« ПредыдущаяПродолжить »
posal that no matter how much we hate each other, the peoples of the world ought to agree on the principle that there is no victory in a universal graveyard and there are other ways of carrying on a conflict besides mass murder.
Stalin's refusal of our proposal might not be permanent. The Soviet dictatorship before this has changed its mind on important questions. It cannot be altogether unmindful of public opinion. It could not possibly exploit among its own people our honest proposal for ending the armament race as it exploits our intervention in Turkey across the mountains from its oil fields, or as it would exploit those military alliances which apparently are Secretary Marshall's substitutes for disarmament. Ideas march on. No iron curtain is impenetrable and no particular dictator is immortal.
A genuine proposal of effective disarmament would change for the better world opinion concerning the United States. Partly as a result of our own blunders and the shortcomings of our democracy, especially in the field of race relations; partly as a result of unscrupulous and effective Communist propaganda, the reservoirs of good will for America in Asia and much of Africa are running low. An honest proposal for universal disarmament; the end of a competition that imposes poverty on masses of men and threatens our civilization, if not our race, with extinction, would help to restore good will for America. Victory of the idea might be delayed; it would not be postponed forever once the peoples of the world are aroused out of the nightmare of their fatalistic fears.
There is a general assumption that the answer to Communist aggression requires some kind of league for security. If that is so, what better basis is there for such a league than general agreement by the nations comprising it that their goal is peace and universal disarmament, that the league they set up is not for military aggrandizement but for common defense against aggression? Surely that is a far better basis than American military support to an indefinite number of regional associations, all of them frantically arming in a neverending search for an impossible balance of arms. The moral as well as the physical power of a league built on this clear basis of defense and eager aspiration for the end of the armament race would do more to deter the realistic Russian rulers than any other form of alliance.
I am not opposed to regional alliances. I have long favored a United States of Europe. I am, however, opposed to the idea that you can solve this problem as Walter Lippmann seems to suggest, by some kind of natural, geographic division of the world. The main fact about communism—and I speak from the long experience of a Socialist–is not that it is Russian; it is that it is Communist. The drive is for world and not regional power and the effort to check that power ought to be primarily in terms of ideology. It ought to be in terms of proposals that appeal to all peoples everywhere. It is perfectly consistent to favor, for legitimate purposes, regional associations, and yet to say that the basis of any security league should be the attitude of nations to a proposal for international universal disarmament under effective international control.
It is in this spirit and with these qualifications and explanations that I commend Resolution No. 163. The ultimate guaranties of an abiding peace will go beyond the Judd resolution. But the passage of that
resolution might well be the first step on the road to peace with security for all nations, great and small.
Chairman EATON. Thank you.
Mr. VORYS. Mr. Thomas, you as well as many other witnesses, have brilliantly stated the question before this committee, but I wonder whether the answers you proposed do not beg the question.
For instance, you criticized very vigorously Secretary Marshall's words as follows:
Steps necessary to bring the National Military Establishment to the minimum level to restore the balance of power relations required for international security.
Those words spell death and only death for all our hopes of peace and the salvation of our civilization. In my judgment, that is precisely the approach of Resolution 163 by its system of a demand for a 10-man security council rather than one of 12; a shift in the balance of power there, and its proposal for an arbitrary division of the balance of military power.
Now, I am like the man who wrote you about this resolution. It is based on balance of power and a balance which strikes me as not particularly more effective or just than the one we have now.
What would you say is the difference between the ABC proposal to shift the balance of power, to restore the balance of power relations required for international securitythat is in the Judd resolution—and General Marshall's proposalTo bring the National Military Establishment to the minimum level to restore the balance of power.
What is the difference between General Marshall's statement and yours? Literally, General Marshall describes the proposal of resolution 163.
Mr. THOMAS. I was opposing the process now being followed by the administration, of the unilateral increase of power without discussion of the possibility of universal disarmament. That cannot be sanctified as strengthening the UN.
Mr. Vorys. I happen to agree entirely with you, that universal and not unilateral disarmament is the key and that conscription must be abolished as well as the atomic bomb or we will merely have oldfashioned war instead of new-flangled war.
There have been steps taken toward disarmament.
Mr. THOMAS. But not in the light of Secretary Marshall's testimony, which I would like to discuss as I saw it.
You will notice that in my testimony, I have expressly said that I favored the resolution, but not as an 'ultimatum. I think it is a reasonable proposal which could be expounded to the nations of the world; in the light first of the aspiration for a better world and second of realities of power. I think both are very carefully considered and I think they could be explained on a far more rational basis than any unilateral attempt of America to redress balance of power by the increase of its own armaments in competition with others. That is the enormous difference. Also you will remember that Secretary Marshall in taking this position opposed the limitations of veto power, which put us
really on a moral level with the Soviet in its attitude to our international control of the atomic energy.
The difference as I see it is the difference between saying, “Listen, peoples of the world, we know what kind of a world we live in and we know we cannot get perfection at once, but we are now saying that our goal is the end of a burden of arms so grievous that people who can give bread to their children are buying bombs. "It is our only pattern of safety, there is no hope the other way.
“We believe that the imperfect machinery of the United Nations could be made efficient for international security. In order to do it, we suggest these changes in the voting structure and this rather logical system of the composition of a security force, carefully worked out so that no commander of an inte national force can easily run berserk, so that no nation will feel it is stripped of all possible defense. It is this arrangement that we want to argue.
The opposite, as far as the administration has made clear is simply our going ahead, our building up our forces, our making our own individual commitments as we see best, and I think that is a road of enormous danger. I, who say that, am no appeaser, as you well know, of Russia.
Chairman EATON. Mr. Gordon.
Mr. COLMER. While you do not regard this resolution as satisfactory, complete, or perfect, you do feel it is a movement in the right direction!
Mr. THOMAS. Yes, Mr. Congressman. Thank you for putting it that way. The reason I do not regard the resolution as satisfactory or perfect is largely because of the imperfections of the world which the authors of the resolution did not make.
As I see the resolution, it is an honest attempt to take account of very great difficulties and to take the next possible forward step. If somebody can show me a better way to take account of those difficulties, I will be interested for I realize that there are objections. What I object to is that so far in and out of this hearing I have heard no alternative. There is no humble person in any distant part of America who believes there is a reasonable hope for peace in the United Nations as it is now going. Or in the United Nations, plus the armament race to which we are contributing.
Mr. COLMER. Thank you for putting it that way, because that pretty well sums up my views.
We know that after 2 years of attempting to deal with Soviet Russia, we have gotten no place. It is an obstruction, it is a hurdle, there is always something wrong from their point of view. Now if we take this action, we at least have taken the lead away
from them and carry the ball for a moment anyway.
Unless they can offer something themselves of a definite, concrete nature, it seems to me that they are left holding the bag, so to speak.
Mr. THOMAS. May I add, I think that is far more important than some of our newspaper writers seem to believe. The people of America, if anything, are more puzzled than may be realized here in Washington. It is not necessary merely to do more or less right, it is necessary to be obvious about it and to persuade other people that we are doing the right thing. We must take the initiative away from the Soviet as the friend of the distressed. This is our outstanding opportunity to do it and we can do it in the right way. Failure to do it will be bad for us. One of the men whom I trust most and who has lived in Russia during the war tells me that we greatly underestimate the weight, even in a dictatorship, of silent objection. If Stalin has things that he can publicize to his own people to our disadvantage, he gets much better support than when he cannot publicize things to hurt us.
If we would say, "People of Russia, we want nothing but an end of the armament race," sooner than we think, even the dictator—if not Stalin, his successor—may have to pay some involuntary heed to that position.
Mr. COLMER. Thank you very much.
Mr. LODGE. Mr. Thomas, I am in great sympathy with many of the preoccupations and aspirations so eloquently expressed by both Miss Thompson and you. I think the question is for us one of implementation. By what method are we going to resolve these preoccupations and lead the world toward a fulfillment of these aspirations?
At the top of page 5 you say [reading]: Soviet Russia could not possibly exploit among its own people our honest proposal for ending the armament race
and so on.
I believe they have exploited our honest attempt under the European recovery program. I wonder if you are not too optimistic when you make that statement.
Mr. Thomas. To a certain extent I think they have exploited an honest proposal—with extraordinary help from some Americans, I may say in that connection, the misunderstanding being very extensive here. But ERP does involve elements of possible American imperialism which are not involved in so clear-cut a proposal as the comprehensive type of disarmament down to a police force level which I have been discussing.
I speak with some knowledge of trying to speak to American audiences. I never had a chance in Russia. If I had a guaranty of my life, I would like to take a chance. I know it is much harder to explain even the European recovery plan than it is to explain a proposal for ending an armament race, the continuance of which is costing the Russians very much and that is costing us very much.
I think with all due respect to the statesman the successful party selects he will have hard work in proving that he can do much about houses and homes and hospitals, if we are going to run up the military expenditure as fast as now seems to be inevitable if this armament race goes on.
We must challenge the world with that and I think the people will listen better to that than to some other things.
Mr. LODGE. You also said that the main point is the “ideology of communism."
That to me, was an interesting statement. I do not underestimate the significance of the ideology but it seems to me Poland was taken not because of the contagion of the Communist ideology. All of the countries behind the iron curtain were captured because of internal forces with external pressure, and not because the ideology took hold.
It seems to me that that is a very significant point. Would you care to comment on that?
Mr. THOMAS. Yes. I thank you for a chance to explain myself.
When I said that the important thing about communism was its ideology, I did not mean that Poland had been captured by Communist ideology. I mean that in judging communism, it is a great mistake to exalt the imperialism of Russia as the Russian nature. The outstanding passion of communism is for world dominion of communism, and that is an ideology that works throughout the whole world. The actual capture of Poland was made possible by military considerations; by our own Government's action and failure to act; and by geography. That I fully admit.
I will point out, however, that important as has been the existence of the Red army, the great advances of communism have not involved the direct use of the Red army in the Balkans and Czechoslovakia. My point is that basically we are dealing with an ideology that is indeed backed up by great force. That to undermine that ideology in South America, Asia, and Africa, we have to have a better ideology and prove it. Part of our American proof should be our offer of an ideology embodied in a practical plan that minimizes the terror and lessens tremendously the present exhausting pressure of an armament race upon the humblest peasants of the world.
Mr. LODGE. Thank you very much, Mr. Thomas.
STATEMENT OF CLARK M. EICHELBERGER, DIRECTOR, AMERICAN
ASSOCIATION FOR THE UNITED NATIONS
Chairman EATON. The next witness will be Mr. Clark M. Eichelberger. I will ask Mr. Eichelberger to take the stand.
Mr. EICHELBERGER. I am the director of the American Association for the United Nations.
Our association, as a rule, does not concern itself with legislative matters, confining itself to an education program, but your resolutions have so much bearing on the United Nations, that I appreciate very much this opportunity to appear and present my views.
In advancing a procedure for strengthening the United Nations without Charter revision, I face with great reluctance the task of disagreeing with those Congressmen and those witnesses whose sole purpose in supporting textual revision of the Charter is to have a stronger United Nations. It is not easy to argue with men going in the same general direction.
The fundamental question before this committee today is, How can the United Nations become a more effective means for world security? There are two suggestions before us: One involves a textual revision of the Charter. The other a strengthening of the United Nations by use, interpretation, and addition.
I want to develop the latter thesis as the only way to proceed at this time. And in so doing, I am going to present on behalf of our asso