Mr. McCook. Yes; the Pacific states, and everywhere. The region may include both sides of the Atlantic, up to the North Pole and down again. All those things are very broad, and they are permissible. I think they should all be given consideration. I do not want those to take the place of the United Nations Charter, unless it is necessary, and may I add this, that those are all matters of defense under the Charter, under 51 itself, as you know, and in turn they tie into the Security Council, and the Security Council is susceptible of a veto. Therefore, where are you, except as you have it ready? Mr. FULTON. May I make a point there, that under article 51 it is not subject to the Security Council, so these organizations can be set up outside that. In article 52, those organizations are subject to the veto. Mr. McCook. You are quite right but it says this, that they can investigate but in 51 it says: Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense, if an armed attack occurs. I would make that broader: until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. So indirectly our friend in the United Nations Security Council comes in. It cannot veto it. You are quite right. Mr. FULTON. Mr. Dulles has stated that language was not carefully written and did not declare in words what the intention was at the time of writing. You are correct in the actual written words but through the interpretation of the man who made the language up, the cart is now before the horse. Mr. McCook. That is the way it struck me, sir. I did not know he said that. Mr. FULTON. That is all. Thank you very much. Mr. JAVITS. Mr. McCook, as a Legionnaire myself, I also would like to compliment you on the balanced character of your statement and on your taking an interest in this very critical public matter. Do I understand that your statement has no implication of putting this problem of reorganization of the United Nations or any other scheme we might adopt, up to the USSR on a "take it or leave it" basis? Mr. McCook. None whatever. We have not said that. That had not, frankly, occurred to me, and I do not think the way to negotiate with people is to start with an ultimatum. You may have to end with one but do not begin with one. Mr. JAVITS. Do you agree with me, that the American people are certainly not for threatening and undertaking a preventive war against the Soviet unless it does exactly what we want it to do in connection with coming into some concert of nations or amending the United Nations Charter? Mr. McCook. I have never heard any such suggestion in our committee and I would believe that would be the general attitude. Mr. JAVITS. I would think so, knowing the American Legion as I do, Mr. McCook. I have one final point: You have recommended certain basic principles: Is there any timing in your mind on that, as to when that should be done? Do you feel that it is something we should be thinking about in the context of our whole foreign policy? Mr. McCook. Only this, that as I said, time is running out, and you never know when. I believe that drifting tends to get you worse. If you are going to have the operation, do it while the patient is fairly strong. I do not mean the operation in the sense of war; I mean for going at this, go at is as soon as you can reasonably bring it before the proper authorities. Does that answer your question? Mr. JAVITS. It does. Thank you very much, Mr. McCook. Mr. LODGE. Mr. McCook, as a fellow Legionnaire and coresident of the State of Connecticut, I would also like to extend a word of welcome to you, and tell you that I think you have made a very significant and vital contribution to the deliberations of this committee. On page 3 of your interesting statement, you say: However, as we diagnosed the situation, the blame rested much less upon the United Nations than upon the attitude and acts of certain member nations, one in particular. Stating the matter bluntly, we concluded that it was a case of deliberate sabotage. I was very much interested in your statement with respect to article 108. That is a matter I myself have brought up on a number of occasions. The question I would like to ask you is whether if these explorations are made under 108 and it is decided to call a conference under 109, and then an impassé is reached on these amendments, you believe that in that event another organization should be formed with a charter containing these amendments? Mr. McCook. There have been brought up before the American Legion, speaking of that, various plans for world government, a federation, among the democracies alone, and whatnot. We felt that there were so many angles to that that it should be referred to a special committee for further study and 10 days ago we did precisely that. I doubt if any specific recommendations will come out of that for some time yet, because that is looking into the future, and as I said at the beginning, Mr. Congressman, I find great difficulty in saying what will happen and what should be done if this fails. I believe in planning ahead as far as you can but I do not think I can answer your question satisfactorily. Mr. LODGE. Then if you were informed by the Secretary of State, and Mr. Austin, that they had gone into these matters and were satisfied that a conference under 109 should be avoided, you would not suggest they go ahead with that conference anyway? Mr. McCook. I would disagree with them. I was on a committee not long ago where they took a telephone poll and it seemed to be unanimous. They called me up last and I did not agree and I asked that they meet. There was no argument but I had some facts about which they did not know. Mr. LODGE. You think the meeting under 109 should be called anyway? Mr. McCook. Under 108. Mr. LODGE. There is no conference provided for there. The conference is provided for under 109. Mr. McCook. No; but it is not the conference I would advocate first. I advocate going at it under 108, and going at is more than once, if need be. Mr. LODGE. Perhaps I do not make my question clear. My question was that if they go ahead under 108, and it appears clear that these amendments would not be adopted, would you suggest calling a conference under 109 just the same, in order to bring the matter into more public view? Mr. McCook. I would, because it must be brought out into the open. If we are thinking at all in terms of democracy as we do hereand I hope the world will some day-certainly the public should know it. But I have more confidence of getting somewhere under 108 than does the Secretary. For example, it was either Secretary Marshall or Mr. Austin who said he felt that it was impossible to get far, because when the matter of changing the veto in matters of settlement of specific dispute, that they could find no warmth to it. I would not find any warmth for that either, on chapter 6. It is chapter 7 that has the root of it. Mr. LODGE. You are inclined to feel that even if the situation does not look promising under 108, a conference under 109 could nevertheless be called. Does that mean you favor Judd Resolution 59? Mr. McCook. The one I have before me is 168. They are similar, are they not? Mr. LODGE. 163 calls for proceeding under article 51 with the making of a separate arrangement. I understood you to say just now you were opposed to doing that at this time. Mr. McCook. Yes. Mr. LODGE. Therefore, I gather you would be opposed to Resolution 163. Mr. McCook. If 163 calls for the calling of a conference right now, I would say that should be done, if it does not work under 108 but I believe 108 is the first thing to follow. That will crystallize it. You may get it on there if it is based on wiping out the veto on the matters of aggression. Let us say it is aggression because it is aggression that hits the conscience of the world and of the United States. I am not much interested in whether we have unanimity required or three-quarters or one-half, on things that are less fundamental, but there are the seeds of world destruction. Mr. LODGE. Mr. Finletter has proposed an amendment to 59 which could well be interpreted as requiring preliminary exploration under 108, so I take it with such an amendment you would favor Resolution 59. Mr. McCook. As I understand it, I certainly would. That is, first try one way, then the second way, under the conference method. That is what you mean, is it not, sir? Mr. LODGE. That is right. Well, of course, the amendment does not specifically mention 108 but it does mention preliminary exploration and conversation. I gather, therefore, that while you would favor 59 under those circumstances, you do not favor a resolution which calls for proceeding separately under article 51 with the formation of another organization? Mr. McCook. No; not by the Congress, or by ourselves. Mr. LODGE. In that case you would be opposed to Resolution 163? Mr. McCook. I thought 163 is different than 168. Mr. LODGE. I believe it is the same thing. Mr. McCооk. Then I do not think that 163 calls for that. I cannot see that 168 calls for what you suggest. Mr. LODGE. It calls for it on page 2, paragraph 5. Mr. McCook. At the end of paragraph 5 [reading]: In the event any permanent member should veto the provision, the United States should join with other like-minded states. Mr. McCook. I have no objection to that. I remember reading it now-to this extent, if there was a period after the words "international organization." It goes on, "for mutual defense." "Mutual defense" is an incident. Mr. LODGE. In other words, let us put it this way: If a conference is called under 109, after preliminary exploration under 108, and that conversation is abortive, you would go ahead under article 51? Mr. McCook. I think that is perfectly all right as it is under any circumstances. Mr. LODGE. Then I misunderstood you. Mr. McCook. May I just say this: When you speak of explorations under 108, I would make it more than that. I would make it a definite attempt with this issue of world aggression and the atomic bomb in mind, and I think you would begin to get somewhere under 108. Mr. LODGE. Thank you very much, Mr. McCook, for your interesting testimony. Mr. CHIPERFIELD. Mr. McCook, since several members have mentioned their connection with the American Legion, may I, as a fellow American Legion member, thank you for such a fine statement? Mr. McCook. You have been very kind, if I have been able to help. Mr. CHIPERFIELD (presiding). Mr. Batt. STATEMENT OF WILLIAM L. BATT, PRESIDENT, SKF INDUSTRIES, INC., PHILADELPHIA, PA. Mr. BATT. I am here today as a member of the United Nations Council of Philadelphia, but while I think I shall voice a cross section viewpoint of the Council it should be understood that I appear before you merely as one interested citizen. Having spent much of the last 8 years in Washington in one capacity or another, but to a very considerable extent in the international field, I have had some experience with the varied developments leading to today's uncertain situation. Let me first state the conclusion to which I have come and then briefly develop the reasoning behind it. This conclusion is that the United States immediately should take a position of leadership directed toward the creation of an additional unit of world organization which may have some more assured hope of preserving world peace. I shall advance no argument for one particular mechanism as against another, since it seems to be clear to me that the need for action is so impelling in its urgency as to make the means wholly subordinate to the end. The quite unparalleled statesmanship and vision shown by this Congress in its dealing with the complex matter of European aid, give me complete confidence in its ability to find the best method for a stronger world organization provided it sets its hand to that task. I urge that it do that now. The decisions which we Americans fail to make in the next weeks and months, quite as much as those we make, may well determine the very existence of this world as a home for freedom-loving people. It was the initiative of the American people which created the United Nations. We placed great reliance in its ability to develop the kind of international atmosphere in which peace would be assured and we are accordingly deeply disappointed in the way it has developed. Secretary Marshall's explanation before your committee that this great body was only to preserve the peace, not make it, will come as a disillusioning surprise to most of us. It is painfully evident that the major powers, who reserved to themselves the prerogative of making the peace, have little to show for their efforts. We are, therefore, faced with the present situation that not only is there no assurance of peace but that we see confronting us black clouds ominously threatening an increased risk of war. With all the deep respect and admiration I hold for General Marshall, I, for one, am not ready to accept his apparent conclusion that reliance should continue to be placed in the present United Nations machinery. To be sure, he does not foreclose discussions looking toward modification, but he makes no recommendations to that end. This is a critical time for what he terms "a change in substance” and I can see no such promise from the negative inaction of continuing to rest all our hopes for peace in an unchanged United Nations. In my visits across the country in the last months, I have sensed a sharply growing conviction everywhere that some new approach to peace must now be tried and tried promptly. There is an awareness and an unrest among the people in their communities, that we have never had before. The attitude of men and women of both political parties in seeking for new vision and more courageous leadership from their candidates for high public office must arise, as I see it, from some deep and growing sense of urgency. More and more is heard the desperate question as to whether the United Nations is or is not a failure, but if it is, the demand that some new and more effective piece of machinery shall be provided. For the American people have had enough of war, and they will make every effort, consistent with national decency and honor, to avoid it. Now we in the United Nations Council of Philadelphia do not write this body off as a complete failure at all, nor have we lost our keen interest in its preservation. It has served and should continue to serve as a useful platform on which the views of all its participating members may have the widest publicity. Its usefulness as a meeting in which the moral indignation of the world can be against aggression and dictatorship must not be unde |