Mr. LODGE. You do not favor 163 because you do not believe it is right at this time to attempt to organize all the rest of the world into another federation under 51.

You do favor the Congress expressing itself as to the general proposition

Mr. CHIPERFIELD (presiding). I might suggest the gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. LODGE. You do believe the Congress should take some action to indicate our hopes and aspirations in this matter?

Mr. DULLES. If all you want to do is to unite as many nations as possible on a concrete program for the control of atomic energy, then I think you could get a very large number of nations into such a compact; almost all except the Russian group.

If you want a tighter basis you will lose some.

If you want to get together on a tighter basis still, you will lose

more.

There must be a lot of latitude for negotiating as to how many you bring in, and if you limit yourself to one purpose, namely, the control of atomic energy, you can probaly get a lot more unanimity than you could on any other single thing.

As you expand the number of things you want to cover, you reduce automatically the number who will come in under it. Therefore, you do not have anything that you could deal with on a rigid basis.

As I say, it is like a rubber band that you can pull out or draw together again.

Mr. LODGE. Thank you very much, Mr. Dulles.
Mr. BLOOM. May I ask Mr. Dulles a question?
Mr. CHIPERFIELD (presiding). Yes, Mr. Bloom.

Mr. BLOOM. Mr. Dulles, in answer to Mr. Judd's question with reference to this House Concurrent Resolution 59 and House Concurrent Resolution 163, I believe you stated that if the Congress should express an opinion that it would have a very material effect upon the other nations; is that right?

Mr. DULLES. That is right.

Mr. BLOOM. If the House would pass House Concurrent Resolution 59, or 163, or some resolution, and if the Senate did not pass that resolution-if it was a concurrent resolution instead of a simple House resolution, and the resolution should die in this Congress, what effect would that have on the balance of the world?

Mr. DULLES. A bad effect.

Mr. BLOOM. Then in answer to Mr. Judd's question, are you not taking a chance if you have a concurrent resolution, instead of a simple House resolution, and then if the Senate wants to have their own resolution, all right, but for the House to pass the simple House resolution that goes out before the world, the House has expressed itself and it has not had the effect of being killed in the other body; is that not right? It should be a simple House resolution instead of a concurrent resolution?

Mr. DULLES. You are involving me in parliamentary problems of which you are a master, you know.

Mr. BLOOM. I am taking Mr. Judd's question.

Now, the question is, What would be more effective, to have a concurrent resolution passed in the House and die in the Senate or a

simple House resolution passed in the House, that goes out to the world as the expression of the House of Representatives of the United States? Mr. DULLES. In order to have an effect upon the conduct of our foreign policy and upon the attitude of other nations, it is perfectly obvious that the United States ought to speak with a united and single voice.

If you have one point of view expressed in the House and another point of view expressed in the Senate, all it shows is that there is divided council within the United States, and our ability to negotiate with other countries disappears.

Mr. BLOOM. Then you are taking a great chance in having a concurrent resolution instead of a House resolution?

Mr. DULLES. You gentlemen can tell how much of a chance you are taking better than I can.

Mrs. BOLTON. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question?

Mr. CHIPERFIELD (presiding). Mrs. Bolton.

Mrs. BOLTON. You say it grows more and more difficult as you try to include different things in this, that the nations would not come in for this purpose or that purpose.

Would they not come in for the express purpose of creating an atmosphere where peace could live?

Mr. DULLES. I think you could probably get all the nations again to reaffirm the Kellogg-Briand Act, which is a general platitudinous expression of the desire to have peace.

Mrs. BOLTON. That is not my point at all. I wonder whether they could not be persuaded to enter a conference, rather than atomic energy or something of that kind. The purpose of the thing is peace of the world. Certainly every country is interested in the peace of the world. Mr. DULLES. I do not believe there are any people who treat peace as the ultimate end. Permanent freedoms, rights, and liberties are the ultimate ends. As far as peace assures them, people want peace. You can have world government today if you will take Mr. Stalin and make him dictator.

Mrs. BOLTON. Would they not come to a council meeting on the basis of peace?

Mr. DULLES. We had one in San Francisco, yes.

Mrs. BOLTON. I cannot make myself clear.

Mr. DULLES. The general problem of peace has been pretty thoroughly threshed out, so it now comes down to the proposition of the relationship of what you do for peace as to your individual rights, freedoms, and liberties.

Peace means one thing to us. We are willing to have peace on certain terms.

Other people think of peace on different terms. They are willing to have peace on those terms.

As long as you talk about peace as a generality, people are for it; but, when you discuss the method by which you get it, it is difficult.

The Soviets say their system is the only system that will bring peace to the world because that involves forcing all human beings into a common mold; that the trouble with the world is there are too many different people in it and they think different ways, and you get diversity and disharmony. They say, "We are going to eliminate all the disharmony. They will be just like sheep; they will all go to

pasture in the morning and go back to the barns at night. Then you will have peace."

We do not want peace on those terms.

Mrs. BOLTON. Thank you.

Mr. CHIPERFIELD (presiding). Mr. Dulles, we thank you for a very fine statement.

We will meet at 2 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 12: 10 p. m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene at 2 p. m. of the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

Mr. CHIPERFIELD (presiding). The meeting will come to order.
Mr. Justice Roberts.

STATEMENT OF HON. OWEN J. ROBERTS, FORMER JUSTICE, UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee, I have not a formal typewritten statement. I will be followed later by Mr. Streit, who will make a fuller presentation of the views that he and I hold than I make in my statement.

I have handed you a précis of the points I think important, and I shall enlarge upon them as I go along.

First, I agree with those who think it is important to preserve and perpetuate the United Nations. We were the ones who brought the United Nations into existence. We have buttressed great hopes of our own people and many people of the world on its continuance. To now denounce it and throw it over or destroy it would seem to me to be a very wrong thing to do. It has its uses, and we all know that. It has all the uses that the League of Nations had and the League of Nations did some very good things, by persuasion, by education, and enlightenment. It is a forum in which we can meet with the nations, we can disagree in system, in views, and in background. I think it should be kept, and we should endeavor to keep every nation in it that is now in it.

Secondly, I agree that the European recovery program, at least for this fiscal year, is essential to bridge the economic gap in western Europe. We cannot hope to get any organization of free peoples of the world, we cannot hope to avoid being less isolated and alone among the people who practice the free way of life if we permit the western European democracries to disintegrate. They must have interim help until we can devise a way for permanent recovery of those nations, in my judgment.

I believe that neither the United Nations nor the European recovery program can preserve the system of individual freedom and democratic institutions, either in western Europe or in the United States. It seems to me perfectly evident that the United Nations cannot guarantee security to the democracies of western Europe. It is perfectly clear to me that the United Nations, as now set up, 'will not promote the economic recovery of the people of western Europe. If it were competent to do it, why should we be going into the European recovery program?

Neither will the European recovery program in the present status of the world, in my judgment, be a long-run method of promoting recovery in western Europe.

There are two things that western Europe requires for economic recovery. The first is military security and the second, a reasonable hope of economic and civilian means of restoring their economy.

Now, the European recovery plan, in my estimation, gives no hope of military security, and can give no permanent hope to our friends that our aid will be enough, or furnished long enough to insure the recovery of the western nations of Europe.

The proposals now before your committee stem from a similar belief, I take it, but I feel that these proposals in turn will prove inadequate to save the free way of life in the world.

First, I take the proposal to attempt to reform the United Nations by abolishing the veto. That, in my view, is impractical, both in method and in results. First, experience shows that any move to this end within the United Nations will involve a delay of years. If you gentlemen will envisage the length of time it has taken to determine that the United Nations cannot agree on a security force, and the length of time it has taken to determine that it cannot agree on an atomic energy plan, and if you will review the enormous delays that obstructionists have been able to use and to resort to in the United Nations whenever they wanted to oppose a plan, I think you will agree with my suggestion that you are going to have a talkfest that will run for years before you come to a show-down on any amendment. I think the crisis in Europe will not permit any such delay. I think the patient will die while you are devising a remedy. Secondly, abolition of the veto cannot be established without the consent of Russia and the United States. Russia will not consent. Have any of you any doubt about that? She said she would not consent. She said it over and over again officially.

The United States, in my judgment, should not consent if the United Nations remains a league of sovereign nations.

Now, you know what the amendment provisions are in articles 108 and 109. Russia must in the final show-down, after the Assembly shall have acted, consent to the amendment or the amendment does not take effect.

Now, the United States position in retaining the veto in the present United Nations framework seems to me to be completely sound. As long as we are dealing with a group of sovereign nations, I cannot see how the United States can give up the veto and allow the other nations for selfish or other motives, first, to put us into a war; second, to control the conduct of that war; and, third, to make the peace. Mr. BLOOM. Mr. Chairman, would the gentleman allow a question at that point?

Mr. ROBERTS. Certainly.

Mr. BLOOM. Do you think the Senate would approve of adhering to or joining the United Nations if they did not have the veto power? Mr. ROBERTS. They said they would not. There were Senators

who said so from the floor.

Mr. BLOOM. Do you think there is any doubt?

Mr. ROBERTS. I do not have the slightest doubt about it. I think I should have taken the same position as those Senators took on an analysis of what the United Nations was and how it could operate.

How could we put our whole future at the peril of a majority decision of a security council? How could we do it, now?

Mr. CHIPERFIELD (presiding). Does the gentleman mind interruptions?

Mr. ROBERTS. I would welcome them.

Mr. BLOOM. May I ask this question: Do you know who suggested the veto?

Mr. ROBERTS. I do not; but I am perfectly sure that Britain and the United States and Russia were for it.

Mr. BLOOM. There is no question about the United States suggesting the veto.

Mr. ROBERTS. I do not question that, but I am not interested in who suggested it, Mr. Bloom, at all. I am interested in what we would do if we took it away and stayed in that organization; what perils we run. Mr. BLOOM. That is the full veto. Of course, the abuse of the veto power is the only thing that is bad.

Mr. ROBERTS. I am coming to that in a minute.

Mr. CHIPERFIELD. Mr. Justice, our representative, Mr. Austin, has tried to amend the Charter in procedural matters, and in every instance he has failed because of Russia's failure to consent. I think your conclusion is absolutely sound.

Mr. JUDD. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. CHIPERFIELD. We cannot get anywhere as long as Russia has the veto power.

Mr. JUDD. May I make this comment: Of course, you understand, Mr. Justice, that nobody has suggested, so far as I know, that we should eliminate the veto except in certain limited matters; one, the right of a nation to veto police action against itself if it is declared an aggressor, second, to veto action against it for arming for aggression; and, third, on the admission of new members to the United Nations. I do not think anybody has suggested that we should give up the veto on somebody else ordering our troops into battle, for example. That would be giving up the power to declare war which is vested solely in Congress and which unless there is genuine world government, Congress could not approve.

Mr. ROBERTS. Would you want to give up the veto on a questqion of whether action of the United States was aggressive? Would you like to have a majority of a security council put you under laps for that!

Mr. JUDD. I would not hestitate to give up the veto on that if there were reasonably substantial agreement among an overwhelming majority of the countries that we were an aggressor. I would not hesitate to give up our veto over a decision by perhaps a two-thirds vote of the United Nations, that a certain action by the United States was aggressive, because we do not intend ever to take action that could be called aggressive under any definition that might be adopted. Mr. ROBERTS. You mean by the Security Council?

Mr. JUDD. By the Security Council, I should have said.

Mr. ROBERTS. I do not believe I am prepared to go that far. Not in an international set-up, where national ambition is left to play out its part in the world, just as it has in the past, except for the intervention of diplomacy and force.

Mr. BLOOM. Who would they gang up against?