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On the contrary, the United Nations Charter, in the form of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, was submitted to the American people and their representatives in a wrapped and tied package, and they were told to accept it without amendment, otherwise they would be guilty of the crime of "sabotaging peace." Under this label and pressure, few dared to raise pertinent questions. I recall a conference called in New York as I recall it, in the winter of 1945, by the State Department, which was then headed by Mr. Stettinius. The leading publishers, editors, editorial writers, and commentators of the newspapers, reviews, journals of opinion, magazines, and major radio networks, were invited. A dais had been arranged, at which sat the Secretary of State, the Assistant Secretary, Mr. Leo Pasvolsky who is reputed to have been a leading mind in framing the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, and other Department functionaries. The audience was composed of some 200 persons, all of them in positions of considerable public influence and some of them men who had devoted lifetimes to the study of international affairs. The State Department functionaries, dividing the task between them, set forth in detail the provisions of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. This was largely a waste of breath, for it is hardly conceivable that there was a person in the room who had not thoroughly studied the proposals, weeks before, at the time of their first publication. At the conclusion of the exposé, the audience were invited to submit questions in writing, which were then sorted out for the secretary or his assistants to answer.

Under such a procedure discussion was, of course, out of the question. The publicists were entirely on the receiving line. The State Department was doing a "selling job," of an opinion and a policy already made and unamendable. There was no apparent wish nor inclination of the Cabinet officials to entertain doubts, suggestions, or strictures of any kind, nor even to ascertain, through these foci of the public mind, what the public mind on the proposals might be. The object of having written questions was obviously to furnish the proper answers, which the publicists could then pass on to their readers, as a promotion project. It was a weird performance, the more so because none of the functionaries seemed to find it strange are remarkable, while judging from their faces and from conversations afterward, the audience either accepted the implicit demeaning of their function, or treated it with cynical and amused contempt.

The right of the public and its elected representatives to accept or reject remains, but not the right to modify, amend, or cocreate. Thus, in creating the pattern of the future relations between nations, a matter of the most profound importance to every living soul, opinion was, from the beginning, reduced to a rubber stamp. The public-including its representatives, historians, political scientists, moral guardians, students of international affairs, practical organizers, and minds in general-were reduced to propagandists or opponents; the issue was not "What kind of peace structure?" but yes or no to the only permissible peace structure-permissible, because three administrations, without benefit of popular legislative or advisory bodies, had decided so. And the argument was, and still is: Take it with the promise of peace, or leave it-with the certainty of war. So everyone has had to stand and be counted as for or against sin.

To be specific-although many of the questions sent up to the State Department functionaries in that conference which I now recall dealt with the absolute power which the Dumbarton Oaks proposals put in the hands of the Council, with the failure of the proposals to create any representative lawmaking body, with the odd offside position of the International Court, and with the glaring inequalities of the small powers, separate or even united, vis-à-vis the great, none of the State Department members found it necessary or possible-to present any arguments in reason for this sort of structure. One misses on every occasion that "decent respect to the opinion of mankind" which once marked the advocacy of public policies.

In "selling" the Constitution of the United States to the people of America, Hamilton, Madison, and Jay expended eighty-odd essays of extraordinary thoroughness, exploring every alternative, explaining every reason for the general structure and its details, tracing historical precedents, exposing historical warnings, the essays altogether comprising one of the most compelling invitations to public thought, and one of the most remarkable documents of political science and philosophy. President Roosevelt, apropos the proposed world organization, remarked on several occasions that, like our Constitution, it would be amended in the process of growth. He omitted to say that the veto had been introduced, making an iron curtain against amendment, and that the American Constitution was repeatedly amended in the process of being; that it was first privately, then publicly debated point by point, for months; that encyclopedic minds of a caliber immeasurably above those of any of the functionaries that worked on the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, not matched in this country's Government since, and doubtfully anywhere else, worked over the Constitution exposing every facet to reason and realism; while small conferences of Great Power "experts" organized a blueprint for the world-in the absence of representatives of a large share of it-apparently seeking to emulate the Creator and throw it together in 7 days. In the meanwhile, however, the people of the world have come to feel the deepest disillusionment with the power of the United Nations as presently constituted, to keep the peace or furnish any nation, large or small, with a genuine system of security. They blame this power of that power; they blame the Russians, if they are Americans, and the Americans if they are Russians. But the blame, I am afraid, lies in the basic assumptions on which the United Nations as presently constituted rests.

That basic assumption is that there is one law for the strong and another for the weak, and that the peace of the world rests on the unavowed readiness of the small and helpless to renounce war and submit to becoming the booty of the strong who will not renounce it. It begins with the wish for universal reconciliation and ends in nobody's lifting a finger as long as misfortune only touches somebody else. On this spiritual premise a new Caesarism is developing under which, for the sake of the peace and security of the great powers nobody else is to have any peace and security at all. Neither law, morality, nor the historic facts of the existence of civilizations enter into it. Whatever the Big Three or Four or Five decides is the "law," however it affects the lives and liberties of other peoples, and whatever the great powers do not agree on cannot be carried out even if an

overwhelming majority of mankind do so agree. This, gentlemen, was the premise of Munich. The three Great Powers of Europe at that time, namely Britain, France, and Germany, decided to make peace themselves. For the sake of that peace by great power agreement, they agreed to the absorption of Austria and the disintegration of Czechoslovakia. That peace foundered on the unwillingness of the next small and helpless victim, Poland, to sacrifice herself for the peace of the powers, and ended in World War II.

That is the premise also of Tehran, and Yalta. There again, for the sake of peace of the great powers, in this case Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union, ancient states were disposed of; measures taken without even consultation with the governments of the states concerned; and, indeed, new governments had to be created-so-called friendly governments, being in fact, exactly the sort of friendly governments demanded by Hitler. Under this concept of great power peace--the duty of the weak to become booty for the sake of the peace of the strong-over 100,000,000 people have been deprived of every scrap of sovereignty and free choice. And under this concept of friendly government, it rapidly has become apparent that a government friendly to one great power, may not be friendly to any other great power.

This game of power politics which the present United Nations structure does nothing to mitigate has laws of its own. These laws were demonstrated after Munich and have been again demonstrated after World War II. They are implicit in the situation. As one great power expands by this device or that, the other is compelled to expand to keep the original balance in relations. As one takes satellites, the other must form satellites to offset it; if one develops new and terrible weapons, the other must move heaven and earth to find the secret or devise even worse and more terrible weapons; as one by propaganda and interference in the domestic affairs of states expands its influence, the other must take the same measures. And this process is, in its very nature, a process of elimination. Starting with five great powers, this number is gradually but effectively reduced as each of the minor three allies itself with one of the really great. Thus we have today not the big five but only the big two, Great Britain and France having entered the American orbit, while China remains a bone of contention.

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That such a development can only have one conceivable outcome is taught by every lesson of history. Eventually two great powers, spending half of their substance on arms, glare at each other across a vacuum of power, offering every temptation to an aggressor. state of tension thus developed inspires fear in every human heart. A perpetual eye-of-war psychosis is created. Now, gentlemen, it is possible for a people to sustain a long war, even a war of terrible destruction. But I submit it is quite impossible for any people to sustain a perpetual eve of war. Eventually there is a demand for show-down; anything seems better than the terrible suspense; and whoever first loses his nerves starts the war, under whatever claim of provocation or incidents may be chosen.

This is the state of the world at present, and in my opinion, this will remain the state of the world, regardless of whoever may come home from a conference waving a treaty and proclaiming peace for our time, unless and until the people of this world are given what they are

promised in the preamble to the San Francisco Charter. I would like to quote from that preamble:

We, the peoples of the United Nations, determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and * * * to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and * to insure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest do hereby establish an international organization to be known as the United Nations.

* * *

* *

And if I may quote from the purposes, as expressed in article I:

1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: To take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.

2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace.

3. To achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for the fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.

4. To be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends.

Now, it seems to me we have a right to inquire whether the machinery of the United Nations, as it is presently constituted, is sufficient to implement these noble purposes, which do, indeed, represent the hopes and desires of the majority of all mankind. And if we do so inquire, we are compelled to answer that the implementation is entirely insufficient. A reference is made to "conformity with the principles of justice and international law," but not the slightest attempt is made clearly to define justice or establish a code governing the behavior of all nations, large or small, powerful or weak, toward each other. It is the purpose to "prevent and remove" threats to the peace, and to "suppress aggression," but the so-called veto right and "principle of unanimity" absolutely nullify any possible action to prevent threats to the peace or to suppress aggression if the offender is any one of the great powers. But from whom do "threats to the peace" come? From the Hollands and Belgiums and Switzerlands of this world? Not at all. They come from the great powers and their combined or unilateral actions. Actually, if there is to be a veto right at all, it would seem that the small states are the ones who would most need it for their protection. We have not heard of Czechoslovakia annexing Germany by force, or Poland annexing Russia by force or the threat of force.

The Charter specifically forbids aggression. But when you forbid something, you certainly start by defining it—that is the beginning of all law. The Nuremberg trials made "preparation for aggression" a crime, and men were sent to be hanged by the neck until dead for breaking this "law" against the conscience of mankind.

Now, I have no objection to what is called retroactive law. Someone has said that law starts with the criminal; an offense is committed, and the conscience of the community is aroused, after which the commission of such offenses is outlawed and penalties are set up.

But I have said it before, and I say it again: If a community and a set of judges, summon persons of state before a bar of judgment, and condemn them with the most drastic penalties for crimes against mankind, crimes against peace, and crimes against humanity, it is then incumbent upon the judges themselves to codify in law the principles upon which the accused have been sentenced, and so provide for the outlawry of such crimes, by whomever committed in the future. Otherwise no justice has been done, but a lynching has been performed. It is obviously impossible to remove the veto until you have first defined the law. No one, however, can subscribe to a law and afterward invoke the veto to protect himself in case he is accused of a breach of it. It is therefore necessary to define and legally forbid, those things which the Charter is specifically charged to preventaggression and preparation for aggression.

It is not difficult to define aggression. In July 1932 growing militarism in Germany and the aggressive national spirit boding the coming into power of Hitler, greatly frightened the Soviet Union. Apprehending possible aggression from that quarter and feeling herself menaced, she concluded a series of treaties with the surrounding neighboring states, including Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. In these treaties both signatories pledged themselves to refrain from aggression against each other, and aggression was defined as follows, and I quote from the treaty between the Soviet Union and Poland:

Any act of violence attacking the integrity and inviolability of the territory or political independence of the other contracting party-even if such acts are committed without declaration of war and avoid all possible warlike manifestations should one of the contracting parties be attacked by a third state or group of other states, not to give aid or assistance directly or indirectly, to the aggressor state during the whole period of the conflict; not to be party to any agreement openly hostile to the other party from the point of view of aggression.

Such a definition excludes not only attacks by violence, but nonviolent plots against the political independence of states, and forbids the use of the territory of one state for actions by a third party against another.

Again, the next year, in 1933, the Soviet Union, Rumania, Latvia, Estonia, Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan mutually signed in London a Convention for the Definition of Aggression, which all agreed to renounce. In this another very clear and complete definition of aggression is formulated:

1. Declaration of war upon another state.

2. Invasion by its armed forces, with or without a declaration of war of the territory of another state.

3. Attack by its armed forces with or without a declaration of war on the territory, vessels, or aircraft of another state.

4. Naval blockade of the ports of another state.

5. Provision of support to armed bands formed in the territory which have invaded the territory of another state, or refusal notwithstanding the request of another state to take, in its own territory, all the measures in its power to deprive these bands of all assistance or protection.

And I would like to point out that this convention contains the following passage:

No political, military, economic, or other consideration may serve as an excuse for justification for the aggression referred to.

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