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Mr. THOMAS. May I add, I think that is far more important than some of our newspaper writers seem to believe. The people of America, if anything, are more puzzled than may be realized here in Washington. It is not necessary merely to do more or less right, it is necessary to be obvious about it and to persuade other people that we are doing the right thing. We must take the initiative away from the Soviet as the friend of the distressed. This is our outstanding opportunity to do it and we can do it in the right way. Failure to do it will be bad for us. One of the men whom I trust most and who has lived in Russia during the war tells me that we greatly underestimate the weight, even in a dictatorship, of silent objection. If Stalin has things that he can publicize to his own people to our disadvantage, he gets much better support than when he cannot publicize things to hurt us.
If we would say, "People of Russia, we want nothing but an end of the armament race," sooner than we think, even the dictator—if not Stalin, his successor—may have to pay some involuntary heed to that position.
Mr. COLMER. Thank you very much.
Mr. LODGE. Mr. Thomas, I am in great sympathy with many of the preoccupations and aspirations so eloquently expressed by both Miss Thompson and you. I think the question is for us one of implementation. By what method are we going to resolve these preoccupations and lead the world toward a fulfillment of these aspirations? At the top of page 5 you say [reading]:
5 Soviet Russia could not possibly exploit among its own people our honest proposal for ending the armament race
and so on.
I believe they have exploited our honest attempt under the European recovery program. I wonder if you are not too optimistic when you make that statement.
Mr. THOMAS. To a certain extent I think they have exploited an honest proposal—with extraordinary help from some Americans, I may say in that connection, the misunderstanding being very extensive here. But ERP does involve elements of possible American imperialism which are not involved in so clear-cut a proposal as the comprehensive type of disarmament down to a police force level which I have been discussing.
I speak with some knowledge of trying to speak to American audiences. I never had a chance in Russia. If I had a guaranty of my life, I would like to take a chance. I know it is much harder to explain even the European recovery plan than it is to explain a proposal for ending an armament race, the continuance of which is costing the Russians very much and that is costing us very much.
I think with all due respect to the statesman the successful party selects he will have hard work in proving that he can do much about houses and homes and hospitals, if we are going to run up the military expenditure as fast as now seems to be inevitable if this armament race goes on.
We must challenge the world with that and I think the people will listen better to that than to some other things.
Mr. LODGE. You also said that the main point is the “ideology of communism."
That to me, was an interesting statement. I do not underestimate the significance of the ideology but it seems to me Poland was taken not because of the contagion of the Communist ideology. All of the countries behind the iron curtain were captured because of internal forces with external pressure, and not because the ideology took hold.
It seems to me that that is a very significant point. Would you care to comment on that?
Mr. THOMAS. Yes. I thank you for a chance to explain myself.
When I said that the important thing about communism was its ideology, I did not mean that Poland had been captured by Communist ideology. I mean that in judging communism, it is a great mistake to exalt the imperialism of Russia as the Russian nature. The outstanding passion of communism is for world dominion of communism, and that is an ideology that works throughout the whole world. The actual capture of Poland was made possible by military considerations; by our own Government's action and failure to act; and by geography. That I fully admit.
I will point out, however, that important as has been the existence of the Red army, the great advances of communism have not involved the direct use of the Red army in the Balkans and Czechoslovakia. My point is that basically we are dealing with an ideology that is indeed backed up by great force. That to undermine that ideology in South America, Asia, and Africa, we have to have a better ideology and prove it. Part of our American proof should be our offer of an ideology embodied in a practical plan that minimizes the terror and lessens tremendously the present exhausting pressure of an armament race upon the humblest peasants of the world.
Mr. LODGE. Thank you very much, Mr. Thomas. STATEMENT OF CLARK M. EICHELBERGER, DIRECTOR, AMERICAN
ASSOCIATION FOR THE UNITED NATIONS Chairman EATON. The next witness will be Mr. Clark M. Eichelberger. I will ask Mr. Eichelberger to take the stand.
Mr. EICHELBERGER. I am the director of the American Association for the United Nations.
Our association, as a rule, does not concern itself with legislative matters, confining itself to an education program, but your resolutions have so much bearing on the United Nations, that I appreciate very much this opportunity to appear and present my views.
In advancing a procedure for strengthening the United Nations without Charter revision, I face with great reluctance the task of disagreeing with those Congressmen and those witnesses whose sole purpose in supporting textual revision of the Charter is to have a stronger United Nations. It is not easy to argue with men going in the same general direction.
The fundamental question before this committee today is, How can the United Nations become a more effective means for world security? There are two suggestions before us: One involves a textual revision of the Charter. The other a strengthening of the United Nations by_use, interpretation, and addition.
I want to develop the latter thesis as the only way to proceed at this time. And in so doing, I am going to present on behalf of our asso
ciation our belief that a multilateral treaty open to all member states based upon article 51 of the Charter is the way to strengthen the security provisions of the United Nations within the framework of the Charter. This proposal would avoid on one hand the dangerous pitfalls of military alliances outside of the United Nations and on the other an impossible effort to revise the Charter. Later in this discussion, I shall present to you a draft text of such a treaty which has been prepared by some of the best experts.
But first let me give the reasons why our association is opposed to an immediate constitutional convention under article 109 to revise the Charter. We believe that such an effort would result in a considerable reduction in the membership of the United Nations. Some nations are unalterably opposed to revision. They might not even attend. They and others would refuse to approve its results.
As I interpret the spirit of some of the resolutions before your committee, particularly House Resolution 163, the United States would then proceed without the recalcitrant ones, either to take over the United Nations or to organize another one. In that way the United States would organize a very comfortable little club composed of likeminded peoples, but the club would not contain the members with whom understanding is essential to world peace.
Indeed, it is not certain that all of the like-minded ones would with the United States in such an effort. The United Kingdom would not wish such a break with other members and it is certain that neither the Scandinavian countries nor France would relish being forced into such a choice.
I am aware of the obstacles that the Soviet Union has presented to the Security Council. But because I have not abandoned hope that an agreement with the Soviet Union can be found-an agreement without appeasement, but involving conciliation-I believe that it is vital that the Soviet Union and its friends be kept within the United Nations. And since elimination of the veto is at the heart of most of the plans for revision, I must say that I prefer the United Nations with the Soviet Union and its friends, and the veto, to a United Nations without the Soviet Union and its friends, and without the veto.
Last week the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, meeting at Geneva, Switzerland, ended a 2 weeks' session. According to the press, the Commission approved a Swedish resolution calling for a committee to examine between now and the next session the desirability of establishing permanent organs within the Commission to deal with intra-European trade. The Secretariat is to prepare data on the possibility of speeding industrial development through improved trade between the eastern and western Europe. In this slight lessening of the tension between east and west through promoting intra-European trade, there may be a beginning of a turn toward conciliation and understanding. Might it not be better that we put up with vetoes in the Security Council for a while and have the continued cooperation of many nations in such efforts as the Economic Commission for Europe than have a drastic break which some of the advocates of these resolutions would risk?
Those appearing before you to advocate revision of the Charter fall into three general divisions. There are those who would start now to transform the United Nations into federal world government. There
are those who would create a federation of the Atlantic community within the framework of the United Nations. Others advocate the resolution you are most seriously considering—House Resolution 163. As for the first group, there is much in their program which appeals,
, particularly the picture of a stronger world court which Mr. Finletter ably presented on May 11. However, a system by which the court could deal with an individual within the state and by which a worl parliament would be elected by the people, while ideal goals, cannot be achieved in the immediate future. Other items on the world-government program, such as the international police force and wide reduction of armaments, can be accomplished within the Charter-if the nations are willing to do so.
As for the federal union of the Atlantic community, while the United States is not going to join such a federation, a spiritual rebirth of Europe seems under way in the move for union of the European states and should have every encouragement from this country. It may be the greatest byproduct of the ERP.
As for the Culbertson plan before this committee, House Resolution 163, it should command the support of everyone were it limited to two very important objectives: Ân international police force, and a rationing of the world arms production. However, accompanying these worth-while objectives is a rigid concentration of power in the hands of five great nations.
Certainly, history teaches that the power ratio never remains fixed. Consequently any eventual revision of the United Nations Charter should be made with the objective of greater flexibility and a wider distribution of power, rather than less. The rise in importance of the General Assembly in comparison with the Security Council is due to the fact that it is based upon a wider distribution of power. But House Resolution 163 would create a Security Council of 10, in which the 3 greatest powers would have 2 votes each, and the 2 lesser powers 1 vote each, or a total of 8 out of 10. Only 2 seats would remain to be rotated among over 50 small powers, as compared with 6 seats to be rotated among them under the present Security Council. And the arms production of the world would be divided among the nations in the same proportion. I do not see how any state other than the three greatest powers could possibly accept this plan.
On the other hand, the American Association for the United Nations believes that the United Nations Charter has much greater capacity for growth than has yet been realized. The American Association for the United Nations favors a considerable strengthening of the United Nations by the following means: A more loyal fulfillment of their obligations on the part of the governments; and additions to the United Nations in the form of new bodies and multilateral conventions to implement the Charter.
A major obstacle to the success of the United Nations today is that a number of nations, including the United States, have not made that fundamental change in national behavior to make the United Nations the foundation of their foreign policy rather than an instrument of their foreign policy. At times the American Government has used the United Nations as though it were the foundation of its foreign policy; at other times it has bypassed the United Nations, or has used it as an instrument of short-sighted policy. It interpreted
the Charter liberally when urging the Security Council to take responsibility for Trieste; it interpreted the Charter narrowly when it wished to reduce the responsibility of the Security Council in Palestine. It is with the greatest reluctance that I assert that the vacillation of the United States in the Palestine crisis has done more harm to the United Nations than any single veto cast by the Soviet Union.
Indeed, while fully recognizing the harm that the veto has done the United Nations we must recognize that it is not solely responsible for certain failures of the United Nations.
I could interpose that the veto has been used in a surprisingly narrow class of cases. No veto prevented the nations from working out the Marshall plan through the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe. No veto has been involved in the Palestine question, in which the United States and the Soviet Union were originally agreed on the solution of that unhappy problem.
Is there a means by which the security potentialities of the United Nations can be increased without losing any members and without undertaking the immediately impossible task of revising the Charter? Is there a way in which the United States may give necessary military guaranties within the Charter, and consequently avoid the dangerous temptation of outside military alliances?
The association has sought diligently for such an answer. We believe that we have it in a suggested draft treaty based upon article 51 which recognizes the right of individual or collective self-defense if the Security Council is not performing its duties. This article is permissive. We propose to make it positive through the United States proposing a multilateral treaty open to all members of the United Nations. In case of aggression and in the absence of action by the Security Council, the signatories would call for a special assembly and if requested to do so by the normal two-thirds vote of this body they would immediately go to the aid of the nation attacked.
Should the danger require automatic action, as is frequently the case in self-defense, the signatories would nevertheless call a special assembly and report to it and ask for its approval.
Each signatory would earmark certain armed forces and facilities for use of action in such a situation.
Such a treaty would have the following advantages: 1. It would provide a way around the veto.
2. It would keep the United Nations membership intact. Nonsignatories would no more be excluded from the United Nations than were those nations excluded who did not participate in the little assembly.
3. It would be a way in which the United States could make military guaranties within the framework of the Charter and enforceable with the authority of two-thirds of the members of the United Nations, rather than signing military alliances outside of the United Nations as is being advocated in some quarters.
4. It would provide for armed contingents for use as an international police force, as is envisaged under article 43, without having to wait until the Military Staff Committee has worked out a seemingly impossible system of ratios.
I want to make it clear that we are not advocating a united nations within the United Nations. We are not advocating a federation