural matter, very much like the discussions which are now held to be procedural, although we had great debate with the Soviet Union about that at San Francisco.

Mr. JAVITS. I would like to join my colleagues in expressing appreciation for your appearance here and appreciating the benefit of your very authoritative experience.

Do you find the statement of Mr. Molotov a suitable basis for undertaking discussions without appeasement or weakness, between ourselves and the Soviet Union, on some of these major questions like atomic-weapons control, or do you find this would not be a suitable

basis?

Mr. DULLES. I did not really come here to testify on that matter. Anything I say there, I say with many reservations.

Mr. CHIPERFIELD (presiding). If you do not care to answer the question, of course, you have that right.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. Dulles, I will withdraw the question.

I might explain, the only reason I asked the question was whether this is the proper basis on which to go into an effort to amend the whole Charter, does this present a suitable opening? I would not want to take advantage of it myself if it did not.

Mr. CHIPERFIELD (presiding). I would say the question is out of order, Mr. Javits.

Mr. DULLES. I would say Secretary Marshall is making a general statement today on that matter and I would prefer to leave the interpretation of that to him.

Mr. JAVITS. You make a statement at page 5 of your prepared statement I would like to question you about. You say that you believe it permissible for a collective defense group to treat as an aggression,

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the violation of rules for the regulation of armament which the General Assembly has determined to be necessary for international peace and security and which the collective defense group accepts for itself. Does that mean that if the nations of the world in the General Assembly should accept the United States proposals regarding an Atomic Development Authority, and if the U. S. S. R. did not accept the plan, the other nations joined together in regional pacts might treat that as an aggression?

Mr. DULLES. That is what I mean, yes.

Mr. JAVITS. That is a very effective way, is it not, Mr. Dulles, in which the General Assembly could really be enforcing world law without any amendment to the Charter whatever?

Mr. DULLES. The General Assembly would not itself be enforcing it but I would say that the General Assembly would in effect make world law and if it did, and should determine that the manufacture of atomic bombs without control or regulation was something that was so dangerous that it would declare it to be illegal and a conspiracy against mankind, then I believe that any collective self-defense movement could adopt that interpretation and consider that manufacture of atomic bombs to be a menace to it which would justify self-defense. Mr. JAVIS. By the regional groups collectively?

Mr. DULLES. By the collective group under 51, perhaps.

Mr. JAVITS. That action of self-defense perhaps being directed against the "lawbreaker," if that happened to be the Soviet?

Mr. DULLES. That is right.

Mr. JAVITS. That is what you consider to be its spirit and intent, being one of the drafters of the section?

Mr. DULLES. Yes.

Mr. JAVITS. I am sure that by discussing regional organization with us, you have no desire to torture the Charter. You really think in terms of regional organizations which have a basis in a region, like the inter-American pact, or perhaps an Asiatic pact, and certainly the western European union.

Am I correct in that?

Mr. DULLES. Yes.

You will appreciate, Mr. Javits, that the action that you take finally is under 51 and not under 52, and 51 is not in the section of the Charter which deals with the regional arrangements. That begins at the end of 51, with article 52.

On the other hand, I would say this, that I believe that the association under 51 should be one which has some nationality. It was not intended by article 51 to permit, let us say, two nations which are unrelated, either geographically, or by common institutions or common beliefs, merely to get together in a defensive alliance or offensive alliance. That was not the spirit of 51.

I recall that in working on 51 at San Francisco, of course, the nub of that was, it was not collective self-defense as against individual self-defense. I used the illustration there of a man and his family, let us say, that there is a certain natural right of people who have ties among themselves, to defend each other, which is quite different from a purely artificial compact of expediency.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. Dulles, would you permit an interruption?

I would like to have you answer at the same time whether or not you consider that the United States has such widespread interests in

the world that it would have a legitimate right to join a regional arrangement anywhere, under your interpretation of what was meant by "regional arrangements"?

Mr. DULLES. I believe that the interests of the United States are so close, not only with the American states, the states of this hemisphere, but also with the European group with which we have such long historic ties-also let us say with China-if you put together the different groupings into which the United States logically forms a part, that that includes most of the world.

Mr. JAVITS. Thank you.

Mr. CHIPERFIELD (presiding). Mr. Lodge.

Mr. LODGE. Mr. Dulles, I would like to congratulate you on a very significant statement which has been very helpful to the deliberations of the committee.

At page 3 you state [reading]:

A time may come when it would be useful to confront the Soviet Union with a conference for revision of the Charter.

I take it therefore you do not favor Resolution 59 at this time; is that correct?

Mr. DULLES. No; I do not favor Congress calling-the immediate calling of a general conference. I say the time may come when it is appropriate to call such a conference but I do not think it can be said that it should be called immediately.

Mr. LODGE. You said a little while ago, sir, that you felt that the emphasis should be rather on proceedings under 51, than on the more universal level.

Does that mean that you favor Resolution 163 as an expression of that particular thought?

Mr. DULLES. I would not want to be committed to the precise language in every respect of 163, but I do think that in general a statement of the purposes sought and an expression of the various alternatives by which the Administration might develop that result, either through a general conference or through an article 51 arrangement, that seems to be entirely appropriate in a resolution to be passed.

I do not want to be committed to the precise language, you understand.

Mr. LODGE. You did express the belief that it would be appropriate and helpful for the Congress to express itself on that matter, to the extent, at least, of indicating that the sentiment of the American people as expressed through the Congress is that we aspire for a world in which there shall be Government by international law rather than by force.

Mr. DULLES. Yes.

Mr. LODGE. You would prefer a resolution along the lines of 163, than one along the lines of 59, for that purpose?

Mr. DULLES. Yes.

Mr. LODGE. Yet I am sure you realize that 163 contains the implication that, first, all possibilities of achieving a stronger United Nations Charter have been exhausted and the only way you can exhaust those possibilities is by attempting to amend the Charter.

Therefore, it seems to me that 163 contains the implication that you will call a conference under 109.

Mr. DULLES. I think I expressed myself very accurately in answering what Mr. Judd put to me. He asked my opinion as to whether the emphasis should be put upon 51 or upon 109 and I said I felt the emphasis should be put upon 51.

However, in the main, what I conceive as being the appropriate role of Congress in this matter is to indicate the goal which is to be sought, and in my opinion those goals are very well put, on the whole, in 163; namely, that we at least start with a rule of law in relation to some matters like atomic energy, armament, and so forth; secondly, to make clear that the United States is willing itself to accept a rule of law on those matters; thirdly, to make clear that the achievement of that goal is looked upon by the Congress, speaking for the American people, as a matter of urgency; and, finally, to leave the administration with all reasonable latitude as to how to get to the goal. It is impossible, in my opinion, for Congress to wisely prescribe the steps which should be taken.

I say, today, that in my opinion, proceedings under 51 offer more hope than proceedings under a Charter amendment. It may be that that could change overnight. I think it would be a great mistake in carrying out this great purpose of declaring the policy of the Congress and of the American people in this matter, to get itself too much involved in attempting to prescribe the detailed procedure which is involved.

Mr. LODGE. Yes, sir. I think that is a very wise and interesting

answer.

-The thought I had in mind was that I think it has been assumed by many of us that you can proceed under 51 as it has been done at Rio, at Brussels, and at The Hague, but that in order to form a 51 federation, as Mr. Finletter put it, in order to attempt to form all the world except the recalcitrant nations into a federation, it would be advisable, first, to attempt to amend the Charter of the United Nations by calling a conference under 109.

I take it that you would not subscribe to that view, that you feel we should go ahead under 51 anyway.

I would then like to ask you this:

Would you feel that we should satisfy ourselves with proceeding under 51, as is being done at the moment at Brussels and at The Hague. or should we attempt to do as was done under the Articles of Confederation, attempt to organize all the rest of the world into another federation?

Mr. DULLES. I think it is quite impractical to organize all the nations of the world except the Soviet block into a federation. That is just as impossible as proceeding under 109. The number of nations that you can draw together on a basis that would be acceptable to us, is relatively few. They are what I might call the free societies, which have a long-established condition of democratic practice and have among themselves the machinery and procedures for establishing and carrying out law.

Mr. LODGE. May I interrupt you there, sir.

Under 163, what is called for is precisely what you have just now disapproved of. In other words, the organization of all the countries which are willing to amend the Charter, the organization of them under 51.

Therefore, it seems to me that you really disapprove of both of these resolutions.

I think it is important for this committee to get your views on these resolutions which are before us and which we must consider when the hearings have been completed.

Mr. DULLES. I have not attempted to discuss in my statement the precise language of each of these three resolutions that are before you. If the committee would like me to do so I would be glad to submit a written memorandum on that.

Mr. CHIPERFIELD (presiding). Or any other suggestions you might have as to what should be the resolution.

Mr. FULTON. That would be a very great help.

Mr. LODGE. Mr. Finletter suggested that we amend Resolution 59, in such a way as to make it clear that we do not call upon the United States representatives to the United Nations to ask for a conference under 109 until we are sure or have some reasonable assurance that such a conference can prove successful.

In that connection it would occur to me there are two ways of amending the Charter of the United Nations. One is a conference under 109, and the other is under 108.

If Resolution 59 is to be amended in the manner suggested by Mr. Finletter, can that not be done by testing these amendments out under 108, without the calling of a general conference, and therefore in effect would that not be watering down Resolution 59 to such a degree that it would be in effect asking for a proceeding under 108 rather than 109? Mr. DULLES. My opinion is that you must first find out through diplomatic channels how much progress you could make. It would be a great catastrophe to launch anything here that you could not carry through reasonably to success.

it

This business is kind of like a rubber band, you know. If you pull very thin you can make it go a long ways. If you want it to be strong and solid, you cannot stretch it out.

Now, there are all kinds of variations. You say you want as many nations as possible to join this.

Then there is this proposition; the more universal it is, the more diluted it is. If you are going to have it tight you will only have a few. If you are willing to have it fairly loose, you will have more. you want to have it universal you must have it thinner yet. Nobody can predict in advance as to how many nations will subscribe to one formula, how many to a little different formula, and how many to a formula a little different than that.

If

I think that the main role of Congress here is to indicate what the United States wants, what we are willing to accept ourselves, and what we want to give our people who are charged with the conduct of foreign affairs a mandate to do and leave them with very great latitude as to how to do it.

Mr. LODGE. Would it be fair to summarize your point of view as follows:

You do not favor Resolution 59 because you consider that such a move would be at best a tactical move and the time for that tactical move has not yet arrived?

Mr. DULLES. That is right.