2. Delegation to the Security Council of adequate powers to suppress aggression and prevent preparation for aggression. Suggested details would include

(a) To establish an atomic development authority responsible to the reorganized Security Council for the rigid control of atomic weapons, with proper safeguards. The same or a similar authority to have like responsibility as to biological, chemical, and other means of mass destruction existing or hereafter developed, with like safeguards.

(b) In the case of other heavy armament, such as warplanes, warships, rockets, and heavy artillery, the Security Council be empowered and directed to limit the total quantity to be produced in the world annually and to allot to each of the five major powers an individual production quota, which it may not exceed, and to allot to the remaining member states a collective production quota which shall be produced within their territories solely by a nonprofit armament authority to be operated under the Security Council; these production quotas preferably to be specified in the United Nations Charter after they have been arrived at by previous agreement. Such production quotas might be: United States, Britain, and Russia, 20 percent each; France and China, 10 percent each; the smaller member states, through the armament authority, a collective quota of 20 percent. In event of actual invasion, the invaded state may exceed its quota and take all other steps to resist.

(c) To delegate to the Security Council the power and responsibility of enforcing all the provisions of these amendments. The Security Council to maintain staffs of inspectors and establish branches of the atomic development authority throughout the world. The inspectors shall have full access to all sources of raw material, plants, and research centers within the scope of their authority, and full information as to any substantial concentration or training of armed forces. Refusal by the government of a member state to submit to inspection or to recognize the authority of the Security Council and World Court shall constitute an act of preparation for aggression.

(d) Effective provision which this committee does not attempt to elaborate shall be considered and made effective as to nonmember states, to the end that they may acquire no advantage by nonmembership.

3. Establishment of a strong world police force organized and equipped to support impartially and effectively the powers of the Security Council. Suggested details would include

(a) The world police force to consist of one active international contingent, and five national contingents ready to operate as reserves whenever needed.

(b) The Security Council shall establish and maintain under its direct control the active international contingent composed of volunteers from the smaller member states only, recruited in national units; this to constitute a professional army, highly paid and highly trained and disciplined. They shall owe their allegiance to the Security Council only and shall be equipped with the collective heavy weapons produced by the armament authority in the smaller member states, namely, 20 percent of the world's production, or equal to that assigned to the United States, Britain, or Russia, respectively.

(c) The Security Council shall cause the international contingent to move against any state found guilty by the World Court of preparation for aggression. In event of actual aggression the international contingent shall move immediately to resist the aggressor. The international contingent may be stationed temporarly in Germany or any other occupied enemy territory as troops of occupation.

(d) The national contingents shall consist of the national armed forces of the five major powers and shall be equipped with the heavy weapons allotted to them in their respective quotas. These shall help and reenforce the international contingent whenever needed, and such need shall be determined by majority vote of the Security Council. In case the national contingents shall not suffice to repel the aggression, further national contingents may be called out but only with the consent of their respective governments.

Further resolved, That we recommend to the President and the Congress that the United States shall initiate the adoption of the foregoing plan: Provided, however, That until such time as the above measures, or similar ones, go into effect, the armed forces of the United States under its weapons of every nature shall be maintained at wholly adequate levels.

Further resolved, That all posts of the American Legion be urged to work diligently to the end that these measures be adopted and become effective at the earliest possible moment.

· Mr. McCook. Then, a few days ago, the same thing came up in our executive committee, along with other important things, because it had been our attempt to try to mold a policy in what was wise. The event cannot always be foretold. That is what we bring before you today.

Mr. RICHARDS. In your language on page 4, you say the car just simply is not working, and you tell why it is not working, and a car that does not work is no good on the road, and you propose to do these things with the United Nations Charter.

Now, suppose you cannot do these things in the United Nations Assembly. Is your organization willing to take the risk of forming a new organization, or to amend the Charter in some other way?

You say Russia's position is really one of nullification. The veto is certainly legal, as far as this international organization is concerned. Mr. McCook. I would say that, but I do not like to look into that, for this reason:

If I am playing a football game and we are moving forward, I never like to stop and think what is going to happen if the other side gets the ball.

I do not like to count votes in advance.

I was interested in what the previous speaker said, but I do not agree with him in part. I do not think we can say what will happen. I think there was a good deal of philosophy and common sense with George Washington when the question came up as to whether the new Constitution could be adopted. Many people said no, that you would never get a majority of the Thirteen Colonies to do it. He said in substance: We must do what our own judgment and conscience call for. The event is in the hands of God."

I do not pretend to say what will come. I think that bridge must be crossed when it comes. I think we will be more likely to accomplish it if we say, "This will be so."

I think if Russia would veto it once, and another year later, 2 years later, if war hadn't come, the thing will come, because it is eternally right, and the thing which is right in the long run prevails.

I believe that thoroughly.

Mr. RICHARDS. You do not know what will happen, but you know what has happened?

Mr. McCook. I know what has happened.

Mr. RICHARDS. You know this thing is not working now, and if we let things go on as they are now, that we are just headed into another world war?

Mr. McCook. I do not like some of these questions of operation; but let me say this, sir, that if a person has a strangulated hernia and things are stopped, it is a case of cut or die.

Now, I say, let us try this. We are no worse off if it does not succeed. If it does not succeed-and not necessarily the first time

things do not always go through Congress the first time—always, we can try again, if we are right, and I believe we are. Mr. RICHARDS. Thank you. I agree with you.

Mr. CHIPERFIELD (presiding). Mr. Jonkman.

Mr. JONKMAN. Mr. McCook, you are not necessarily advocating any steps beyond the matter of submitting the revision of the Charter to the United Nations Organization?

Mr. McCook. With our recommendation to do that. A great deal of reference has been made to section 109; I think under section 108 is the first way to do. As a last resort you can call for a conference of nations, but try it under the Charter through 108. Then, beyond that, we cannot say. Meanwhile, keep our powder dry, be ready, doing constructive things, as some of the speakers have said here on other days.

By all means do the constructive things in the direction of world peace, but do not stop with that.

If this is the right thing-and certainly war and the atomic bomb are the penalty if we do not succeed-but let us try.

Mr. JONKMAN. If it does not succeed you would not advise the formation of a club within the club or anything of that kind but merely keep hammering at it and next year hammer at it again?

Mr. McCook. You asked my own feeling, and of course that is it. The Legion has, of course, looked that far, but our policy goes just that far; it goes for what we can sustain and then beyond that-there are provisions under 51 and 52, but those are mostly defense measures. They are not what I would call charters under the Charter.

There are various things that can be done and may have to be done. If this results in an absolute stalemate, drastic things may have to be done, but I do not foresee that and hope we shall not see it, sir. Mr. JONKMAN. Thank you very much for a very fine statement. You have answered my question.

Mr. CHIPERFIELD. Mr. Merrow.
Mr. MERROW. No questions.
Mr. CHIPERFIELD. Mr. Mansfield?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I have no questions.

Mr. CHIPERFIELD. Mr. Judd?

Mr. JUDD. Mr. McCook, I want to join with those who have thanked you for a hard-headed and common-sense analysis of the situation, and your constructive proposals.

It has been said here this morning and you just referred to it, that article 51 is not a proper basis for a charter within the Charter. I am sure you know that there are already two "charters" within the Charter. We have the over-all United Nations Charter and under it we have two others--the Rio compact and the Brussels agreement. So we already have two smaller clubs within the club and if worst came to worst, and the suggestion which Mr. Culbertson discussed, and which some of us proposed a long time ago were followed through, would it not be as Mr. Dulles said yesterday, not a second organization, but a fourth? And its condition would be a fourth charter, if you call it a charter, not a second one, since we already have three. Ŏur suggestion is that we and others go ahead under article 51 to form a club of those who are willing themselves to abide by the revised rules, they have hoped all the members of that organization would

accept, until such time as they do accept. For relations between and among themselves, they live by those rules in the inner club, while remaining full members of the larger club.

You do not see any disadvantage to that; do you?

Mr. McCook. Well, in a sense it is a charter within a charter. As you say, there are two or three and there may may four or five or a dozen. As a matter of fact, the Charter recognizes international arrangements of various sorts.

My point is to go ahead under the Charter as far as you can and at the same time push for these things. Then if trouble comes you have your regional pact of whatever it may be.

I cannot see anything different in principle dividing the United Nations up and down by democracy, and so on, which some believe in, or dividing them longitudinally, by areas, one against the other. If they are done in a hostile way, then you are splitting the United Nations up.

Now, I would avoid splitting the United Nations up. Work under its rules; seek constantly to bring it into a compact, working whole, and in the meantime make use of what limited powers are there.

Mr. JUDD. In the present situation whereby lateral negotiations are at least being discussed between the United States and Russia, is there not a greater danger that real trouble will break out when we alone are, in a sense, set off against Russia, than if we are part of a group of nations voluntarily organized and speaking in the name of 75 percent of mankind?

That is, it would not be the United States saying to Russia, "You must do so and so." It would be, if worst came to worst, most of the world saying to Russia or to any aggressor, through such a group, "The kind of aggressive conduct in which you are engaged is intolerable."

If a man is pouring typhoid organisms into a city's water supply I, as an individual, cannot stop that man but the organization that the community has set up to protect it not only can but must say to him, "It is intolerable that you should be pouring typhoid organisms into the water supply."

Should we not have as many as possible of the people of the world organized to stand against a certain type of behavior, regardless of who carries it on?

Mr. McCook. I would agree with what you say entirely.

I am a lawyer when I am not doing this sort of thing. I have found that you can sit down with a man with whom you disagree and often arrive at a decision, but if you do not trust that man, if his word is not good, either do not talk to him or have a third person present.

I would say that is one cardinal principle in this whole thing. From the practical standpoint, our friend Napoleon Bonaparte was a pretty practical man. When he was dying, he was asked to what he laid his downfall, and he said it was because he had shocked the moral sense of Europe.

In other words, coalition after coalition grew against him. He would knock one down and another would come up. The moral sense was there.

I have great faith in the power of world public opinion.

Mr. JUDD. And the way to get that is for the United States not to act alone but to do its best to get as many as will to act together? Mr. McCook. Act like a decent citizen among the world of nations and go ahead.

Mr. JUDD. Thank you very much.

Mr. CHIPERFIELD (presiding). Mr. Fulton?

Mr. FULTON. As a Legionnaire myself, I am glad to see the Legion taking such a stand. I want to compliment these citizens in Middletown, Ohio, and the people who have cooperated in developing this policy. I think this is a very forward-looking policy the American Legion has put forth here today.

May I also compliment you personally on your own excellent method

of statement.

We know that under article 51 there are possible regional set-ups that can be made, such as the Charter of American Nations at Río, and the development at Brussels and The Hague, of the European Federation.

For America, this has been looking first to the south, in this hemisphere, and then we look to the east, to Europe.

Does the Legion have any policy, either on joining such a federation for self-protection and defense in Europe, for example, or does the Legion have a policy possibly to look to the west, and possibly call for a conference of the nations of the Pacific, in which we would be included?

Mr. McCook. The Legion has not established a policy, in answer to your specific question, no specific policy, as to any particular area, unless you take this, in the last resolution that was presented, that since certain nations of western Europe have joined together in order to use effectively their own facilities in combination with our economic aid—and I might say that the lead of that resolution was on the extent of economic aid, to see that the ERP functioned properly, and to oppose aggression, and to give military cooperation to those nations of western Europe, in the event of aggression, in order that our economic aid may be effectively used and that free institutions in which we mutually believe may survive.

I speak of that because that word "cooperate" was used advisedly. In the first draft it said "assistance."

I will tell you now of the debate.
No; we did not want an alliance.
Next, Should we give assistance?

We believed "cooperation" was the better word because it had two meanings, both constructive. "Cooperate" means to work with. We did not want to give assistance unless they were ready to do their part.

Mr. FULTON. But you have not yet arrived as a group at a point where you have definitely decided whether the United States should go into an organization under section 51, in Europe, or should stay out and assist, or stay out and simply cooperate?

Mr. McCook. No; that question has not been propounded to us, but I would say whatever was wise for the United States to do is there to be done, and this is permissible.

Mr. FULTON. Do you think it may be appropriate, Mr. McCook, that there should be an organization under section 51 that the nations of the Pacific could function under?